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Abstract 
This dissertation scrutinises two related claims that were particularly 
heightened in 2009 as the European Union (EU) was celebrating the first 
tenth anniversary of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the 
implementing arm of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). First, 
the two policy frameworks allegedly embodied sufficient added value for 
bettering EU intervention for human protection purposes in third places. 
Second, the ESDP supposedly enabled the EU to make a difference in its 
response to two bloody wars that broke out in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DR Congo) successively in 1996 and 1998. This thesis argues that 
the alleged added value and difference have been overstated at best. While 
various studies have taken a similar position, they have important 
shortcomings for at least four reasons: lack of a comprehensive account of 
the CFSP motives, capacities,  and response; exclusive focus on civil and 
military operations; focus on the post-Second Congo War period; and a lack 
of conceptual clarity regarding two key terms – ‘conflict resolution’ and 
‘peacebuilding’. This thesis goes beyond generalisation and undertakes a 
forensic examination of the CFSP statements, decisions, and actions 
precisely through the lens of Conflict Resolution (CR): a specific subject area 
of study with its own normative, theoretical, and practical advantages and 
shortcomings; and with a more comprehensive and indeed seminal 
conceptualisation of peacebuilding. The outcome is a far more nuanced 
assessment of failure and success of the EU’s peace endeavours in this 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the EU foreign policy is to replace the law of 
force with the force of law. (Solana 2009a: 4).  
The author of the opening quote is Mr. Javier Solana, once Secretary 
General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO, 1995-1999) and, 
for the purpose of this research, the first High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union 
(EU) from 1999 until 2009. By “EU foreign policy”, he meant the CFSP that 
was introduced under the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). In the 
declaration on the entry of the TEU into force on 1 November 1993, the 
European Council, the highest political body of the EU, stated that the aim of 
the CFSP was “to enable the Union to speak with a single voice and to act 
effectively in the service of its interests and those of the international 
community in general.” (European Parliament 2002; added underlining). 
Article 11(1) of the TEU (Title V) outlined the specific objectives of the CFSP 
as being the following:  
 To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence 
and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter; 
 To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;  
 To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles 
of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including 
those on external borders;  
 To promote international co-operation; and  
 To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Though the 1993-TEU version was amended twice in 1997 and 2001 (I offer 
details in the section “History and development of the CFSP and ESDP: 
1993-2009” of the fourth chapter of this thesis), these objectives were not 
substantially changed until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) 
on the 1st of December 2009: the end-date of the period under review (see 
the section “Research Timeline” of this chapter for more details). Hence, 
unless otherwise specified, ‘Treaty on European Union’ or ‘TEU’ hereinafter 
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refers to the consolidated version of 2002, following the amendments agreed 
by the European Summit on 26 February 2001 in Nice (France). At the time 
of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Solana recalled that the EU 
needed “a foreign policy which [was] common and elements of security which 
[were] linked to ESDP” (added underlining) in order to actually “be an 
important player” in a more and more globalised world that constantly 
challenged EU’s “values and interests” (Solana 2009b). He indicated that the 
noted challenges manifested themselves in the form of “abuse of human 
rights, flows of migrants escaping conflict and failed states, disputes over 
natural resources, or terrorism.” For EU leaders, most of these challenges 
were generated beyond EU’s borders and an EU foreign policy was needed 
because no country in Europe could cope with them on its own (Solana 
2009a: 4). For France,  
Compared to the EPC, the CFSP was a significant step forward on at least three 
points: first, it cover[d] all areas of foreign and security policy, including ‘the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy’; secondly, it require[d] Member 
States to ‘ensure that their national policies [were] consistent with common 
positions’; and finally, it create[d] a new legal instrument, Joint Action, which 
allow[d] the EU’s financial resources to be mobilised. (Representation of France to 
the EU 2008: 6).  
The first High Representative for the CFSP made the opening statement of 
this dissertation when the EU was celebrating the first 10th anniversary of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The European Council 
formally established the ESDP at its meeting in Helsinki (Finland) on 10-11 
December 1999 and upgraded it to Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) under the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. In accordance with Treaty 
provisions (TEU, Title V, art. 17), the ESDP was incepted as the operational 
backbone of the CFSP in order “to develop the capacity of the EU for 
autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises” when and where NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation] as a whole would not be involved. In the words of Solana, the 
decisions taken at Helsinki, also known as Helsinki Commitments, reflected 
a “new international morality” that warranted humanitarian intervention for 
human protection purposes: 
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Too often in the past, whether in Bosnia, in the Great Lakes, or in Kosovo, the 
European Union seemed unable to protect and enhance the values that are at the 
core of European integration. And too often, the generous humanitarian relief 
financed by the EU throughout the world has been looked at as an alibi, as a 
collective feel-good factor for political inaction. […] The commitments taken in 
Helsinki will ensure that this is no longer the case. And that the EU can develop a 
common foreign policy which is credible and respected as such - in primis, by our 
own citizens, by the people. (Solana 2000: 6). 
Concretely, the European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 
agreed five main milestones. First, they committed themselves to cooperate 
voluntarily in EU-led operations and be able by 2003 to deploy within 60 days 
and sustain for at least one-year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 
persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking. Second, they agreed to establish new 
political and military bodies and structures within the Council to enable the 
EU to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such 
operations, while respecting the single institutional framework. Third, they 
undertook to develop modalities for full consultation, cooperation and 
transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all 
EU Member States. Fourth, they agreed to define appropriate arrangements 
that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, 
non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute 
to EU military crisis management. Fifth and finally, Member Sates committed 
themselves to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism that 
would allow to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means 
and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the EU and 
its Member States. 
From then onwards, the EU rapidly developed military and civilian capacities 
and capabilities to the extent that two years later only (2001), the ESDP was 
declared operational. In 2003, the EU adopted its first Security Strategy: “A 
Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy (ESS) (Council 
of the European Union (Council) (2003b). By means of that Strategy, the 
Union aimed to reaffirm its “common determination to face its responsibility 
for guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world” and further strengthen its 
capacity “to better deal with the threats and global challenges and realise the 
opportunities facing [it].” (European Council 2003c: 22, para. 85). In the 
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course of that same year, the Union conducted its first field operations under 
the ESDP, including the military operation Artemis in the DR Congo. By 
2007, the EU had at its disposal 15-battle groups whose tasks on the ground 
included the aforementioned Petersberg tasks and those outlined in the ESS 
such as disarmament, counter terrorism, security sector reform, and 
support to third parties. At the same time, the Union counted on over 1.6 
million EU civilian personnel who were reportedly specialised “in the four 
priority areas of civilian action […]: police; strengthening the rule of law; 
strengthening civilian administration and civil protection.” (Council 
2009c: 2). 
Success Stories 
At the time of the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the ESDP, the EU had 
undertaken, through the ESDP, over twenty civil-military operations around 
the world in response to violent crises and conflicts. EU authorities made a 
very positive evaluation of these achievements in these terms: 
We can be justly proud of our success. Who could have foreseen, in 1999, that in 
the course of the next ten years we would deploy 22 civilian and military 
operations, spanning three continents? Since the Franco-British Summit at St Malo 
and the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, when the ESDP was born, the 
development of our crisis-management capacity has made the EU a global 
provider of security. […] Ten years ago, ESDP was an aspiration; now it is a reality 
on the ground, with crisis-management operations making a real difference to 
people’s lives across the world. We have demonstrated repeatedly that we can 
respond rapidly to a crisis and operate in the most inhospitable of terrains. Through 
the ESDP, the European Union is making an effective contribution to international 
peace and security. Until a decade ago, EU foreign policy consisted of making 
declarations. Since then, we have been steadily building up our capacity to take 
action in crisis zones in order to help people. (Solana 2009c: 8). 
That same year, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 
published a multi-authored volume on the same topic with the following 
conclusion: 
Ten years after its formal launch in June 1999, ESDP has established itself as a 
key component of the EU’s external projection and international profile. It has 
provided tangible added value through many of the 20-plus military and civilian 
operations deployed in the last six years. It has channelled and fostered 
cooperation between EU Member States in the sensitive domains of security and 
defence. It has helped generate an original, comprehensive strategic approach to 
crisis management, and it has set in place some of the tools to implement it. ESDP 
is a success story, not least when one considers that it was born and developed in 
turbulent times, and at a time of profound change for the EU itself. (Grevi et al. 
2009: 403; added emphasis). 
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One of the reported testaments of that success story is the allegedly decisive 
contribution of the ESDP to the EU response to two wars that broke out in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) successfully in 1996 and 1998. 
The DR Congo lies at the heart of the Africa’s Great Lakes Region where 
precisely in 1994 the international community failed to prevent and halt 
genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. On the eve of the abovementioned 
celebration, a former Special Adviser for Africa to the CFSP High 
Representative (2005-2009), Mr. Belliard, was asked about the contribution 
to peace and security in Africa that the ESDP had made so far. His response 
was the following: 
In Africa, I am convinced that the European Union has helped make a difference 
[...]. The most complete example, I believe, is the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). The European Union has committed itself there in a stubborn manner: two 
military operations, one in Ituri (Bunia), the other in Kinshasa enabled, each time at 
the request of the United Nations, to put the peace process on track. This work 
was complemented by the launch of two missions (EUSEC, EUPOL), the objective 
of which is to contribute to reform the security forces (Army, police). This work has 
not been in vain. With limited resources: military operations were limited in time 
and in their size (nothing to compare to what the EU has done in the Balkans), the 
two missions EUSEC and EUPOL are not costly at all, the EU has helped stabilize 
a vast country, ravaged by conflict. (Belliard 2009: 54-55). 
Belliard went on to offer an overview of other operations and missions (in 
Darfur, Chad, Central African Republic, and Somalia) that in his view had 
enabled the EU to make a difference in general:  
DRC, Darfur, Somalia: the EU intervenes in the most dangerous places in Africa, 
the only places where, actually, people are still fighting each other. It never 
intervenes lightly, and, upon arrival, makes a difference. The European Union - it 
must be said - makes a difference in Africa. The balance of the European Union in 
Africa is positive and this is why we must continue to mobilize ourselves for this 
continent, which is so close to us. (Belliard 2009: 55; added emphasis). 
Two years to the celebration, I interviewed a senior diplomat at the CFSP 
who too underscored the contribution of the ESDP to the EU response to 
violent conflicts in Africa, in general, and in the DR Congo, in particular. 
When I pointed out that some critics could not see the real difference 
between the CFSP and its predecessor European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) because the CFSP, like the EPC, had resorted more to non-legally 
binding instruments, in particular Declarations, he strongly rejected such 
comparison: 
Forget Statements, Declarations [...]...I don't think it's a good indicator for CFSP all 
you mention there. Of course Declarations are very important, but it's a very small 
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part. Look at what is happening in the field. Look at what is happening in Africa. On 
two occasions Europe has sent troops to Congo to be sure the process remains on 
the track. Can you imagine? For the EU 4 or 5 years ago, this was not conceivable 
that we would send troops to Congo. Half of the Member States do hardly know 
where Congo is and certainly don't know where Ituri is. But in 2003 the EU, all 
Member States decided: "Yes, it's good to send troops to Ituri", and they were 
looking where [on the map] it was. Two years or three years later, we said again: 
"It's good to send troops to Kinshasa because we have to preserve the electoral 
process." In the meantime, we have spent five hundreds millions dollars to finance 
the elections in Congo. And this was financed 80% by the EU, Community, and 
Member States. That is where the EU Policy is. That's the test for the EU Policy [...] 
We have been, for the Great Lakes [Region of Africa], almost 80% financing the 
electoral process, government, it's the EU. And on two occasions we sent troops, 
now we have 70 military and policemen on the spot, we have two security sector 
reforms there, military and police; we're trying to support the reform of the 
Congolese security services: army and police. So, that’s where you see whether 
we are useful and really giving an added value. Another example is Sudan. Of 
course, our support has been again financial support that is largely coming from 
the EU, Member States, and Commission altogether. We are very active in the 
peace process there. (Head of Unit at the Council of the EU 2007, interview, 3 
October). 
Another EU’s senior official underlined that, actually, the Union had carried 
out more missions in Africa than in any other part of the world during that first 
decade of the ESDP (Head of Unit at the European Commission 2008, 
interview, 20 May). Likewise, two Swedish representatives to the EU told me 
that, “on the whole really, there ha[d] been a lot of focus in terms of EDSP 
instruments in Africa.” (Anonymous 2008, interview, 19 May). They reminded 
me that the first mission of the EU outside Europe had been in Africa, 
precisely in the DR Congo (operation Artemis). In total, the EU undertook 
five ESDP missions in that country between 2003 and 2009.  
Apart from EU officials and Member States diplomats, various academics too 
have sustained in varying degrees this narrative of success (Dobbins et al. 
2008; Clément 2009; Helly 2009; Major 2009; Rodt 2009; Vircoulon 2009; 
Martin 2010). For instance, in 2008 about ten researchers at the non-profit 
research organisation RAND Corporation concluded their investigation into 
Europe’s role in nation-building from the Balkans to the Congo as follows: 
In the late 1990s, the DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] was in an anarchic, 
Hobbesian state of war. The challenges to nation-building were great. Yet by 2006, 
the DRC held democratic elections and appeared, albeit tentatively, on course 
toward greater stability. The case of the DRC is also important for understanding 
Europe’s developing nation-building capacities. The country has been a major 
focus for Europe and a proving ground for an evolving European policy. The EU 
has conducted two military missions under the ESDP in the DRC and has spent 
more on statebuilding there than anywhere else outside Europe. Europe’s 
experience in the DRC has, in turn, had a major influence on the evolution of the 
ESDP, encouraging the development of EU battle groups and the introduction of 
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new financing mechanisms while pointing up some of the problems inherent in 
coordinating nation-building within the EU itself. (Dobbins et al. 2008: 133). 
Statement of the problem 
As it transpires from the foregoing, EU authorities and some academics 
sustain that the CFSP and its operational spine ESDP have an in-built added 
value that has enabled the Union to improve its response to violent conflicts 
in third places like the DR Congo. The inception of the CFSP was positively 
received because it allegedly entailed the long awaited “common stance” and 
“joint action” by Member States in all areas of foreign and security policy of 
their Union (Tonra 2000; Habermas and Derrida 2003; Reynolds 2004; Wong 
2005). For EU authorities and some scholars, the ESDP was a success 
because it provided the EU with the reportedly long missing operational 
means for strengthening its world status and adequately dealing with violent 
conflicts (Stavridis 2001; Petiteville 2003). This dissertation argues that the 
allegedly in-built added value of the CFSP and ESDP and the difference 
they have reportedly enabled the Union to make in its response to the 
two Congo Wars are at best overplayed. First, the EU Member States 
purposely made the CFSP inherently intermittent and much less common 
than claimed and desired. By Treaty provisions (TEU, Title V, arts. 11, 12, 
14, 16, 17), the CFSP could wield real supranational competences only and 
when Member States would so decide. Indeed, ‘Common foreign policy’ is 
different from ‘single foreign policy’ that usually pertains to individual 
sovereign nation-states. This means that in practice, there could be a 
‘common foreign policy’ and the means required to implement it, only when 
and where EU Member States would so decide through constant dialogue 
and discussions. Under such a condition, reaching a common foreign policy 
could result in an endless and painstaking process and an end in itself than a 
permanently granted starting point; especially as important decisions and 
actions under the CFSP required unanimity of all involved. In this regard, the 
reaction of the CFSP to the 1994-genocide in Rwanda is a case in point. As 
Samyn (1997: 1) recalls,  
The Rwandan crisis clearly revealed the difficulties involved in developing a 
common position and a joint action. Some Member States [of the EU] (Belgium, 
namely) pushed for the withdrawal of the operation of the United Nations (UN) 
rather than requiring an adjustment of the mandate of UNAMIR [United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda] jointly or to engage in a joint action within the 
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Western European Union (WEU) to change the dramatic course of events. The 
French unilateral action, Operation Turquoise, received a UN mandate, but was 
never discussed in the context of the CFSP. This failure of the EU to establish 
sufficient preventive action is the most surprising having regard to the position of 
some Member States: Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany were very involved 
in the Great Lakes region both historically and recently during the period before the 
Arusha Accords. France and other Member States have, unequivocally, pursued 
their national interests at the expense of a common EU approach. 
Second, and most importantly, “common stance”, “joint action”, and 
operational capacities do not necessarily entail better decisions and actions 
in favour of the victims of violent conflicts, unless such decisions and actions 
are tailored to the needs of the announced beneficiaries. Such decisions and 
actions must also be timely, sufficient, multi-levelled, and multi-functional not 
only after the formal end of armed confrontation, but also before the outbreak 
of violence and during its escalation, as Conflict Resolution (CR) prescribes. 
In view of the ambiguity over the issue-areas of the CFSP and the limitation 
of the scope of the ESDP to some aspects of crisis management (the 
aforementioned Petersburg Tasks), their potential for enabling solutions that 
are need-tailored, timely, sufficient, multi-level, and multi-functional in violent 
conflict situations was inherently limited. Third, under the TEU provisions, 
ESDP field operations required prior authorisation of the United Nations (UN) 
and or by the authorities of the target country. As the foregoing quote from 
Samyn (1997) indicates, the UN Security Council, two members (France and 
United Kingdom) of whom were EU Member States, denied such 
authorisation to the commander of its peacekeeping troops in Rwanda at the 
height of the 1994 genocide in that country because of the opposition of 
some of its members. Fourth, the CFSP was and remains inherently 
Eurocentric and self-interested because its stated primary purpose was and 
still is “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, and 
independence of the Union”. Arguably, less often than not could those values 
and interests coincide with those of third countries and regions in desperate 
need of assistance under the CFSP. In this sense, it might be regarded, 
unsurprisingly, as part of the project of Liberal Peacebuilding. Fifth, the 
difference allegedly made in the DR Congo is at best overvalued in view of 
the reality on the ground. Indeed, the CFSP response to the human suffering 
in that country was insufficient and often came too late. In 2009, precisely 
when the EU authorities and some academics were underscoring that 
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success, the “flow of internally displaced persons (IDPs) […] had reached 
half a million in North Kivu, and almost as many (419,000) in South Kivu.” 
(Lemarchand 2012: 226). As Lemarchand poignantly points out, the 
acronyms IDPs is  
emblematic of many such aseptic renderings of human tragedies, which tend to 
obscure their magnitude and downplay their cruelty. The searing experience of 
displacement and dislocation, the destruction of homes and property, the fear and 
despair etched on people’s faces, their seemingly endless march to nowhere, such 
as are the grim realities encapsulated in “IDP”. There are many variations on this 
theme ─ such as the use of the neutral term “closure” to refer to the systematic 
destruction of refugee camps, in 1996-97, the indiscriminate shootings of civilians, 
their flight into the forest, and the ensuing manhunt. The result, invariably, is to 
conceal the unsettling realities of war in eastern Congo. (2012: 226). 
Moreover, “According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC) the death 
toll in the DRC [DR Congo] between 1998 and 2008 was estimated at nearly 
5.4 million.” (Lemarchand 2012: 213). According to the same humanitarian 
organisation, 3.3 million of these victims perished between 1998 and 2003 
(Gegout 2005: 447). Lemarchand (2012: 213) notes that although the 5.4 
million figure was later “revised downward, it is probably a fairly conservative 
estimate if one adds the human losses in Rwanda and Burundi since 1993”. 
In 2007, the national mortality rate in the DR Congo was almost 60% higher 
than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (International Rescue Committee 
2007). In August 2010, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR) published a mapping report, known as ‘UN Mapping 
Report 2010’, in which it documented the commission of mass atrocity crimes 
in the DR Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 because of the violent 
conflicts that befell that country in the course of that period. The authors of 
the report indicated that some of those crimes “could be classified as crimes 
of genocide [...] if they were proven before a competent court” (Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2010: 281, para. 515). 
 
While other studies have already challenged the claimed added value of 
the CFSP and ESDP and the difference they have reportedly enabled 
the EU to make in the DR Congo, they present important shortcomings 
that this dissertation undertakes to remedy. Regarding the alleged unique 
value embodied in the CFSP and ESDP, various analysts in fact find it 
exaggerated at best and counterproductive at worst. For some, the CFSP is 
indeed less common than alleged because of its intergovernmental 
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decision-making principle by which Member States individually or collectively 
resort to it only when they cannot achieve their foreign policy objectives on 
their own or in coalition. It is therefore misleading to speak of “common 
policy” (Wessel 1999; Knodt and Princen 2003; Wagner 2003; Mahncke 
2004). Others see the CFSP as a process of either Europeanisation of 
national foreign policies (Allen 1998; Tonra 2000; Reynolds 2005) or policy 
convergence by which decisions and actions at the national level and 
initiatives at the EU level continuously outsource each other (Wong 2005). 
For her part, Hazel Smith unreservedly advances that the EU can and does 
in fact have a foreign policy like that of a sovereign nation-state because in 
practice it behaves as a sovereign actor on the international scene (Smith H. 
2002). In this respect, she equates the European Council with a central 
government of a sovereign nation-state like the United States of America 
(USA). As I establish in detail in the chapter on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the CFSP, this research sides more with the policy 
convergence view and refutes the position of Hazel Smith. I show that having 
a central, supreme authority is indispensable for effective policymaking, and 
that the European Council does not compare to such authority for the foreign 
and security policy of the EU. On the other hand, the most interesting debate 
on the ESDP and its military component in particular opposes two groups of 
analysts. On the one hand, there are those who hold that the ESDP came 
quite late but precisely when the EU most needed it in order to be able, at 
last, to perform as true force for a global common good (Stavridis 2001; 
Petiteville 2003). On the other, we have academics who contend that its 
inception rather meant the death of such a force (Smith K. 2000, 2005). In 
the chapter on the potential and shortcomings of and CFSP, I argue at length 
that the former fail to demonstrate whether the EU failed to perform as a true 
force for a global common good in the cases they cite (Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, Congo, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Iraq, Serbia, Sudan) because its 
non-military assets were insufficient or inadequate. Nor do they establish 
whether international actors with military capabilities performed more and 
better in those same cases. Likewise, academics for whom the introduction 
of the ESDP meant the death of the EU as a true force for a global common 
good fail to validate whether the European Communities (EC’s), first, and the 
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EU, second, did actually perform at all or did perform more and better as a 
real ‘global good Samaritan’ (Brysk 2009) before the inception of the ESDP. 
Arguably, Development Aid ─ the oldest, classic, and most known non-
military instrument of the EC’s/EU assistance to third world countries ─ failed 
to yield the expected results in most of the 79 countries integrating the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group (David 2000; Babarinde and 
Faber 2004). In many of them, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
development aid partly caused or exacerbated violent conflicts (Adedeji 
1999). As I further develop, the main shortcoming in the debate on the 
relevance and potential of the CFSP and its operational spine ESDP is that 
the focus on common stance, centrality of decision making, joint action, 
autonomous operational means obscures the imperative to establish 
normative, theoretical, political, and practical conditions under which the two 
can enable the EU to be what Aggestam (2008: 1)  terms “a ‘power for good’ 
and a ‘peacebuilder’ in the world.” In humanitarian terms, common stance, 
centrality of policy and decision-making, and autonomous operational means, 
particularly military ones, do not inherently entail more and better behaviour 
in international politics. Nor does their absence or insufficiency necessarily 
entail the opposite. This dissertation attempts to show that a Conflict 
Resolution approach has more advantages for establishing such conditions 
and evaluating their fulfilment. Concerning the claimed difference that the 
CFSP / ESDP enabled the EU to make in the war-afflicted DR Congo, 
various studies, too, consider such difference at best partial and at worst 
inexistent because, as I argue, the reportedly decisive response was often 
inadequate, insufficient, and too late. Unlike much of the literature on the 
theme and case study, this thesis sustains that various determinants, instead 
of a single one, altogether underpinned these shortcomings. They include the 
primacy of self-interests and values of the EU (Eurocentrism) and or its 
Member States (Gegout 2005; Froitzheim, Söderbaum, and Taylor 2011); the 
lack of clear benchmarks and solid experience in hard foreign and security 
matters (Ajello and Richard 2000); and the diktat of global culture (Paris 
2003) or the politics of frames that makes local conflict resolution appear 
irrelevant and illegitimate (Autesserre 2009). They also include the subsidiary 
role of the CFSP; the non-exclusive competence status of the CFSP and its 
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voting unanimity principle; the conceptual and legal insulation, from the start, 
of the CFSP as a standalone pillar from the rest of EU external policies; the 
Somalia syndrome; the guilt complex from the Rwandan genocide. Overall, 
the literature on the CFSP and ESDP and their response to the two Congo 
Wars present various shortcomings that this research attempts to address. 
First, no study has offered a comprehensive account of the CFSP decisions 
and actions regarding the DR Congo throughout the period prior to the 
‘success celebration’ date (2009). Some of the studies have treated the 
CFSP/ESDP performance in that country in the wider context of the external 
policies of the EU and its Member States (Youngs 2004; Froitzheim, 
Söderbaum, and Taylor 2011); while others have focused on one or a few 
undertakings, in particular ESDP field operations (Bagayoko 2004; Gegout 
2005; Ajello 2010; Martin 2010; Rodt 2011a, 2011b). Others analyses have 
indirectly addressed the response of the EU to violent conflicts in the DR 
Congo in the context of international peace efforts in that country and the 
whole Africa’s Great Lakes Region (Vircoulon 2005; Daley 2006; Autesserre 
2009; Lemarchand 2012). Certainly, the broad scope of these studies has 
permitted to uncover and validate various reasons of the failure or limited 
success of peace efforts in the region, such as the endemic coordination and 
coherence problems within EU’s own different external policies (Froitzheim, 
Söderbaum, and Taylor 2011) and among all international actors involved in 
that country and region (Youngs 2004; Lemarchand 2012). Yet, without a full 
and systematic account of the specific decisions and actions undertaken 
under the CFSP, it is hardly possible to fully discern and fairly assess the 
claimed difference that the CFSP enabled the EU to make in the RD Congo. 
Second, the omission of non-operational decisions and actions and or the 
excessive focus on ESDP civil and military operations can make one wrongly 
believe that the CFSP and the ESDP are two separate frameworks 
independent of each other. For instance, in her 17-page analysis of the 
causes and consequences of Operation Artemis, it is in a footnote on the 9th 
page that Gegout (2005: 435) mentions for the first and sole time that 
ARTEMIS was an ESDP operation. Throughout the article, she reports on 
various undertakings pertaining to the CFSP, including ARTEMIS. However, 
she namely mentions the CFSP only once almost at the end of her article (on 
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the 15th page) and only in reference to its support to a police mission 
inadequately labelled: “The EU’s CFSP policy also supported a police 
mission in Kinshasa. An ESDP Joint Action (EUPOL) provided for the 
monitoring of and advice for trained UPI officers.” (Gegout 2005: 441). This 
thesis has it clear that by Treaty provisions, the CFSP is the legal and 
political umbrella for the ESDP, its integral and operational component, and 
that any ESDP achievements are inherently CFSP achievements. When in 
2008 the EU updated its Security Strategy, it indeed clearly recalled that the 
ESDP was “an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy” 
(Council of the European Union (Council) 2008e: 2). The omission of non-
operational decisions and actions and or the focus on ESDP field operations 
can also make one erroneously believe that such operations constitute the 
sole undertakings of the CFSP, or that they are its sole variables worthy of 
any serious scrutiny. Besides, most of those non-operational decisions and 
actions uncounted for in most studies are indispensable for capturing and 
fairly assessing the essence, potential, and limits of the CFSP. Otherwise, 
how could one verify the claim of EU authorities that the CFSP, unlike its 
predecessor European Political Cooperation framework, does not mostly 
consist of good intention statements, for instance? Third, most if not all 
analyses of the CFSP-based response to war in the DR Congo focus, nearly 
exclusively, on the Second Congo War, which wrongly suggests that there 
was either not any CFSP-born reaction to the First Congo War or that any 
such reaction is not worth considering. Fourth, most studies on the CFSP-
based response to the Second Congo War focus on the period after the 
formal end of armed conflict (2002). This can lead one to erroneously believe 
that the EU did nothing under the CFSP before and during all-out war, or that 
any CFSP response during these two other stages of the war is not worth 
considering for an overall evaluation of the alleged difference that the CFSP 
enabled the EU to make in the DR Congo. This dissertation accounts for 
as many CFSP decisions and actions as possible of each stage of the 
two wars, using the Conflict Resolution approach. Fifth, some studies, 
much like this dissertation, varyingly attribute the failure of ‘international 
peacebuilding’ in that country and whole region mainly to the non-application 
or marginal application of a ‘conflict resolution’ approach. Nevertheless, they 
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have some shortcomings that this research sets out to address. For 
examples, I consider only four works. In 2004, Richard noted that the “the 
scale of conflict-resolution efforts undertaken by the EU ha[d] remained 
minimal relative to the magnitude of the problems that beset the Great Lakes 
region.” He pointed out that the “EU's prioritisation of 'local ownership', 
economic reform and infrastructural reconstruction” had “inappropriately 
tempered the depth of engagement with Africa's underlying political 
imbalances.” (Youngs 2004: 305-06). In his view, “The kinds of initiatives 
apparently conceived and presented as being aimed at the political roots of 
conflict in fact betray[ed] an elitist orientation in the types of political 
dynamics judged pertinent to conflict resolution.” He established that the EU 
had been promoting and supporting structures of governance that did not 
reflect the “broader values of the inter-ethnic pluralism” and that “the political, 
economic, diplomatic and military elements of conflict resolution policies 
ha[d] not yet been harnessed into systematically more comprehensive or 
structural approaches.” (Youngs 2004: 320). Five years later, precisely when 
the EU was celebrating the first decade of its ESDP, Autesserre argued that 
“international peacebuilders” had been failing in the DR Congo because a 
specific “postconflict peacebuilding frame” that excludes “local conflict 
resolution” shaped their intervention. The frame in question is made of key 
elements: (i) the labelling of the DR Congo situation during the transition from 
war to peace and democracy (2003-2006) a “postconflict situation”; (ii) the 
firm belief that violence is innately part of the Congolese life even in 
peacetime; (iii) the confinement of international intervention to the national 
and international realms; and (iv) the consideration of elections (ideally 
multiparty elections), “as opposed to local conflict resolution, as a workable, 
appropriate, and effective tool for state- and peacebuilding” (Autesserre 
2009: 249). She concluded as follows: 
During the Congolese transition from war to peace and democracy, the postconflict 
peacebuilding frame shaped the international understanding of violence and 
intervention in a way that overlooked the decisive role of local agendas in 
sustaining violence. This frame made certain strategies (such as national and 
regional negotiations or election organizations) appear as legitimate and 
appropriate, and others (notably local conflict resolution) seem irrelevant and 
illegitimate. Thus, this frame proscribed international action on local violence. It 
channelled constraints and interests toward elections and away from local 
peacebuilding and ultimately doomed the international peacebuilding efforts. 




For Daley, true peace in the Great Lakes of Africa has been ill-fated by the 
use and imposition of “universalistic conflict resolution models” that prescribe 
a standard formula of ceasefires, negotiated transitional power-sharing 
among the elite, multi-party elections, and economic reconstruction at the 
national level to the detriment of a more inclusive, participatory, emancipatory 
approach to peace by and for all the people in the region. She holds that this 
standard formula, often referred to as the ‘one size fits all’ solution, reflects 
the Western view of warfare and genocide in Africa as “barbaric and atavistic 
─a regression of Africans to pre-modern tribal societies” and emblematic of 
“state failure or collapse, linked to the greed or grievances of the political elite 
and their associated social groups.” Daley contends that these conflict 
resolution models “assume that the full imposition of liberal democracy and 
neoliberal economic reform offers the best chances for peace” and thus fail to 
identify and address the roots causes of conflicts and the complexity of 
politics in Africa (Daley 2006: 304).  
Unlike the three preceding academics, Lemarchand (2012) does not use the 
‘magic’ term conflict resolution. However, throughout his analysis of 
peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, he clearly suggests that 
the limited success at best and failure of peacebuilding at worst there was 
due to partial or inadequate application of a Conflict Resolution approach. In 
fact, his list of the causes of such little positive impact or failure include the 
following: (i) the intractability of the conflict; (ii) the exclusion of local issues 
such as land access and ownership in eastern DR Congo; (iii) the 
confinement of remedies to the domestic realm and the exclusion of 
interstate threats to peace; (iv) discordinated and competing agendas among 
international peacebuilders (IPBs); (v) the use of a top-down approach; and 
(vi) the prevalence of a short-term perspective. In the case of the DR Congo, 
he argues that too early multiparty elections seriously jeopardised the 
chances for building a strong and durable state, which is the precondition for 
lasting democratisation (Lemarchand 2012: 228):  
In the absence of a professional army, Kabila's strategy has been to recruit former 
rebels, thus paving the way for further human rights abuses and defections. 
Similarly, the exigencies of creating a modicum of trust within the government have 
given rise to a clientelistic system that bears all the trademarks of the Mobutist era. 
And just as under Mobutu ethno-regional ties provided the glue that held the 
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system together, so also under Kabila, whose closest advisers are from his home 
province, Katanga. This is hardly the most propitious scenario for peacebuilding. 
The main shortcoming of these four works is that it is not clear whether their 
authors directly and implicitly use the term ‘(local) conflict resolution’ 
generically, or as a specific subject area of study with its own normative, 
theoretical, and practical advantages and shortcomings; as well as its own, 
indeed seminal and more comprehensive conceptualisation of peacebuilding 
(PB) that by default includes statebuilding. A first order reading of their works 
suggests that they have used or implied conflict resolution in a generic 
sense; as efforts aimed at resolving disputes, disagreements, tensions, and 
confrontations, including armed ones. It seems to be in this same way that 
Autesserre (2009) and Lemarchand (2012) have used the term 
peacebuilding, that is, endeavours aimed at ensuring long lasting peace in 
violent conflict-afflicted societies regardless of the conflict stage (prevention, 
management, post-conflict peacebuilding) and its particularities. Such 
generic definition might underpin for instance the recurrent use by Autesserre 
of both local conflict resolution and local peacebuilding (Autesserre 2009: 
273) or statebuilding alongside peacebuilding (Autesserre 2009: 249) without 
clarifying whether and how they relate to each other. However, the authors’ 
analyses and prescriptions for remedying the shortcomings they have 
identified bear most, if not all, of the hallmarks of Conflict Resolution as a 
specific subject area of study primarily concerned with holistic and systematic 
understanding and successful non-violent handling of violent human and 
social behaviours. Certainly, a theoretical or conceptual clarification of (local) 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding was necessary to help the reader 
avoid unintended misattribution concerning the authors’ own use of those 
terms and the criteria against which they have evaluated their 
implementation, and to draw one’s own conclusion. As Curtis (2012) 
underscores, peacebuilding (PB) is not a fixed idea, concept or practice, but 
rather a set of ideas, concepts and practices constantly mediated by and 
between local, national, regional, and international actors. Peacebuilding is “a 
political context involving questions of authority, legitimacy, equality, and 
knowledge”. A “single, all-encompassing definition” of what it stands for is 
simply “elusive” and anyone who wants to help PB achieve its intended 
results must first be aware of this reality (Curtis 2012: 24). Arguably, so are 
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other equally unfixed concepts - like peace, conflict, conflict resolution, 
conflict prevention, conflict provention, and conflict/crisis management - that 
are constantly used in reference to efforts to build a world free from violence. 
Yet, the more elusive a single, all-encompassing definition of a term is, the 
more efforts one should make to get closer to a theoretically grounded one. 
In reference to the definition of peacebuilding in An Agenda for Peace by 
former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali (1992), Francis (2012: 4-5) 
indeed asks: “But what type of peacebuilding are we talking about? In fact, 
peacebuilding for whom, by whom and for what purposes?” He justifies his 
question by rightly claiming, like Curtis, that “there is a lack of consensus on 
the definition, approaches and practice of peacebuilding.” (Francis 2012: 5). I 
take up the task of getting closer to a theoretically grounded definition of 
these key concepts in the chapter on the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation. I show that a Conflict Resolution approach, with its own 
limitations, offers a better alternative for capturing as holistically as possible 
the substance of these concepts and for establishing criteria for the 
evaluation of decisions and actions designed for their translation into 
concrete norms, policies, and actions. Another shortcoming that this thesis 
attempts to address is the disproportionate emphasis on the direct causes to 
the detriment of the deep causes of little positive impact or failure of efforts to 
restore lasting peace in the DR Congo. This is particularly the case of five of 
the six causes identified by Lemarchand (2012: 228) and which I have just 
listed above. Why actually did international peacebuilders confine the 
remedies to the domestic realm and exclude interstate threats to peace? 
Why did they use a top-down approach or exclude local issues such as land 
access and ownership in eastern DR Congo? Why did they use a short-term 
perspective? 
Research Purpose, Questions, and Activities  
The aim of this research is to show that the claimed added value of the CFSP 
and ESDP for enabling the EU to become a force for a global common good 
and the alleged difference the two policy frameworks enabled the EU to 
make in its response to the two Congo Wars are overstated at best. Its 
original contribution resides in the clarification and use of the Conflict 
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Resolution approach, which is better suited for addressing the shortcomings I 
have just highlighted. Indeed, for eventual long lasting success of peace 
efforts, the approach allows and requires, in essence, a comprehensive 
understanding of violent human and social manifestations, on the one hand. 
On the other, the CR approach enables and requires a timely, context-
sensitive, victims’ needs-tailored, sufficient, multi-level, and multi-dimensional 
response to them not only after the formal termination of violence but also 
before its outbreak and during its escalation (Burton 1984, 2001; Sandole 
1993, 1998; Miall et al. 1999). Specific objectives are the following: 
 To highlight the normative, theoretical, analytical, and practical 
advantages and limitations of the Conflict Resolution approach to human 
and social violence; 
 To progress knowledge and understanding of the strengths and 
shortcomings the CFSP and ESDP for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms outside Europe; 
 To offer a more comprehensive, systematic, and critical account of the 
CFSP/ESDP decisions and actions regarding the two Congo Wars and a 
systematic assessment of them; and  
 To progress knowledge and critical understanding of the status and role 
of the EU in international politics since the end of the Cold War. 
The central research question of this research is the following: What do we 
learn when we analyse through the lenses of Conflict Resolution the alleged 
benefit of the CFSP and ESDP and their actual response to the two Congo 
Wars? Attendant questions include the following: 
 What do we learn from Conflict Resolution regarding violent human and 
social behaviours and third party involvement in efforts to handle them? 
 How has the EU responded to the opportunity of learning from Conflict 
Resolution for the establishment and development of the CFSP and 
ESDP? 
 How did Conflict Resolution insights inspire the CFSP-based response to 
the two Congo Wars? 
To achieve the above-stated objectives, I undertake the following tasks: 
 Review the normative, theoretical, and practical precepts of Conflict 
Resolution for the understanding and handling of violent human and 
social behaviours; 
 Revisit the mainstream debate on the alleged added value of the CFSP 
and ESDP;  
 Discern the background of the two Congo Wars; and 
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 Account systematically for and assess the decisions and actions of the 
CFSP concerning the two Congo Wars. 
  
Research Methodology 
This research is a critical, qualitative assessment of the claimed potential of 
the CFSP and its operational backbone ESDP, and of the difference that the 
two policy frameworks reportedly enabled the EU to make in its response to 
the two Congo Wars. It is a critical study because it attempts to “de-bunk 
hidden assumptions” (Olsen 1997: 6) underlying the establishment of the 
CFSP, including its ESDP, its claimed in-built benefit for the defence of a 
global common good, and its response to the two Congo Wars. This is done 
through the lens of Conflict Resolution as a specialist field of study the 
primary concern of which is the holistic analysis and handling of human and 
social violence. On the other hand, this research is qualitative for various 
reasons. Drawing on several authors, Creswell (1998: 14) defines qualitative 
research (QR) as “an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct 
methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem.” 
For him and others, QR is a “difficult, rigorous, and time-consuming” form of 
research the main aim of which is to generate a new understanding of a 
relevant issue, by resorting to different analytical approaches and different 
sources of information (Creswell 1998: 13-14). By “distinct methodological 
traditions”, Creswell means “the historian’s biography, the psychologist’s 
phenomenology, the sociologist’s grounded theory, the anthropologist’s 
ethnography, and the social, urban studies, and political scientist’s case 
study.” (Creswell 1998: 15) With regard to the case study tradition, which I 
have chosen for this research, Creswell presents it as an in-depth 
“exploration of a ‘bounded system’ or a case (or multiple cases) over time 
through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information rich in context.” (Creswell 1998: 61). The case study can be a 
programme, an event, an activity, or individuals.” This research meets these 
requirements in as much as is it sets out to generate a different 
understanding, a different construct of knowledge, and explanation of the 
potential and limits of the CFSP and ESDP, using a Conflict Resolution 
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theoretical approach, drawing on various sources, and covering a lengthy 
period (1994-2009). 
Regarding the rationale for qualitative inquiry, Creswell (1998: 17-18) lists 
eight reasons most of which are valid for this research. The first motive is the 
nature of the research question which usually begins with a ‘what’ or ‘how’, 
and sets the broad picture of what is going on. The second reason is the self-
evidenced need for continuous exploration of the topic. In the case at hand, 
the CFSP and its implementing tool ESDP are newer than any other external 
policy framework of the European Community (EC) and its successor EU; 
and they continue to grow and generate debates about their normative 
relevance and practical use. The third motive for conducting a qualitative 
research is “the need to present a detailed view of the topic.” (Creswell 1998: 
17). This is a key aim and feature of this study, for it is a comprehensive 
critical account of the essence of the CFSP and its response to the two 
Congo Wars through the lens of Conflict Resolution. The fourth motive is the 
need to go out to the setting to gain access to and collect data. I have 
conducted in-person interviews with EU officials and Member States 
nationals involved in the making of EU foreign and security policy at the EU 
headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The fifth reason is the interest of the 
researcher to write in a literary style, bringing herself or himself into the study 
through the use of the personal pronoun “I”, among other strategies. The 
sixth motive is the availability of sufficient time and resources to spend on 
extensive data collection and analysis. The seventh reason to conduct a 
qualitative research is the nature of the target audience who must be 
receptive to such inquiry. This is a doctoral dissertation in Social and 
International Studies, with a special focus on the performance of the EU 
foreign and security policy in the war-afflicted DR Congo. It thus has 
academics in these areas as its primary audience. The eighth and final 
reason for conducting a qualitative study is the researcher’s intention to 
emphasise her or his role as an active learner rather than an expert who 
passes judgment on others’ perspectives and meaning (Creswell 1998: 18). 
My intention is to improve my own understanding and that of any academic 
reader of the potential and limit of the EU foreign and security policy for 
serving a global common good, using the DR Congo as a case study.  
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Types and Sources of Data 
One of the requirements of qualitative research (QR) is the use of multiple 
sources of information that include (but are not limited to) documents, 
reports, interviews, archival records, audio-visual materials, and observations 
(Creswell 1998). The data for this research include (i) primary data and (ii) 
secondary data. The latter are essentially made of documents of foreign 
policy outputs, that is, decisions and actions, and publications relevant to the 
CFSP, ESDP, and the case study. Primary data are made of in-depth, 
qualitative interviews. In qualitative research whereby social meaning does 
not exist independently of people (Sayer 1992), interviews help clarify (with 
respondents) the specified features and unveil the un-specified features of a 
meaning by way of elicitation and assessment. By in-depth’, it is assumed 
that there is more meaning and explanation than those made available in 
respondents’ utterances in the first instance, and that it is the role of the 
interviewer to explore and relate the two to the possible extent. Citing Rubin 
and Rubin (1995), Warren (2002: 83) stresses that qualitative interview, 
unlike the standardized survey interview with which it shares “the emphasis 
on researchers asking questions and listening, and respondents answering”, 
tends to be epistemologically “more constructionist than positivist.” This 
implies that an interview is treated as both a resource and topic (Seale 1998: 
215-6), that is, as a “part and parcel of society, not simply a mode of inquiry 
into and about society.” (Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 30). As a resource, it 
leads to the first order meaning. As a topic, it helps unveil the second order 
meaning of social phenomena. This research adheres to the view that 
interview participants, including the interviewer, “are more likely to be viewed 
as meaning makers, not passive conducts for retrieving information from an 
existing vessel of answers” (Holstein and Gubrium 1995; as quoted in 
Warren 2002: 83). 
Issues, Levels, and Units of Analysis 
In line with the holistic approach (to the analysis and handling of violent 
human and social manifestations) of Conflict Resolution, this study considers 
different issue-areas, different levels of analysis, and different units regarding 
the CFSP and its response to the two Congo Wars. It examines a wide range 
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of issue-areas; from political, economic, and social to structural and systemic 
dimensions of dealing with violent conflicts. The purpose is to determine if 
and how the design of the CFSP and its response to the two Congo Wars 
reflected due awareness and treatment of such issue-areas. My assumption 
is that without due awareness and treatment of all the relevant issue-areas, 
the CFSP, contrary to what some analysts have alleged (Stavridis 2001; 
Petiteville 2003), cannot enable the EU to become a force for a global 
common good. Concerning levels of analysis, various academics have 
pointed out that, in the case of “a multi-tiered system of government such as 
the EU” with loose structure, complexity, and heterogeneity (Peterson 1995: 
70), the need to take breath at different levels becomes more self-evident 
because “patterns and processes of policy-making ‘vary considerably from 
sector to sector’” (Wallace 1983: 52; as quoted in Peterson 1995: 69-70). 
Vale and Mphaisha’s (1999: 90) have warned that, 
Whether we choose to approach foreign policy as something that should be 
explained on the level of the international system, or on the level of the society 
within which that state operates, or on the level of the individuals in that society, 
has fundamental implications for how foreign policy is analysed and what 
conclusions are reached. 
For the purpose of this research, I draw on the three-level analytical 
framework of the policy network model developed by Peterson (1995). The 
three levels are super-systemic level, systemic level, and the sub-systemic / 
meso-level. Peterson convincingly argues that his model is particularly 
suitable for studying the decision-making in the European Union for two main 
reasons. The first is the lack of “‘off-the-shelf’ institutions’ which can facilitate 
bargaining between different types of actors at the meso-level.” This 
argument is particularly valid for the period before the inception of the ‘off-
the-shelf’ organ, that is, the European External Action Service (EEAS) under 
the Treaty of Lisbon that entered in force on 1 December 2009. The second 
reason is that “decisions taken at the policy formulation stage have become 
more important determinants of eventual EU policy outcomes in recent 
years.” (Peterson 1995: 71). 
The first level of analysis concerns history-making decisions and 
“transcends the EU’s day-to-day policy process”. Such decisions “alter the 
Union’s legislative procedures, rebalance the relative powers of EU 
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institutions, or change the EU’s remit.” They “address the question: how does 
EU governance change?” (Peterson 1995: 72; added underlining). In this 
sense, EU history-making decisions “alter the way the EU works as a system 
of government.” (Peterson 1995: 72-3). Peterson places EU’s history-making 
decisions into three categories. The first one concerns decisions that are 
“taken to launch the process of revising treaties in intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs).” Here the generic units of analysis are the IGCs. An 
intergovernmental conference is, in EU terminology, a special negotiations 
meeting of representatives of the governments of member states with a view 
to amending the Treaties (European Union (EU) 2013). Analytical variables 
at this level include the different treaties and their respective annexes 
(Protocols, Declarations, Final Acts, Statements) that directly relate to the 
study object and or case study of this research. The second category of 
history-making decisions consists of “broad, strategic decisions about the 
EU’s agenda, priorities and finances” (Peterson 1995: 72) that are taken by 
the European Council. The latter “brings together the Union’s Heads of State 
or government and the President of the European Commission, and is the 
Union’s supreme political authority.” (Council 2008b: 6). Upon the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, “the European Council 
became a fully-fledged institution in its own right”; with “a president, elected 
for a term of two and a half years, renewable once.” (Council 2010a: 3). 
Before that date, it rather referred to the regular meetings of the Heads of 
State or Government of the Member States and usually met at least twice a 
year and “was chaired by the president or prime minister of the Member 
State holding the six-monthly Council presidency.” (Council 2010a: 3). 
Concrete examples of history-making decisions by the European Council 
include Conclusions, Reports, Acts, Statements, and Declarations of 
European Summits that “often become ‘bibles’ in EU politics.” (Peterson 
1995: 72; added underlining). In relation to the CFSP, Article 13 (Title V) of 
the TEU assigned to the European Council two tasks the first one of which 
was to “define the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP, 
including for matters with defence implications.” (Added emphasis). The third 
and last category of history-making decisions concerns “legal decisions 
handed down by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)” and which set out “the 
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limits of the EU’s powers” and by time, become “touchstones in EU 
governance such as ‘direct effect’ and ‘proportionality’” (Peterson 1995: 72). 
Bradley (2002: 119), too, has stressed the “central role” of the ECJ driven 
from its function as “the ultimate authority for interpretation” and application 
of the EU law. At this sub-level of analysis, there does not seem to be much 
substance for the purpose of this research because the TEU (Title V) 
excluded the CFSP decisions from the supervision of the ECJ. 
The second level of analysis – systemic level – concerns “policy-setting 
decisions” which usually address the following question: “what should be 
done?” (Peterson 1995: 73). At this level, “choices are made between 
alternative courses of action according to one of several versions of the 
‘Community method’ of decision-making [Assent procedure- AVN; co-
decision procedure- COD; consultation procedure- CNS, and co-operation 
procedure- SYN].” (Peterson 1995: 73). Various institutional actors at this 
level share the powers to set policy and constitute, in principle, our main units 
of analysis. The first one is the aforementioned European Council. One of its 
tasks is to “decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union “in 
areas where the Member States have important interests in common” (TEU, 
Title V, art. 13; added emphasis). Besides, the European Council “may act as 
‘a court of last resort’ when first COREPER [committee of permanent 
representatives] and then the Council of Ministers are deadlocked.” 
(Peterson 1995: 73). The second unit of analysis is the Council of the 
European Union, also referred to as the Council of Ministers (Council, in 
short). It is the main decision-making body of the EU and represents the 
Member States (Peterson 1995: 73; Smith H. 2002: 107). The third unit of 
analysis at the systemic level is the European Commission (Commission, in 
short). Under EU treaties, the Commission is responsible for coordinating, 
executing, and managing the actions of the Union. According to Nugent 
(2002: 151), “The Commission’s main functions can be grouped under six 
headings; policy initiator, legislative functions, legal guardian, mediator and 
broker, and external representative and negotiator.” In Smith’s view, the 
“Commission’s role in [EU] foreign policymaking and implementation changes 
according to which particular aspect of foreign policy is under discussion”, 
and  its “most important external competence is in terms of the foreign policy 
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aspects of trade, including the highly political issue of economic sanctions.” 
(Smith H. 2002: 109). However, the competence of the Commission for 
CFSP matters is much less central and rather limited by the 
intergovernmental procedure of the CFSP, notwithstanding the initiative and 
consultative power conferred onto it in the treaty on the Union (TEU, Title V, 
arts. 14, 18, 20, 22, and 27). The fourth unit of analysis at the systemic level 
is the European Parliament (EP) whose assent is indispensable prior to the 
conclusion of any international agreement, among other things. Article 21 of 
the TEU (Title V) required the Presidency to inform and “consult the 
European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the 
common foreign and security policy”, and to ensure that its views would be 
duly taken into consideration. The president-in-office had to deliver a report 
to the European Parliament’s full session on EU foreign policy and could 
have to answer questions of Members of the European Parliament (MEP) at 
its monthly plenary session. Besides, the EP could put questions to the 
Council or make recommendations to it.” (TEU, Title V, art. 21). Finally, the 
EP would hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common 
foreign and security policy. Member States constitute the fifth unit of analysis 
at the systemic level. Their role is central for both policymaking and 
implementation because, as Smith H. (2002: 113) notes, “it is the member 
states that can add teeth to foreign policy”. Article 11(2) of the TEU (Title V) 
stipulated that Member States had to “support the Union's external and 
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual 
solidarity”, and “work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity.” It also required them to “refrain from any action which would be 
contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a 
cohesive force in international relations.” The Treaty earmarked a number of 
prerogatives to Member States, ranging from requesting a revision of a joint 
action to taking “the necessary measures as a matter of urgency” in case 
“major difficulties in implementing a joint action” or “imperative needs arising 
from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision” (TEU, Title V, 
art. 14(6,7)). 
The TEU also required Member States to “coordinate their action in 
international organisations and at international conferences” where they 
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would have to “uphold the common positions” and keep informed those not 
present of any common interest (TEU, Title V, art. 19). Under the CFSP legal 
provisions, those Members States who were permanent members of the UN 
Security Council had to defend “the positions and the interests of the Union, 
without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter.” Article 20(TEU, Title V) required the “diplomatic and 
consular missions of the Union’s Member States in third countries and in 
international organisations and conferences” to “cooperate in ensuring that 
the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council were 
complied with and implemented.” (Added underlining). Likewise, Member 
States had to “inform and consult one another within the Council on any 
matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that 
the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of 
concerted and convergent action.” (TEU, Title V, art. 16). Any Member State 
could also “refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign 
and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council.” (TEU, Title V, 
art. 22(1)). More importantly, under Article 23 of the TEU (Title V), a Member 
State could abstain in a vote of any Council’s decision under the CFSP, and 
thereby not be obliged to apply the decisions in question or to contribute to its 
financing (TEU, Title V, art. 28(3)). This prerogative to opt out on financial 
contribution was applicable in case of “operational expenditure arising from 
operations having military or defence implications and cases where the 
Council acting unanimously decide[d] otherwise”; and which de facto could 
not be charged to the budget of the European Communities (TEU, Title V, 
art. 28(3)). 
The third level of analysis – the sub-systemic or meso-level – is that of 
“individual EU policy sectors […] where many policy-shaping decisions are 
taken, particularly as policy options are formulated.” Peterson defines the 
term “meso” as usually implying “a level between one (macro) and another 
(micro).” (Peterson 1995: 74). Yet, in the case at hand, “very little actual 
decision-making occurs at the ‘micro-level’ in EU governance, which mostly 
features the implementation of decisions taken elsewhere or management of 
the EU’s activities by actors with very little discretion of their own.” (Peterson 
1995: 89; endnote nº 5). Peterson points out that “[m]ost policy-shaping 
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decisions are ‘second-order’ decisions which address the question: how do 
we do it?” (Peterson 1995: 74). Key actors at the meso-level include “the 
Commission’s Directorates-General (DGs), national civil servants and private 
actors who bargain with each other in various types of committee or Council 
working groups.” (Peterson 1995: 74). Much like at the systemic level, the 
role of the Commission’s DGs, Committees, and Units depends on which 
issues and aspects of foreign policy are concerned. During the time 
reference of this research (1994-2009), the most notable Commission’s DG 
was the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX, in short, 
under its French acronym: Direction Générale des Relations Extérieures). In 
particular, DG RELEX was responsible for the participation of the 
Commission into the CFSP and the management of over a hundred of 
representations of the Commission in third countries. Following the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty (on 1 December 2009), DG RELEX was merged 
into the European External Action Service (EEAS) by Council Decision of 26 
July 2010 (2010/427/EU).  During the same timeline, there were also various 
CFSP-related units of analysis at the Council level. The first one is the former 
General Affairs Council (GAC). It was renamed General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) since June 2002 and split into two sub-
configurations, General Affairs Council (GAC) and Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC), by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). GAERC was responsible for the 
Union’s relations with the rest of the world, among other things. GAERC’s 
members were Member States’ foreign (affairs) ministers and their primary 
task was to discuss and negotiate foreign policy (Smith H. 2002: 107). In 
particular, GAERC was responsible for deciding joint actions (JAs) and 
common positions (CPs), the two most important outputs of the CFSP that 
this dissertation critically accounts for. The second unit of analysis on the 
Council side is the above-mentioned Committee of Permanent 
Representatives, more referred to by its French acronym ‘COREPER’ 
(“Comité de Représentants Permanents”). This committee “occupies a 
special position in the Council hierarchy, because it has the final say in the 
preparation of Council proceedings.” (Council 2008b: 13). COREPER brings 
together “permanent representatives of the Member States’ governments in 
Brussels” who “meet several times a week in a virtually permanent process of 
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discussion and negotiation” and “establish and maintain relationships of trust 
and confidence that facilitate mutual understanding of their respective 
positions.” (Council 2008b: 12). COREPER members exercise political 
control over other expert groups within the Council. One of those groups is 
for instance the Africa Working Group. All representatives of EU Member 
States whom I interviewed at the headquarters of the EU in Brussels were 
members of COREPER or participated in its meetings from time to time. 
The third unit at the meso-level is the General Secretariat of the Council 
(General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), in short). Its staff, in particular the 
Secretary-General (SG) of the Council and High Representative for the 
CFSP until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (1 December 2009), 
play an important role in the formulation, preparation, and implementation of 
policy decisions adopted under the CFSP. The overall task of the GSC is “to 
provide every support the Council needs to do its work.” (Council 2008b: 15). 
Concretely, it advises the Union’s Presidency, ensures continuity of the work 
of the Council’s different services, monitors meetings, and manages the 
budget of the Council (Council 2008b: 15). Like in the Commission, different 
functional Directorates-General exist within the Council and directly 
dependent on the CGS (Council 2008b: 15-17). During the time reference of 
this research, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) 
established by Declaration No. 6 annexed to the Final Act of the TEU 
(Amsterdam version, 1999) was housed in General Secretariat of the 
Council. It was responsible for, among other things, monitoring, analysis and 
assessment of international developments and events, including early 
warning on potential crises and for drafting policy options for the attention of 
the Council. All my interviewees in the Council were directly or indirectly 
involved in the work of the PPEWU. 
Conclusion 
This section summarises the types and sources of data on the one hand, 
and the issues, levels and units of analysis, on the other, for this research. 
Regarding the former, I have drawn on both Primary Data and Secondary 
Data in line with the requirements of Qualitative Research (QR). As indicated 
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earlier, primary data are made of in-depth, qualitative interviews, formally 
requested by email correspondence and telephone calls from the following: 
 Officials involved in the external relations and foreign policy of the EU, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, at the Council, the European 
Commission, and the European Parliament;  
 Permanent representations of EU Member States to the EU in Brussels; 
 Representatives of the DR Congo and South Sudan to the to the EU; 
 Policy officers involved in EU foreign policy matters in Civil Society 
organisations in the EU’s capital Brussels (Belgium); 
 General Secretariat of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of 
countries; and 
 Representation of the African Union (AU) to the EU. 
Regarding EU officials, I sought interviews from staff at the level of Director, 
Head of Unit, Committee Chairperson, and Desk Officers. Concerning EU 
Member States’ permanent representations to the EU, two main criteria 
guided my choice: (i) the specificity and weight of a Member State in EU 
foreign and security policy and (ii) historical links with, interest, and 
involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa and or in the DR Congo. In total, I 
contacted 9 Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and UK. I directed my request primarily to 
senior diplomats, including with the rank of ‘Ambassador’, responsible for EU 
political, foreign, and security affairs. As for Civil Society actors, I contacted 
the following organisations: Amnesty International (AI)-Europe, European 
Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), and European 
Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). My interview requests included my 
identification details, an outline of my research project, the main issues for 
discussion, confidentiality assurance, and a recommendation letter from my 
supervisor. Regarding unsuccessful requests, I either did not receive a 
response at all or was informed that the appropriate staff was not available 
for interview. Positive responses came from the following: 4 EU Member 
States (Germany, Portugal, Sweden, and UK), the Council and the 
Commission, and 2 non-governmental organisations (AI-Europe and EPLO). 
In terms of format, interviews were semi-structured (with open-ended and 
check-listed questions) and tape-recorded (unless otherwise wished by the 
respondent, prohibited under the security protocol of the respondent’s 
institution / department, or hindered by technical problems). 
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Contacted 
(staff) 
6 2 2 9 2 3 1 1 
Positive 
Response 
6 2 0 4  2 0 0 
Negative 
Response 
0 0  1 1 0 0  
No response 0 0 2 4 1 1 1 1 
Interviewees 5 2 0 7 0 2 0 0 
         
I was not able to do field research in the DR Congo mainly because of 
security reasons. I am Rwandan and from July 1994 until September 1995, I 
lived and worked as a broadcast journalist in eastern DR Congo for 
humanitarian organisations during and after the massive exodus and 
settlement of over one million of Rwandan refugees there. I found it too risky 
to return there and do interviews in the same insecure place where some of 
my broadcast colleagues were assassinated and others disappeared during 
the two Congo Wars. I have attempted to remedy this lack of first-hand data 
by drawing on the most authoritative resources, namely reports by non-
governmental human rights and humanitarian organisations. As my 
interviewees at Amnesty International and European Peacebuilding Liaison 
Office in Brussels proudly confirmed, such organisations constitute the best 
sources for independent, timely, accurate, detailed, and widely, swiftly, and 
efficiently disseminated accounts of the situation on the ground. Free access 
and use of such detailed and periodical accounts are determinant for 
establishing, in line with Conflict Resolution, three important facts. The first 
fact, which many studies take either as for granted or as minor, is whether 
the EU did always have timely and appropriate warning information on the 
situation on the ground. The second one, which is also missing in most 
studies on the same theme and case study, is whether there was always a 
CFSP response when the situation on the ground so required. The third and 
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last fact is whether any CFSP-based response was need-tailored, timely, and 
decisive. Moreover, such accounts are crucial for testing the quote that 
opens this dissertation: “The aim of the EU foreign policy is to replace the law 
of force with the force of law.” (Solana 2009a: 4).     
On the other hand, secondary data mainly include foreign policy outputs and 
publications relevant to the subject of inquiry (CFSP) and case study (DR 
Congo). They essentially are EU documents pertaining or related to the 
CFSP and concrete CFSP-based decisions and actions on the two Congo 
Wars. These decisions and actions, herein also termed CFSP outputs, the 
so-called “Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP” in EU’s own 
terminology, that the Union adopted and implemented in relation to the case 
study. They include the following: Principles and General Guidelines; 
Declarations; Demarches;  Common Strategies;  Common Positions; Joint 
Actions; and Decisions. My secondary data also include relevant literature on 
the EU foreign and security policy, as well as on Conflict Resolution, the DR 
Congo, and the Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Regarding EU documents 
pertaining or related to the CFSP in general and concrete CFSP-born 
decisions and actions in particular, the main source was the online public 
registers of the Council and other institutions of the EU. These registers had 
been operational since the late 1990s following the entry into force of 
the TEU (Amsterdam version, 1999) and were said to contain references to 
“all non-sensitive documents” that can publicly be accessed (Council 2012c). 
I could directly request from the relevant services of the EU only documents 
that were not available in the online registers. This is an important challenge 
for people without or with limited access to internet and or who are unfamiliar 
with online search. In the absence of a readily available list of contents of 
each register beforehand, it was impossible to establish the proportion of the 
online search results in relation to the actually existing material on a subject 
of one’s interest. The search result depended on the search options (‘Simple 
search’, ‘Advanced search’, ‘Advanced search’, and ‘Latest documents’) and 
established search criteria (‘Document number’, ‘Words in  Title’, ‘Text’, 
‘Subject Matter’, ‘Date’). In the case of one request, the relevant services of 
the General Secretariat of the Council responded me that the lists of some of 
the “main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP”, namely Declarations, 
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Demarches, Reports of Heads of Mission, and Political Dialogue meetings, 
had not been (systematically) drawn for the period from 1994 to 1997 and 
therefore were not available (Sieberichs 2011). Besides, one of my requests 
for clarification remained unanswered. Hence, my analysis is based on the 
records that I accessed and the quality and amount of which I considered 
sufficient for substantiating my argument in the manner hereby exposed. 
Overall, I have drawn on all legally binding decisions and actions of the 
CFSP, that is, CFSP Legal Acts (Common Strategies, Common Positions, 
Joint Actions, and Decisions) and non-legally binding outputs (Principles and 
General Guidelines, Declarations, and Demarches), all of which I accessed 
online or obtained through correspondence with the relevant services of the 
Council. The two reference documents for all CFSP legal acts herein referred 
to have been the following: the thematic list published on 31 December 2009 
(Council 2009d) and the (daily) Official Journal of the European Union (OJ). 
For non-legally binding instruments, my counting and analysis is based on 
the online register of the following sources: European Council meetings 
(European Council 2013); CFSP Statements (Council 2013a); the different 
annual reports on the CFSP activities; and the “recapitulative lists of CFSP 
instruments (declarations, démarches, reports of Heads of Mission and 
political dialogue meetings)” drawn up by the Secretariat of the Council 
respectively since 1998 and 2004 onwards (Council 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 
2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2004, 2005b, 2006e, 2006f, 2007b, 2007c, 
2008c, 2008d, 2009e, 2009f, 2010b, and 2010c).  
I consider a wide range of issues, levels and units of analysis involved in the 
EU foreign policy within the framework of the CFSP. I follow Peterson’s 
three-level model of super-systemic level; systemic level; and meso-level, 
respectively concerned with the EU history-making, policy-making/setting, 
and policy-shaping. Units of analysis are those that were most involved in the 
EU foreign policy-making at each of the aforementioned three levels. These 
units were the following: 
 Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), European Council, and EU 
Presidency, at the super-systemic level;  
 The Council of Ministers (Council, in short), the European Parliament, 
and Member States through COREPER, at the systemic level; and  
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 The Commission through its DG RELEX, GAERC, the Council General 
Secretariat and attendant Directorates-General, departments, and units 
involved in the shaping and making of foreign policy, at the meso-level.  
As Peterson might have noted, this 3-level distinction is not to be conceived 
and or argued in absolute terms. The degree of cross-level actorness is 
significant in most cases mainly because of the presence and interference of 
member governments at and across all stages of EU decision-making as a 
result of what Peterson and others have identified as lobbying network 
channels between national capitals and EU headquarters. Likewise, the 
European Council seems to be involved at both the super–systemic level and 
the systemic one. For its part, the Commission seem to have a significantly 
limited presence at the systemic level in contrast to its lead role at the meso-
level. 
Levels and Units of Analysis in EU Foreign Policy Decision-making: table adapted from 
Peterson (1995: 71). 
Level Decision Typology Main Actors 
Distinctive 
Rationality 
Super-systemic: History-making IGCs Political 
How does EU 
governance change?  
  
  European Council Legalistic 
  EU Presidency   
  European Court of Justice    
Systemic: Policy-setting/making European Council Political 
  Council of the EU 
What should be 
done? 
  EU Parliament Technocratic 
 




    European Commission Administrative 
Sub-systemic/ 
meso-level: 
Policy-shaping European Commission Technocratic 
 How do we do it?   DG RELEX Consensual 
   GAERC Administrative 
    Council General Secretariat    
    Directorate-General E    





This research covers a specified period (1994-2009) because one of the 
shortcomings that it addresses is the lack of a systematic and comprehensive 
account of the CFSP decisions and actions that reportedly enabled the EU to 
make a difference in its response to the two Congo Wars. For a fairer, 
comprehensive, and balanced assessment, it is important to take into 
account not only field operations and missions but also any other foreign and 
security policy endeavours. I have chosen the year 1994 as the start-date 
because of two reasons. The first one is that it was the first full year of the 
actual implementation of the CFSP. Indeed, the Treaty on the European 
Union (Maastricht version) that established the CFSP entered into force on 
the 1st of November 1993. The second and most important reason is that, as 
detailed later, the First Congo War broke out in early October 1996. In line 
with the Conflict Resolution approach of this research, the prevention period 
that falls within the existence of the CFSP spans from January 1994 until the 
outbreak of armed confrontation. On the other hand, the end–date (2009) 
marked the celebration of the first decade of the ESDP and the exceptional 
heightening of its achievements, particularly by EU authorities. The first High 
Representative for the CFSP underscored the historic importance of that year 
in the following words: “2009 is a landmark year for the European Union's 
role in the world. It marks ten years of European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), during which the EU became a global provider of security, making a 
real difference to people's lives all over the world.” (Solana 2009d: 1). More 
important to underline, the year 2009 marked the entry into force, on the 1st 
of December, of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Treaty of 
Lisbon, in short). The new treaty introduced significant changes that fall 
outside the methodological approach of this research. First, the Treaty of 
Lisbon (Title V) abolished the three pillar structure of the EU (European 
Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Police and 
Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC)) that was introduced by the 
1993-TEU and maintained throughout to the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. With the merging of the three pillars, the CFSP, the long awaited and 
most salient and commented pillar under the abrogated structure, became an 
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integral part of a Union’s External Action that also encompasses the “external 
relations” traditionally pertaining to the European Commission. The grouping 
of all external relations of the EU under the External Action umbrella was 
meant to resolve the coherence and coordination problem that reportedly 
affected negatively the CFSP contribution to international peacebuilding in 
the DR Congo (Martin 2010: 72). Second, as the table below shows, the 
objectives of the External Action were made less ambiguous and more 
comprehensive, at least on paper, than the ones assigned to the CFSP prior 
to 2009. 
  
CFSP objectives (pre-Lisbon TEU, 
Title V, art. 11(1)) 
External Action objectives (Lisbon TEU, Title V, 
art. 21) 
(1) Safeguard the common values, 
fundamental interests, independence 
and integrity of the Union in 
conformity with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter. 
(1) Safeguard the values, fundamental interests, 
security, independence and integrity of the 
European Union. 
(2) Strengthen the security of the 
Union in all ways. 
(2) Consolidate and support democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and the principles of international 
law. 
(3) Preserve peace and strengthen 
international security, in accordance 
with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter, as well as the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act 
and the objectives of the Paris 
Charter, including those on external 
borders.  
(3) Preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen 
international security, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act 
and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including 
those relating to external borders. 
(4) Promote international co-
operation. 
(4) Foster the sustainable economic, social and 
environmental development of developing countries, 
with the primary aim of eradicating poverty. 
(5) Develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
(5) Encourage the integration of all countries into 
the world economy, including through the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international 
trade. 
 
(6) Help develop international measures to 
preserve and improve the quality of the environment 
and the sustainable management of global natural 
resources, in order to ensure sustainable 
development. 
 
(7) Assist populations, countries and regions 
confronting natural or man-made disasters. 
 
(8) Promote an international system based on 





Besides, the Lisbon Treaty established a European External Action Service 
(EEAS), a cross-institutional department deemed to increase coherence and 
coordination of all the external policies of the EU. It also expanded the post of 
the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to that of a 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who 
is at the same time one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission 
and Chief of the EEAS. Third, the Lisbon Treaty (Title V, art. 24) reduced the 
specific policymaking instruments under the CFSP from five (Principles and 
General Guidelines; Common Strategies; Common Positions; Joint Actions; 
and Decisions) to two (General Guidelines and Decisions). Fourth and last, 
the Lisbon Treaty (Title V, art. 42) upgraded European Security and Defence 
Policy to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the latter 
was kept as an integral part of the CFSP and an essentially 
intergovernmental matter, its role was significantly reinforced through the 
enlargement of its mission (Title V, art. 43(1)). Three new tasks (joint 
disarmament; military advice and assistance; and post-conflict stabilisation) 
were added to its original three tasks known as the Petersberg Tasks 
(humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks; and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management). Because of methodological 
constraints and for the sake of fairness, it is imperative to review the ‘success 
narrative’ using the same context and elements on the basis of which it has 
been constructed, even if the post-Lisbon potential of the CFSP and its actual 
performance in the violence-afflicted DR Congo may not much be different. 
Research Structure and Organisation  
This work revolves around the following chapters. The first chapter is an 
introduction that outlines the context, the aim and main argument, the 
methodology, as well as the timeframe and structure of the dissertation. The 
second chapter critically highlights the advantages of Conflict Resolution 
(CR) as a specialist field of study with attractive normative, theoretical, and 
practical precepts for systematically theorising about conflict and conflict 
intervention. Chapter 3 offers a background to the two Congo Wars, 
highlighting the origin and development of the problems of the country into an 
International Social Conflict (ISC) to which the EU might have made a 
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positive difference only by means of a timely, need-tailored, multilevel, 
multifunctional, decisive, cross-national, and long-term response. Chapter 4 
engages in detail the discussion on the claimed added value of the CFSP 
and its operational pillar ESDP for enabling the EU to do more and better 
about wars and violent conflicts in third places. The purpose is to establish 
the extent of integration of relevant insights from Conflict Resolution into the 
CFSP during the period covered by this research. Chapters 5 and 6 offer 
detailed accounts of the first and second wars in the DR Congo and the 
corresponding response of the EU through its CFSP. The aim is to identify 
any general need-response pattern, applying the three stage delineation 
prescribed by Conflict Resolution: early warning and prevention (EWP); 
conflict management (CM), and post-war/conflict (settlement) peacebuilding 
(PW/C(S)PB). In the seventh chapter, I offer an overall, final evaluation of the 
potential of the CFSP and its response to the two Congo Wars, thus laying 




CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
What does Conflict Resolution (CR), as a subject area of study, have to offer 
for the systematic theorising about and handling of violent human and social 
behaviours? In this chapter, I set out to answer this question. I argue that CR, 
with its own limitations, still offers a more valuable and affordable, though  
sophisticated and demanding, alternative for capturing and addressing the 
multiple and complex realities of human and social violence wherever and 
whenever it occurs or threaten to do so. Its insights are particularly relevant 
for assessing the allegedly inherent added value of the CFSP and the 
claimed difference it has enabled the EU to make in its response to two 
bloody wars that broke out in the DR Congo successively in 1996 and 1998. 
As indicated in the first chapter, various studies attribute the total or partial 
failure of international peace efforts by the EU and other international actors 
in the DR Congo and its region precisely to the lack or minimal application of 
what seems to be a CR approach (Youngs 2004; Autesserre 2009; 
Lemarchand 2012;). Others rather attributed the failure of peace efforts in 
that country and the entire Great Lakes region of Africa to the imposition of 
what they present as ‘conflict resolution models’ that prescribe a ‘one size fits 
all’ solution, that is, a neo-liberal peace agenda that is irrespective of the 
specificities of each case (Daley 2006). In that chapter, I showed that the 
main shortcoming of these works is the lack of conceptual clarity concerning 
their use of key terms, mainly ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘peacebuilding’. This 
shortcoming is important because CR is different from what some academics 
have referred to as ‘post-Cold War Conflict Resolution Mechanism’. They 
have termed it ‘International Conflict Resolution Mechanism’ (ICRM) and 
described it as being essentially characterised by third party-mediated 
negotiated settlement among the conflicting parties, preceded by a cease-fire 
and followed by the implementation of the agreed solution that include 
transitional power-sharing and free, and fair multi-party elections as the final 
stage. They have criticised this mechanism mainly because they find it based 
on an assumed universal applicability (Salem 1993; Duffield 1997; Clapham 
1998a, 1998b). This chapter shows that the ‘Conflict Resolution model’, so to 
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name it, is different from and does not prescribe the ‘one size fits all solution’ 
or the ICRM. 
Though an abundant literature on the subject exists, and an attempt is here 
made to do justice to as many relevant works as possible, I shall essentially 
draw on the following works: Miall et al. (1999) and Sandole (1993, 1998, 
2001). Not only did their publication coincide with the birth of the EU and its 
announced commitment to assume an active and positive foreign and 
security policy in a post-Cold War environment, but also their authors 
explicitly sought to make them as much policy-relevant as possible. Miall, 
Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) present their authored book as a 
response to “the need for a single, comprehensive survey of contemporary 
conflict resolution and its contribution to the management of post-Cold War 
conflicts” (Miall et al. 1999: xi), and their conflict resolution approach as 
representing “the ‘praxeological edge or purpose’ of peace research.” (Miall 
et al. 1999: 44). In my view, it is a complete account of the origin and 
development of Conflict Resolution, both in theory and practice, to its stage 
precisely at the time the EU was allegedly taking on board lessons learned 
from failed humanitarian interventions in places like Former Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, and Rwanda. The authors pay due tribute to both outspoken critics 
and outstanding proponents of the field. On the other hand, the work of 
Sandole draws upon an impressive literature inside and outside the field of 
Conflict Resolution and proves to be a successful attempt to articulate a 
generic theory of conflict formation and escalation, with direct policy and 
practical implications. 
Conceptual and Normative Clarifications 
The terms conflict and conflict resolution (CR) are so widely, often 
indiscriminately, used that it is important to specify the definitional, practical, 
and normative scope of their use for the purpose of clarity, pertinence, and 
due attribution. Conflict may mean “armed confrontation” or “war” for some, 
and any “physical and direct violence”, for others. Some define it as a 
“process”, others as “start-up conditions”, and others as both (Sandole 1993, 
1998, 2001). In some contexts, the term is used to refer to “an aspect of our 
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lives which is taken for granted – something that will always be” and which 
“occurs at every level of social interaction from the personal to the 
international.” (Fetherston 1994: 96). Burton defines conflict as “an essential 
creative element in human relationships.” For him, conflict “is the means to 
change, the means by which our social values of welfare, security, justice 
and opportunities for personal development can be achieved…the existence 
of a flow of conflict is the only guarantee that aspirations of society will be 
attained.” (Burton 1972: 137-138). In this sense, conflict “is not necessarily a 
bad thing; indeed, it may be an ‘early warning’ sign that something has gone 
wrong in an otherwise important relationship that needs to be addressed 
before it gets worse.” (Sandole 1993: 6). Galtung (2000: 51) claims that 
conflict amounts to “a challenge with the problems shouting ‘transcend me!’, 
go beyond, force motrice driving human beings, societies, the whole world 
forward.”  
Here, I use the term conflict as defined in the specialised study field of 
Conflict Resolution, that is, as “an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of life”, “an 
expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as 
new formations generated by social change come up against inherited 
constraints.” (Miall et al. 1999: 5). In particular, I refer to Sandole who defines 
conflict as “a dynamic phenomenon, a ‘manifest conflict process’ (MCP), 
characterized by phases of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, and 
management, perhaps leading to some kind of termination reflective of 
settlement, resolution, or transformation” (Sandole 1993: 6). As a manifest 
process, conflict means “a situation in which at least two parties, or their 
representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible 
goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, each other's goal-seeking 
capability.” (Sandole 1993: 6). Things get worrying and complicated when the 
manifest conflict process takes an aggressive turn, with involved parties or 
their representatives attempting “to pursue their perceptions of mutually 
incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the property and 
high-value symbols of one another […]; and/or psychologically or physically 




On the other hand, conflict resolution (in lower case) is commonly and 
generically understood as “an objective and an activity that is universal and 
practised by people throughout the world who may or may not be aware of 
the term.” (Miall et al. 1999: 60). However, this generic definition is different 
from the specific one that implies awareness, relevant knowledge and skills, 
patience, as well as strong commitment. In context of this dissertation, 
Conflict Resolution (upper case in initials) is used “as a defined specialist 
field” (Miall et al. 1999: 2-3) concerned with the holistic analysis and non-
violent handling of conflicts whenever and wherever they actually occur or 
threaten to do so. It means at the same time (i) “a specialist academic and 
practical field” and (ii) a prescriptive “description of successful outcome to 
peacemaking and peacebuilding process”. (Miall et al. 1999: 60). Most, if not 
all, theorists and researchers in this field stress the fact that “[a]s both an 
analytic and normative field, conflict resolution takes violent or destructive 
conflict as its topic, and aims to gain an accurate understanding of its nature 
and aetiology in order to learn how it can best be overcome.” (Miall et al. 
1999: 43, added emphasis). Its objective “is not the elimination of conflict, 
which would be both impossible and […] sometimes undesirable. Rather, the 
aim of conflict resolution is to transform actually or potentially violent conflict 
into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change. This is an 
unending task as new forms and sources of conflict arise.” (Miall et al. 1999: 
22).  
The Need for Multidisciplinary Knowledge and Skills 
The breaking down of knowledge in the name of science is probably a 
significant reason for humanity's persistent failure to control its 
destiny…[People] tend to perceive situations in a limited context, to seek 
limited remedies for problems and generally to reduce seemingly complex 
variables to simple proposition… This lack of a holistic view obviously leads 
to superficial, false and often damaging policy decisions. (Burton 1997: 130, 
as quoted in Sandole 2001: 2). 
Conflict Resolution emerged and developed as a multidisciplinary area of 
study out necessity and conviction. It has drawn on many disciplines with a 
view to addressing properly the multiple problems of man’s society. Miall, 
Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999: 42) and Sandole (1993, 1998) offer a 
good account of this cross-disciplinary inspiration. As most of CR theorists, 
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they stress the original influence of early studies of human behaviour and 
labour-management relations in the area of industries and organisations. The 
list includes; Anthropology, Biology, History, International Relations, Pacifism, 
Physiology, Political Science, Psychoanalysis, Psychology, Religious 
Studies, Schizophysiology, Social Psychology, and Sociology.  
Following the failure of conflict interventions in the early 1990s, Conflict 
Resolution benefited a great deal from a wealth of constructive criticisms 
from critical theorists, development studies, cultural studies, gender studies. 
More attention has been drawn to (i) the need to scrutinise the link between 
the search for power and self-perpetuating discursive violence and 
oppression along Foucault’s line of thought (Fetherston 2000); (ii) the 
necessity to intervene at all levels, in particular the grass-root one, of the 
affected society (Lederach 1997); (iii) the imperative to avoid or minimise 
negative effects of both cultural imperialism or universalism and cultural 
relativism or particularism (Salem 1997; Avruch 1998; Duffey 2000); and (iv) 
the need to acknowledge and properly address the discrimination and 
exclusion of women within and across societies (Taylor and Miller (eds.) 
1994; Francis 2001). The integration of these and other contributions from 
relevant fields and disciplines underpins the complexity theory by which 
“everything is connected to everything else”, including nature and nurture 
(Sandole 1998: 11). This means that conflict analysts and resolvers need “all 
the bits or […] levels represented” in order to avoid to fall victim of 
“disciplinary fragmentation of knowledge into zealously guarded ‘sovereign 
units’”, which “breeds arrogant ethnocentrism and comedic, if not also 
dangerous, replays of the scenario of the three blind men, each assuming 
that the bit of the elephant he has grabbed onto represents the totality of the 
beast.” (Sandole 1998: 11, added emphasis). 
Conflict Theory and Analysis  
The normal conflict has many actors, many goals and many issues, is 
complex, is not easily mapped, yet mapping is essential. (Galtung 1998: 6-
7). 
Adequate conflict analysis – polémologie, to borrow the French terminology 
– has from the start, been the essential prerequisite for normative conflict 
resolution. (Miall et al. 1999: 65). 
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Human Needs Theory 
Deterrence does not deter sane behaviours, and the power political frame 
[is] unrealistic because no account [is] taken of relevant human factors: there 
are ontological, inherent human needs that cannot be suppressed, (needs of 
identity and recognition that are the bases of relatedness), which make 
deterrence sometimes irrelevant at all societal levels. The only option, in 
politically realistic terms, [is] to resolve the social and behavioural problems 
that [lead] to specific conflicts, and not try merely to suppress them or to 
settle them by coercion. (Burton 2001a: 4). 
Explicit in the above quote is the existence of limits to the patience and 
tolerance of humans when some of their cherished needs are actually or 
potentially denied and or threatened. Since the 1970s onwards, Burton 
consistently sustained that individuals or groups will resort to any means and 
assume any risks and punishment in defence and pursuit of their needs. 
Unlike interests, which are material and may therefore be in short supply 
from time to time, needs are non-material and, therefore, non-negotiable 
through power bargaining. They are to be satisfied. This is possible because, 
for instance, “the more security and recognition one party to a relationship 
experiences, the more others are likely to experience”. (Burton 1990: 242, as 
cited in Miall et al. 1999: 47). Likewise conflicts, unlike disputes, are to be 
resolved and not settled (Burton 2001a: 4) because they involve needs. 
Therefore, deterrence is illusory and counter-productive in situation involving 
needs, since it only increases the perception of frustration of those 
subjugated to coercion. For Burton, frustration, that is, “interference with the 
occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behaviour 
sequence” (Dollard et al. 1939: 7, as quoted in Sandole 1993: 13), is the 
main cause of violent behaviour. This explains why Burton has always 
defended his frame of ontological human needs (identity, recognition and 
security) as representing a useful and better analytical tool for understanding 
both domestic and international problems such as the decline of the 
international system based on nation-states; the inadequacy of former 
colonial boundaries; demands for greater autonomy of minority ethnic 
communities; inner city violence and unrest, “widespread and protracted 
violence wherever nation-state authorities seek to suppress secessionist 
movements.” (Burton 2001a: 6). 
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Logically, Burton’s Need Theory, also referred to as the Basic Human Needs 
Theory (BHNT) and which he proudly presented as “a holistic theory of 
human behaviour”, emerged and developed as an alternative to post-World 
War II theories of conflict and conflict resolution. These were, in his view, 
inspired by power politics and “legal frames”, and oriented towards “self-
promotion of dominant groups in their own short-term interests.” (Burton 
2001a: 3). His aim was to provide a conceptual alternative approach that 
would help “tackle thoughtfully and constructively problems such as 
environmental destruction and increasing violence within and between 
societies.” (Burton 2001a: 5). His problem solving, the practical application of 
the Needs Theory, refers to “interactive processes” whereby conflicting 
parties are helped identify the sources of their problem, revealing possible 
options that can satisfy their needs. It is therefore a “facilitation process [that 
is] essentially non-bargaining, non-negotiating, at least until the analysis of 
the situation is complete, until there is agreement on the nature and sources 
of the conflict, and until details of options have been discussed.” 
(Burton2001a: 6). At the decision making level, the approach implies that 
decision makers acquire insights into the conflict, assess the costs and 
consequences of policies in the longer term before taking decisions, “rather 
than relying on coercion in the event of adverse responses.” (Burton 2001a: 
4). 
Assessing Burton’s Contribution 
According to various CR theorists and analysts, Burton is not credited for 
inventing the Needs Theory, but for having given it “its most impassioned and 
uncompromising expression.” (Rubenstein 2001: 1). He is renowned for 
using the theory to ground “the field of conflict analysis and resolution […] in 
a defensible theory of the person.” (Rubenstein 2001: 1). The “personalists 
held that the individual was unchangeably aggressive and the situationalists 
that he/she was infinitely malleable.” (Rubenstein 2001: 1). For Burton, no 
amount of persuasive deterrence or manipulative reward can prevent 
individuals or identity groups from pursuing their needs. Instead, more 
deterrence and manipulation trigger more anti-social behaviour and violence 
within and across societies. Other merits of Burton’s theory for CR theorists 
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and practitioners include the following. First, the BHNT establishes a clear 
distinction between (negotiable) interests and (non-negotiable) needs or  
values and the corresponding processes of conflict resolution. Burton insists 
that negotiable interests “can be dealt with by employing the conventional 
trinity of force, law, and/or power-based negotiation […] characteristic of 
strategic studies, conventional diplomacy, and ‘alternative dispute 
resolution’.” (Rubenstein 2001: 3).  
Contrariwise, needs and values “are not for trading” and require other 
methods and means, mainly problem-solving. Burton recommends to keep 
settlement or negotiation processes (appropriate for disputes, i.e. interests-
based problems) and problem-solving processes (more appropriate for 
needs-based problems) separate until such time when “both frames are part 
of general knowledge and training in both is readily available” in a way that 
practitioners may be able to use either frame according to the context and 
not according to what they better know to handle (Burton 2001a: 5). He 
suggests that, as a matter of principle, dispute-like situations be allocated to 
“persons trained in negotiation, and situations that are likely to have deep-
rooted elements to others with relevant analytical and facilitation training.” 
(Burton 2001a: 5). 
Human Needs in Context 
The most obvious flaw of Burton’s theory, pointed out by various critics like 
Avruch (1998) and espoused by Rubenstein and myself, lies in its being 
“indefensibly” essentialist or ontologist, “a-historical”, “apolitical”, and “de-
contextualised”, and as such non-realist: human needs cannot be analysed 
outside the political and social context in which they are manifested and 
fought for (Rubenstein 2001: 4). The identity need, that is, the need to be 
whom one wants to be or whom one believes one is; the need be different, 
be it in some aspects only, is a matter of culture. The latter is dynamic rather 
than static; it evolves over times and depending on contexts. The need for 
recognition is related to the identity need. It refers to the need for humans to 
have their distinct identity accepted and respected culturally, socially, 
politically, and ideologically.  
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Likewise, the security need generally derives from the fear of hurt to one’s 
physical and psychological integrity. In protracted social conflicts, it derived 
from the fear of identity loss and betrayal. It becomes a matter of survival in 
the psychological and moral sense. The Israeli-Palestine is a good case in 
point, as is Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi. “Biologizing” or 
“ontologizing” human needs therefore “forecloses the inquiry that should be 
made into the extent to which certain needs are becoming universal as a 
global culture comes painfully and convulsively into existence.” (Rubenstein 
2001: 4). “Ontologizing” human needs “also forecloses other necessary 
inquiries: for example, into the relationship between childhood and adult 
behaviour.” (Rubenstein 2001: 4). Rubenstein also points out the typological 
problem concerning the needs. Not all conflict theorists agree on their 
number or salience. According to Burton, the most salient needs are three or 
four: identity, recognition, and security (and personal development), with 
special importance of the first two. Galtung’s (1994: 72) list of basic needs 
include; the survival needs, well-being needs, identity needs, and the 
freedom needs. In 1973, Paul Sites identified eight essential needs whose 
satisfaction would be indispensable to avoid ‘non-deviant’, ‘non-violent’ 
behaviour of individuals: (1) consistency of response; (2) stimulation; (3) 
security; (4) recognition; (5) justice; (6) meaning; (7) rationality; and (8) 
control (Sites 1973, as quoted in Rubenstein 2001: 1). 
Rubenstein contends that Burton’s original error which led him to 
‘absolutizing’ human needs is that, like Galtung, he “departed quite 
deliberately from Abraham Maslow's post-Freudian psychology, with its 
hierarchy of developmental needs seemingly rooted in unacknowledged 
Western and bourgeois cultural values.” (Rubenstein 2001: 4). By “extracting 
basic needs from the mental structures postulated by Freud and his 
successors”, BHN theorists threw the baby out with the bath water, thus 
putting “emotional and cognitive dynamics into a ‘black box’, much as their 
behaviourist predecessors had done.” (Rubenstein 2001: 5). In Rubenstein’s 
view, much could be gained by opening up the black box and asking some 
fundamental questions including the following ones: (i) Are imperative needs 
expressions of a libidinal drive, as Freud thought? (ii) Do they emerge in the 
course of human development, as Erikson (1963) and others believed? (iii) Is 
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their nature and role best explained by cognitive theory, discourse analysis, 
or some other perspective on mind and personality (Rubenstein 2001: 5)?  
Generic Theory of Conflict 
Drawing on an impressive wealth of studies in most existing disciplines, 
Sandole (1993, 1998) has come up with a useful generic theory of conflict 
formation and escalation with relevant implications for conflict intervention 
that provides some answers to Rubenstein-suggested research questions. 
His “embryonic generic theory”, as he labels it, postulates the following 
(Sandole 1998: 11-13). First, Sandole asserts that there exists, in human 
beings, a physiological mechanism that requires some kind of stimulation to 
be activated to produce violent reactions, and which can however be 
influenced by learning. Sandole indicates that his hypothesis is loaded in 
Paul MacLean’s (1975, 1978) theory of man’s “triune brain”. The latter is 
described as being constituted of (i) reptilian, (ii) limbic, and (iii) cerebral 
cortex subsystems corresponding to the phylogenetic evolution of humankind 
from the reptilian to modern man. The first two, allegedly inherited from 
reptilian and mammalian antecedents of humans, are concerned primarily 
with the ‘Self’ and the preservation of species. When stimulated, they 
produce physiological reaction associated with “preparation for attack”. 
However, unlike other animals or reptilian and mammalian descendants, 
humankind is expected to be governed more by the cerebral cortex than any 
of the other two because the cerebral cortex is more developed in human 
beings than in any other living species.  
Second, the possibility for the limbic part of human brain (passion) for 
dominating the neo-cortical one (reason) during instances of actual or 
perceived violations of one’s basic needs for, among others, recognition, 
identity, and security increases the probability of a violent response to the 
perceived source (or a surrogate of the source) of the frustrated needs. Third, 
real or perceived structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1969) at various 
levels of our external environment, such as rank disequilibrium (Sandole 
1993: 12, citing Galtung 1964) or relative deprivation (Sandole 1993: 12, 
citing Gurr 1970), feed frustration. Four, the frustration-of-needs−aggression 
nexus is both stimulated by, and in turn stimulates, ethnocentrism and 
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political realism. Five, Sandole argues that when two or more actors so 
characterised are parties to a conflict, then the frustration-of-
needs−aggression nexus can generate a quasi-deterministic spiral, reflective 
of action-reaction processes, with reciprocal, imitated increases in the 
capability to wage war, and in other steps to war. The more involved in this 
process the actors become, the more they will tend to over-perceive and 
overreact to threatened and actual assaults to needs, even in cases where 
their capabilities have been reduced. This will fuel further the spiral, and 
increase the probability of generating negative self-fulfilling prophecies 
(NSFPs).  
Six, NSFPs may be reflective of self-stimulating and or self-perpetuating 
conflict processes as well as of action-reaction processes, or a combination 
of both. Action-reaction processes can operate independently of self-
stimulating and or self-perpetuating conflict processes. However, over time, 
in protracted conflict situations, will probably give rise to the latter, that is, a 
culture of violence. Seven, NSFPs, or conflicts-as-process, as well as 
conflicts-as-start-up conditions, can be further exacerbated by environmental 
shocks and uncertainties associated with developments at the international 
and global level. These include, among others, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction; the "Malthusian nightmare revisited"; the collapse of 
previously existing political and other systems, and corresponding increases 
in the number of political units and in territorial contiguity; and increases in 
the amount of violence and war worldwide. Finally, Sandole finds that third 
parties enter the scene at the conflict-as-process level. Their ‘trick’, he 
suggests, is to create the ‘magic’ by which competitive processes driven by 
political realism can be replaced, or at least supplemented, by cooperative 
processes of conflict resolution inspired by political idealism. 
Assessing Generic Theory 
Sandole’s generic theory sheds significant light on some of the still shadowy 
parts of the inside world of humans and its interaction with the external 
environment in conflict formation and escalation processes. His contribution 
is original in that he brings back the baby, be it part of it only, into the bath 
water, using relevant findings in physiology and psychoanalysis. Perhaps 
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because of this, Sandole stresses the individual level as the most important 
for analysing causes and conditions of conflict. Like Burton (1984: 19), 
Sandole does not consider the distance from the individual level to the 
societal or international level important because, he argues, “[m]uch of what 
applies at the individual level has been or can be applied at the societal level 
and beyond” (Sandole 1993: 15), in spite of some clear and understandable 
differences of scale and appearance to be born in mind unless one wants to 
fall prey to reductionism. In his view, “individuals are still involved in across 
the spectrum of different levels of analysis, as decision-makers, by 
implication, so are individual-level causes and conditions.” (Sandole 1993: 
15). 
Sandole also offers a useful description of conflicts as either start-up 
conditions (underlying causes or “incendiary materials”) or as processes 
(immediate causes). This distinction is very important for determining both 
the type and timing of conflict intervention. Finally, Sandole defends third 
party’s intervention as being indispensable much more on pragmatic than 
moral grounds. In some instances, he argues, only a third party can unlock 
those conflicting parties locked into “a decision-making quandary”, 
particularly in situations whereas they are presented with “equally 
unattractive choices”, or when positive elements of a particular option are 
cancelled out by its negative ones (Sandole 1998: 5). 
Azar’s ‘Protracted Social Conflicts’ model 
Developed in the 1970s and 1980s, the protracted social conflicts (PSCs) 
model went almost un-noticed in the conventional literature on conflict (Miall 
et al. 1999: 70). Indeed, during this period, world’s most “attention was 
focussed on the East-West conflict and its spectre of thermonuclear 
annihilation; the endlessly intractable Middle East conflict and the Northern 
Irish ‘Troubles’; the brutal Apartheid system in South Africa; the inexplicable 
Greek-Cypriot/Turkish-Cypriot conflict, and the like” (Sandole 2001: 1). Yet, 
the model constituted a major qualitative shift in the way violent conflicts 
were understood and explained. Azar coins some conflicts “protracted” 
because they are deep-seated “in religious, cultural or ethnic identity” (Azar 
1990: 2, as quoted in Cavanaugh 2000: 66), have no organic, close end 
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cycle, and can alternately remain non-manifest (latent) or manifest (overt) 
over periods depending on the circumstances. Concerning the recurrence of 
PSCs, Azar stresses the deprivation of human needs as the main 
precondition for conflict escalation from its otherwise essentially creative role 
in human relationships (Burton 1972) to high levels of intensity and direct 
violence. Other preconditions include, in addition to the communal 
composition, the state’s role in the frustration or satisfaction of needs and the 
international linkages such as economic dependency and politico-military 
alliances (Miall et al. 1999: 73-74; Cavanaugh 2000: 66). 
Preconditions of protracted social conflicts (PSC): Azar’s typology 









Communal content Degree of ethnic 
heterogeneity 
Politics, political economy Governance Scale of political repression 




Volumes of arms exports 
and imports 
Source: Miall et al. 1999: 76. 
 
Azar’s conceptual and analytical model departed from the conventional 
perspective to conflict mainly in four main aspects. Azar’s model was amply 
exposed in his most cited work: The Management of Protracted Social 
Conflicts (1990). First, it stresses the multiplicity and dynamism of the causes 
of post-World War conflicts. Second, it dismisses any clear-cut distinction 
between domestic and international sources of conflict and confers a more 
determining role to the former. Third, Azar’s model stresses the open end, 
that is, the absence of “a starting and an end point of protracted social 
conflicts. Finally, the model highlights the resilience of communal factors in 
PSCs (Miall et al. 1999: 72-74). On this last point, Azar contends that a 
protracted social conflict is a manifestation of “the prolonged and often violent 
struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security [protection 
from physical, social and psychological harm], recognition and acceptance 
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[need of individual and groups to feel recognised, accepted and fairly treated 
as having specific defining identity features], fair access to political 
institutions and economic participation” (Azar 1991: 93, as quoted in Miall et 
al. 1999: 71, added  emphasis). The need for fair access to and participation 
in social, economic, and political institutions has an added value in that 
effective participation “may not be just an interest, but – along communal 
recognition and physical security – a basic development need.” (Cavanaugh 
2000: 67). 
Consequently, Azar identifies three determinants and process dynamics that 
activate conflicts: (i) communal actions and strategies; (iii) state actions and 
strategies; and (iii) in-built conflict mechanisms, that is, “mutually reinforcing 
dynamics of intergroup conflict escalation and de-escalation” (Miall et al. 
1999: 88). Azar confers special role onto the communal actions and 
strategies, “tracing the deepest source of PSC to the societal (sub-state) 
level and locating it in the unsatisfied human needs of identity groups.” (Miall 
et al. 1999: 88). By communal actions and strategies, reference is made to 
the necessity to look into the “the ways in which dissatisfied groups come to 
articulate grievances, mobilize, specify goals and strategies and, eventually, 
mount a militarised challenge to existing state power-holders” as an integral 
part of conflict formation and escalation process (Miall et al. 1999: 88). Azar 
has found out that, as a result of the process, more often than not painful 
(since achieved through violent struggles), of state formation and nation-
building throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, most societies here and there 
(with striking salience in the underdeveloped world) are multi-communal (with 
more than one identity group). They are “characterised by the disarticulation 
between the state and society as a whole” and hegemonic domination of one 
group to the detriment of the others whose essential needs are denied or 
frustrated (Azar 1990: 6-7, as cited in Cavanaugh 2000: 66). In this regard, 
the DRC conflict is case in point. As highlighted later in the chapter on the 
background to this research, it is deep-rooted in the brutally exploitative, 
repressive, discriminatory, patrimonial, and hegemonic domination practiced 
first by King Leopolod II of Belgium,  second by Belgian colonial masters, and 
third by the successive post-independence regimes; all of whom ill-fated the 
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life of over 200-hundreds ethnic groups who make up the Congolese mosaic 
society. 
Like some other CR theorists and analysts (Mitchell 1981 and Burton 1987), 
Azar recognises the important role of perception in the conflict escalation 
process. Both individuals and groups indeed tend to interpret the denial or 
violation of their needs, in particular the access need, as reflecting decision-
makers’ disregard and rejection of their distinct identity. Perceived alienation 
and victimisation generate strong sentiment of in-group belonging and 
cohesion within the affected groups, and increase the potential of collective 
violence. In her application of Azar’s explanatory model to the Northern 
Ireland conflict, Cavanaugh (2000: 68) makes the following pertinent 
observation:  
Mobilisation of marginalized […] group occurs when individual victimization is 
recognized on a communal level. The mobilization of these groups as manifested in 
collective protest is often met by suppressive rather than accommodative measures 
by the dominant group. What may begin as a [genuine and legitimate] demand for 
fulfilment of one need can, if felt unfulfilled, soon envelop a wider range of issues. 
This spillover effect may serve to mobilize a greater participation within the 
aggrieved group. The communal actions and strategies employed by the [aggrieved] 
group may change to become more stringent or extreme, depending on the 
response of the political authority; civil disobedience may quickly turn into political 
violence. 
Perhaps nowhere else than in the Great Lakes region of Africa do in-group 
belonging, solidarity, and cohesion along ethnic and tribal lines play a 
decisive role in the violent seizure, accumulation, and exercise of absolute 
power and in the formation and escalation of conflicts into mass atrocity 
crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing (ethnocide), 
and genocide). 
International Social Conflicts (ISCs) 
Some have coined conflicts displaying the above listed constitutive features 
as ‘international social conflicts’, ISCs in short (Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse 1996: 87-105; Hansen et al., 2000: 10-11). ISCs become easily 
drawn-out and exacerbated and their causes – deep and immediate - vary as 
much as their manifestations, involving various actors with changing interests 
and strategies to achieve them (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 104; 
Galtung 1998: 6-7). ISCs differ from Cold War conflicts in that:  
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 they occur outside the superpower ideological rivalries by proxies; 
 they emerge in reaction to the failure of inept, corrupt, repressive or 
collapsed state systems to fairly provide citizens with some of the basics 
taken for granted in the developed world;  
 they translate, in most instances, the determination of the victims to 
stand up and fight for their rights along group identity lines across 
conventional social classes and state borders; and  
 they are fought by identity groups, organised bands, and militia acting on 
their own or in connivance with one or more internal or external 
supporters. 
In their worst form, ISCs are fought by unscrupulous and unaccountable 
militias, criminals, arms smugglers, mafias, mercenaries, state-sponsored 
and armed civilians who terrorise, extort, kill innocent civilians and force large 
number of others into internal displacement or exile (Cater 2002). Some have 
referred to this phenomenon as warlordism (Mackinlay 2000). Their effective 
handling is possible only through a range of solutions - short and long-term 
ones - that pay due attention to their multiple, inter-related immediate and 
root causes at all levels: individual, communal, national, regional and 
international. By each and all these characteristics, the tragedy of the DR 
Congo is by far an illustrative case. 
Conflict Handling  
Whether conflict leads to destructive action, indifference or constructive 
action, or some mixture, is for us to decide. (Galtung 2000: 51). 
Conflict Resolution, despite its diverse nature and criticisms against it, 
remains essentially traceable to its strong commitment to (i) “the assumption 
that aggressive win-lose styles of engagement in violent conflict usually incur 
costs that are not only unacceptably high for the conflict parties, but also for 
world society in general”; and to (ii) “a search for ways of transforming 
actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful processes of political and 
social change.” (Miall et al. 1999: 63-64). This stance is rooted in another 
distinctive assumption of Conflict Resolution that posits the following: “the 
way we deal with conflict is a matter of habit and choice” and it “is possible to 
change habitual responses and exercise intelligent choices.” (Miall et al. 
1999: 2-3). In other words, CR theorists assume that constructive handling of 
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violent human and social behaviours is not only desirable but also feasible 
not only for the conflicting parties but also to the international community in 
general. Arguably, this assumption underpinned the creation of the European 
integration project in the early nineteen fifties, to prevent the relapse of the 
continent into World War-like intra-European confrontations, and the 
inception of the CFSP and ESDP in the nineties, to address post-Cold War 
International Social Conflicts.  
A Matter of Habit: Discriminant Learning and Positive Reinforcement 
As a matter of habit, dealing with conflict reflects Bandura’s discriminant 
learning and positive reinforcement by which the individual develops “a 
selected reaction to certain stimulus, a particular relationship between a 
certain stimulus x and response y” (Sandole 1993: 11, citing Bandura 1973). 
Once this stimulus-response pattern has been established and serves as a 
norm for the individual in similar situations, and brings successes, it over time 
becomes so internalised that “it will become progressively more difficult to 
undermine that internalized x-y connection, even in case where it no longer 
applies.” (Sandole 1993: 11). In Sandole’s view, this response generalization 
and internalisation explains why “Realpolitik is so compelling a normative 
guide to action” in case of perceived threats. It tends to dominate 
international relations because it has been learned, used with rewards 
(instead punishment) and internalised over time. Sandole and other CR 
theorists, analysts and practitioners espouse the thesis that “learning can 
play a powerful role in conflict especially in the escalation and perpetuation of 
violent conflict systems.” (Sandole 1993: 11).  
A Matter of Choice: Four-in-One v. One-in-Four Paradigms 
Theorists of learning in conflict handling optimistically assume that what is 
learnt can be unlearnt and intelligent choices can be made mainly through 
acknowledgement and comparison of different paradigms, that is, lens with 
which social reality is looked at, analysed, interpreted, and dealt with. 
Sandole (1993: 4) has identified “at least four paradigms relevant to conflict 
and conflict resolution at all levels, from the interpersonal to international”. 
These are Political Realism (Realpolitik); Political Idealism (Idealpolitik); 
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Marxism; and Non-Marxist Radical Thought (NMRT). The first two are “polar 
opposite” and “each can be viewed as a reaction to the other.” Political 
Realism tends to be the dominant system and has three components: 
Descriptive Realism, Explanatory Realism and Prescriptive Realism. 
Descriptively, Political Realism defends the view of the world as potential and 
actual battleground. Explanatorily, it inspires the belief that two factors 
account for the battleground state of affairs. First, the existence, at all levels, 
of a negative core genotypic basis - the flaw with which all human beings are 
born, reminiscent of the biological determinism, as advocated by Koestler 
(1967) who metaphorically spoke of the ghost in the machine. Metaphorically, 
the “ghost” means the in-built flaw in human nature, while the machine 
stands for “human kind”. Second, there does not exist “appropriate conflict 
resolution mechanisms”, in particular at international level. This premise is in 
line with Waltz’s (1959: 232, as quoted by Sandole 1993: 4) assertion that 
“wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them”.  
Prescriptively, Political Realism recommends successful defence and pursuit, 
by all means, of one’s interests as the ‘only morality’ in a world of anarchy. It 
thus encourages the use of what Morton Deutsch once coined “‘competitive’ 
processes of conflict resolution: power-based, adversarial, confrontational, 
zero-sum, win-lose’ approaches to dealing with conflict.” (Deutsch 1973, as 
cited in Sandole 1993: 4). For Sandole and other Conflict Resolution 
theorists, Political Realism was the determinative paradigm of “superpowers 
decision-makers during the Cold War” and “continues to dominate 
perceptions and behavior” in some post-Cold War conflict situations. This 
makes the association of Political Realism with “destructive outcomes” less 
surprising. 
Political Idealism (Idealpolitik) is the second mainstream paradigm through 
which social reality is often seen, analysed, interpreted and dealt with. It 
concedes to Political Realism its description of an alarming frequency and 
intensity of violence, but does reject its explanation and prescription. Political 
idealists sustain that “violent conflict can be the result of many contributing 
factors, including learned responses to frustrated goal-seeking behavior.” 
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(Sandole 1993: 4). Accordingly, the range of responses is wide, “including 
counter-violence (in self-defence), but also non-violent means for bringing 
about change in political, social, economic, and other systems to eliminate 
causes and conditions of violent conflict.” In this sense, Political Idealists 
encourage the use of Deutsch’s second type of approach to conflict: 
“cooperative processes of conflict resolution: non-adversarial, non-
confrontational, non-zero-sum (positive-sum), ‘win-win’ approaches to 
dealing with conflict” (Deutsch 1973, as cited in Sandole 1993: 4).  
This makes the association of Political Idealism with constructive outcomes 
possible, appropriate and preferable. For Sandole, the basic difference 
between Political Realism and Political Idealism is that of “nature vs. nurture”. 
While Political Realism “stresses ‘containing’, ‘deterring’, and making the best 
of a basically negative, biologically determined situation”; Political Idealism 
“emphasises the changeability of environment and therefore of behaviour.” 
Therefore, “one orientation is clearly pessimistic in outlook while the other is 
optimistic” (Sandole 1993: 5). As for Marxism and Non-Marxist Radical 
Thought (NMRT), Sandole presents both as representing “combinations of 
Political Realism and Idealism.” In his view, Marxism, like Realism, “stresses 
the inevitability of conflict (between socio-economic classes). Like Idealism, it 
emphases “structural change, especially in the system of ownership of the 
means of production, as the way to bring about behavioural change.” Both 
Marxism and Idealism “have a variable conception of human nature, which is 
dependent on environment, in contrast to Realism’s fixed conception of 
human nature (irrespective of environment).” (Sandole 1993: 5).  
On the other hand, Non-Marxist Radical Thought recognises, like Realism, 
the “potency of our biological nature”, such as the ‘power of human needs in 
world society’ as developed by Coate and Rosati (1988, cited in Sandole 
1993: 5). Like Idealism, NMRT “stresses structural change to bring social, 
political, economic, and other institutions more in line with basic human 
needs”. It also “has a sense of the validity, power, and rationality of 
cooperative processes (and constructive outcomes) as the only way to 
achieve a fair, long-lasting, durable solution to the problems underlying 
manifest conflict.” (Sandole 1993: 5). Like Marxism, it recognises “that the 
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changes necessary to (re)align institutions with needs – environment with 
‘human nature’ – are often radical and, therefore, attempts to effect such 
change, coupled with the ‘role-defence’ response to such attempts by 
supporters of a threatened status quo, are likely to generate and sustain 
violent conflict cycles.” (Sandole 1993: 5). 
Conflict Handling: Paradigms and Worldviews 
 
 Description Explanation Prescription 
Political 
Realism 
Anarchy. - Inherently negative 
human nature. 
 - Lack of (appropriate) 
conflict resolution 
mechanisms. 
All-out competition and 
deterrence: defence and pursuit 
of self-interests by all means. 
Political 
Idealism 














Structural change, through 




Potency of human 
biological nature (power 
of human needs). 
Structural change, through 
violence if necessary. 
 
In a nutshell, both Marxism and NMRT “are like Realism in that they see 
competitive processes of conflict resolution (and often destructive outcomes) 
characterising the efforts of disenfranchised, disempowered, need-violated 
persons and minority outgroups generally, attempting to redefine their 
relationships with resistant supporters of a status quo which benefits only the 
ingroup.” (Sandole 1993: 5). For Sandole, the paradox for Marxists and 
NMRT proponents “is that the use of competitive processes, intentionally or 
ostensibly, to clear the way for structural and cooperative processes, may 
generate self-perpetuating violent conflict system which fall right into the 
Realist category (a fate which could befall Idealists as well, who become 
involved in wars to end war’).” (Sandole 1993: 5-6). Sandole (1993: 6, 2001: 
7) prefers the combination of the four conflict orientations and the two 
approaches into an overall basis for examining the different causes and 
conditions of conflict and strategies for handling them. 
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Three-Stage Intervention Strategy 
Most Conflict Resolution theorists espouse Sandole’s (2001: 7) suggestion 
“to complement elements of Realpolitik with elements of Idealpolitik, 
Marxism, and NMRT to ‘capture the complexity of conflicts.’” They have 
consistently argued that whilst in some cases (of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing, in particular) the use of force, preferably under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and with international consensus and legitimacy, may be needed 
to control violence, inclusive dialogue and participation (Galtung 1996: 271), 
broad-based compromise and sustained external support to nurture peace 
(Hampson 1996) through the building and strengthening of local peace 
constituencies and effective broad-based institutions should prevail and given 
preference when addressing violent conflicts (Woodhouse 2000). Here lies 
the key difference between the allegedly predominant ‘International Conflict 
Resolution model’ that is constantly criticised because of its assumed 
universal applicability (Salem 1993; Duffield 1997; Clapham 1998a, 1998b; 
Daley 2006; Autesserre 2009) and the ‘Conflict Resolution model’ with which 
it is often confused. Reflective of this essence and difference is the conflict 
intervention continuum that Galtung (1976), already in the mid-seventies, 
prescribed in his three approaches to peace – peacemaking, peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding – and which have since then been refined in a three-stage 
conflict intervention process consisting of Conflict Prevention, Conflict 
Management, and Post-conflict Peacebuilding. The following section 
addresses each of the three stages separately. 
Conflict Prevention 
Sandole (1998: 12) defines Conflict Prevention (CP) as meaning to stop the 
house from catching on fire. He gave as an example the mission of the UN 
Preventive Deployment Force [UNPREDEP] in Macedonia. Likewise, Miall et 
al. (1999: 96) conceive of CP as referring to “those factors or actions which 
prevent armed conflicts or mass violence from breaking out.” Miall and his 
colleagues also present the aversion of violent conflicts in Macedonia and in 
some other Balkan states that broke away from the former Yugoslavia and or 
the Russia Union as successful cases of preventive intervention. More 
interesting for the purpose of this analysis is their claim that the prevention of 
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conflict was central to CR from the very start of this subject area of study in 
the 1950s and their presentation of CP at its present stage. According to 
them, CP dates back to Boulding’s idea of Conflict Resolution as meaning 
“the development of a knowledge base in which ‘social data stations’ would 
emerge, forming a system analogous to a network of weather to produce 
indicators ‘to identify social temperature and pressure and predict cold or 
warm fronts’” (Miall et al. 1999: 43, citing Kerman 1974: 82). They see this 
idea as the right presage of contemporary CP as an early warning and early 
action mechanism, which was introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
in particular following the failures of conflict intervention in Rwanda and 
former Yugoslavia. Miall et al. (1999: 101) assign a two-fold role to early 
warning: (i) to monitor areas prone to conflicts and (ii) to devise ways for 
“early action to nip a potential conflict in the bud where this is feasible and 
appropriate.” Its task is also two-fold: (i) to identify the type of conflict and 
location and (ii) to monitor and appraise the escalation of identified conflicts. 
Monitoring of areas prone to violent conflicts 
One line of approach for early warning to achieve its aim is to determine the 
circumstances under which conflicts are likely to occur, using methods and 
techniques pertaining to both qualitative conflict monitoring and quantitative 
conflict monitoring. Qualitative conflict monitoring is concerned with the 
provision of quality and timely information, analyses on particular cases and 
societies. On the other hand, quantitative / statistical conflict monitoring deals 
with number of indicators of conflict proneness on particular cases and 
societies. The results of this conflict watch method vary depending on the 
variables used and are difficult to generalise.  
In comparative perspective, qualitative monitoring offers more advantage 
because it “offers vastly more content-rich and contextual information than 
quantitative statistical analysis” (Miall et al. 1999: 102, added emphasis). Its 
less attractive side lies in noise and information overload (ibid.), which 
renders its management and distribution in a digestive way very challenging. 
Indeed, information saturation may cause fatigue and confusion when it 
comes to make selection. Still, “[g]iven the current state of the art, qualitative 
monitoring is likely to be the most useful for gaining early warning of conflict 
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in particular cases: the expertise of the area scholar and the local observer, 
steeped in situational knowledge, is difficult to beat.” (Miall et al. 1999: 102). 
Devising ways for effective conflict prevention 
The more effective is monitoring, the greater the possibility for designing 
effective preventive tools. Drawing on a range of both qualitative and 
quantitative studies on conflict proneness indicators and factors, in particular 
Ted Gurr (1993, 1998), Miall et al. (1999: 108) produce the following table on 
likely factors likely to generate conflict and possible preventors at each of the 
five analytical levels retained by various conflict theorists and analysts: 
individual, societal, national, regional, and international. 
 









Change in international order. 
Regional 
Regional diasporas. Regional security arrangements. 
 
State 
Ethnic stratification. Consociational politics/ 
federalism/autonomies. 
Weak economies. Development. 
Authoritarian rule. Legitimacy, democratisation. 





Weak societies. Strengthening civic society, institutions. 
Weak communications. Round Tables, workshops, community 
relations. 
Polarised attitudes. Cross-cultural work. 
Elite/ Individual Exclusionist policies. Stronger moderates. 
Source: Miall et al. (1999: 108); slightly adapted. 
 
 
Third Parties’ Contribution to Conflict Prevention 
The contribution of third parties to the prevention of conflict escalation may 
take different forms. On policy level, Miall et al. (1999: 111-113) have made 
an inventory of some of the measures for both light intervention (for light 
prevention) and deep intervention (for deep prevention). Their listed policy 
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measures for light intervention (crisis management and preventive 
diplomacy) include official diplomacy: mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, 
good offices, peace conferences, envoys, conflict prevention centres, and hot 
lines. Light intervention measures also include non-official diplomacy (private 
mediation, message carrying and creation of back channels, peace 
commissions, problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and 
round tables). Besides, they comprise support to peacemaking efforts by 
local actors (church-facilitated talks, debates between politicians, cross-party 
discussions, and powerful states’ inducements “in an effort to twist the arms 
of governments, strengthen moderate leaders and counteract the influence of 
extremists”. Such inducements consist of the following:  
 Political measures (mediation with muscle, mobilisation through regional 
and global organisations, and attempts to influence the media); 
 Economic measures (sanctions, emergency aid, and conditional offers of 
financial support); and 
 Military measures (preventive peacekeeping, arms embargoes, and 
demilitarisation). 
Policy measures for deep intervention include measures to strengthen or 
restore governance (promotion of and support to national conferences, 
constitutional making/reforming commissions). They also include election 
assistance (election monitoring); support to trials (monitoring human rights 
abuses, supporting judicial independence; and support to professional and 
independent media. To this list, one can add promotion of and support to 
other bodies of the civil society such as non-governmental organisations and 
non-state institutions and agencies involved in human rights activities, child 
education, gender equality promotion, grass root sustainable development. 
   
 Light Intervention: crisis 
management and preventive 
diplomacy 
















Measures to strengthen or restore 
governance 
Non-official Election assistance 
Support to Local Peacemaking 





Support to professional and 
independent media 
Economic measures 
Promotion of and support to the civil 
society at large 
Military measures  
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Justifying and Assessing Conflict Prevention 
The main assumption underlying the Conflict Prevention (CP) proposal is 
two-fold: (i) the prevention of violent conflict is desirable and (ii) the 
prevention of violent conflict is possible. On the desirability of CP, there does 
not seem to be any significant controversy. Like other CR proponents, Miall 
et al. (1999: 95-96) are of the view that, in light of the tragedy that bedevilled 
Rwanda and other regions in the early 1990s, it is definitely much better and 
much easier to handle conflicts and save lives before conflicting parties have 
reached a point of armed confrontation and large-scale violence. Evans 
(1998: 65) stresses, among others, motivation as an advantage of early 
prevention in that conflicting parties “are more likely to accept assistance 
while issues are still specific and before grievances accumulate and the 
desire for retribution becomes paramount.”  
Another advantage of early prevention is effectiveness, since intervention 
occurs “before issues have generalized, issues and parties have multiplied, 
positions have hardened, and actions have turned into ever more hostile 
reverberating echoes of threats and counterthreat.” (Evans 1998: 65) In 
terms of financial and human cost, many experiences also demonstrated that 
conflict prevention is cost-effective in comparison to the high cost of relief, 
protection, and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. From an 
internationalist point of view, conflict prevention is finally desirable because 
the causes and consequences of contemporary conflicts are located at 
national, regional and international levels, which is brought to the attention of 
the world public, “through worldwide media coverage, refugee flows, the 
impact of diasporas and the destabilisation of surrounding regions.” (Miall et 
al. 1999: 96) The second assumption, that is, the actual possibility to prevent 
destructive conflicts by removing the conditions that are necessary for such 
conflicts to occur, is the most controversial one. First, neo-realists would see 
the proposal, like the whole CR enterprise, as wishful thinking. In my view, 
such a stance is not totally immune from contradiction, not least because 
their concession (and indeed advice) that humans can and should do their 
best to get the best of a basically negative nature and anarchical 
environment does suggest some conflict prevention efforts, for example 
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deterrence! Where the real controversy lies is on determining when, how, 
and why conflict prevention has taken place, has succeed or failed. I do not 
intend here to engage in the epistemological debate on causality. The 
authors herein cited (Miall et al. 1999: 99-101) have fairly addressed the 
issue. My (additional) comment is that it is always difficult, even in retrospect, 
to determine for certain the causal relationship between a single factor and 
an event, partly because people ascribe different meanings (often 
competitive and contradictory) to the same event, depending on their 
interpretive paradigm and purposes. Hence, absolute and final knowledge is 
a myth. It is for this reason that discourse analysis is often required in order 
to deconstruct and reconstruct knowledge to show its multiple dimensions. In 
any case, policies and actions to prevent conflicts are, per se, as much as 
justifiable as are policies and actions to prevent road accidents, floods and 
robberies. One is never one hundred percent sure that a single action such 
as alcohol test (for preventing road accidents), dykes (for dealing with 
floods), or increased policing (for handling thefts and armed robberies) is 
responsible for failure or success. Sometimes, a road accident may happen 
without casualties because its occupants used safety belts rather than 
abstaining from alcohol. In the final analysis, what one would be expected to 
prove to oneself (in order to avoid self-blame and remorse) and to others (in 
order to avoid blame and possible punishment) is whether one has done 
one’s best out of one’s best knowledge, abilities, and means to prevent or 
help prevent whatever misfortune expected to be prevented from occurring. 
Decision and policy makers would be judged in function of their awareness 
and use of the best epistemic knowledge and prescriptions available to them 
on conflict prevention.  
For Conflict Prevention to be seen as satisfactory it needs to address both 
likely immediate causes and likely root causes of both particular possible 
conflicts and possible conflicts (Miall et al. 1999: 100). Miall et al. (1999) 
speak of Light Prevention (LP) when CP addresses immediate causes 
(dealing with conflict-as-process, in Sandole’s terminology) and of deep 
prevention (DP) when it addresses root causes (dealing with conflict-as-start-
up conditions, in Sandole’s terminology). Light prevention is judged 
successful when it averts armed conflict, that is, when it stops the house from 
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catching on fire. It is considered failed when the house catches on fire; that 
is, when outbursts of violence take place. On the other hand, deep 
prevention is considered successful when peaceful social change takes place 
before the house catch fire and or gets damaged, and un-successful when 
the result (of omission or inappropriate action) is conflict-prone situation in 
society (Miall et al. 1999: 118-127). In sum, Conflict Prevention refers to short 
and long-term decisions, policies, strategies, actions and activities 
undertaken with a view to preventing a crisis from escalating into open, 
intensive, and extensive violence and to laying the foundation required for 
peaceful social transformation to take hold before and not after the outbreak 
of the catastrophe. 
  
 Success and failure in conflict prevention 
 Success Failure 
Light Measures 
Armed/ violent conflict 
averted. 
Armed/ violent conflict takes 
place. 
Deep Measures 




Source: Miall et al. (1999: 127); slightly adapted. 
Conflict Management 
Generically, Conflict Management (CM) refers to a whole range of short and 
or long-term decisions, policies, strategies, actions and activities undertaken 
in order to contain, handle and or put an end to the vertical and spatial 
escalation of a conflict. From a Conflict Resolution angle, CM means “the 
limitation, mitigation and containment of violent conflict.” (Miall et al. (1999: 
21). On Sandole’s (1998: 12-13) typology of conflict intervention, Conflict 
Management ranks second, just after Conflict Prevention, and means, in his 
house fire metaphor, preventing “an existing fire from spreading”. He gives as 
example the mission of the UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR, in Bosnia. As 
a fire limitation, mitigation and containment process, CM is made of two 
components: peacemaking and peacekeeping. The former refers to (third 
party’s) efforts to induce conflicting parties to voluntarily reach a settlement to 
their conflicts, as is envisaged under Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter (on ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’). Peacemaking activities “can be 
identified with the search for creative, and at the same time acceptable and 
sustainable, outcomes of the conflict.” (Galtung 1996: 271). For Galtung,  
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There is one mistake which is no longer pardonable: the single-shot ‘table at 
the top’, the high table, for ‘leaders’. Rather, let one thousand conferences 
blossom, use modern communication technology to generate a visible flow 
of peace ideas from everywhere in society. Proposals may be contradictory - 
but why should peace look the same at all places? Tap the insights all over, 
marginalizing nobody, making peace-making itself a model of structural 
peace. To believe that a handful of diplomats can do it alone is like the (post-
) Stalinist belief that 400 apparatchiks can play the economy of 400 million. 
Or look at Israel/Palestine in the hands of the political leaders of both sides, 
peace movements apparently being deactivated. These issues are so 
terribly complex that mass participation in their solution is needed. And 
creativity can be found all over, when properly stimulated. (1996: 271). 
The second component of CM, that is peacekeeping, refers to the 
contemplation and actual use of force with a view to decreasing and 
neutralising the intensity of the fire, to use Sandole’s metaphor. It was 
following the failure of conflict intervention in the early 1990s (Somalia, 
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda) that voices requesting the use of force to avert or 
halt mass violence during peace operations increased and gained support. At 
the same time, proponents of Conflict Resolution made a strong case for 
complementarity of the two components. They referred “to peacekeeping as 
an important instrument of positive conflict transformation, as [peacekeeping] 
practitioners ha[d] come to employ psychological and communication 
strategies instead of conventional military force.” (Hansen et al. 2001: 10). 
They suggested that peacekeeping become more formally and systematically 
associated with certain tasks traditionally pertaining to Conflict Resolution 
and that peacekeepers be accordingly trained and equipped with the relevant 
skills. 
Military operation and peacekeeping / CR: behaviour differences and skills 
requirements 
Traditional Military Behaviour (Contemporary) Peacekeeping / Conflict Resolution 
No contact with civilians. 
Intense interaction with civilians and co-operation with 
civilian components of the peace mission. 
Use of basic military skills (non-
contact skills). 
Use of negotiation skills (contact skills). 
Destruction of opposing armed 
elements. 
Negotiation with opposing armed elements. 
Adversary role. Pacific role. 
Identified enemy. No identified enemy. 
End goal: military victory. End goal: resolving underlying conflict causes. 
Forcible. Consent based. 
Source: Hansen et al. (2001: 16); slightly adapted. 
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Moreover, it has been argued that, for effective conflict intervention, the 
number of qualified civil agents participating in peace operations be 
significantly increased in order to adequately address the non-military 
aspects (structural, cultural, social, and psychological) of post-Cold War 
conflicts (Weiss 1999). In his Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means, 
Galtung (1998: 12) suggested that, “peacekeeping operations could be 
improved by calling on expertise not only in military reasoning and the means 
of violence, but also in police skills, non-violence skills and mediation 
capabilities”. He and many others have even made the case for the 
involvement of less “military teeth”, to use Weiss’ expression, and more 
‘civilian teeth’, so to say, in peace operations.  
As a result of the integration of military and non-military elements, peace 
operations have been assigned wider and comprehensive functions that 
require them to be multilateral (involvement of several distinct actors), 
multidimensional (different components: military, civilians, police) and 
multinational and/or multicultural (different national and cultural backgrounds 
of participants) (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (eds.) 2000). The lead 
argument here is that Conflict Management should be conceived, designed, 
and implemented with a view to preparing the ground for Post-conflict 
Peacebuilding to which I turn now. 




Monitoring and verification of cease-fires. 
Cantonment. 
Disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. 
Overseeing the withdrawal of foreign forces. 
Mine-awareness education and mine-clearance. 





Establishment and maintenance of a judiciary system. 
Law enforcement. 
Monitoring, training and advising local enforcement authorities 




Political guidance of the overall peace process. 
Assistance in the rehabilitation of existing political institutions. 
Promotion of national reconciliation. 
Electoral Element 
Monitoring and verification of the electoral process. 
Education of the public about electoral processes. 
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Functions of multidimensional peacekeeping operations 
Assistance for the development of grass-roots democracy. 
Human Rights Element 
Monitoring of human rights. 
Investigation of cases of human rights violations. 
Promotion of human rights. 
Humanitarian Element 
Delivery of relief aid. 
Repatriation of refugees. 
Resettlement of displaced persons. 
Re-integration of ex-combatants. 
 
Source: Hansen et al. (2001: 4-5); slightly adapted. 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding  
When he first introduced the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ in the 1970s, Galtung 
(1975) assigned it the role of addressing “the practical implementation of 
peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and 
development”. Three decades later, the Canadian Peacebuilding Co-
ordinating Committee (CPCC) defined peacebuilding as being “the effort to 
promote human security in societies marked by conflict”, and its “overarching 
goal” as being “to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict 
without violence, as a means to achieve sustainable human security.” (Last 
2000: 80; quoting the CPCC). Both definitions - quite similar – are generic. 
They do not take into account the time and context of intervention, in which 
case peacebuilding can take place before, during and after violent conflict. It 
may even take place in the absence of real or potential conflict, simply in 
order to strengthen societies’ capacity to address their difficulties and 
problems, in which case it may go un-noticed as part of general (not specific) 
prevention. 
In the context of conflict intervention from a CR perspective, peacebuilding is 
more understood and used as “a comprehensive term that encompasses the 
full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards 
sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes.” (Lederach 1994: 14). More 
emphasis has been put on building relationships within the overall framework 
of conflict intervention continuum. Hence, peacebuilding “underpins the work 
of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing the structural issues and 
the long-term relationship between conflictants” (Miall et al. 1999: 22). 
Sandole (1998: 13) equates peacebuilding to conflict transformation and to 
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Burton’s conflict provention, and conceives of its role as being to “deal with 
the long-term relationships among the surviving occupants of the house, and 
between them and their ‘neighbors’, such that, ‘next time’, they can resort to 
less lethal means of conflict handling than burning down the house”. 
For CR theorists and proponents, peacebuilding has two main objectives: (i) 
prevent a relapse into direct (physical) violence (negative peace, in Galtung’s 
terminology) and (ii) promote self-sustaining peace (positive peace) by 
addressing the underlying (cultural, structural, economic, political, 
environmental) causes of violent conflict. In the context of UN post-settlement 
peacebuilding, Ramsbotham (2000: 182) offers a conceptual framework for 
peacebuilding made of five dimensions:  
 Military/security dimension;  
 Political/constitutional dimension;  
 Economic and social dimension;  
 Psycho/social dimension; and  
 International dimension.  
The latter, less often than not distinctively included by analysts, involves (1) 
direct, culturally sensitive support for the peace process; (2) transference to 
local control avoiding undue interference or neglect; and (3) integration into 
cooperative and equitable regional and global structures. 
Post-Settlement Peacebuilding: a possible framework 
 Short term 
measures 





Consolidation of new 
national army under 
civilian control 
Demilitarised politics 




army and police 








Overcome the challenge 
of first elections 
Establish tradition of good 
governance including the 
respect of democracy, 
human rights and rule of law 
Constitutional 
reform 
Peaceful transfer of 
power 
Development of civil society 





Humanitarian aid Rehabilitation of 
resettled persons 
Stable macro-economic 
policies and economic 
management 
Essential services Reviving agriculture Sustainable community 
development 
Communications Demining Distributional justice 
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Post-Settlement Peacebuilding: a possible framework 
 Short term 
measures 















to the peace 
process 
  
Transference to local 
control avoiding undue 
interference or neglect 
Integration into cooperative 
and equitable regional and 
global structures 
Source: Miall et al. (1999: 203) and Ramsbotham (2000: 182). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to answer the following question: What is the added 
value, if any, of Conflict Resolution (CR), as a subject area of study, with 
regard to systematic theorising about and handling of violent human and 
social behaviours? The aim was two-fold. First, I wanted to underscore that 
CR, despite its own limitations and requirements (of specific knowledge and 
skills, unshakable commitment, and patience), offers a more valuable and 
affordable alternative for capturing and addressing the multiple and complex 
realities of human and social violence wherever and whenever it occurs or 
threaten to do so. Second, by systematically discerning the essence and role 
of Conflict Resolution, I aimed to show that CR is different from the often 
applied and critiqued neo-liberal conflict resolution models and that in any 
related analysis, it is imperative to clarify key concepts such as ‘conflict 
resolution’ and ‘peacebuilding’ in order to avoid any misunderstanding, 
misspecification, and unintended misattribution. I also advanced that CR 
insights are particularly relevant for discerning the allegedly inherent benefit 
of the CFSP and ESDP and the claimed difference the two policy frameworks 
have enabled the EU to make in its response to two bloody wars that broke 
out in the DR Congo successively in 1996 and 1998. The foregoing clearly 
shows that CR does provide original insights for comprehensive analysis and 
treatment of violent human and social behaviours, as well as for assessing 
responses to them; and are therefore particularly relevant for critically 
analysing both the substance of the CFSP and ESDP and their claimed 
decisive role in the EU’s response to the two Congo Wars. What follows is a 
summary of my findings. 
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Conflict Theory and Analysis: Needs Theory and its Derivatives 
The most noted merit of Burton’s Needs Theory is that it is the most holistic 
theory of human being. As such, it enables a systematic and comprehensive 
inquiry into the multiple motives, from the biological to the environmental, 
underlying ‘deviant’ human and social behaviours. As such, the theory and its 
derivatives are, at best, better alternatives and, at worst, complements to 
other theories on human and social violence. As most theories, the Need 
Theory has its less attractive side. The most retained flaw of Burton’s theory 
is his ‘ontologisation’ of human needs in contrast to his ‘contextualisation’ of 
their satisfiers (Rubenstein 2001). His (deliberate?) error has been reported 
to be his extraction of the baby (human needs) out of the bath water, contrary 
to the expectations of neo-Freudists and neo-Maslowists. I am inclined to 
argue that Burton’s contradiction and error are better captured by referring to 
the informational comment offered by Miall et al. (1999: 47-48) and according 
to which Burton’s thesis reflects the influence he had from the “idea of first 
order and second order learning” of the systems theory. System theorists are 
concerned with “the role of social learning and culture in the way in which 
social systems change.” They claim that “although social systems learn 
through their members, who individually adjust their world view according to 
experience, socio-cultural systems also have underlying assumptions which 
make the system as a whole more resistant to change than individual 
members.” Rapoport coins these assumptions default values. Reference is 
made to the fact that being so commonly used, default values “become 
regarded as immutable, and actors in the system tend to forget they can 
exercise choices in order to attain goals. When society members run into 
problems, they address them first by reference to the default values.” Theirs 
is a first order learning reaction, instead of second order learning one “which 
requires a willingness and capacity for challenging assumptions” following 
the neo-constructivist line of analysis. 
If Burton effectively became under the influence of systems theory, I am 
therefore tempted to contend that his absolutist concept of needs is less 
‘biologized’ than assumed and more in line with a first order learning 
interpretation; whilst his problem-solving approach echoes a second order 
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learning concern. Human needs may be ontological in their essence, but 
contextual in their manifestation and, mainly, their fulfilment. And here is 
where Burton’s original contribution lies: by bringing the human needs to the 
most experimental observation status, he made more visible, or at least 
attempted to do so, the distinction, be it partial, between needs, wants, and 
interests than would have been otherwise possible, say, by solely observing 
the baby in the bath water. His appears to be an attempt (perhaps un-
intended) at combining positivist perspectives (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias 1996) and realist approaches (Outhwaite 1987; Sayer 1992) to 
social inquiry. Otherwise, it is inconceivable to reconcile his ‘deliberate 
deviation’ from the road traced by Freud and Maslow on the one hand, a 
choice one would expect some CR advocates to welcome, and his 
conception of human needs in ontological terms. Otherwise, I too would 
consider him the most daring and risk-taking of all unreserved proponents of 
Conflict Resolution. 
Indeed, Sandole, whose generic theory of conflict is a derivative of Burton’s 
Needs Theory, has attempted to dig deeper into the inner human world 
discovered by Freud and Maslow in search of an answer to his own 
fundamental question: What is it in the ‘Self’ that when frustrated can cause 
conflict to be expressed violently? (Sandole 1993: 12). Taking the existence 
of human needs as the best starting point, he then moves on to search for 
the deepest origin of human needs and the activating mechanism of violence, 
by revisiting early biological, physiological, and psychoanalytical inquiries. As 
he develops his generic theory of conflict, he deliberately stops short of 
explicitly including biological factors. In Sandole’s (1993: 8) view, proponents 
of the biological origin theory of human aggression, mainly Arthur Koestler 
(1978), have provided neither empirical evidences nor conclusive 
argumentation. Nor is his personal stance vis-à-vis Freud’s (1922, 1959, 
1961) theory of the eternal ‘dialectical struggle’ between two forces within 
man’s nature, Eros (life) force and Thanatos (death) force, clear. According 
to this theory, of which Sandole gives a good account, the domination of Eros 
directs aggression outward (‘explosion’); whilst the ascendance of Thanatos 
redirects aggression inward (‘implosion’). What is however clear from his 
theory is that, like many of his study field fellows, he does not conceive of 
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human needs in absolute terms. He rather presents them as products of the 
interaction between man’s inner world and the external one. 
Sandole’s understandable caution is indicative of a seemingly eternal 
dilemma facing Conflict Resolution. Explicit acknowledgement of and 
emphasis on a biological origin of man’s aggression entails condoning 
biological determinism and political realism, in which case there would be 
little place for Conflict Resolution. On the other hand, outright exclusion of 
natural ingredients from the human needs box would make needs pure social 
and cultural inventions, in which case (cultural) relativism, with its anarchical 
flavour, would take the upper hand. In the face of such a dilemma and until 
advocates of biological determinism get it irrefutably right, it is wise to stop by 
physiology and argue for a combination of nature and nurture, with a more 
determining role for the second. Azar’s use of the human needs concept 
reflects this concern. Although his idea of human needs is not different from 
that of Burton, his emphasis on communal factors and state actions and 
strategies move human needs further away from the biological fence and 
the inner circle of individual psychology to that of community and state 
politics.  
Moreover, the determining role he and others confer to perception, values, 
and group identity reflects concerns usually pertaining to ethnography 
studies (Cavenaugh 2000: 76-77). This cross-disciplinary influence lends 
more credit to the thesis that, in the final analysis, needs are contextual and 
their salience depends on the perception one has of them as well as of the 
means required to fulfil them at specific periods of history. This means that 
needs are tradable (as is their fulfilment), be it in the second or final analysis, 
not only within but also across communities and societies. This implies that 
Conflict Resolution has but to be constantly more self-reflexive and flexible 
than Burton and his followers might be willing to concede, with all the virtues 
and limits of such a requirement when it comes to theory application. 
Conflict Handling 
Conflict Resolution emerged as a “viable alternative” to power politics as a 
way of handling violent interactions among and between humans within and 
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across societies. Its prescription for effective conflict handling logically stems 
from its human needs approach to human and social violence, with its four 
fundamental claims. The first one is that conflict handling is imperatively 
desirable. The second and more important is that conflict intervention is 
always possible. The third assertion is that human nature and social 
problems are complex: human needs have multiple facets and therefore 
require multiple satisfiers (economic, social, political, cultural, and 
psychological) at all levels of analysis (individual, communal, societal, 
national and international). The fourth and last hypothesis is that deterrence 
does not deter humans from pursuing their needs, but rather increases the 
possibility of the occurrence of violence. This alleged self-evidence entails 
the use of peaceful means and cooperative approaches to conflict 
intervention. The latter should ideally occur before the denial or frustration of 
some human needs leads to the outburst of violence.  
However, CR recognises that humans do not live in an ideal world, partly 
because humans are capable of the worst acts in defence and pursuit of their 
needs much more because of nurture (internalised negative default values) 
than human nature per se. Hence, where prevention fails to occur at all or to 
occur effectively, CR recommends conflict management, with deterring 
muscle if needed, to control violence; and peacebuilding to prevent relapse 
into violence and (re-)build relationships and self-sustainable peace and 
development from within affected communities. The community-based (three-
stage) conflict intervention continuum and the use of both the carrot and stick 
best reflect the conception of CR as a holistic science of human behaviour 
and social problems. More importantly, these prescriptions reflect both the 
virtues and limitations of the field. As virtues, they widen the scope of options 
for appropriate understanding and handling of violent human and social 
behaviours. On the other hand, the prescription of an integration of bits of 
each and all paradigms and approaches require a great deal of adequate 
knowledge and skills, genuine commitment, and patience, all of which are 
more often than not in short supply. In the absence of a clear standard 
formula for the perfect integration of all the bits, all and each formula might 
be valid until results prove the contrary. Unfortunately, in most instances, 
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convincing evidences become available as a result of post-mortem diagnosis, 
leaving one with counter-factual hypotheses only.  
The foregoing has two main implications. First, Burton’s concept of 
provention is the best option and it needs to be more explored than it actually 
is. Second, education and training in conflict analysis and conflict 
intervention need be given adequate prominence if conflict handling is to be 
more a matter of intelligent choices rather than of habit. Placing education 
and training at the centre of conflict analysis and conflict intervention theory 
with direct implications for practice not only is likely to help improve 
knowledge in the field as a result of inputs from different perspectives and 
contexts; but also can decisively contribute to making that knowledge better 
work as long as it blossoms from within rather than from outside the societies 
concerned in the first instance. Communities and societies not only need own 
adequate conflict analysis and handling; they mostly need to own the 
knowledge that can make positive peace hold at home. As Samoth and 
Stromquist (2001: 664-65) argue, “problems-solvers must directly be involved 
in generating the knowledge they require”, because “[a]chieving information 
affluence in poor countries cannot rest on transfer and absorption but rather 
requires a generative process with strong roots.” In this regard, the CFSP 
and ESDP are inherently flawed. As I shall show later, their foundational and 
main reference texts clearly suggest that the two foreign policy frameworks 
are essentially geared towards generating EU’s own knowledge, skills, and 
experience, first, and transferring that know-how package to the stated 
beneficiaries of EU’s conflict intervention in third places, second. This leads 
us directly the status and role of third party involvement in conflict diagnosis 
and resolution. 
Third party conflict intervention 
Advocates of CR conceive of the role of third parties (mainly individual states, 
intergovernmental organisations and institutions, the United Nations) for the 
successful handling of violent conflicts as desirable, necessary, and 
sometimes indispensable for intertwined moral, pragmatic, and political 
reasons. Morally, third party intervention is rooted in the humanitarian 
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impulse common to all humans as once captured in “Kant’s idea of suffering 
in one part of the world being felt in all other parts” (Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse 1996: 107). This stance reflects the view of the international 
collectivity as a single community of humans with shared values and 
aspirations. It is this moral position that has reportedly underpinned the 
European Union project from its very start as a European Community in the 
fifties until present. It allegedly also underpins the inception and development 
of the CFSP and ESDP which were presented as the long missing arm for 
enabling the EU to perform as a true force for the global good, particularly in 
violence-afflicted places (Solana 2001). This idea of commonality of human 
nature and imperative solidarity is probably the best argument for any third 
party intervention. However, in practice, it is the most likely to be contested 
more for its abuse than its utility by both defenders and deniers of human 
needs, not least because of the prevalence of narrow self-interests and the 
lack of consistency in its materialisation. As substantiated in detail later in this 
dissertation, the primary intended beneficiaries of the CFSP in general and 
its implementing ESDP in particular was and still is the backyard of the EU, 
mainly the Balkans, independently of the amount and urgency of needs on 
the ground. Indeed, my interviews with some EU officials revealed that when 
the ESDP was nearing its much-celebrated first decade of existence, some 
Member States often complained that it had been doing more in Africa than 
in Europe. However, my critical account of concrete CFSP-ESDP decisions 
and actions on the DR Congo clearly demonstrates the opposite in terms of 
political commitment, relevance, promptness, and effect.  
Pragmatically, CR argues that conflicting parties may be so embittered 
against each other that only an outsider can do something worth doing to 
help them resolve their problems as less violently as possible. It has been  
rightly pointed out that “[o]nce individuals in conflict – whether at the 
interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, international or any other level 
– start to express themselves through [violent means], they may become 
brutalized, unable to view their ‘enemies’ as anything but despicable 
subhumans. (Sandole 1998: 5, quoting Sandole 1987) Moreover, third 
parties, in particular from the so named North (i.e. rich and developed 
countries), are better placed in terms of means, both material and non-
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material, that are required for effective conflict intervention (Miall et al. 1999: 
109). The two assertions raise two important related questions. The first one 
concerns moral legitimacy. The second question concerns the issue of 
neutrality of third parties. More often than not, third parties, in particular those 
with the necessary power and resources are not so innocent in most of the 
tragedies they want or are called upon to help avert and or mitigate. The DR 
Congo is a perfect case in point. As I argue in Chapter Three, the tragedy of 
the country is significantly a direct consequence of colonialism and post-
colonial destructive involvement by Western powers. According to various 
analysts (Sandole 1993; Agnew 2000; Burton 2001), shortcomings in the 
Western production and consumption system led to inter-imperial wars for 
cheap and abundant resources in overseas lands. The case of the DR 
Congo, which I develop in the next chapter, best exemplifies this view 
because the scramble for access to and control of its unimaginably abundant 
natural riches was the main objective of the 1884-85 Berlin Conference at 
which the then major Western powers decided the partition, conquest, and 
plundering of Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Others hold that one reason for 
the South’s armament race “is that it may allow [it] to compensate partially (in 
a military sense) for the massive economic disparity it [the South] suffers 
from in its relationship with the North.” (Sandole 1998: 18). The lack of 
consensus on how to deal with global warming and West’s reluctance to 
deliver on HIV/AIDS treatment are good examples of the ever-growing 
disparities between the North and the South and the practical limits of the 
humanitarian impulse. They certainly fit into Galtung’s structural violence on 
a global scale and are testament to the necessity to resolve the problems at 
the global level as well. Conflict Resolution acknowledges this and 
recommends some solutions, namely the “integration of conflict-prone 
countries and regions into cooperative and equitable regional and global 
structures.” (Ramsbotham 2000: 182). The unresolved practical question or 
dilemma is that more often than not, the parties largely responsible for and 
beneficiaries of structural violence are at the same time the ultimate decision-
makers for its mitigation and eradication. For this not to occur, the moral 
argument needs to overweigh any other arguments. As I highlight at length in 
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the corresponding chapters, this is not the case for the CFSP and ESDP, 
both in theory and practice. 
Politically, CR rightly suggests that it is in the own interest of outsiders to get 
involved in handling what Luttwak (1999) coins “other peoples wars” because 
(i) the causes of contemporary conflicts are located at national, regional and 
international levels and (ii) their consequences are felt at global level as well. 
The increasing level of internationalisation, interdependence, and 
interpenetration of contemporary societies leaves no room for risk–free 
indifference or inaction (Miall et al. 1999: 116). Here again, realpolitik and 
political idealism enter into interpretive conflict. CR’s political argument 
reflects an international society point of view according to which the 
international collectivity is composed of “states cooperating for mutual 
advantages” (Miall et al. 1999: 116); while realists and neo-realists would see 
the political argument for third party intervention as valid only for the defence 
and pursuit of one’s interests. Here is where Sandole’s ‘one-in-four 
paradigms’ approach to violent conflicts and their constructive handling is of 
unique value for discerning and fulfilling the needs of both interveners and 
intervened societies. As developed in Chapter Four, the CFSP and the ESDP 
are, at least in light of the letter and spirit of the lead reference documents, 
that is, Treaties and European Security Strategy, more for the defence and 
promotion of EU values and interests (Council 2003b: 6-10) than for global 
Samaritanism. 
In conclusion, Conflict Resolution does enable us to theorise about conflict 
and conflict intervention more thoroughly than would be possible in any other 
discipline I have knowledge of, mainly because of its extensively developed 
and well-articulated Human Needs Theory and its interdisciplinary approach. 
However, the endorsement, integration into policies, and implementation of 
its prescriptions are unattractive to able external interveners for four main 
reasons: (i) they require genuine transformation of deep-rooted habits or 
default values; (ii) they demand specific knowledge, skills, patience, and 
long-term commitment; (iii) they do not yield immediate tangible results; and 
(iv) they are not politically marketable or rewarding as do military 
interventions and or massive humanitarian assistance in the wake of a 
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catastrophe. Most if not all the requirements of CR are more often than not in 
short supply in the foreign and security policy-making realm. As one observer 
has put it, decision-makers, administrators, and consultants are much closer 
to journalists than to academics in that the former, contrary to the latter, work 
to get it fast and right with their eye always fixed on the deadlines (Hanlon 
1998). More importantly, CR prescriptions often become of very limited 
relevance for policy makers when their upheld values clash with high politics 
self-interests. Whether the CFSP and its response to the two Congo Wars 
are or are not an exception is the focus of Chapter Four and subsequent 
ones. Before that, I offer the background to the First and Second Congo 
Wars in in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND TO THE TWO CONGO WARS 
How did the situation of the DR Congo (DRC, in acronym) worsen to the 
extent of requiring non-forcible intervention by the EU and other international 
powers from the early nineteen nineties onwards? This chapter sets out to 
answer this question. Throughout most of its known history, the DR Congo 
has had different names. Under the rule of Belgium’s King Leopold II (1885–
1908) and colonial masters (1908-1960), it was respectively named 
‘Independent State of Congo’ (ISC), also referred to as ‘Congo Free State’ 
(CFS), and ‘Belgian Congo’ (Prunier 2009: 75). The country’s second 
president after independence, Mobutu Sese Seko, renamed it successively 
‘Democratic Republic of Congo’ (1965-1971) and ‘Republic of Zaire’ (1971-
1997). In May 1997, Mobutu’s successor, President Laurent Désiré Kabila, 
renamed it ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 1). 
To date, the country has not seen its name changed again. Geographically, 
the DRC lies right at the heart of Africa, sharing borders with nine other 
African countries: Angola, Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, 
Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Sudan. It covers 
2.3 million square kilometres/905,000 square miles (Prunier 2009: 75), which 
makes it the 11th largest country in the world, the second largest country in 
Africa (Lemarchand 2012: 214) after Algeria, and as big as Western Europe.  
The DRC has a population of some 70-million and over 200-ethnic groups 
and tribes many of whom “straddle national boundaries” (Nzongola-Natalaja 
2002: 14) and whose main languages of countrywide communication are 
French (official), Lingala, and Swahili. More importantly, the DR Congo is 
incomparably endowed with natural resources and wealth. According to The 
Economist (1997, 3 May), its subsoil hosts most of “the richest ores in the 
world- gold, manganese, zinc and cobalt as well as copper”. Its abundant 
natural resources also include diamonds, silver, niobium, tantalum, 
petroleum, tin, uranium, coal, hydropower, and timber. Daley points out that 
the country’s “biodiversity is almost unparalleled in the world” and that, 
likewise, “its water resources extend over some three million square miles of 
the Congo River basin.” She rightly concludes that, “On the basis of primary 
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resources, the Congo [DR Congo] should be the richest country in Africa and 
among the wealthiest in the world.” (Daley 2006: 306).  
 
Source: Le Monde Diplomatique (2006). 
Unfortunately, these unparalleled natural endowments have more been the 
source of misery and suffering instead of prosperity and well-being for the 
large majority of Congolese people since pre-independence times (Nzongola-
Natalaja 2002; Daley 2006; Pruner 2009; Froitzheim, Söderbaum, and Taylor 
2011). As Nzongola-Natalaja (2002: 2) recalls, since the Berlin Conference 
on Africa arbitrarily established the Congo Free State in 1885,  
the enormous wealth of the country has served not to meet the basic needs of the 
people but to enrich the country’s rulers and their external political allies and 
business partners. The economic, social and moral decay of the Congo is thus the 
logical outcome of the country integration, however imperfect, in the political 
economy of imperialism, on the one hand, and its rulers’ insertion in the 
transnational networks of pillage and corruption, on the other. 
As a result, the DR Congo is one of the poorest countries in the world whose 
rank was 168 out of 169 countries on the UN’s 2010 Human Development 
Index (Froitzheim, Söderbaum, and Taylor 2011). In the following sections, I 
offer a short overview of the context and conditions that have led the country 




The DR Congo, as a country and modern state, emerged as “an arbitrarily 
cut chunk of the African continent” (Prunier  2009: 75) at the free trade-
minded Berlin Conference on (the partition of) Africa where fourteen imperial 
powers signed a General Act by which Belgium inherited it as an 
‘Independent State’, officially named ‘Independent State of Congo’ (ISC) and 
headed by King Léopold II of Belgium. In fact, the king acquired it as his 
personal property (Daley 2006: 306). Actually, King Léopold II had astutely 
initiated his business agenda of making the Congo basin his own property 
earlier in 1876, with the creation and chairing of intermediary agencies, 
mainly the Brussels International Conference, Association Internationale 
Africaine (AIA), and Association Internationale du Congo (AIC) (Nzongola-
Natalaja 2002: 17-18). During his 23-year patrimonial rule (1885-1908), King 
Leopold II of Belgium “turned the ‘Congo Free State’ into a massive labour 
camp, made a fortune for himself from the harvest of its wild rubber, and 
contributed in a large way to the death of perhaps 10 million innocent 
people.” (Dummett 2004: 1). Daley points out that the Congo Free State 
“gave freedom to Western capital, and death and enslavement to indigenous 
populations.” For instance, “In order to supply labour to the plantations, 
villages were exterminated, bodies mutilated and diseases spread in 
epidemic proportions.” (Daley 2006: 306). Nzongola-Natalaja too recalls that 
the deaths were caused mainly by murder, starvation, exhaustion, 
exploitation, exposure, and disease. As a result, the total population 
dramatically shrank from between 20 and 30 million people at the start of the 
colonial era to 8.5 million in 1911 (Nzongola-Natalaja 2002: 22). Another life 
enduring legacy of the rule of King Leopold II is the reorganisation, on the 
basis of tribal identity, of “the indigenous population into rigid homelands” that 
were “supervised by ‘native/black’ authorities” in order to render easy the 
“recruitment of cheap and forced labour.” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011: 11-12). 
That tribal identity-based reorganisation of the local population led to the 
creation of “rigid ‘ethnic’ identities” intrinsically related to homelands, and it 
sowed the seeds of contestations, tensions, and armed confrontation over 
identity, land ownership, and citizenship, particularly the country’s fertile and 
minerals-rich eastern regions where migrants from neighbouring kingdoms of 
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Burundi and Rwanda had been settling since pre-colonial times (Reyntjens 
2009: 13). Concerning the ruthless rule of the king, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2011: 
1) notes that, “When the atrocities related to brutal economic exploitation in 
Leopold's Congo Free State resulted in millions of fatalities, the US joined 
other world powers to force Belgium to take over the country as a regular 
colony.” The substitution took place in 1908 when the Belgian Parliament 
formally replaced “the king’s exclusive rule and territorial rights” by a colonial 
regime system (Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 26). Under the new rule, the socio-
economic situation significantly improved mainly in terms of economic 
growth, socio-economic infrastructures and education, particularly in urban 
and mining areas (Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 62). Prunier (2009: 76) advances 
that, “Apart from South Africa, the Belgian Congo was the most industrialized 
and ‘developed’ territory on the continent. By 1958, on the eve of 
independence, 35 percent of all adults were in salaried employment, a 
proportion unknown elsewhere in Africa.” However, the benefits were limited 
to the colonial masters, other western expatriates/settlers, and the small local 
elite, to the detriment of the peasants (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 62-77). 
Prunier (2009: 76) too warns that the Belgium-induced development “was 
deceptive: out of the whole salaried workforce, barely fifteen hundred could 
be termed "professionals," while the others were unqualified workers, farm 
laborers, petty clerks, and assorted fundi (artisans and repairmen). By the 
time of independence in 1960 there were only seventeen university 
graduates out of a population of over twenty million.” Prunier argues that the 
deceptive development of indigenous populations was intended because 
“[t]he Belgian paternalistic system needed disciplined, semi-qualified drones”, 
and not “people who could take responsibility”, since the “whites were there 
for that.” More importantly, systematic exploitation, oppression, and 
repression in all forms went on, albeit in a less shocking manner, since the 
Belgian colonial masters did not address the root causes of King Leopold’s 
atrocities against and enslavement of the indigenous populations, that is, 
extreme structural and systemic violence (Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 26-41). 
They pursued a more or less similar policy of ethno-tribal polarisation and 
institutionalised the voluntary and forced immigration and resettlement of 
Rwandans in the eastern provinces in order to secure free and or cheap work 
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force. The institutionalisation took place mainly through the creation in 1948 
of the Banyarwanda Immigration Mission that lasted until 1955. The 
“displaced Rwandans” were given land to work, and “this was not welcomed 
by the ‘indigenous’ locals.” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(UNECOSOC) 1996a: 5, para. 19). 
Post-Independence Rule 
From 1956 to 1960, the Congolese people organised a sustained struggle 
against colonial exploitation, oppression, repression, and social injustice that 
finally led to the independence of their country from Belgium on 30 June 
1960 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 77-88). Unfortunately, as Belgium “shifted 
from total denial of any ‘native problem’ to a hurried flight from both 
colonization and any form of responsibility” (Prunier 2009: 76), the country’s 
small elite was not prepared enough to handle the unjust and discriminatory 
political system their colonial masters left behind (Braeckman 1992). Worse, 
the new leaders fought each other for the same unjust and extravagant 
privileges that the colonial rulers had denied them (Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 
88-89). As a result, the country quickly fell prey to severe instability and 
insecurity including the first secessionist rebellions in mine-rich and fertile 
regions of the country (South, East, and North). The situation was finally 
brought under control by the first UN military intervention that was 
codenamed United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC) and which that 
lasted from July 1960 until June 1964 (Lemarchand 2012). One year later, in 
November 1965, a military coup brought onto power the then Army Chief of 
Staff and a former colonial army sergeant, General Mobutu, with the 
assistance of Western powers in the context of the East-West rivalries in 
Africa (Lewis 1997; Lemarchand 2001; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 2011; Prunier 
2009).  
Mobutu stayed in power for three decades (1995-1997) only because of the 
protection and assistance of the West, in particular the Americans, “who saw 
him as their most reliable cold war ally on the African continent” (Prunier 
2009: 77), and “a staging post for US anti-communist wars in Africa.” (Daley 
2006: 306-07). During his rule, Mobutu so impoverished and destroyed his 
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country for his own benefit and that of his cronies that in the early 1990s 
Zaire was but a phantom state (French 1997) and many of the then 45 million 
Zairians could not even afford to buy beer or soap (French 1995: 1). In 1993-
5, the per capita gross domestic product (GDP), estimated at US$117, was 
65% lower than in 1958, two years before the independence of the country 
(French 1995: 1). In 1997, President Mobutu’s personal fortune was 
estimated at around US$4 billion: almost equivalent to the total multilateral 
and bilateral aid (some US$3,900 billion) that his country received between 
1982 and 1991. In that same year, the external debt of the country was 
estimated at around US$5 billion (El País 1997: 3); while the modern socio-
economic infrastructures that the Belgian colonial masters left behind had 
been falling in decay since long before. For instance, “the [road] network was 
reduced from 140,000 km in 1959 to a mere 20,000 km at the beginning of 
the 1970s” and by the early 1990s, “the Roads Department [was] better 
known as the Potholes Department. Transports costs in the countryside 
[were] 40-50 per cent higher than they were before independence, and the 
life expectancy of a lorry [was] no more than 80,000 km.” (Bayart 2009: 65). 
Ironically, until the end of the Cold War, Zaire was among the main recipients 
of major development aid in Africa and perhaps in the world. In 1970-01 and 
1980-01, for example, Zaire was among the top five recipients of European 
Development Fund Aid to Africa (Lancaster 1999: 2010). Bayart (2009: 83-
88) convincingly shows that during Mobutu’s personalised authoritarian reign, 
Zaire stood out as an example of state-sponsored and organised endemic 
appropriation and accumulation of the country’s wealth and means of 
production and trade. Gordon and Gordon (2001: 75) point out that, while 
“most African political systems were characterized by varying degrees of 
personal authoritarian rule” at the end of the first decade of African 
independence, in some cases, “such as Zaire […] under Mobutu in the early 
to the mid-1970s, the personal authority of a strongman ruler became 
virtually synonymous with government itself.” Indeed, Mobutu’s three decade-
long rule was based on a combination of oppression, repression, predation, 
and “neo-patrimonial exercise of power that progressively corrupted official 
institutional norms and frameworks” and “allowed the transfer of large parts 
of the economy to political and military elites” (Reyntjens 2009: 11). 
 85 
 
Neopatrimonialism made this possible because, as Francis (2008: 10) rightly 
recalls, like patrimonialism, it involves “the exercise of political authority 
based on an individual, whereby patrimony (public resources) is used to 
serve the private and vested interests of the state power-holders, including 
the ruling and governing elites.” In a (neo-)patrimonial system, “the state 
governing institutions are appropriated, used, subverted, privatized, 
informalized, and subordinated to the interests of the personalized ruler, the 
regime in power and its supporters.” (Francis 2008:10).  
French (1997: 2) reports that Mobutu’s “systematic looting of the national 
treasury and major industries gave birth to the term ‘kleptocracy’ to describe 
a reign of official corruption that reputedly made him one of the world's 
wealthiest heads of state.” This three pillar governance strategy of “violence, 
cunning, and the use of state funds to buy off enemies” (French 1997: 2) and 
to reward supporters led to the gradual disappearance of the Zairian State 
and its institutions from the public sphere. In this regard, Williams (2011: 46) 
does not exaggerate when he advances that under Mobutu, Zaire was 
probably “the quintessential case” of the fragmentation policy (consisting of 
the systemic weakening and partition of institutions, in particular the security 
ones) in the sense that “President Mobutu effectively handed out to local 
strongmen licences to pillages and loot […] in order to keep the country 
sufficiently destabilized to avoid a threat from within the military itself.” In the 
area of social and communal relations, Mobutu exploited the negative 
colonial legacy of discrimination and segregation on tribal, ethnic, and 
regional origin grounds. On the one hand, he practiced the politics of 
provocation, incitement, and impunity regarding racial and xenophobic 
violence between ‘original’ indigenes and ‘migrant’ indigenes in various parts 
of the country (UNECOSOC 1994: 21). On the other hand, he would grant or 
deny citizenship to Congolese of ‘foreign’ ancestry (mainly Rwandans) as 
fitted his own political interests. In either case, the outcome was at best 
material destruction, resentment, and alienation; and at worst communal 
violence resulting into many deaths, wounded, and displaced persons. In 
1991-3 for instance, inter-communal violence instigated or condoned by 
State authorities caused thousands of deaths and displaced hundreds of 
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thousands in the Shaba and Northern Kivu regions (UNECOSOC 1994, 
1996, 1997).  
On the regional level, Mobutu also sowed the seeds of much of the violence 
that is the object of this research. He used the strategic position of his 
country (at the heart of Africa), its abundant natural wealth, and the West’s 
support and protection to cajole and punish regimes and rebellions in 
neighbouring countries in order to impose himself as the “godfather” and the 
“guarantor” of regional stability (Braeckman 1995: 388-394). In the Angolan 
civil war, he would propose and impose his mediation to the Angola’s 
government with its sworn enemy UNITA rebel movement while the latter had 
its main rear bases in and trafficked minerals through Zaire’s south-eastern 
province of Shaba (French 1997; Tshiyembe 2003: 55-56; Prunier 2009: 74-
5, 88-98). When the Rwandan civil war broke out in October 1990, Mobutu 
was the first regional president to convene meetings and summits that led to 
the first-ever durable cease-fire agreement, known as N’Sele Cease-Fire 
Agreement, signed on 29 March 1991. At the same time, he did little to 
prevent Congolese of Rwandan Tutsi descent and Rwandan Tutsi refugees 
in Zaire from enrolling in and supporting the Rwandan rebel forces  in the 
early 1990s (Lemarchand 2012: 217); whereas he sent some 2,000 of his 
elite troops to assist the regular troops of the then Rwandan government in 
the first days of the hostilities (Braeckman 1995: 392; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 
154). Mobutu played the same double game of arsonist and fire fighter with 
regard to Uganda and Burundi regimes whose rebel movements had bases 
respectively in the north and south-eastern parts of Zaire (Braeckman 1992, 
1994, 1995; Tshiyembe 2003: 64-65; Prunier 2009: 74, 80-88). 
End of Cold War and the demise of Mobutu’s absolute reign 
President Mobutu’s three-decade rule of oppression, repression, kleptocracy, 
neopatrimonialism, and regional paternalism remained unchallenged, except 
on two occasions (1977-8 and 1991-2) when his Western protectors - mainly 
the United States of America (USA), France, and Belgium - intervened 
militarily in order to put down respectively a secessionist rebellion in the 
country’s south-eastern region and a violent revolt by unpaid soldiers (French 
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1995, 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 160-163). The situation changed rapidly 
and dramatically following the end of the Cold War “which had been the great 
justification for his regime.” (Prunier 2009: 77). Firstly, the alleged threat of 
the spread of Communism in central Africa disappeared, thereby rendering 
unnecessary and unjustifiable the support and protection of Western powers 
(French 1997). As Lemarchand (2001: 9-10) puts it, “By the early 1990s, [...] 
the Congo [Zaire] had lost its strategic significance as a client state of the 
West, and the costs of an external rescue operation seemed to greatly 
outweigh the benefits. At a time when multiparty democracy was the order of 
the day, bolstering Mobutu’s dictatorship had ceased to be a realistic option”.  
Secondly, as some have already sustained, the end of the East-West 
standstill meant the triumph of Western neoliberal politico-economic views 
and policies and unleashed related internal and external demands for 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law worldwide, particularly in place 
where populations had been long neglected and oppressed by their own 
rulers with the indifference and or complicity of West’s or East’s 
superpowers. In this respect, Macey and Miller (1992: 277-278) recall “the 
dramatic events across the world, including Tiananmen Square, the 
overthrow of Ceaucescu, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the partial triumphs of 
democracy in Nicaragua and the Philippines, and, of course, the emergence 
of democracies in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Eastern 
Europe”. In the case under study, when in 1990 Mobutu responded to pro-
democracy demonstrations “by ordering a massacre of students at the 
University of Lubumbashi [the country’s second largest city], Belgium, Zaire's 
largest source of foreign aid, cut off assistance, demanding democratic 
reforms. Soon, the United States and France also joined in.” (Howard 1997: 
7). Likewise, the “Bretton Woods institutions and other donors followed suit in 
response to Mobutu’s resistance to change (Reyntjens 2009: 11). As a result, 
Mobutu found himself with fewer and fewer resources to reward his cronies 
and to buy off his opponents; which accelerated the collapse of the central 
state and its retreat to the capital Kinshasa, where it ‘operated’ in isolation 
and was totally disconnected from the reality in any other corner of the 
country (Reyntjens 2009: 11-15). By the early 1990s, Zaire simply “had sunk 
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below the level of even the most deficient African polities” because of “the 
corrupt leadership” of President Mobutu (Prunier 2009: 47). 
The Rwandan genocide and the end of the Mobutu regime 
Arguably, the fall of Mobutu was easily, swiftly, and tragically made possible 
by the prompt and massive influx and settlement of over one million of 
Rwandan ethnic Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire – the Kivu North and South 
provinces – in the summer of 1994, in the aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide. Their unexpected mass settlement all along Zaire’s eastern border 
with Rwanda and Burundi unprecedentedly worsened the already volatile 
situation and poor living conditions of the receiving country Prunier (2009: 46-
52). In fact, the new refugee flow included ordinary peasants, political leaders 
(from the country’s President to the chief of the 10-house cell), business 
people, civil servants, academics, and students. Most importantly, they 
included the bulk of defeated governmental troops and political parties’ 
militias accused of having been at the forefront in the genocide against the 
ethnic Tutsi minority group and massacre of members of the opposition 
parties in their home county from April to July 1994 (UNECOSOC 1994; UN 
Security Council 1994a). They were “soon followed by thousands of Hutu 
refugees from Burundi fleeing the avenging arm of the Tutsi-dominated 
army.” (Lemarchand 2012: 217). In humanitarian, economic, and 
environmental terms, their rapid and massive settlement in an already 
overpopulated eastern DR Congo unprecedentedly overwhelmed 
humanitarian agencies and organisations and collapsed the already fragile 
local infrastructures and resources (United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) 1994; United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2000).  
In social and communal terms, the sudden settlement of over one million of 
ethnic Hutu refugees sharpened longstanding tensions and violent clashes 
between ‘indigenous’ citizens and ‘non-indigenous’ nationals on the one 
hand, and between ethnic Hutus and ethnic Tutsis, on the other (UNHCR 
2000: 258; Reyntjens 2009: 43). As indicated earlier, other large groups of 
ethnic Hutus and Tutsis from Rwanda and Burundi had been settling there 
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since the pre-colonial era and had often been party to and victims of political 
manipulation and racial and xenophobic violence. As Reyntjens (2009: 13) 
puts it, 
The most visible and violent expression of the identity, land ownership, and 
citizenship problem was the situation of the ‘Banyarwanda’, the Kinyarwanda 
speakers living in the Kivu. They consisted of several groups: the ‘native’ 
established since the pre-colonial period, the ‘immigrants’ and the ‘transplanted’ of 
the colonial period, the ‘infiltrators’  and ‘clandestines’ before and after 
independence (1960) and the Tutsi and Hutu refugees. 
Lemarchand (2012: 217) rightly notes that it was not until the sudden arrival 
and settlement on the eastern Zairian soil of the new Rwandan refugees that 
“the ‘Banyarwanda’ label dissolved into full-blown Hutu-Tutsi enmities.” He 
points out that, “[a]lmost overnight the lines were clearly drawn between the 
Mobutu-backed Hutu refugee community and the pro-Rwanda Tutsi minority, 
the latter including both the long-established so-called Banyamulenge […] in 
South Kivu, and the ethnic Tutsi of North Kivu.” Politically, the settlement of 
the new Hutu refugees from Rwanda played into the endless jockeying game 
between President Mobutu and the opposition and led to the postponement, 
for two more years until 10 July 1997, of the first multi-party parliamentary 
and presidential elections (UN General Assembly 1995: para. 877). 
Rwandan refugees in the Great Lakes region, end-August 1994 
Location Figure 
Northern Burundi 270,000 
Western Tanzania 577,000 
South-western Uganda 10,000 
Zaire (Goma) 850,000 
Zaire (Bukavu) 332,000 
Zaire (Uvira)  62,000 
Total 2,101,000 
Source:  UNHCR 2000: 251. 
 
In terms of security and stability, the unexpected settlement of such a huge 
number of Rwandan refugees - including a significant number of the armed 
and security forces of the ousted regime, militia, and convicts - exponentially 
increased acts of violence, thefts, lawlessness, extortion, banditry, militia 
warfare, and cross-border incursions into and from Rwanda and Burundi (UN 
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Security Council 1994a, 1995b; UNHCR 1996a, 1996b, 1996c); all the more 
that the Zairian State had long ceased to exist and function as such, except 
in the isolated capital Kinshasa. In particular, the new situation embittered the 
relations between the post-genocide Rwandan authorities and the Zairian 
government because of the paternalistic support that President Mobutu had 
assured to the ousted Rwandan regime throughout its lifetime (1973-1994) 
(Braeckman 1994, 1995). Unsurprisingly, the war that toppled President 
Mobutu, the so-called First Congo War (1996-1997), was masterminded and 
carried out by the post-genocide Rwandan regime under the pretence of 
removing the security threat posed by armed elements in and around refugee 
camps. As Lemarchand (2001: 11) contends, “if failure [of the Zairian state] 
was already patent in 1992, collapse did not materialize until late 1996, with 
the destruction of the Hutu refugee camps of eastern Zaire by the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) and the emergence of Laurent-Désire Kabila as the 
self-proclaimed leader of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo (AFDL).” Other regional countries, namely Burundi and 
Uganda, actively participated in the anti-Mobutu military campaign and the 
proclamation of Laurent-Désire Kabila as President of the new DR Congo. It 
was also Rwanda who initiated and led the Second Congo War (1998-2002) 
that some analysts have coined Africa’s First World War (Prunier 2009, 
Reyntjens 2009) in view of the number of participating African countries (at 
least nine national armies), the huge number of human casualties, extreme 
inhumane suffering, and its continent-wide repercussions. As I highlight later 
in this dissertation, both wars were a foretold and preventable tragedy whose 
terrible consequences would long last. 
Conclusion 
I started this chapter by posing the following question: How did the situation 
of the DR Congo worsen to the extent of requiring non-forcible intervention, 
by the EU and other international powers, from the early nineteen nineties 
onwards? From the foregoing, it is clear that by that time, Zaire was 
progressively becoming a continental battlefield and a slaughterhouse of 
millions of people and a theatre of massive displacement of others. This was 
the consequence of a combination of endemic authoritarianism, repression, 
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State-led and or sponsored patronage, clientelism, predation, violent conflicts 
and wars in neighbouring countries and ensuing massive flows of 
populations, and the negative involvement of Western powers - mainly 
Belgium, France, and the United States of America - and the international 
organisations in which they had a big say, since colonial times. Logically, the 
EU (former European Economic Community, EEC, and European 
Community, EC) was expected to do help remedy the situation not least 
because of moral, historical, and political reasons. In 2001 the then Head of 
the CFSP recalled the moral reason in these terms: “The right way for the 
European Union is the way of compassion and of engagement. It is 
recognising that when others suffer, we all lose a little of our own humanity.” 
(Solana 2001: 7, para. 31). Solana’s statement echoed a view and an ideal 
that some scholars have described as “the universal morality of the human 
community” (Hill 1989: 8, quoting Wright). As the author of the economic 
treatise Wealth of Nations (1776) and of The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759) reminds us, “all our moral sentiments arise from ‘sympathy’ […], which 
leads us to enter into the situations of other men [and women] and to partake 
with them in the passions which those situations have a tendency to excite.” 
(Smith, as quoted in Marshall 1996: 27). Historical and political motives 
include the responsibility of an intergovernmental organisation one member 
state (Belgium) of which colonised Congo in the way described above. They 
also include the special ties between Europe and Africa, the so-coded 
‘Euroafrican’ link (Lister 1995), that took shape during the colonisation era 
and were progressively woven since then until today. In particular, the 
‘Euroafrican’ relationship has been cemented through cooperation 
agreements the most important of which were the successive four Lomé 
Conventions (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995). These agreements were 
initiated in 1975, date of the creation, by the Georgetown Agreement, of the 
organisation of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) States. The Lomé 
Conventions, like their predecessors (the two Yaoundé Conventions: 1963 
and 1969) served as the main channel through which the EEC / EC provided 
development aid to ACP countries of which Zaire was a member. As noted 
earlier, Zaire was one of the top aid recipients of such aid during much of the 
Cold War era. Political reasons also include the need for the EU, whose 
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creation in 1993 coincided with the total decay of the Zairian State, to 
demonstrate that it could live up to the expectations it itself raised by 
establishing the CFSP: to become an important international actor and a real 
force for a global common good. Could and did the CFSP actually enable the 
EU to perform as such a force, as some have claimed? I try to answer this 
question in the next chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CFSP - STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS 
As advanced in Chapter 1, one of the shortcomings in the literature herein 
reviewed concerning the CFSP-based response to the two Congo Wars is 
the lack of empirical evidence of the actual assets of the CFSP throughout 
the period under which the CFSP allegedly enabled the EU to make a 
difference in its response to the two wars. Yet, without such factual 
knowledge, fairly establishing whether the then available resources of the 
CFSP were appropriate and sufficient, first, and whether the EU made the 
best use of them, second, is impossible. In this chapter, I address the first 
part of the puzzle. The second question – did the EU actually make the best 
use of the CFSP resources at its disposal in its response to the suffering of 
the two wars? – is addressed in subsequent chapters. Concerning the first 
task – availability and suitability of resources – I undertake the following 
tasks. First, I offer a critical account of the gradual development of the two 
policy frameworks throughout the period under consideration. Second, I 
engage the debate on the two perennial issues – common stance and 
operational means – that reportedly constitute proofs of the claimed added 
value of the CFSP for enabling the EU to do more and better in its dealing 
with violent conflicts in third places. As indicated in Chapter 1, my argument 
is two-fold. One the one hand, I endorse the widely held view according to 
which the CFSP is much less common than claimed and desired. Unlike 
other analysts, I show that the CFSP is in fact ‘common’ and ‘uncommon’ at 
the same time and that, because of that sui generis status, no single major 
theory about European integration fully captures that contradiction in terms. 
In particular, I refute the ‘federalist’ standpoint of Hazel Smith (2002) 
according to which the EU can and does have a foreign policy like that of a 
sovereign nation-state and her equation of its supreme decision-making 
authority, i.e. the European Council, to a central government of a sovereign 
nation-state, namely the USA. I show that having such supreme central 
authority is important for any international actor, particularly in the realm of 
foreign and security policy, and its absence in the case of the EU means that 
the CFSP is much less common than claimed and desired. This suggests 
that, in most practical instances of high risk of human casualties and or of 
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little or no shared high politics interests, reaching a common position is likely 
to become an end in itself and CFSP-born decisions and actions are likely to 
reflect the lowest common denominator. On the other hand, and more 
importantly, I contend that from any theoretical perspective, in particular that 
of Conflict Resolution, common stance does not necessarily entail better 
decisions and actions in favour of the real victims of violent conflicts. Nor 
does its absence necessarily lead to the opposite. If anything does entail a 
common stance, it is the protection and promotion of the EU’s self-interests 
such as its own worldview, its international visibility, influence, prestige, 
trade, and economy.  
Regarding operational resources, I shall establish that both proponents and 
critics of the inception and development of the ESDP fail to substantiate their 
respective positions. The former fail to demonstrate whether the failure of the 
EU in places ridden by violent protracted conflicts in the Balkans and or 
elsewhere in the 1990s was a consequence of the lack of operational means 
and whether any international actor did achieve lasting positive peace in 
those places because of its operational capacities and capabilities. For their 
part, critics who have argued that the introduction of the ESDP meant the 
militarisation of the EU, and its death as an allegedly true force for a global 
common good, fail to prove whether the EU did ever perform as such a force 
in its dealing with violent conflicts in third places before the inception of the 
ESDP. My overall argument is that the normative, theoretical, and practical 
criteria of Conflict Resolution, as exposed in Chapter Two, are more reliable 
than ‘common stance’ and ‘autonomous operational resources’ for 
adequately assessing whether the CFSP, in particular its operational 
component (ESDP), has led or can actually lead the EU to become or cease 
to be(come) a true force for a global common good both in theory and 
practice.  
History and development of the CFSP and ESDP: 1993-2009 
When, how, and why did the CFSP and ESDP come into existence and 
developed? For the purpose of this research, the origin and development of 
these two policy frameworks during the period under study can be outlined in 
three distinct yet connected and complementary stages: foundation stage; 
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development stage; and consolidation and experimentation stage. The 
foundation stage (1993 - 1998) started at the end of 1993 when the TEU, 
also known as the Treaty of Maastricht (ToM), entered into force and placed 
the then nascent EU on a single institutional structure of three pillars the 
second of which was the CFSP covering “all questions related to the security 
of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defence” (ToM, Title V, art. J.4). As 
indicated in Chapter One, the CFSP was assigned five specific objectives the 
first one of which was to safeguard the common values, fundamental 
interests and independence of the Union. In relation to the EU’s global role, 
the five objectives included (i) the preservation and strengthening of 
international peace and security and (ii) the development and consolidation 
of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Another important achievement pertaining to the 
foundation stage was the adoption on 2 October 1997, after two years of 
tough negotiations, of the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and certain related Acts, Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), in short. Its 
amendments to the CFSP provisions were awaited with great expectations 
because it “was negotiated between 1995 and 1997 when European leaders 
were grappling with the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which ended in 
November 1995.” (Hallergård 2009: 56). Its main inputs included the 
integration of the so called Petersberg Tasks (listed in Chapter One) of the 
Western European Union (WEU) into the scope of the CFSP (ToA, Title V, 
art. 17 (2)); the introduction of a new legal instrument named ‘Common 
Strategy’ (Title V, art. 13 (2)); and the requirements for Member States (i) to 
“work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity” (Title 
V, art. 11 (2), 2nd subpara.) and (ii) to support the “progressive framing of a 
common defence policy” as they consider appropriate, “by cooperation 
between them in the field of armaments.” (Title V, art. 17 (1), 4th subpara.). 
At the same time, the ToA provided for a Member State to opt out of any 
security and defence agreement reached under Article 17 in order to comply 
with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure (ToA, Title V, art. 24 
(1)). The ToA also provided for the creation of a permanent post of High 
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Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (High 
Representative for CFSP, in short), who at the same time was the Secretary-
General of the Council (Title V, art. 18 (3)); the appointment of EU special 
representatives on CFSP matters (Title V, art. 18 (5)); and the conclusion of 
“an agreement with one or more States or international organisations in 
implementation of the provisions” on the CFSP (Title V, art. 24).  
Concerning policymaking procedure and resources, the main innovations of 
the ToA were possibly the following. First, it removed “Member States” as co-
subject and / or co-decision-maker alongside the Union and confirmed the 
Union as the sole subject and/or decision-maker (Title V, arts. 11, 16). 
Second, the ToA enhanced the possibility to use qualified majority voting 
(QMV) for the CFSP matters, except for “decisions having military or defence 
implications” (Title V, art. 23 (2)). Third, it introduced the concepts of 
constructive abstention (ToA, Title V, art. 23 (1)) and subsequent emergency 
brake that a Member State or a group of Member States could invoke to stop 
an operational decision being taken by QMV (ToA, Title V, art. 23 (2)). 
Fourth, the ToA established the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit 
(PPEWU), Policy Unit in short, to be housed in the Council Secretariat and 
placed under the direct responsibility of its Secretary-General (Declaration Nº 
6) and High Representative for the CFSP (ToA, Title V, arts. 18 (3), 26). Its 
main task would consist of monitoring crisis and conflict situations, gathering 
and analysing information, and formulating policy and action plan options.  
The foundation phase ended in December 1998 when Heads of State and 
Government of France and the United Kingdom met and issued a statement, 
known as Saint-Malo Declaration, calling for the development of EU capacity 
“for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises.” (Council 2000a: 1, para. 2). Arguably, the Saint-Malo 
Declaration defined the real entry point of the European Security and Policy 
(ESDP) for two reasons. First, it came from the two most important EU 
Member States regarding security and defence issues, with long standing 
conflicting views on the project of a European common defence. On the one 
side, France is known for relentlessly pushing for a European political union 
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that is totally autonomous, self-reliant, and independent; as well as capable 
in each and all aspects of foreign policy, security, and defence (Grevi 2009: 
22, Gordon 2000: 13). On the other hand, the preferred option of the United 
Kingdom, “whose forces are necessary to any credible European military” 
(Gordon 2000:12), is reportedly to enhance “the military capabilities of EU 
Member States”; while at the same time “preserving the central role of the 
Atlantic Alliance [NATO] as the main forum for European defence” and 
avoiding “duplicating at EU level institutional structures [...] already available 
to NATO and individual countries” (Grevi 2009: 22). Second and more 
importantly, the European Council meeting in Cologne (Germany) in June 
1999 fully integrated the recommendations contained in the Saint-Malo 
Declaration into its conclusions for the inception of the ESDP (European 
Council 1999a). 
The development stage (1999-2002) started in 1999 with the entry into force 
on 1 May 1999 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) which, as highlighted 
above, had raised great expectations and substantially amended the 
provisions on the CFSP (TEU, Title V). Indeed its entry into force was 
immediately followed by the formal establishment, hardly one month later, of 
the ESDP (European Council 1999a: 33, para. 1); the appointment of the first 
ever High Representative for the CFSP (European Council 1999b); and the 
adoption of the aforementioned Helsinki Commitments (European Council 
1999c). These 1999-year steps were quickly complemented by the 
establishment, between 2000 and 2001, of political, military, and civilian 
decision-making and operational structures for the ESDP: Interim Political 
and Security Committee (Council Decision 2000/143/CFSP); Interim Military 
Body (Council Decision 2000/144/CFSP); Secondment of national military 
experts to the General Secretariat (Council Decision 2000/145/CFSP); 
Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (Council Decision 
2000/354/CFSP); Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Council Decision 
2001/78/CFSP); Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) (Council 
Decision 2001/80/CFSP); Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC) 
(Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP). To these developments, one should add 
the transfer of the operational function of the WEU to the EU (European 
Council 2000b); the adoption of the EU Programme for the Prevention of 
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Violent Conflicts (European Council 2001b: 12, para. 52); and the declaration 
of the ESDP as operational in December 2001 (European Council 2001c: 2, 
para. 6). The development stage concluded in 2002 when the European 
Council extended the mission of the ESDP to the fight against terrorism 
(European Council 2002b: 31-34) and concluded an agreement with NATO 
allowing EU access to NATO assets and capabilities in pursuit of the ESDP 
mission (European Council 2002c).  
The consolidation and experimentation stage, that is, the third and last stage 
(2003-2009) of the period under examination, started in 2003 with the 
launching of the first ESDP missions and operations in and outside Europe: 
EUPM (EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 January 2003), 
EUFOR Concordia (EU military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, 31 March 2003), and ARTEMIS (EU military operation in the DR 
Congo, 12 June 2013). Other most defining milestones of this phase 
comprise the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice (ToN) on 1 February 2003 
and the adoption, on 12 December 2003, of the ever first European Security 
Strategy (ESS) of the EU: A Secure Europe in a Better World. European 
Security Strategy. The first two operations fall outside the geographical scope 
of this research; whereas ARTEMIS is addressed in detail later in this 
dissertation. Regarding the ToN, it amended the aforementioned Treaty of 
Amsterdam and made various changes to the provisions on the CFSP and 
ESDP. The most important amendment was the removal of the provisions for 
close cooperation between the European Union and the WEU on defence 
and security matters and the integration into the EU of those functions of the 
WEU that were necessary for the EU to assume its new responsibilities in the 
security and defence area (ToN, Title V, art. 17). For Whitman (2002: 13), 
“This was an acknowledgement of the agreement at the Helsinki European 
Council that the Member States are to collectively develop the military 
security provisions of the CFSP within the EU rather than at arm’s length 
through the WEU.” Concerning the decision-making procedure, the ToN 
introduced “enhanced cooperation” (Title V, arts. 27a - 27e) except for 
“matters having military or defence implications”. Besides, it extended the 
application of “qualified majority voting” (QMV) to the appointment of the 
Secretary-General and High Representative for CFSP, the Deputy Secretary-
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General (Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) 2002, art. 207 
(2)), special representatives of the Union on CFSP matters (ToN, Title V, art. 
23 (2)); and to the conclusion of international agreements in implementation 
of the CFSP (ToN, Title V, art. 24). 
Regarding the European Security Strategy, EU authorities presented it as a 
reaffirmation of its “common determination to face its responsibility for 
guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world” and a tool that “would 
enable the European Union to better deal with the threats and global 
challenges and realise the opportunities facing [it].” (European Council 
2003c: 21, para. 85). Drawn up under the authority of the EU's High 
Representative for the CFSP in the aftermath of the deep divisions among 
Europeans over the US-led armed invasion of Iraq in Spring 2003, the ESS 
identified “global challenges and key threats” to the security of the EU and 
defined the strategic objectives and policy options to address them. Global 
challenges included the following: Wars; AIDS and other deadly pandemics; 
poverty; environmental degradation and scarcity of natural resources; and 
energy dependence (Council 2003b: 1-3). The document earmarked five 
clear-cut key threats to the security of the EU: Terrorism; Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction; Regional Conflicts; State Failure; and 
Organised Crime (Council 2003b: 3-5). Besides, the ESS established three 
strategic objectives for the EU to “defend its security and to promote its 
values”: addressing the threats; building security in its neighbourhood; and 
developing an international order based on effective multilateralism (Council 
2003b: 6-10). The document set out four clear-cut policy options for the 
Union in pursuit of these objectives: be more active (more prevention); be 
more capable (more institutional and operational capabilities); be more 
coherent (by bringing together the different instruments and capabilities 
available to the EU); and working with partners (in particular the USA) 
(Council 2003b: 11-14). The 2003-developments were followed by the 
creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and of EU Battle groups in 
the course of the following year (2004). By 2007, the EU had at its disposal 
15-combat-trained battle groups whose tasks on the ground included the 
aforementioned Petersberg tasks and those outlined in the ESS such as 
disarmament, counter terrorism, security sector reform, and support to 
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third parties. The EU Battle group was to be 1,500 personnel strong; “the 
minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force 
package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger 
operations” of crisis management under a UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) (Council 2009b: 2-3). At the same time, the Union counted on over 
1.6 million EU civilian personnel who were reportedly specialised “in the four 
priority areas of civilian action […]: police; strengthening the rule of law; 
strengthening civilian administration and civil protection.” (Council 
2009c: 2). Since 2003 until the end-date for this research (2009), the EU 
undertook over 20 civilian and military missions in response to violent crisis 
and conflicts within and outside Europe. 
In conclusion, the answer to the initial question for this section − When, how, 
and why did the CFSP and ESDP come into existence and develop? − is the 
following. The CFSP was established in 1993 at the same time as the EU 
itself of which it formed the most political and innovative of its three pillars. It 
came into existence by way of the same Treaty that established the EU as a 
political union. The foregoing account of the key reference documents unveils 
that the treaty-based inception and the gradual, yet rapid development and 
consolidation of the CFSP and its operational spine ESDP were a matter of 
urgent necessity as Member States of the then European Community were 
trying to cope with the complex foreign and security policy challenges, 
notably the breakup of Yugoslavia that followed the end of the Cold War. The 
necessity was urgent because the USA, the main ally and traditional security 
provider of Western Europe, mainly through NATO, was becoming less and 
less willing to take on alone or at all those challenges (Gordon 1997, 2000).  
CFSP Instruments 
Throughout the period under examination, the CFSP had its own specific 
instruments and procedures for its decisions and actions. From 1993 
onwards, they were periodically updated in line with the adoption and entry 
into force of amended versions of the TEU and of other history-making 
documents of the EU. The latest updates took place upon the entry into 
force, on 1 December 2009, of the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL). In particular, the 
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new treaty redefined and reduced the main instruments of the CFSP from 
five (Principles and General Guidelines; Common Strategies; Common 
Positions; Joint Actions; and Decisions) to only two (General Guidelines and 
Decisions). As explained in the first chapter, the ToL introduced significant 
changes to the CFSP provisions all of which led me to establishing 
December 2009 as the end-date for this research project for methodological 
reasons. Hence, this section concerns only instruments and procedures that 
were enacted and updated prior to that date and therefore were available for 
use for the response of the EU to the violent conflicts in the DR Congo. In 
this context, I use the acronym ‘TEU’ for generic reference to the post-Nice 
consolidated version of the TEU. According to one senior official responsible 
for CFSP-related legal matters at the Council of the EU whom I interviewed, 
the CFSP instruments for the period under review can be categorised into 
two main sets: Non-Legal Instruments and Legal Instruments. Non-Legal 
Instruments are characterised as such because they are NOT legally 
binding on the Union and or its Member States. My interviewee specified that 
Non-Legal Instruments are only political instruments whereas Legal 
Instruments are also political. For an example, he indicated that Common 
Positions are legal and political positions while Declarations and 
Statements are political positions only. He clarified that both have the same 
political value and effect but are legally different. Hence, Non-Legal 
Instruments can also be referred to as Non-Legally Binding Instruments or 
Exclusively Political Instruments. They include Principles and General 
Guidelines, Declarations, Demarches, and Political Dialogue. On the other 
hand, Legal Instruments are legal acts and as such, they are legally binding 
on the Union and its Member States upon their adoption and publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ). For the period under 
consideration, these instruments were Common Strategies (CSs), Common 
Positions (CPs), Joint Actions (JAs), and Decisions. One legal instrument, 
Common Strategy (CS), was not available at the time of the First Congo War 
(1996-1997) because it was introduced under the Treaty of Amsterdam that 
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For the purpose of this research, I consider all Legal Instruments and exclude 
‘Political Dialogue’ from the list of Non-Legal Instruments. The exclusion of 
‘Political Dialogue’ is dictated by various factors. First, the services of the 
General Secretariat of the Council of the EU informed me that no lists of the 
aforementioned non-legal acts, except ‘Principles and General Guidelines’, 
had been drawn for the early years of the CFSP, in particular for the 1994-
1997 period, and therefore were not available either in the archives or in the 
online public registry of the Council (Sieberichs 2011). Second, Political 
Dialogue was rather a cross-cutting external relations activity and not a 
specific instrument of the CFSP. Third, the amount of Political Dialogue 
activities throughout the period under study is too huge and the issue-areas 
they cover are too broad to be systematically accounted for in the context of 
this research. In fact, EU Political Dialogue meetings regularly took place at 
various levels: Heads of State and Government level, Ministerial level, Senior 
Officials level, and expert level. For instance, in 1998 alone, 96 meetings 
were held at the expert level alone, “in the fields of Human Rights, United 
Nations, Security, Drugs, Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
OSCE, Non-proliferation, Disarmament, Terrorism, Africa, Western Balkans, 
Middle East Peace Process, Latin America, Asia, South-Eastern Europe, 
Planning and Analysis, Mashrek-Maghreb, Middle East Gulf.” (Council 1999: 
43). Because of these difficulties, data on all non-legal instruments, except 




Non-Legal Instruments under analysis include the following: Principles and 
General Guidelines, CFSP Declarations, and Demarches. ‘Principles and 
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General Guidelines’ pertain to the second category of “EU history-making 
decisions”, that is, “broad, strategic decisions about the EU’s agenda, 
priorities and finances” (Peterson 1995: 72-3), as well as foreign and security 
policy (TEU, Title V, art. 13(1); added underlining). For any case or matter, 
being the object of ‘Principles and General Guidelines’ means the highest 
attention and commitment it can receive from the EU of which the European 
Council is the highest political organ. Examples of ‘Principles and General 
Guidelines’ include the aforementioned Helsinki Commitments and the 
European Security Strategy. It is therefore important to establish if, when, 
and why the two Congo Wars were the object of these history-making 
meetings and decisions of the EU throughout the period under scrutiny. On 
the other hand, Declarations or Statements express “the Union's position, 
requests or expectations vis-à-vis third countries and international issues.” 
Their “main focus” is “the defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and the support for peace and democratisation processes.” (Council 1998b: 
10). A Declaration "is an instrument for which there is no provision in Title V 
of the Treaty on European Union but which was a feature of European 
political cooperation (EPC). It is not a mandatory instrument and is still 
frequently used under the CFSP." (European Union 2005: 47). A Declaration 
forms part of the so-called “Other CFSP Activities” which “represent well-
established tools of the Union's activity in the foreign policy area and as such 
contribute to its worldwide visibility as a foreign policy actor.” (Council 1998b: 
10). Where and when necessary, CFSP Statements express “the Union's 
objectives and intentions” vis-à-vis an event or a situation and their political 
impact “may be very significant; some statements have more political weight 
than formal texts.” (Council 2008a: 175). CFSP Declarations were published 
as EU Declarations at Council sessions or as Presidency Declarations on 
behalf of the EU outside Council sessions (Council 1998b: 10). 
Concerning Demarches, they are (confidential) diplomatic initiatives with 
third countries in particular. EU Demarches are undertaken particularly in 
support of “the respect for human rights and democracy, humanitarian action, 
UN peace missions and election monitoring, as well as non-proliferation of 
biological and chemical arms, the UN register for conventional weapons and 
the universality of the prohibition of nuclear tests.” (Council 1999a: 43). EU 
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Demarches are generally carried out by a small group of diplomats or 
ambassadors on behalf of the EU. For instance, on 14 December 1997, a 
“demarche was carried out by a Troïka of EU Heads of Missions in Kinshasa 
with the DRC Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning the harassment of 
citizens of EU Member States.” Another demarche was carried out on 26 
January 1998 “by the EU Heads of Missions Troika with the Rwandan 
Minister of Justice concerning the situation of prisoners in that country.” 
(Council 1998b: 29). Like Declarations, Demarches did not have a legal base 
under the Treaty provisions for the CFSP, but were part of the 
aforementioned “Other CFSP Activities” under the period under review. The 
responsibility to decide whether the publication of the content of the 
Demarches rested with the Presidency of the EU, in consultation with the 
Member States and the Commission (Council 2008a: 176). 
Legal Instruments 
Legal instruments that are the object of our analysis comprise Common 
Strategy (CS), Common Position (CP), Joint Action (JA), and (CFSP) 
Decisions. Common Strategy was introduced under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (ToA), which entered into force in 1999, and was therefore not 
available for use when either of the two Congo Wars broke out. It was meant 
to be implemented “in areas where the Member States have important 
interests in common” and to serve for outlining the overall strategic interests, 
position, objectives, and priorities of the EU regarding a given partner or a 
group of partners, as well as the means to be made available by the Union 
and the Member States for its implementation (TEU, Title V, art. 13(2)). The 
adoption of a CS exclusively rested with the European Council and its 
execution would be established usually for an initial period of four years. On 
the other hand, Common Position was introduced under the Treat of 
Maastricht (ToM) and was therefore available for use throughout the whole 
period under review (1994-2009). The EU updated the provisions for CP 
successively through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the Treaty of Nice 
(2003). In substance, CPs served to define the stance and approach of the 
EU to a particular geographical or thematic issue (TEU, Title V, art. 15) and 
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to promote and enhance systematic and coordinated cooperation between 
Member States on foreign and security matters (TEU, Title V, art. 19(1)); 
French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2008). CPs could “define 
medium-term strategies giving valid guidelines over a relatively long period”, 
or “shorter-term guidelines” and “immediately operational provisions.” The 
process always involved prior “examination in detail of the common interests 
of the Union in respect of a third country or a multilateral question” (Council 
2008a: 28). 
Like Common Position, the legal instrument of Joint Action (JA) was 
available for use since the inception of the CFSP in 1993 and was 
successively updated under the Treaties of Amsterdam (1999) and Nice 
(2003). JAs were meant to address specific situations where operational 
action by the EU would be required (TEU, Title V, art. 14(1)). The text for 
each JA would detail its specific objectives, scope, timeframe, the resources 
required, the conditions and, if necessary, the duration for its implementation 
(TEU, Titel V, art. 14(1)). Like CPs, JAs committed the EU and all Member 
States in the positions they would adopt and in the conduct of their activities 
(TEU, Title V, art. 14(3)). The main difference between CPs and JAs lay in 
the essence of the latter: “the pooling of means available to the European 
Union to carry out specific actions.” (Council 2008a: 28). Like CPs and JAs, 
CFSP Decisions too were available for use since the inception of the CFSP 
in 1993 and were successively updated under the Treaties of Amsterdam 
(1999) and Nice (2003). The EU was to use them to define and implement 
other CFSP instruments, in particular Common Strategies, Common 
Positions, and Joint Actions (TEU, Title V, art. 13(3)).  
Commentary 
This chapter, in general, and the foregoing section, in particular, set out to 
address the following questions: What resources did the EU have at its 
disposal under the CFSP for its response to the two Congo Wars? Were 
those resources adequate enough for the EU to make a difference for the 
many civilian victims of the two wars? During the period under scrutiny, the 
EU could resort to General Principles and Guidelines, Common Positions, 
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and Declarations in order to express its intention, concern, support, 
disapproval, and or condemnation regarding the violent conflict in the DR 
Congo. It could also engage in some concrete action through the adoption 
and implementation of Joint Actions and Decisions. On the other hand, the 
EU could count on Common Strategy and ESDP operational capabilities but 
only from 1999 and 2001 onwards, respectively. To some extent and at least 
on the paper, these resources were in line with the recommendations made 
for improvement following the tragic failure of the international community in 
its dealing with mass atrocities crimes in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Those recommendations were mainly the following: appropriate knowledge 
and skills; genuine and sustained political commitment; need-tailored and 
timely response; appropriate and clear norms, laws, and mechanisms; 
comprehensiveness and complementarity of response (Vassal-Adams 1994; 
Eriksson 1996; Millwood 1996; UNDPKO 1996; Barnett 1997; Sandole 1998; 
Carlsson et al. 1999; Mial et al. 1999; IPEP 2000; Ramsbotham 2000). 
However, these resources were too inadequate for the EU to make the 
claimed difference because of the following major shortcomings. The first one 
is the late establishment of the CFSP with reference to the timeline of the two 
Congo Wars. During much of the period under scrutiny, the EU was still 
putting together and or fine-tuning most of the assets, in particular military 
ones, it had identified as indispensable for developing and strengthening its 
CFSP. By the time the CFSP entered into force (November 1993), the 
conflict in the DR Congo had entered in its most protracted stage of 
sustained political decay, statelessness, lawlessness, and socio-economic 
deprivation as described in Chapter Three. ‘Common Strategy’, the CFSP 
most important legal instrument, was available for use only after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999; nearly one year after 
the breakout of the Second Congo War. Likewise, the EU adopted its first 
Security Strategy on 12 December 2003; one year after the formal end of the 
Second Congo War and the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement 
among the parties to that bloody conflict. The ESDP itself was formally 
established at the end of 1999, more than one year into the Second Congo 
War, and was declared fully operational three year later (2001). Its supporting 
civilian, political, and military institutional structures were hardly in place by 
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the end of 2002; whereas its 15-combat-trained battlegroups and nearly 2 
million civilian experts in the four earnmarked issue-areas - policing; 
strengthening the rule of law; strengthening civilian administration; and 
civil protection – reached their envisaged full strength in 2007. 
 
The second main shortcoming is intrinsically related to the first, and is the 
huge inexperience of the European Communities (EC), first, and European 
Union (EU), later, in foreign and security politics in general and in 
humanitarian intervention for human protection purposes in violent conflict 
contexts, in particular. Until the adoption in 1992 and entry into force in 1993 
of the TEU, anything close to the pretended CFSP had taken place under the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) and consisted only of voluntary 
consultation, information exchange, and non-legally binding declarations. 
Therefore, when Member States of the then nascent European political union 
jointly embarked on the CFSP venture, they had no point of reference of their 
own, except high ambitions. They had but to start from scratch to the same 
degree, or even much more, as they had had to in the 1950s when they 
embarked on economic integration. Any participation in humanitarian 
interventions had taken place throughout NATO and or WEU. This handicap 
is particularly exemplified by the trial and error approach that guided the 
development of the CFSP during the period under examination. For instance, 
the most important legal instrument, Common Strategy, and the most 
important strategic document, European Security Strategy, were adopted 
respectively five and 10 years after the inception of the CFSP. Conceivably, 
Common Strategy should have been introduced from the very beginning of 
the CFSP, in 1993, because it was meant to serve establish the overall 
strategic orientation of the EU towards a country, a group of countries or a 
region. Similarly, the EU should have adopted the ESS long before 2003 
since it conceived and presented it as the key reference document 
embodying the vision and values pursued through the CFSP. The trial and 
error approach also underpins the substantial amendments and fine-tuning of 
the Treaty provisions for the CFSP on two occasions (in 1997 and 2001) 
during the period under review. The third major in-built flaw is the lack of 
clarity regarding the scope, objectives, and criteria of the CFSP; mainly 
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exemplified by the use of vague notions such as “all areas of foreign and 
security policy”, “important common interests”, and “common interests of the 
Union” in the definition of the main reference documents. One immediate and 
more frequent negative consequence of this shortcoming is the lack of a 
clear policy line towards specific situations. The DR Congo serves to test this 
hypothesis.  
The fourth shortcoming is the primacy of the values, needs, interests as well 
as the modus operandi of the EU, in the design, development and use of the 
CFSP architecture. The Union expects the promotion of international peace, 
security, rule of law, and human rights to occur and take roots in third places 
as a natural consequence of its self-assertion as a driving force for a global 
common good, a ‘normative power Europe’ in Manner’s (2002) terms; and its 
new capacity, ability, and operational readiness for autonomous action in 
response to international crises (European Council 1999b: 33). The problem 
here is that these institutional and operational developments embody EU’s 
worldviews, values, needs, interests, and modus operandi. This means that 
views, values, needs, interests, and modus operandi of non-EU societies and 
or non-EU key allies would most likely matter as far as they would be in line 
with those of the EU and its key allies. One feature that particularly attests 
this Eurocentric and self-interested nature of the CFSP, particularly its ESDP, 
is the choice of state level and issue-areas (policing; strengthening the 
rule of law; strengthening civilian administration; and civil protection by 
state institutions) for its conflict intervention, to the detriment of local 
community level and issue-areas for (post-conflict) peacebuilding. In line with 
the Conflict Resolution approach of this research, the latter could include, but 
not be limited to, inter-community dialogue and reconciliation, community 
training in locally nurtured conflict resolution, community-based awareness 
raising and or training programmes on gender issues, multi-ethnicity, 
multiculturalism, citizenship, psycho-social healing, human rights and 
humanitarian law, participatory democracy, social responsibility and 
accountability. As Francis (2012: 2) notes, “rebuilding failed and collapsed 
states” - one of the main sources of threats and challenges to international 
peace and security according to the European Security Strategy - and 
“reconciling bitterly divided communities” constitute a titanic task that 
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“requires not only the rebuilding and reconstruction of physical, political, 
governance, economic and development infrastructures and institutions, but 
also psychological and emotional repair at individual, societal, regional 
(provincial/sectional) and national level.” Far from this, the CFSP and its key 
reference documents not only privilege the state level but also the most 
attractive and rewarding aspects of what Lemay-Hébert (2013: 3) describes 
as the Western or Weberian model of statebuilding: strong institutions of the 
central state, their capabilities to legitimate the state’s monopoly of the use of 
physical force and to secure the state’s grip on the society.” Under this 
approach, “the state is equated with its institutions, state collapse is 
understood in terms of the state institutions, and statebuilding implies their 
reconstruction.” This orientation, common to post-cold war international 
peacebuilding, has already been widely criticised because it primarily serves 
the interests of external interveners and their local proxy elites. In response 
to Paris’ (2010) unreserved defence of liberal peacebuilding, Cooper, Turner, 
and Pugh (2011: 1999, 2001) convincingly show that all international 
peacebuilding endeavours, whether carried out by consent or coercion, 
“reflect the exercise of hegemonic power” by the intervener(s) and often fail 
“because local ‘buy-in’ is limited and the incentives for obstruction, co-option 
or evasion of neoliberal governance mechanisms commensurately higher.” 
These three scholars underline the fact that all post-conflict international 
peacebuilding strategies share “a core of common prescriptions: neoliberal 
policies of open markets, privatisation and fiscal restraint, and governance 
policies focused on institutions, enhancing instruments of state coercion and 
‘capacity building’ based on the now near-universal conceit that ‘development 
require security’.” Francis (2012: 7) too argues the same and highlights “the 
increasing ‘securitisation of development’, and the ‘developmentalisation of 
security’” of a liberal peace agenda that highly values “state(re)building as 
key aspect of post-war peacebuilding because without viable and functioning 
state authority and institutions, conflict and instability will continue to threaten 
international peace and security.” In this sense, the almost exclusive focus of 
the ESDP on the (re)construction of the Weberian state places the EU 
straight among the most powerful defenders and promoters of the statist 
approach to post-conflict peacebuilding in third places. The most powerful 
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proponents include the World Bank (WB) which, “backed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities, places state institutions building at the 
top of its agenda so that neoliberal political economies can be 
institutionalised.” (Cooper, Turner, and Pugh 2011: 2000-01). Clearly, this 
approach denotes interveners’ (neo-)realist view of the state as “the central 
actor in international politics.” (Hobson 2000: 2). Undoubtedly, all this is in 
dissonance with the normative, theoretical, and practical precepts of Conflict 
Resolution which, as  exposed in the third chapter of this dissertation, places 
‘nation’ before ‘state’, ‘individual’ before ‘group’, ‘bottom’ before ‘top’, and 
‘local’ before ‘global’ in terms of priorities.  
 
The fifth, embedded handicap is the subsidiary and dependent status of the 
CFSP. The foregoing account of key reference documents reveals the 
primacy of NATO as the main security framework for the EU, the confinement 
of EU intervention to where and when NATO is not already engaged, the 
Treaty-based obligation for the CFSP and ESDP not to prejudice the foreign 
and security policies of individual Member States, and the Treaty-protected 
requirement of UN request and or authorisation for any EU humanitarian 
intervention. The sixth important in-built flaw is the importance the EU and 
various academics give to military muscle over any other assets in the 
development of the CFSP. Conceivably, the nature of the actual and 
perceived security threats and the reluctance of the USA to continue 
providing alone the security shield for Western Europe (Gordon 1998, 2000) 
somehow justify such importance. However, such a focus constitutes an 
important in-built shortcoming because the use of military force for 
humanitarian protection purposes is less likely in third places of little or low 
self-interests and high risks for the EU and any other external interveners; 
and is unreliable from a Conflict Resolution perspective. Devising an 
adequate, definite fix for these shortcomings is hardly possible unless the EU 
primarily resolves the two main underlying issues:  ‘Ends’ and ‘Means’. I take 
up them in the following sections. 
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Common stance and joint action 
Proponents of the CFSP have underlined Treaty-based “common stance” 
and “joint action” in all areas of foreign and security policy as one of its most 
enabling innovations particularly in comparison to its predecessor EPC 
(Representation of France to the EU 2008, Solana 2009). However, the 
claimed innovation is overvalued at best and much less determinant for the 
EU to make a difference when it comes to prevent and or mitigate 1994-
Rwanda-like tragedies. As the preceding account of key reference 
documents shows, the CFSP is inherently much less common than often 
alleged and desired, and is consequently doomed to function intermittently 
and on the least common denominator basis. More notably, common position 
and joint action per se are no guarantee for the EU, or any other actor, to 
become a true force for a global common good. Concerning the degree of 
commonality, a first–order reading of the EU official discourse and glossary 
suggests that the use of the term ‘common’ is intended to convey a sense of 
communitisation or communalisation. According to the glossary of EU 
legislation (European Union (EU) 2012a), communitisation “means 
transferring a matter which, in the institutional framework of the Union, is 
dealt with using the intergovernmental method […] to the Community method 
[…].” The latter, also known as the supranational method, “is based on the 
idea that the general interest of Union citizens is best defended when the 
Union’s institutions play their full role in the decision-making process, with 
due regard for the subsidiarity”. The glossary outlines the four salient futures 
of the Community method (i.e. Community modus operandi) as being the 
following (EU 2012b): 
 The monopoly of the European Commission – Commission, in short – of 
the right of initiative;  
 A widespread use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of the 
EU;  
 An active role for the European Parliament (EP); and  
 A uniform interpretation of Community law by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). 
These criteria sharply contrast with those for the intergovernmental method 
that has been governing CFSP decision-making and which is guided by the 
logic of cooperation between and among Member States through the Council 
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of the EU, with minor and or consultative involvement of other key actors 
namely the Commission, EP, and the ECJ. The glossary of the EU legislation 
clearly warns that the abolition of the “pillar” structure under the Treaty of 
Lisbon (2009) “did not entail the ‘communitisation’ of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy for which the intergovernmental method is maintained.” 
(EU 2012b). What then does the key qualifier “common” stand for? 
Veiled Intergovernmentalism? 
Most if not all intergovernmentalist analysts have so far presented the CFSP 
as process of predominantly national foreign policy projection whereby 
communitisation, if any, of foreign policy issue-areas is but too partial, 
optional, and circumstantial to account for a full-fledged and permanent 
common stance that some EU authorities and outright euro–optimists often 
speak of, and much less a single foreign policy some of them might have 
been dreaming of. Bomberg and Stubb (2003: 117) have sustained that “it is 
often unclear how much weight the EU has because the member states in 
the final analysis must allocate the resources necessary to execute the EU’s 
foreign and security policy.” In their typology, foreign and security policy 
clearly pertains to Member State prerogatives. Mahncke (2004: 28) even 
finds it difficult to define the ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ and 
argues that the denomination “is essentially something of a misnomer” 
because, 
Unlike the Common Fisheries Policy, for example, the CFSP is only ‘common’ to the 
extent that member states identify shared foreign policy interests and produce 
common outputs accordingly. When they cannot, the CFSP is less a policy than a 
set of procedures for mutual foreign policy consultation and co-operation. Hence, 
even when interests diverge, CFSP as a ‘system’ continues to function, although it 
then lacks the output of a common policy. 
  
Mahncke (2004: 28) holds that “the CFSP does not replace national foreign 
policies (even if this could be said to be the long–term logic of such a 
process) but exists in tandem with them”; and that “national foreign policies 
are an essential underpinning of the CFSP”. He sustains that this is the case 
because “from declarations and demarches to participation in international 
negotiations, the vast majority of the CFSP’s diplomatic instruments are in 
fact national instruments, usually provided by the member states holding the 
rotating Council Presidency.” Mahncke (2004: 39) argues that it is “either by 
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chance or as a result of conscious efforts to come to the same position 
(through diplomatic consultations and in fact through the CFSP process)” that 
individual national foreign policy issues and initiatives “might be similar or 
identical” and then presented to “the outside world as a common European 
(though not formally a Union) stance.” He concludes that this state of affairs 
is likely to remain unchanged even in the event the EU establishes the post 
of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs for its External Action Service (Mahncke 
2004: 28). 
Wagner (2003: 577) too contends that, “the CFSP has not been 
communitarized and is unlikely to become so in the future”. The reason is 
that the intergovernmental set-up of the CFSP and the Treaty-granted 
recourse to qualified majority voting (QMV) are sufficient for “the principals in 
European foreign policy”, that is, the member states, “who will delegate 
decision-making power not because they are striving for a European 
federation but only if and when delegation helps them to realize their 
interests. (Wagner 2003: 589). Due to the predominance of (external) crisis 
management as the main common function of the CFSP, Wagner explains, 
“there are few incentives [for Member States] to delegate sovereignty to 
supranational institutions such as the Commission or the ECJ.” (2003: 585). 
Knodt and Princen (2003: 1–2) too advance that policies under the CFSP 
“have remained firmly intergovernmental” and “[D]ecision-making and 
implementation remain completely under the member states’ remit, even if 
they try to act together as ‘the EU’.” The two analysts sustain that though 
these policies “have been brought under the umbrella of ‘the’ European 
Union and the European Commission has often actively sought to gain a 
foothold in these areas, the formal role of EU–level institutions in them is 
limited.” Likewise, Wessel (1999: 319–320) argues that, regardless of its 
“prima facie broad scope”, CFSP “is not to be seen as a common policy in 
the same way as the concept is used in, for instance, the Community’s 
common agricultural policy or common commercial policy.” For him, “The 
non–exclusive nature of CFSP is paramount. The competences of the 
institutions, the obligations of the member states and the decision–making 
procedures all reflect the intention of the states to create a common policy 
that would not unconditionally replace the national policies of the individual 
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states, but would only emerge where and when possible.” (Wessel 1999: 
319–320). Wessel notes that, “Despite concrete obligations aiming at the 
establishment of a common policy, a number of vague notions (‘important 
common interests’, ‘general interest’, ‘reasons of national policy’) allow for a 
large margin of appreciation on the part of member states.” This means that, 
“Whenever policy does not prove possible, member states are free to pursue 
their own national foreign policies.” (Wessel 1999: 319–320). In sum, for 
intergovernmentalists, the intergovernmental set-up of the CFSP will prevail 
as long as Member States consider it sufficient for well serving their 
respective self-interests. Accordingly, Member States would agree to further 
or full communitisation if and only if that would always better serve their 
individual interests, which is unlikely.  
Open-ended communitisation? 
Other analysts hold a rather balanced or even opposite view and report a 
process of Brusselisation or Europeanisation of the foreign policies of EU 
Member States since the introduction of the CFSP. Allen’s (1998) neologism 
of Brusselisation suggests that “the national foreign policies of EU member 
states are slowly becoming less national in the sense that foreign policy is 
now increasingly made both in and with reference to what happens in 
Brussels [EU capital].” (Reynolds 2005: 51). Reynolds (2004: 50) sustains 
that “the degree of difference and divergence among member states’ foreign 
policies can in fact be said to be diminishing” due “in no small measure to the 
increased intensity and institutionalisation of foreign policy co-operation 
within the European Union.” Reynolds notes an increasing presence of the 
‘European dimension’ in consideration of the ‘national interest’ and argues 
that the implication is that “national foreign policies today are resolutely not 
defined in isolation, but are very much affected by what happens in 
Brussels.” (Reynolds 2005: 54). For him, this may lead to “the increased 
centrality of Brussels as the loci for foreign and security–making within the 
Union.” (Reynolds 2005: 58). In a similar vein, Tonra (2000: 160) contends 
that, “the institutionalisation of the CFSP through its committee structures has 
contributed to the Europeanisation of national foreign policies” and 
consequently the redefinition of so–called ‘national interests’ in a new 
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European context.” This view is much in line with that of most of the EU 
officials and Member States’ representatives to whom I posed the following 
question: Can we speak of Communitisation or Europeanisation of the 
foreign and security policies of the EU’s Member States in reference to the 
CFSP? “Yes”, one EU official answered, “in the sense that national foreign 
policies are made in reference more and more to the European Union’s 
foreign policy. The foreign policies of Member States are more and more 
blurred and subsumed by the Foreign Policy of the European Union.” 
(Director for legal matters at the Council of the EU 2005, interview, 1 
October). For Wong (2005: 149), Europeanisation under the CFSP “can be 
understood as a process of foreign policy convergence”; as “a dependent 
variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating from actors (EU 
institutions, statesmen, etc.) in Brussels, as well as policy ideas and actions 
from member state capitals (national statesmen).” Wong (2005: 150) 
conceives of Europeanisation as “a process of change manifested as policy 
convergence (both top–down and sideways) as well as national policies 
amplified as EU policy (bottom–up projection)” the resulting effect of all which 
is the redefinition of both identity and interests. 
Three dimensions of Europeanization in national foreign policy 
Aspects of 
 Europeanisation 




a)  Increasing salience of European political agenda. 
b)  Adherence to common objectives. 




a)  State attempts to increase national influence in the world. 
b)  State attempts to influence foreign policies of other member 
states. 
c)  State uses the EU as a cover/ umbrella. 
 Identity 
Reconstruction 
a)  Emergence of norms among policy–making élites. 
b)  Shared definitions of European and national interests. 
Wong 2005: 142; Table 7.2. 
By these accounts, Wong’s conceptualisation of Europeanisation seems 
more attractive. While some scholars confines it to national foreign policy 
adaptation, Wong captures it as a change resulting from mainly two mutually 
reinforcing processes whereby national foreign policies outsource and get 
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outsourced from the ideas, agreements, and decisions prevailing within and 
across the common institutions in the Union’s capital Brussels, all of which 
lead to important identity reconstruction over time. However, and more 
importantly, from these and other institutionalist accounts of the CFSP, the 
outcome of the process of ‘Brusselisation’ or ‘Europeanisation’ of national 
foreign policies is not clear: complete or open-ended communitisation?  
Federalization? 
Hazel Smith takes a rather unreserved stance and refutes the argument 
according to which the European Union does and cannot have a foreign 
policy much the same as that of the nation-state because it is not a sovereign 
entity (Smith H. 2002: 4). She contends that the European Union “behaves 
as if it were sovereign” because its different institutions regularly take and 
implement decisions on its behalf and “its partners negotiate and react to the 
Union as if it were a sovereign actor.” (Smith H. 2002: 2). She sustains that 
this is so “because the Union has an impact on both the domestic and 
international affairs of partner countries such that it cannot be ignored […] 
partly because the member states have given up sovereignty to the 
Community (as part of the Union) on external trade.” (Smith H. 2002: 2). 
Even “when the member states have not formally abrogated sovereignty”, 
she argues, the Union’s “decision-making structures allow for a process of 
negotiation so that a European Union commonality of foreign policy interest 
can be achieved”, depending on the stakes involved (Smith H. 2002: 4). She 
goes as far as to compare the European Council to a central government of a 
sovereign nation-state like the United States, thereby refuting the lack of a 
central and supreme authority as one of the proof that the EU, unlike 
individual sovereign states, cannot afford a foreign policy worth the name. 
Smith alleges that her opponents “confuse speed and alleged effectiveness 
with capacity”, and infer a theoretical value to “the practical question of the 
time decisions take to be made”. In her judgement, this difficulty affects 
sovereign states as well, and is much more a matter of the degree of 
commonality of European Union foreign policy interests than of the existence 
of a centralised decision-making capacity with a single executive authority. 
“Many states,” she contends, “particularly democratic states that are built 
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upon a separation of governmental powers, are vulnerable to conflicting 
interest groups demanding different foreign policy in response to those 
different interests.” (Smith H. 2002: 4-5). The United States and the various 
scandals like Irangate that some of its central leaderships had to resort to in 
order to counter interest groups’ opposition to some foreign policy choices 
constitute her noted supporting examples.  
Certainly, foreign policy coordination is a challenge for nation-states as well; 
and, as this research postulates, the existence of a central authority endowed 
with executive power is not per se a sufficient condition for successful 
resolution of that challenge. However, Smith’s claim that the mere absence of 
such authority is more a practical rather than a theoretical problem needs to 
be substantiated beyond any reasonable doubts for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, in the case of a sovereign nation-state, the issue of commonality of 
foreign policy interests is less problematic because core national interests 
are clearly established in a long-term perspective and are not subject to 
continuous negotiations and trade-offs between interest groups who 
individually have primary prerogatives over the area-issues in question. 
Secondly, unlike in the case of a sovereign nation-state, the commonality of 
foreign policy interests cannot a priori be imposed, if need be, by any 
supreme executive. Some or all of the insufficiently specified areas and 
issues of the foreign and security policy of the EU, in particular those covered 
by the CFSP, are a priori subject to inter-governmental negotiations and the 
member states’ commitment to them under the Union’s roof is essentially 
voluntary and a matter of loyalty, mutual solidarity, and good faith from the 
outset (TEU, Title V, arts. 11, 12, 14, 16). Thirdly, member states’ primary 
right to make and carry out their own foreign and security policies where and 
when the CFSP is not engaged and, importantly, the requirement for the 
CFSP not to prejudice them, are both Treaty-protected (TEU, Title V, art. 17).  
For all these reasons, Smith’s comparison of the European Council to a 
central government of a sovereign nation-state like the United States is 
overstated at best. The US has a central federal government led by a 
President fully empowered by the US Constitution to take, autonomously and 
independently, decisions on behalf of all her/his fellow US citizens on any 
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matter of national interest, without having to conditionally consult and obtain 
the approval of the governor of each State of the federation. The European 
Council does not have such constitutional power as of yet, notwithstanding 
many attempts in this regard.  
Smith implicitly puts the EU Member States on an equal footing with “interest 
groups” in the United States of America. If my reading of her reasoning is 
correct, these groups may be individual States of the federation or coalitions 
of political party representatives. We may also compare the US decentralised 
federal system to that of Spain where Autonomous Communities are the 
equivalent of American federated States. Certainly, party representative 
coalitions, Autonomous Communities in Spain or individual States of the US 
federal nation-state or any other federal nation-state worth the name can 
oppose and attempt to block the foreign policy decisions and actions of the 
central state government. Still, the latter can, sometimes out of personal 
interests and ambitions of some of its lead members, pursue its preferred 
foreign policy course of action, despite foreseeable and foretold negative 
consequences. The participation of Spain in the US-led invasion and 
occupation of Iraq is perhaps the best example. An overwhelming majority of 
Spanish citizens, individual political parties, and highest authorities of some 
Autonomous Communities publicly and strongly opposed it (El País 2003). At 
the subsequent general elections of May 2004, they harshly punished the 
Popular Party-led government for acting against their will and voted the main 
opposition party, the Socialist Party (El Mundo 2004). The latter subsequently 
fulfilled its electoral promise to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq (Aizpeolea 
2004). 
On the other hand, the European Union remained divided and paralysed 
(Habermas and Derrida 2003, Mollet 2003, Murphy 2003) simply because it 
did not have a central government fully empowered to commit it, if need be, 
against the will and wishes of some of its Member States. Unlike any EU 
Member State government, no Autonomous Community in Spain, no single 
State of the American federal nation-state, no interest group can undertake 
its own foreign policy action as result of its disagreement with or in opposition 
to the central federal authority where such authority actually exists. Smith H. 
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(2002: 121), too, notes that the “EU decision-making in general relies on 
negotiation and consensus to a much greater extent than decision-making 
within a national state where a majority party may seek to impose its policies 
on an oppositional minority party rather than to achieve consensus.” 
However, she adds: 
The difference between EU and member-state decision-making is much less 
significant in the case of foreign policy […] because foreign policy is much more 
likely to be a consensual activity between the major political parties in the member 
states with most governments willing to go to some lengths to involve opposition 
parties in major foreign policy initiatives. (Smith H. 2002: 121).  
Her conclusion is that “[t]he EU, much like a nation-state, seeks to minimise 
internal conflicts in order to present a united front to the outside world.” 
(Smith H. 2002: 121). The fundamental difference I note here is that, in the 
case of the EU, it is not just one single central government, but rather as 
many central governments as Member States who are equally empowered 
“to go to some lengths” to convince each other. In this respect, Dobson and 
Weale (2003: 156) make an important point: “The EU has evolved beyond an 
ordinary association between independent states, but not to the extent that it 
has become a state in its own right.” Both scholars warn against the limits of 
comparison of the EU “to other systems of multilevel governance like the 
US.” (Dobson and Weale 2003: 167). Their list of differences between the 
two multilevel governance systems include the “great deal of trouble” the US 
assumes to socialize each generation into the American creed”; the 
incomparable strength of “nation-state identity and powers” within the EU, 
“particularly in defence and foreign affairs”; and the multiplicity of languages 
in Europe” that “makes it difficult for a common European party system to 
emerge.” (Dobson and Weale 2003: 167-8). Furthermore, the two academics 
note,  
very few Europeans want to be assimilated on the model of the American melting 
pot. Instead they want to remain as separate and diverse peoples, but peoples 
united in a multiplicity of ways around core values and projects they hold in 
common, such as a commitment to liberal democracy, respect for the rule of law, 
the promotion of human rights and a decent society, and welfare and prosperity. 
(Dobson and Weale 2003: 168). 
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Hence, the two analysts conclude, “the proper structural equivalent, if there is 
one, is not to a developed federal system but to something beyond the loose 
North American Free Trade Agreement yet short of the US federal system.” 
(Dobson and Weale 2003: 168). Overall, my position regarding the federalist 
argument of Hazel Smith is that, while democratic sovereign nation-states 
face problems of coordination and integration of their respective foreign 
policy activities, the EU is incomparably prone or vulnerable to inaction, 
unwarranted delays, and insufficiency of decisions and actions under its 
CFSP for which it derives its legitimacy from Member States, and not the 
other way around.  
In response to the initial question of whether the denomination ‘CFSP’ is a 
misnomer or a contradiction in terms, the foregoing suggests that the CFSP 
does have supranational competences, mainly because it has a Treaty base 
and envisages foreign and security initiatives, including operational actions, 
that commit all Member States. It is therefore ‘common’ by design and much 
more than the EPC: the simple intergovernmental consultation and 
cooperation mechanism that it replaced. It is ‘uncommon’ because it neither 
replaces nor rules over national foreign policies unconditionally, because it 
can exercise the Treaty-conferred supranational competences only when and 
where Member States so decide. This, in addition to the lack of experience, 
underpins the aforementioned semantic ambiguity over its scope and issue-
areas. The Treaty provisions that were finally adopted in 1992 for the CFSP 
were a rather light version that Member States preferred to a more radical 
one drafted by the Dutch government and which reportedly would have 
communitised, from the very start, the CFSP and prevented Member States 
to have supreme control of foreign and security matters handled by the Union 
on their behalf (Wagner 2003: 578). However, this should have come as no 
surprise since the CFSP could but mirror the very sui generis status of the 
EU of which it was deemed to be the ‘high politics’ pillar: it is by far more than 
any conventional intergovernmental organisation, yet very short of any 
federal nation-state worth the name. Like the EU itself, the CFSP is by far 
more prone to intermittence and inaction than any foreign policy of a 
sovereign nation-state. Notwithstanding, does ‘common stance’ and ‘joint 
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action’ necessarily entail betterment in humanitarian terms? I address this 
question in the following section. 
Utility of Common Stance and Joint Action 
Since the inception of the CFSP in 1993, many voices have demanded for its 
‘communitisation’; alleging or implying that without full unity, there would be 
no betterment. Only three years after its entry into force, the then European 
Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy 
argued that, “under the CFSP, national policies should be complementary to 
common actions and not the other way around.” (Van den Broek 1996: 3-4). 
He went on to warn Member States in these terms: “Unless common action 
becomes the normal reaction of the Union when faced with external 
challenge, the Union will continue to serve rather a paymaster than a 
peacemaker.” He indicated that conflict prevention, crisis management and 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, for instance, “cannot 
possibly be effective on a purely national basis.” (Van den Broek 1996: 4). A 
decade later, Van den Broek (2007) reaffirmed that “[r]eaching common 
positions between 27 member states” remained the requirement in order to 
be able to “to make a difference when being confronted with today's serious 
international crisis situations”. For former President of the European 
Commission Romano Prodi (1999-2004), the EU simply “will not succeed in 
contributing to peace and stability in the world...unless...the entire foreign and 
security policy of the Union is brought inside the Community system” (quoted 
in Wagner 2003: 578). The example of negative consequences that 
proponents of a communitised foreign policy most cite is the EU paralysis in 
the face of the US invasion of Iraq, with the support the UK and the 
opposition of France in the spring of 2003. Hoebink and Mollet (2003: 37) for 
example commented: “The split over the US-led war on Iraq in spring 2003 
brought European divisions into harsh focus; the nascent ‘Common Foreign 
and Security Policy’ reduced to something like a joke in the eyes of many”. 
The above-quoted former President of the European Commission lamented: 
“Europe should have a role; saying that it should is exaggerated because we 
are not yet united to speak with one voice. However, if Europe had a 
common goal, in these days it could have a very big influence in the world 
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scene. But instead we are being laughed at.” (Romano Prodi, as quoted in 
Murphy 2003: 1). In their world-widely commented joint call for the rebirth of 
Europe, Habermas and Derrida (2003: 1) – two of the most authoritative 
thinkers of 20th century Europe too observed: “There is no doubt that the 
power of feelings brought Europe's citizens to make a stand together [against 
the war against Iraq]. But the war also brought Europeans awareness of the 
long foreseen failure of their common foreign policy.” (Added underlining).  
Clearly, these views infer an inherent and self–evident qualitative added 
value, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, to full communitisation of the 
CFSP. Yet, they appear to be inspired by a challengeable euro-centrist 
premise that the sum or melting of the foreign and security policies of 
individual Member States under the CFSP can only make them become 
(more) effective and (more) ethical, that is, policies for the global common 
good. Certainly, common position and joint action can be enabling factors. 
Still, they are dependent as variables and cannot per se and alone account 
for the implied qualitative improvement. As Lister (1997: 8) has pertinently 
pointed out, it does not seem theoretically proven that a Union’s common 
foreign policy would be, say, “better than the sum of the individual foreign 
policies of the member states”. Earlier, I too underscored that individual 
nation-states, unlike the EU, have no problem of single centrality and unity 
for their own foreign policies. Yet, more often than not, they fail to live up, 
either by action or by omission, to their responsibilities, their promises, and 
the expectations of their own citizens and or of the rest of the world. The 
invasion of Iraq under the American administration of President Bush is a 
case in point. Actually, what difference would a unified foreign and security 
policy of the EU have made in the case of the 2003-Iraq invasion? Would the 
EU, instead of few of its Member States, have participated in the invasion? 
Would the EU, instead of some of its Member States, challenged and 
convinced the USA not to go on war? Would the EU have presented a better 
(preventive) alternative to military invasion? Would the EU have made the 
invasion internationally legal, or would they have made it more humanitarian 




It seems that in the absence of theoretical and empirical evidence, the 
alleged added value of the ‘communitisation’ variable is as much overstated 
as the existence of the variable itself. The CFSP can be a force for a global 
common good or not, independently of the degree of its communitisation. 
EU’s long standing development aid and trade policies, which have 
transformed the EU into the world’s first aid provider and trade block, have 
always been fully communitised since their inception. Yet, various analysts 
consider them partly responsible for the misery and suffering of their target 
beneficiaries due to the predominance of the interests of donors and the ill-
design and mismanagement of development aid and trade projects 
particularly during the Cold War period (David 2000). Mostly, common stance 
and centrality of decision and action do not necessarily entail altruistic, 
need-tailored, timely, and sufficient foreign policy decisions and actions 
prescribed by Conflict Resolution. Nor does uncommon and decentralised 
foreign and security policy axiomatically lead to the opposite.  
Means: Civilian vs. Military Power Europe 
Much like communitisation, the lack or disposal of operational means has 
have always been at the centre of the debate about the status and role of, 
first, the European Community (EC) and, second, its successor the European 
Union on the world stage; hence the importance and priority that the EU has 
given to the ESDP in the development of the CFSP. When the first Gulf War 
unfolded in the early nineteen nineties, former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark 
Eysken lamented: “Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and, even 
worse, a military worm until it concerns itself with elaborating a defence 
capability.” (Quoted in Leibfried 2009: 11). When in the mid and late nineties 
the former Yugoslavian empire violently disintegrated and fell prey to ethnic 
cleansing and genocidal massacres, Europeans in general and EU members 
in particular attributed their inaction or little action to the lack of robust 
capacities and capabilities. When the second Gulf War broke out and a US-
led coalition invaded Iraq against the will and warnings of the majority of 
Western European powers, again EU top leaders blamed their divisions and 
paralysis to their lack of a unified foreign policy and of a euro-army worth the 
name (Moravcsik 2003, 2004, 2009). Arguably, the lack of the progress 
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desired by some is due to the lack of unity among EU citizens and the public 
opinion in general on the benefit and feasibility of either variable for the 
improvement of EU international identity and behaviour. Indeed, some policy 
makers, analysts, and public opinion makers have seen in the inception and 
the development of ESDP the end of Civilian Power Europe; while others 
have welcomed the military component as the long missing element for the 
EU to be a Civilian Power worth the name. In the following sections, I shall 
review the views of each side separately. 
Peace by Civilian Means 
[H]ow could a political entity so successful at creating order within 
through the logic of interdependence now turn to the old logic of 
coercive action externally? (Nicolaidis and Lacroix 2003: 141). 
This quote reflects the stance of people whom its authors refer to as the 
“critics on the left and within NGOs” who “deplored the old-fashioned logic of 
a force-centred approach to power” adopted by the EU after the end of the 
Cold War. Indeed, critics of the defence and military dimension of the 
European Union and advocates of civilians ends by civilian means all draw 
upon and espouse the concept and definition of such a power as articulated 
by Francois Duchêne in the nineteen seventies: “[T]he European Community 
will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains true to its inner 
characteristics. These are primarily: civilian ends and means, and a built-in 
sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social 
values of equality, justice and tolerance.” (Quoted in Smith K. 2000: 28). In 
Duchême’s conviction, 
The European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on 
economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to 
domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and 
those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring to international 
problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics 
which have been in the past associated exclusively with ‘home’ and not foreign, 
that is alien, affairs.’ (Quoted in Whitman 2002: 4). 
Likewise, Zielonka has no doubt whatsoever that “[o]pting for a civilian power 
Europe would represent one of the basic strategic choices that could help the 
Union acquire a distinct profile – so important in terms of identity and 
legitimacy” (quoted in Smith K. 2000: 27). Drawing on and embracing these 
views, Karen Smith has made various reflections two of which I wish to 
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consider here because they complement each other. Smith made her first 
reflection just in the aftermath of the inception of the ESDP and the adoption 
of the Helsinki Commitments in December 1999, to point out the irrelevance 
of a military force and to warn against its potential harm to the ‘civilian 
EC/EU’. She made the second reflection half the first decade of the 
implementation of the Helsinki Commitments, to announce and confirm the 
definite death of ‘civilian power Europe’ and therefore to close off the debate 
about the civilian and distinct identity of the EU. In the first reflection, Smith 
advances a two-fold argument. First, she unreservedly asserts that the Union 
has been “abandoning its civilian power image” since the inclusion of the 
defence dimension in the Maastricht Treaty provisions for the CFSP and its 
later development from the Saint Malo Declaration and Helsinki 
Commitments onwards (Smith K. 2000: 12). Second and more importantly, 
Smith argues that “an EU military capability is not necessary and is, 
furthermore, potentially harmful.” (Smith K. 2000: 27). 
Unnecessary defence and military force 
Smith holds that defence dimension and the associated military power are 
not necessary because the objectives they are supposed to help achieve can 
be pursued, even more effectively, by already existing non-civilian means 
available in abundance to the Union. The pursued objectives are mainly 
three: full political integration, strong international identity and influence on 
the international scene, and (better) handling of international crises and 
conflicts. In terms of enabling full integration, Smith argues that the 
pursuance of defence dimension and military power is based upon the 
(traditional) statehood model of foreign policy, while “the EU itself is sui 
generis” and “its development cannot be neatly categorised as a state-
building enterprise, although key actors have pushed for such a project since 
the 1950s.” (Smith K. 2000: 19). She recalls that, “Born of an attempt to 
reduce the threat of war within Western Europe”, the EU “is the premier 
example of how inter-state relations can be transformed through intense 
cooperation, which does not necessarily entail the creation of a superstate.” 
In support of her point, she endorses Duchêne’s assertion that, “With all its 
imperfections, the Community domesticates the balance of power into 
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something which, if not as ‘democratic’ as domestic norms, has made the 
international system in Europe take a huge step in their direction” (Smith K. 
2000: 19).  
With regard to strong international identity and influence on the international 
scene, Smith argues that the distinct and attractive identity of the EU has 
been achieved and can be further strengthened through the success of the 
European model of exclusively using peaceful and intense cooperation to 
transform inter-states relations. This success, she argues, is so powerful and 
attractive that regions and countries want to join or be linked with the Union 
in one form or another simply because the “EU is simply not threatening” 
(Smith K. 2000: 24). For Smith, it is from this success that “the civilian power 
image [of the EU] derives particular strength.” Unfortunately, Smith regrets, 
“in the debate on an EU defence dimension, the contributions that a civilian 
EU could make to international relations have been discounted” (Smith K. 
2000: 19).  
Moreover, Smith contends that proponents of a military power EU forget or 
ignore that “[m]ost foreign policy does not involve the use of force” and that, 
instead, the EU can and should increase its international influence by better 
using and “strengthening the economic and diplomatic instruments and 
procedures that the EU can already use, including trade and association 
agreements, aid, the use of special envoys, election observation, human 
rights monitoring, and so on” (Smith K. 2000: 23). In Smith’s view, “Excessive 
emphasis on the military dimension diverts attention from the key problem – 
the member states themselves” without whose agreement “there will be no 
common foreign policy and no use of foreign policy instruments, civilian or 
military.” In any case, she concludes, “adding a military dimension will not 
turn the EU into a more influential actor” (Smith K. 2000: 20); while “[a] 
civilian power EU could have represented a major shift in international 
relations.” (Smith K. 2000: 28). Smith is convinced that “it would be far better 
for the Union to improve its capacities to do what it can already do fairly well, 
with civilian means.” (Smith K. 2000: 23). 
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Concerning the handling of international crises and conflicts, Smith argues 
that the “perceived effectiveness of NATO’s use of force in Bosnia and 
Kosovo” has “provided the justification and spur for the development of an 
EU military capability.” (Smith K. 2000: 19). She however contends that as far 
the implementation of the Petersberg Tasks, in particular military intervention 
in internal conflicts, is concerned, “there may be little that outsiders can, or 
should, do in these cases, especially when the combatants are still fighting” 
(Smith K. 2000: 20). She cites the reluctance of states to intervene at all in 
most internal conflicts because of past controversial and disastrous military 
interventions such as the one in Somalia in the early 1990s; the absence of 
an otherwise required international agreement on the circumstances under 
which military intervention in internal conflicts should be justified and carried 
out; and the requirement of prior UN authorisation even in cases of military 
intervention for human protection purposes (Smith K. 2000: 20). 
  
Smith rather endorses the allegedly wide-held view that the EU is “very well-
placed” and better equipped than any other international organisation with 
the type of non-military means which are the most appropriate for tackling the 
economic, social and political root causes of the internal conflicts and 
security threats the EU set itself out to respond through the CFSP (Smith K. 
2000: 23). Such civilian assets include “intellectual impact of a new model of 
interstate relations, the disposition of considerable economic influence over 
the management of the international economy, the possession of a vast 
network of contacts and agreements with every region of the international 
system” (Hill, quoted in Smith K. 2000: 23). Her empirical evidence of EU’s 
successful use of these non-military means are the same as those listed by 
other analysts (Whitman 2002; Moravcsik 2003, 2009; Leibfried 2009). They 
include the Pact for Stability in Europe and enlargement towards southern, 
central, and eastern Europe (Smith K. 2000: 15-6). Leibfried (2009: 11) 
sustains that, “With the exception of the post-war reconstructions of Japan 
and West Germany, no external stabilization effort in history can boast such 
success.” Smith insists that even in the event of necessity of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes, “the EU does not have to be the 
organisation that does the intervening.” (Smith K. 2000: 25) Alternative 
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organisations for providing “political direction and authority” and through 
which the EU could make its contribution already existed by the time the EU 
set out to acquire a defence and military dimension. Her alternatives 
particularly include the United Nations (UN), enlargeable Western European 
Union (WEU), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) (Smith K. 2000: 25-26). 
Potentially harmful defence and military force 
Smith K. asserts that the pursuit and eventual achievement of military power 
by Europe is “potentially harmful” for various reasons. She points out that 
“[a]n EU military capability would represent the culmination of a ‘state-
building project” and lead to the recreation of “the state on a grander scale”; 
just the opposite of the fundamental objective of the European integration 
project (Smith K. 2000: 27). In her view, building up an EU military force 
could create security dilemma and therefore be met with suspicion and 
opposing alliances by non-member states and thus “could cement a division 
in Europe rather than overcome it.” (Smith K. 2000: 24-25). Smith warns that 
this would mean the end of civilian power EU. She indicates that even if the 
EU would use military means as last resort and in self-defence or for 
humanitarian purposes, thus allegedly remaining a civilian power, still “the 
stated intention of enhancing the EU’s military resources carries a price: it 
sends a signal that military force is still useful and necessary, and that it 
should be used to further the EU’s interests. It would close off the path of fully 
embracing civilian power. And this means giving up far too much for far too 
little.” (Smith K. 2000: 27). It is Smith’s conviction that wielding military power 
“would signal the end of the EU’s (potential or actual) contribution to a 
different kind of international relations, in which civilian instruments are 
wielded on behalf of a collectivity which had renounced the use of force 
among its members and encouraged others to do the same.” (Smith K. 2000: 
28). 
Death of ‘Civilian Power EU’ 
In her second reflection made half the first decade of the development of EU 
military capacities and capabilities, Smith K. (2005: 1) announced the death 
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of civilian power EU and undertook “to knock off once and for all the idea of 
‘civilian power EU’, and indeed the idea of naming the EU as a specific kind 
of international actor”. She concluded that the EU was “no longer a civilian 
power” (Smith K. 2005: 17) and that “civilian power EU [was] definitely dead” 
(Smith K. 2005: 12) because the EU could not fulfil any of the four defining 
features of an ideal-type civilian power: civilian means; civilian ends; 
persuasion/ soft power; and democratic control. In terms of means, Smith K. 
(2005: 1) argued that the EU had developed military capabilities since the 
inception of the ESDP in 1999 onwards and was heading for more military 
force in view of the then planned setting up of EU battle groups. She rejected 
the labelling or categorisation of ‘peacekeeping troops’ as ‘civilian means’ 
because peacekeepers, whether armed or not, “are still troops who are 
trained also to kill”. Besides, she sustains, since the tragic experiences of the 
1990s, the trend had been to “depart from traditional peacekeeping principles 
and allow for the use of more ‘robust’ forms of intervention.” (Smith K. 2005: 
2).). Therefore, for her, the EU could not deny possessing and using military 
means under the disguise of the aforementioned Petersberg Tasks. In her 
view, “It is much easier and more coherent to maintain a distinction between 
purely civilian means and military means” because “saying that acquiring or 
using a bit of military means still qualifies an actor as a civilian power leads to 
the inevitable question of how much military: where is the cut-off point?” On 
the other hand, dropping the element of ‘means’ of the definition of a ‘civilian 
power’ weakens the concept and lets doors wide open for any actor, in 
particular actors with military means, to qualify (Smith K. 2005: 10-11). 
Concerning ‘civilian ends’, Smith recalled those proposed by the precursor of 
all writers on ‘civilian power’, that is, Francois Duchêne: international 
cooperation, solidarity, domestication of international relations (or 
strengthening the rule of law in international relations), responsibility for the 
global environment, and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance.” 
(Duchêne 1973: 19-20, as quoted in Smith K. 2005: 3). Her observation is 
that these goals “are still quite fuzzily defined” (Smith K. 2005: 3) and very 
hard to define (Smith K. 2005: 12). Her proposal is that not only we must 
acknowledge the ambiguity of the alleged ‘civilian ends’ but also avoid 
uncritically stating that, “the EU is actually pursuing civilian ends [...] and 
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therefore is a civilian power.” (Smith K. 2005: 10). To illustrate her point, she 
for instance underlines that it is not clear what ‘solidarity’ means in terms of 
policy practice (Smith K. 2005: 3), or “which human rights are promoted (only 
political?) and which democratic principles (majority rule?)” prevail (Smith K. 
2005: 10). Nor does she find clearly stated which of the following numerous 
foreign policy objectives of the EU takes precedence and how they reinforce 
each other: the promotion of regional cooperation, economic 
interdependence, human rights, democracy, sustainable development, fight 
against terrorism, conflict prevention,  organised crime, and illegal 
immigration (Smith K. 2005: 15-17). Besides, Smith denotes that empirical 
evidence suggests EU’s preference for those objectives that promote its self-
interests such as the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration than those 
that further the interests of its foreign policy target countries and regions 
(Smith K. 2005: 16).  
Regarding the third criteria, the use of persuasion, instead of coercion, to 
domesticate the behaviour of international interlocutors, Smith holds that the 
EU has been using “command power”, particularly since the late 1990s, “to 
induce or coerce third countries to do certain things” that satisfy more its own 
interests and or produce inconsistent results. For an example, she points out 
that conditionality has become “a well-established feature of EU foreign 
relations.” (Smith K. 2005: 10-11). She underlines that the EU coerces its 
interlocutors particularly with “negative conditionality” (negative measures 
such as reduction, suspension of aid, or sanctions) which is “coercion, in 
other words.” (Smith K. 2005: 11). With reference to the last criteria, civilian 
control over foreign policy, Smith affirms that “formal parliamentary control in 
the CFSP (or over trade agreements, or, as is increasingly important, the 
external aspects of the Justice and Home Affairs agenda) is not assured”. 
She contends that, “the parliamentary input – and public debate – over the 
use of the armed forces by the EU and/or by the member states is minimal” 
and that “the entire development of the European Security and Defence 
Policy has occurred with very little public discussion, or even knowledge.” 
(Smith K. 2005: 11). Smith’s conclusion is that the EU “finds itself, like almost 
every other international actor on the planet, somewhere along a spectrum 
between the two ideal-types of civilian and military power.” She asserts that, 
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“like all other international actors”, the EU “faces moral dilemmas between 
carrying out duties towards its citizens and carrying out duties towards 
foreigners.” (Smith K. 2005: 17). Smith henceforth calls for the debate about 
the alleged distinct international identity of the EU to be shifted and focused 
on the kind of (international) order and justice – the (international) milieu – 
the EU cherishes and upholds and how it actually does pursue and should 
pursue that milieu. 
Still ‘Civilian Power EU’  
While Smith K. (2005: 17) was announcing the definite death of ‘civilian 
power EU’ and was calling for an end to “classifying or categorising the EU – 
and celebrating its distinctiveness” in world politics, others were doing the 
opposite. This is the case of two authors, Moravcsik and Leibfried, whose 
views are otherwise identical to Smith’s ones. Amid the international and, 
particularly, trans-Atlantic discord over the Iraq crisis in the early 2000s, 
Moravcsik (2003, 2004, 2009) argued, like Smith, that an EU military power 
measurable to the US’ one was and is unnecessary, unachievable, and 
harmful for EU’s global influence for peace and security. Military force is not 
necessary because, Moravcsik sustains, the EU “possesses five instruments 
that, taken in total, constitute an influence over peace and war as great as 
that of the United States.” (Moravcsik 2004: 172). Those instruments are the 
following: free trade based accession; aid (civilian development and 
humanitarian aid); multilateral peacekeeping and policing; monitoring and 
building global trust by international institutions; and multilateral legitimation 
and legitimacy. In Moravcsik’s (2004: 173) view, the first instrument “is 
perhaps the single most powerful policy instrument for peace and security in 
the world today.” Concerning the second, Moravcsik points out that EU 
contribution represents “70 per cent of all” development and humanitarian aid 
worldwide and “four times more than the United States’”, and “is far more 
equitably disbursed, often by multilateral organisations”. As to the third 
instrument, Moravcsik underlines that the EU contributes “ten times as many 
peacekeeping troops as the United States” to multilateral peacekeeping and 
policing. Concerning the fourth instrument, monitoring and building global 
trust by international institutions, Moravcsik sustains that the EU can and 
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should increase its support. In his conviction, “The Iraq crisis might have 
developed very differently if the Europeans had cared enough to offer the 
option of sending, say, ten times as many weapons inspectors to Iraq, ten 
months earlier.” (Moravcsik 2004: 173).  
Regarding the fifth and last instrument, Moravcsik (2004: 173) considers 
international / multilateral legitimacy to be “the basis of ‘soft power’ – the 
power to attract rather than compel” in the contemporary world. In his view, 
“Even modest progress on difficult civilian tasks – like tightening ties with 
Turkey, developing EU flexibility on the Israeli-Palestinian question, 
establishing a multinational coercive inspection force for WMD, or cutting 
agricultural subsidies – would do more, euro-for-euro, to promote world 
peace and security than construction of a ‘Euro-force’.” (Moravcsik 2004: 
174). Furthermore, Moravcsik argues, building a euro-military power in the 
US’ image is not feasible because “[i]t is unlikely that Europeans will spend 
the money, or approve the wrenching industrial and political upheavals, 
necessary to create a serious high-intensity force.” (Moravcsik 2004: 172). 
Finally and even more important to underline in Moravcsik’s view, the calls 
and initiatives to build up a high-intensity euro-force are harmful for two 
reasons. First, “militarisation betrays European ideals and interests”, deeply 
rooted “in an admirable European idealism about the potential efficacy of 
non-military foreign policy instruments.” Second, “European defence 
schemes distract Europe from its true comparative advantage in world 
politics: the cultivation of civilian and quasi-military power.” (Moravcsik 2004: 
172). 
When the ESDP was celebrating its tenth anniversary by the end of 2009, 
Moravcsik confirmed his prediction, made five years earlier. He announced 
that the EU had actually become “the quiet superpower”, “the only other 
global superpower besides the United States in a bipolar world”, and the 
“world’s pre-eminent civilian power”. He argued that its power and global 
influence were actually rising and would continue to do so for a foreseeable 
future because they are based on “stable factors such as high per capita 
income, long-term institutional advantages and convergence of underlying 
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national interests between European countries and other great powers, 
notably the United States.” (Moravcsik 2009: 403).  
At the same point in time, Leibfried (2009) too disapproved of harsh criticisms 
and constant demands for credible military power to remedy EU’s alleged 
lack of foreign policy worth the name. For him, such criticisms and demands 
are misplaced, unfair, and harmful. They are misplaced because they are 
inspired on an outdated model of foreign of classical nation-state foreign 
policy that is inapplicable to the case of the EU, which is not a superstate. 
They are unfair because, they fail to realistically assess the “unusual policy 
instruments” of the EU” the “most important and successful” of which “is its 
accession policy.” Thanks to this policy, Leibfried argues, the EU has turned 
“fragile post-dictatorial democracies in Greece, Spain and Portugal” into 
“reliable partners.” (Leibfried 2009: 11). Leibfried’s list of unusual and 
innovative, yet undervalued, foreign policy instruments include “Europe’s 
association treaties with countries on the Mediterranean rim” and “its trade 
and development programs in some members’ former colonies.” (Leibfried 
2009: 11). 
Lastly, Leibfried finds the criticisms against EU foreign policy and demands 
for military force harmful because; “As long as we expect Europe to behave 
like a nation-state rather than allowing it to develop on its own terms, its 
foreign policy will be misdiagnosed and overprescribed, doomed to perpetual 
crisis and impotence.” In order to avoid this and with a view to enabling the 
EU “to make an enormous contribution toward solving critical regional and 
global problems”; Leibfried rather proposes strengthening EU’s “sui generis 
capabilities” and using “them to influence and embed its neighbours”. 
(Leibfried 2009: 11). 
Peace by Civilian and or Military Means 
In sharp contrast with the foregoing argument of Smith (2000, 2005), 
Moravcsik (2003, 2004, 2009), and Leibfried (2009), various analysts 
endorse the official discourse of EU authorities and sustain that military force 
rather reinforces ‘Civilian Power Europe’ (Gasteyer 1996; Bretherton and 
Vogler 1999; Heisbourg 2000; Howorth 2000; Stavridis 2001; Petiteville 
 134 
 
2003). In particular, Stavridis and Petiteville have made a strong case for the 
EU to acquire a credible military force in order to be an able and credible 
Civilian Power on the international scene. Stavridis (2001: 3) maintains that, 
“thanks to the militarising of the Union, the latter might at long last be able to 
act as a real power in the world, and more importantly as a civilian power, 
that is as a force for the promotion of democratic principles in the world.” He 
directly refers to the “many atrocities in the former–Yugoslavia and other 
areas of the world” (Stavridis 2001: 3). He undertakes to demonstrate that 
“the militarising of the EU” is not only compatible with but also indispensable 
for the strengthening of a Civilian Power Europe. He thus sets out to 
challenge scholars (namely Whitman 1998, Edwards 2000, and Smith K. 
2000) who argue the opposite: that the militarising of the EU under the CFSP 
entails the end of Civilian Power Europe.  
Stavridis’ argument revolves around two main pillars: (i) the military power 
requirement and the status of the EU in world politics and (ii) the concept of 
civilian power and the military power condition. Here I shall focus on the 
second, as I have no fundamental observation on his valuation of military 
power as a means to enhance the Union’s high politics profile on the 
international scene. EU authorities have themselves made clear that the 
introduction of the CFSP aimed to assert the Union’s identity and to level up 
the EU political influence to its coveted economic leverage on the 
international stage (TEU, art.1). 
Military Power and Civilian Power EU 
Stavridis (2001: 21) contends that “only half of the initial definition” of the 
concept of civilian power was used and “useful during the nuclear stalemate 
and the predominance of the bipolar world.” He too recalls that the concept of 
civilian power as applied to Europe was academically first developed by 
Duchêne (1972, 1973), and was initially used in reference to Japan and West 
Germany. He notes that the concept had two main features: (i) “the absence 
of military means (both conventional and nuclear) and the presence of 
economic and financial importance in the international system” (Stavridis 
2001: 4-5); and (ii) the promotion “through [one’s] foreign policy [of] the ideals 
of democracy, human rights, economic growth and international cooperation.” 
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(Stavridis 2001: 6). His main finding is that only the first characteristic was 
unfortunately emphasised, with as a result the under-study of “the question of 
military power as part of the concept”. Hence, Stavridis criticises scholars 
who emphasise the non-military condition of any civilian power at the 
expense of the second – the normative prerequisite of promoting democratic 
principles – and ignore “the more problematic question of how to promote 
these principles without ever having to use force.” (Stavridis 2001: 9). He 
finds this question more than just a theoretical one “because it implies, 
though not explicitly, that democracies should never fight each other.” To 
challenge this assumption he advances that “[h]istory and reason point to a 
different direction of the course” and simply asks; “What would have been a 
civilian response to Hitler’s military takeover of Europe?” (Stavridis 2001: 9). 
For him, “the possession of military means is necessary because it allows for 
the possibility of using them. It adds to the credibility of an international actor. 
Equally important is, in his view, the fact that by not having a military option 
the range of possibilities becomes more restricted and less credible.” 
Comparing the EU to the United States of America, Stavridis affirms that, “by 
having both military and non-military options, the Americans enjoy more 
freedom of manoeuvre when dealing with international issues.” (Stavridis 
2001: 18). His conclusion is two–fold. First, he affirms that “we need to move 
from the concept of a civilian power ‘by default’ to that of a civilian power ‘by 
design’ (or by conviction)”. Second, he advances that “the militarizing of the 
EU makes the concept even more useful.” (Stavridis 2001: 20). 
For his part, Petiteville (2003: 137) argues that, “without support from a 
stronger CFSP, including military potential, the EU’s capability to play a major 
role in conflict–preventing and peace–building operations may remain quite 
limited in the future.” Petiteville and like–minded analysts “believe that the 
EU’s current soft diplomacy has more to win than to lose if completed by a 
stronger CFSP which is equipped with a military potential to perform the so–
called Petersberg tasks.” Petiteville advances that, “Contrary to Karen Smith 
(2000) and other authors”, himself and his like-minded fellows “do not see the 
‘end of civilian power EU’ in the evolution but the strengthening of the EU’s 
external capability.” In his view, “promoting democratic and human rights 
values is not necessarily contradictory with the disposing of a military 
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potential to face, in the last resort, the crises of a frequently ‘uncivil world’ 
[…], provided that the latter is not used as a tool for expansion, imperialism 
or hegemony.” (Petiteville 2003: 137). Petiteville bases his call for the 
building of EU military capability on the allegedly inherent limits of soft 
diplomacy. He define the latter “as a diplomacy resorting to economic, 
financial, legal and institutional means to export values, norms and rules and 
achieve long–term cultural influence.” He sustains that soft diplomacy “is 
mainly based on the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, sustainable development and so on”; and “is 
usually seen as deprived of power interests and as a useful contribution to 
the work of the United Nations’ efforts to promote global governance.” 
(Petiteville 2003: 134).  
Petiteville relates soft diplomacy to the concepts of soft power and civilian 
power, both of which “underline the primacy of economic and institutional co–
operation over military means, and of long–term cultural influence on short–
term diplomatic pressures, to achieve international political influence.” He 
recalls that soft diplomacy “is not totally new and has, for instance, 
characterized the diplomacy of states like Canada and Scandinavian 
countries.” (Petiteville 2003: 134). Besides, Petiteville notes that the “EU’s 
soft diplomacy is not new in itself, but the EU brings an added value because 
its weight in the world is comparable to the US.” In that context, he points out,  
the EU may pretend to compete with the US for global leadership in promoting its 
own conception of democracy (for example banning the death penalty and 
defending strong welfare states), promoting sustainable development (through 
support for the Kyoto protocol which was rejected by the US) and by regulating 
globalisation (especially on social protection, culture, agriculture, development aid, 
etc.). (Petiteville 2003: 134).  
Accordingly, Petiteville sustains, the “EU’s soft diplomacy as a way of 
proposing values, norms and rules is all the more important given that the 
globalisation era is characterized by a collective need for meanings other 
than strictly economic norms.” (Petiteville 2003: 134). Nonetheless, he 
warningly contends, EU soft diplomacy “faces obvious geo–political 
constraints.” It “may be adapted to ‘soft conflictual’ situations where 
economic sanctions are sufficient to exert an effective pressure on 
governments”, but is inefficient “in more serious cases of political/military 
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conflict such as mass crimes (Rwanda), civil wars (Sierra Leone, Angola, 
Congo) or authoritarian regimes resistant to economic pressures (Iraq, 
Serbia, Nigeria, Sudan).” (Petiteville 2003: 137). He advances that without 
the support of a strong CFSP, “the objective of ‘conflict prevention’ set by the 
Cotonou Agreement as a new objective of the EU co–operation with ACP 
states seems quite unrealistic”. He quotes a member of the cabinet of former 
Commissioner for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, Mr. Poul 
Nielson (1999 –2004) as sharing his assessment: “Conflict prevention 
sounds great in speeches, but in practice, unless involving 500,000 soldiers, 
we do not know how we will manage” (Petiteville 2003: 137). Moreover, he 
gives the case of the role of the EU in Asia and Middle East as empirical 
evidences. He sustains that the objectives contained in the Strategy 
presented by the Commission in 1994 for Asia and which included “a strong 
EU contribution to regional security including negotiations about arms control 
and non–proliferation […] are merely rhetorical given the weak political 
influence of Europe in Asia.” Concerning his second area of empirical 
evidence, he affirms that “the Middle–East is another classic example of the 
EU’s limited capacity to link economic co–operation with diplomatic 
influence.” He argues that while the “EU provides more than 50 per cent of 
international aid to the Palestinians”, its “diplomatic position”, which is 
reputed to be closer to the Palestinians than the US, has given Israel the 
incentive to leave the EU out of the Israel–Palestinian negotiation process.” 
(Petiteville 2003: 137). 
Commentary  
The views exposed above share a fundamental premise that the EU is by 
design an essentially civilian power at least in two aspects: means and ends. 
Nuances and divergences exist only in terms of the importance of either 
criterion and of the way and extent to which the EU must satisfy either 
criterion in order to qualify as a civilian power worth the name. Proponents of 
a Civilian Power EU without any military force whatsoever hold that non-
military means are not only appropriate but also sufficient for the EU to 
domesticate international relations through the promotion and protection of 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law worldwide. They 
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regret and warn against the weakening and, worse, the death, of Civilian 
Power EU because of the introduction and development of a military 
dimension through the ESDP. Their critics argue the opposite and welcome 
the military dimension as a rather enabling factor for a global civilian power 
EU by design rather than by default. Both sides provide insightful accounts of 
the origin and contours of the concept of civilian power and its relevance and 
applicability to the case of the EC/EU, and its benefit for the conception, 
conduct, and evaluation of foreign policy. In particular, Smith’s (2005) 
conceptualisation of an ideal-type civilian power, with the four complementary 
criteria, and Stavridis’ re-conceptualisation of a Civilian Power Europe, with 
an emphasis on the second normative condition – the promotion “through its 
foreign policy of the ideals of democracy, human rights, economic growth and 
international cooperation” (Stavridis 2001: 6) – are pertinent. Equally useful is 
Moravcsik’s (2003, 2004, 2009) delineation of the EU’s five foreign policy 
“instruments that, taken in total, constitute an influence over peace and war 
as great as that of the United States.” (Moravcsik 2004: 172). Leibfried 
(2009) too makes an important point by stressing that the EU is neither a 
superpower nor superdwarf and that we should assess its foreign policy 
accordingly. Finally, Petiteville’s (2003) definition of soft diplomacy and his 
account of its actual application by the EU constitute an important 
contribution to the discussion. 
However, there exist some important shortcomings with either side, 
particularly when it comes to civilian ends, that is, the normative condition of 
a civilian power in Stavridis’ conceptualisation. Advocates of non-military 
instruments fail to demonstrate how in their cited empirical evidence, the use 
by the EC/EU of non-military foreign policy instruments successfully furthered 
civilian ends in favour of recipient countries of little or no high stakes for the 
EC/EU and or its key allies. Enlargement (in particular towards central and 
eastern Europe), the more cited empirical evidence of a civilian power 
Europe, undeniably owes its success to the sustained political will, long-term 
commitment, and determination that altogether underpin the European 
integration project: a non-forcible creation of a community of shared 
geographical location, history, ideals, values, and interests. In other words, 
enlargement is an integral part of the main “means” for furthering the 
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European integration venture and is therefore nurtured by a strong self-
realisation interest. Critics of the military dimension also leave one wondering 
whether the failure of the EC/EU to avert or stop the tragedies in certain 
places was due to the non-use or inadequate use of its otherwise sufficient 
non-military foreign policy instruments.  
More importantly, their outright rejection of military means and the warning 
against the death of civilian power EC/EU clearly suggest that until the 
introduction and development of military capacities and capabilities under the 
CFSP, the EC/EU was a civilian power worth the name by their own criteria. 
In her second reflection, Karen Smith sets out to argue that “the EU is no 
longer a civilian power” (Smith K. 2005: 1); but she unexpectedly decides not 
“to delve into the question of whether the EC/EU ever was a real civilian 
power, before the end of the Cold War”, evoking space constraints (Smith K. 
2005: 6). In any case, none of the authors reviewed here claim more 
assertively than she does that the EC was real civilian power before the end 
of the Cold War. Yet her claim, be it implicit, is challengeable in terms of 
ends. Issues of human rights, good governance, rule of law, and fundamental 
freedoms were deliberately long left out of the scope of development aid and 
trade policies of the EC/EU because of the cardinal principle of non-
interference into internal affairs during the Cold War and the primacy of self-
interests. In the case of the EC/EU’s partnership with ACP group, it was not 
until the entry into force of the Cotonou Agreement in April 2003 that such 
issues were taken on board.  
I could easily agree with Smith K. and others that the EC/EU could do more 
and better with its non-military foreign policy instruments, and could 
undertake or participate in military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
through alternative organisations such as the UN or WEU. I however do not 
see how Smith’s proposed indirect military intervention would be less harmful 
than direct military intervention, in terms of the world’s perception of the EU 
as “a collectivity which had renounced the use of force among its members 
and encouraged others to do the same.” (Smith K. 2000:  28). Likewise, I 
share Smith and others’ scepticism about the real possibilities of military 
intervention for human protection purposes by able actors in high risk places 
unless core self-interests are at stake. Nevertheless, negative experiences of 
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disastrous interventions (in Somalia) and or inaction (in 1994-Rwanda) do not 
per se close off the possibility of positive action, particularly when decisions 
makers come under strong pressure from the voters and world’s mass 
media.  
Concerning proponents of military means for civilian ends, I agree with 
Stavridis (2001) and Petiteville (2003) that the military option may be needed 
or even the only possible course of action to prevent or halt mass atrocities in 
certain circumstances. Stavridis’ historic example of the Allies’ response to 
Hitler’s military takeover of Europe is pertinently convincing. Therefore, 
international actors who claim to be civilian powers in terms of the ends of 
their respective foreign policies should have that option available to them 
individually or collectively, autonomously or dependently. I also agree with 
Petiteville that actual use of military force for human protection purposes 
should take place as the last step on a long continuum involving trade and 
economic sanctions. However, in any of their cited cases where military force 
was and would be indispensable for successfully dealing with mass atrocity 
crimes (Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda), civil wars (Angola, Congo, Sierra 
Leone), or repressive regimes resistant to non–military compliance 
enforcement measures (Nigeria, Iraq, Serbia, Sudan), none of the two 
authors indicates whether, at the time of these tragedies, the EU did have 
that continuum; whether it tried that continuum; and why, if ever it tried that 
continuum, the EU still needed its own credible military power to eventually 
succeed. Moreover, Petiteville and Stavridis constantly compare the EU to 
the US to highlight the weakness of the former and the strength of the 
second, as a direct consequence of the inequality of their respective military 
forces. Yet, in the two examples of Asia and Middle East that Petiteville 
gives, it is not empirically evident that the US has actually performed better 
than the EU on the second prerequisite of a civilian power, or that any 
hypothetically better performance would be attributable to Washington’s 
overwhelming military force. In their analyses, it is not evident first whether 
the United States of America are or behave as a civilian power at all, and, 
second, if and when the US are or behave as a civilian power because of its 
military superiority.  
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Another point of discord is the added value that Petiteville ascribes to the 
EU’s soft diplomacy simply because, economically (for the time being), the 
Union can compete with the US for global leadership. From a CR 
perspective, his assessment appears to be much more quantitative than 
qualitative. Some individual countries, including small ones, can qualitatively 
and morally compare to and even outweigh the US and or the EU in terms of 
inducing peace, human rights protection, and sustainable development by 
way of humanitarian aid, development aid, cooperation, and negotiations. His 
own mention of the praxis of Canada and Nordic countries could not be more 
pertinent here. Lastly, Stavridis affirms that a civilian power concept emptied 
of its second condition was “useful” during the era of nuclear stalemate only. 
However, he does not state why. In whose interests was it useful? Arguably, 
it was not in the interest of those countries that proved to be more 
impoverished and afflicted by violent protracted conflicts after decades of 
development aid from the EC. For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa was on top 
of the development aid agenda of the EC/EU since the inception of the 
establishment of the so-called Lomé Conventions in 1975 throughout to the 
Cotonou Agreement concluded in 2000. Yet, in 2005, Sub-Saharan Africa 
was “the only region to have grown poorer” since its independence in the 
nineteen fifties and “its share of world trade ha[d] halved in a generation.” 
(Department for International Development 2005). The European 
Commission’s official (Mr. Poul Nielson, 1999-2004) may be right in warning 
that conflict prevention under the Cotonou Agreement is unachievable 
without a back-up force strong of half a million troops. Not less problematic is 
the actual use (through the CFSP) of such a force without a clear and 
implementable ethical common foreign policy, in order to enforce compliance 
with the Agreement provisions (Art. 8) on human rights, democracy and rule 
of law, corruption, and mismanagement, conflict prevention, and 
peacebuilding in recipient countries.   
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to identify the resources that the EU had at its disposal 
under the CFSP for its response to the two Congo Wars that broke out 
successfully in 1996 and 1998, and to establish, from a CR perspective, 
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whether those resources were adequate enough to enable the EU to make 
the difference for the millions of civilian victims of those two wars. The 
foregoing discussion has established that during the full period under 
examination, the EU disposed of various normative, policy-making, and 
operational resources for use under the CFSP. The latter indeed experienced 
a so rapid and extensive development politically, legally, institutionally, and 
operationally that in only one decade (1999-2009) it carried out over twenty 
civilian and military missions in responses to international crises. The 
foregoing examination of key reference documents also shows that these 
developments reflected clear attempts to integrate some of the relevant 
lessons from failed humanitarian interventions of the 1990s (in the Balkans 
and in the Africa’s Great Lakes region); as well as the normative, theoretical, 
and practical insights from CR, at least in that they embedded the EU’s 
rejection, be it on paper only, of indifference and inaction in front of shocking 
human suffering and the Union’s subscription to the complex theory and 
praxis of violent conflict. However, the reported developments were not 
sufficient enough to enable the EU to make the claimed difference in its 
response to the two Congo Wars. Firstly, from a timing perspective, during 
much of the two wars, the EU was either devising or fine-tuning most of the 
assets it considered necessary for developing and strengthening its CFSP. 
For examples, by the time the CFSP came into force, conflict prevention for 
the First Congo War was nearly overdue; and when the CFSP gathered most 
of its own resources, the Second Congo War had formally ended. The ESDP 
itself was incepted at the end of the 1999, nearly one year and a half into the 
Second Congo War, and was declared operational at the end of 2001. 
‘Common Strategy’, the most important policy-making instrument of the 
CFSP, was available for use only from 1 May 1999 onwards; whereas the 
European Security Strategy was adopted a decade after the entry into force 
of the CFSP and one year after the formal end of the Second Congo War. 
Finally, CFSP’s own supporting civilian, political, and military structures were 
hardly in place by the end of 2002; whereas its 15-combat-trained 
battlegroups and its nearly 2 million civilian experts reached the planned full 
strength in 2007.  
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Secondly, from a qualitative perspective, these resources were inadequate 
because of various intertwined reasons; the most decisive one of which being 
the transcendence of the values and interests of the EU and its Member 
States to the detriment of the ‘humanitarian imperative’. Another 
overwhelming shortcoming is the deliberate ambiguity over the scope, 
normative stance, and objectives of the CFSP, which serves to keep 
everyone comfortably on board but is largely responsible for the inherently 
intermittent and open-ended status; and clearly denotes a minimalist 
approach to humanitarian intervention for human protection purposes. This in 
turn makes the CFSP too unreliable and unpredictable for the EU to make a 
difference in world politics in general and nation-(re)building in particular. 
Moreover, the subsidiary status of the CFSP; its dependence on the 
authorisation of the UN and or the government of the intervention-target 
country; its lack of experience in ‘high politics’ foreign policy and in CR praxis 
(availability and use of specialised holistic knowledge, abilities, and know-
how); the excessive focus on ‘Means’, and the related importance and priority 
given to military power, at the expense of ‘Ends’, and the focus on the most 
marketable and fashionable issue-areas of contemporary international 
peacebuilding (policing; strengthening the rule of law; strengthening 
civilian administration and civil protection) suggest excessive 
eurocentrism and focus on post-war statebuilding to the detriment of the 
context-tailored, multi-stage (conflict-continuum), multi-level, and 
multifunctional approach prescribed by CR. All this unsurprisingly reinforces 
the perception of the CFSP as being part of international liberal 
peacebuilding the main features of which I have just exposed in the 
preceding section. Overall, from the CR perspective, the CFSP normative, 
policy, and operational growth is a much less “success story” than often 
claimed. Is this also the case in practice? I respond to this question in the 
following chapters by investigating the alleged difference the CFSP, in 
particular its operational pillar ESDP, enabled the EU to make in its response 
to the two Congo Wars. Indeed, to date, the DR Congo has been one of the 
largest African recipients of “international peacebuilding and state 
reconstruction interventions” (Francis 2012: 6) and “a major focus for Europe 
and a proving ground for an evolving European policy.” (Dobbins et al. 2008: 
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133). For analytical clarity, I account for the CFSP-borne response to the 
most pressing needs and challenges of each of the two wars separately, 
drawing on secondary data. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CFSP-BASED RESPONSE TO THE FIRST CONGO WAR 
(1994 - 1998) 
Timely and quality information is crucial for successful analysis and handling 
of violent conflicts. Arguably, such information is even more crucial than the 
often-overvalued operational capacities and capabilities. Surprisingly, all the 
studies reviewed earlier concerning the EU response to the tragedy of the 
DR Congo fail to provide empirical facts on both the information on the 
violent conflict and the CFSP resources that were available to the EU for its 
response. They also fail to establish if and how the EU did (not) make good 
use of that information and those resources. This chapter sets out to fill the 
gap regarding the First Congo War by answering the following questions: 
Was the information on the first war in the DR Congo timely and sufficient for 
the EU to respond adequately for its prevention, mitigation, and recurrence? 
Did the EU make the best use of the CFSP assets that were available for its 
response? I carry out this task by using the three-stage analytical approach 
of Conflict Resolution: Early Warning and Prevention (EWP), Conflict 
Management (CM), and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB). This approach 
helps discern any general need-response pattern and account, as 
systematically and thoroughly as possible, the difference that the CFSP in 
general and the ESDP in particular reportedly enabled the EU to make in its 
response. 
Early Warning and Prevention (July 1994 - Sept. 1996) 
Needs and Challenges 
The period for early warning and prevention (EWP) for the First Congo War 
(FCW) spans from July 1994, the date of the massive and sudden influx of 
1.2 million refugees from Rwanda into eastern Zaire (Democratic Republic of 
Congo as from May 1997 until to date), until September 1996 when the war 
broke out. From day one of that biblical exodus, there was unanimous 
consensus among all concerned that “[t]he presence of refugees in North and 
South Kivu was […] a threat both to internal stability and to security along 
Zaire’s borders with Burundi and Rwanda.” (UN Security Council 1996a: 7, 
para. 27). Hence, various warnings and calls for preventive action were 
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constantly made from the very beginning of the crisis. The first of such 
warnings was rather a threat from the new Rwandan authorities. On several 
occasions, they publicly vowed to pursue the refugees and dismantle the 
camps if appropriate measures were not taken for their “immediate 
repatriation [...] or their removal away from the border area deeper into 
Zaire.” (UNHCR 2000: 251). In late 1994, a US Defense Attaché echoed the 
threat of Rwandan government to the staff of the UN Refugee Agency in 
eastern Zaire in these terms:  
If you as the head of the UNHCR operation here in Goma do not address the issue 
of disarming the ex-FAR [former Forces Armées Rwandaise] and militias in the 
camps, you will probably see an RPA [Rwandan Patriotic Army] brigade on that 
traffic circle within the next year […] There is another war coming if we do not 
disarm the camps and get the refugees home. (Odom 2006: 1). 
On 19 December 1994, Zaire’s Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo informally 
addressed members of the UN Security Council on the issue. According to 
an unclassified cable of the United States Mission at the UN in New York, Mr. 
Kengo Wa Dondo criticised the ousted Rwandan leaders for hindering the 
return of their country fellows and “for invading a large section of the Zairian 
territory and terrorizing local populations.” (United States Department of State 
(US Department of State) 1994: 2, para. 3). He also criticised the new 
Rwandan authorities for threatening to pursue their refugees in host 
countries; wrongly suspecting the government of his country of aiding the 
ousted Rwandan government forces to reorganise; and for preferring 
domestic justice to international tribunal. For solutions, Kengo Wa Dondo 
proposed three complementary options: repatriation, resettlement, and 
relocation. He asked the international community to provide the necessary 
means because his own government could not alone cope with the situation. 
Concerning his first and preferred option, Kengo Wa Dondo advocated the 
setting up of security corridors from the camps to the borders of his country 
with Rwanda and the establishment of safe areas within Rwanda to facilitate 
the return of refugees (US Department of State 1994: 3, para. 6). Regarding 
the second option, he urged the UN to find another place of asylum for the 
exiled Rwandan political leaders. For the third and last option, he asked the 
international community to move the refugees, in particular political leaders, 
military and militia personnel, away from the border areas between his 
country and Rwanda in accordance with the African Convention on refugees 
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that required at least a 150 kms distance from the country of origin. He 
informed the Security Council that his government had “earmarked four 
possible sites [farther] in the interior for camps, but had no transportation.” 
(US Department of State 1994: 2, para. 7).  
Kengo Wa Dondo told the UN Security Council that his country was not 
“responsible for the war in Rwanda and should not pay the price of the 
policies of its neighbours.” He indicated that the damage caused by Rwandan 
refugees to his country’s “economy, environment, education, infrastructures, 
and health sectors” was so unbearable and intolerable that it “required the 
international community to take urgent action.” (US Department of State 
1994: 2, para. 4). He “threatened that that persons of Rwandan descent who 
had acquired Zairian citizenship fraudulently would no more be tolerated”; 
thus reviving the long-standing debate and tensions over citizenship in the 
country’s political and social arenas. Besides, he warned that if humanitarian 
aid did not reach his country’s armed forces, the latter “would only steal the 
food from the civilians.” He argued that “the international community should 
feed the impoverished local Zairians, failing which they could ‘take up arms’ 
and expel the Rwandan refugees.” (US Department of State 1994: 5, para. 
10). Kengo Wa Dondo warned members of the UN Security Council that his 
country security forces “had been maintaining order in the camps for six 
months without reinforcements, and were so [...] weakened that ‘anything 
could happen.’” (US Department of State 1994: 2, para. 4). He promised to 
make available 1,500 troops to police the camps with UN logistical support 
and at the regular rate of compensation for blue helmets (US Department of 
State 1994: 3, para. 6).  
A month before the warning and call for appropriate action of Zaire’s Prime 
Minister, his government’s concerns and proposals had already been taken 
on board by the UN Secretary-General in his report S/1994/1308 of 18 
November 1994 to the UN Security Council concerning the situation in 
Rwandan refugee camps. However, the options of repatriation and 
resettlement were soon ruled out because of the lack of the necessary 
conditions of safety and dignity inside Rwanda, for the first option, and of 
candidate countries for receiving part of the refugee population, for the 
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second option (UNHCR 2000; UN Security Council 1995). Moreover, the 
massacre by post-genocide Rwanda’s new army of thousands of internally 
displaced persons in the UN-protected camp of Kibeho, south-western 
Rwanda, on 22 April 1995, virtually brought voluntary repatriation to a halt 
and triggered more displacements from the region towards neighbouring 
countries, in particular Zaire and Burundi (UNHCR 2000: 255). Arguably, the 
Kibeho events and the ambivalent reaction of the international community 
were a clear foresign of a much larger scale tragic scenario that was about to 
unfold in refugee-hosting eastern Zaire (Prunier 2009: 38; Odom 2006: 8-9). 
This meant that the only realistic temporary option at the time was to focus 
on the following: 
 Policing camps; 
 Disarmament of armed elements in the camps;  
 Separation and protection of the 1 million ordinary refugees from the 
influence and control of military and political leaders; and  
 Relocation of camps far away from the Rwandan border.  
For implementation, the UN Secretary-General (UN SG), in agreement with 
the UN Refugee Agency, submitted to the UN Security Council three options: 
Traditional Peacekeeping Peace Operation, UN-led Peace Enforcement 
Operation, and UN-authorised Peace Enforcement Operation. (UN Security 
Council 1995) However, only an insignificant number of the sixty potential 
troop-contributing countries contacted by the UN SG responded positively 
(UN Security Council 1995). Consequently, the sole alternative was the least 
reliable solution of using Zairian security forces. In February 1995, the UN 
Refugee Agency and the Government of Zaire concluded an agreement by 
which the “Zairian Contingent for the Security of the Camps” (ZCSC) was 
established. It was a specially recruited force strong of 1,500 troops from the 
‘Division spéciale présidentielle’ of President Mobutu and backed up by 
“international advisers from the Netherlands and from several West African 
countries.” (UNHCR 2000: 254-255). Its task consists of essentially policing 
the camps in order to restore therein law and order. Despite its impressive 
beginnings, the Force eventually did not live up to expectations. According to 
the UN Refugee Agency, the Contingent “eventually proved to be poorly 
disciplined” and “was soon drawn into the endemic corruption of the 
administration in the Kivus and other parts of Zaire.” (UNHCR 2000: 255). 
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Moreover, its poor performance added to the widening political divide in Zaire 
because it “was directly accountable to President Mobutu, through his 
Minister of Defense, and not to the Prime Minister” from the political 
opposition (UNHCR 2000: 255). By mid-1995, consistent reports (Amnesty 
International 1995a; Human Rights Watch 1995) emerged on military bases, 
training, and equipment being provided to former Rwandan armed forces and 
militias in violation of the different arms embargoes decided by the UN 
Security Council (Resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995), and 1011 (1995)).  
As early as January 1996, the International Commission of Inquiry that the 
Security Council established to investigate those allegations (Resolution 
1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995) “in the Great Lakes region and elsewhere 
between October 1995 and October 1996” confirmed them (UN Security 
Council 1998b). Security in and around the camps continued to deteriorate in 
the last part of 1995 and throughout 1996. Incursions and infiltrations from 
and into refugee camp areas in eastern Zaire and pre-emptive and retaliatory 
strikes by the new Rwandan government’s armed forces gradually 
intensified; as did inter-communal tensions and violent clashes in North and 
South Kivu. The situation produced many deaths and displaced persons 
some of whom, in particular from the ethnic Tutsi community, crossed into 
Rwanda and Burundi seeking refuge (ECOSOC 1996, UN Security Council 
1996, UNHCR 2000). In his 1995-end-of-year report to the UN General 
Assembly, the UN Secretary-General warned member states of a potential 
regional flare-up in these terms: “The combination of ethnic polarization in 
Burundi and Rwanda, massive circulation of arms, porous borders and trans-
border movements of refugees threaten, at best, to keep the sub-region 
perpetually unstable and, at worst, to ignite a large-scale regional conflict.” 
(UN General Assembly 1995:  para. 888) These concerns materialised in 
mid-September 1996 when armed confrontations erupted between the rebel 
group of the so named Banyamulenge (Congolese descended from Rwanda’ 
ethnic Tutsis, some of whom had settled in South Kivu during pre-colonial 
times) and armed elements from Rwanda’s and Burundi’s ethnic Hutu 
refugee camps. By mid-October 1996, the name of the Banyamulenge rebel 
group was revealed as “Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL)”, in French; translated into English as 
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Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire. One month 
into the clashes, the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali alerted the UN 
Security Council, reporting increasing tension “on the border between 
Rwanda and Zaire, including cross-border exchanges of heavy weapons fire 
and mutual accusations between the two Governments.” (UN Security 
Council 1996b: 1) Ten days later, he reported on the deterioration of the 
situation and underlined that “[t]he failure to address the root causes of the 
conflicts in the region of the Great Lakes, in political and economic as well as 
security terms, ha[d] once again unleashed a spiral of violence and human 
suffering that may spin out of control unless urgent measures are taken 
immediately to contain the situation.” (UN Security Council 1996c: 2). 
CFSP-based Response 
For Early Warning and Prevention (EWP) of the First Congo War, the EU had 
at its disposal some of the CFSP decision-making and implementation 
instruments identified in the preceding chapter. Political and non-legal assets 
included Principles and General Guidelines, Declarations, and Demarches; 
whereas politico-legal instruments included Common Positions (CPs), Joint 
Actions (JAs), and Decisions. This section determines per category which of 
these resources the EU actually resorted to, when and how it did so.  
Non-Legally Binding Decisions and Actions 
In terms of Principles and General Guidelines, the European Council held 
six summits three of which addressed the situation in Zaire and or the Great 










First Congo War: Early Warning and Prevention (July 1994 - Sept 1996) 
 
CFSP Response: Principles and General Guidelines 
 
  1994 1995 1996 
 
Total EU Summits 2 2 2 6 
EU Summits with reference to DR Congo/ Great Lakes 
Region (GLR) 
0 2 1 3 
Main issue-areas addressed with reference to the 
DRC/GLR: 
        
EU concern about and condemnation of “all acts of 
violence and destabilisation attempts by extremists of 
every hue” in Burundi. 
0* 1 1 2 
EU call for the convening, as soon as possible, of a 
conference on peace, security and stability in the region of 
Great Lakes. 
0 1 1 2 
EU emphasis on the importance of national reconciliation 
and stability in the Great Lakes Region. 
0 1 0 1 
EU support to rapid appointment of a new special 
representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to 
Burundi. 
0 1 0 1 
Confirmation of the appointment an EU Special Envoy for 
the Great Lakes Region. 
0 0 1 1 
EU’s support to the democratic transition in Zaire and 
readiness to assist Zaire in the preparation and 
organisation of the elections. 
0 0 1 1 
 
0 4 4 
  The figure corresponding to each area-issue refers to the number of EU 
Summits that addressed that particular area-issue in the DR Congo and or 
Great Lakes Region. 
At the end of the first meeting held in June 1995, the European Council 
issued a statement (European Union Statement on Burundi) by which it 
expressed the concern of the European Union about and condemnation of 
“all acts of violence and destabilisation attempts by extremists of every hue” 
in Burundi, and called for the convening, “as soon as possible” of “a 
conference on peace, security and stability in the region of Great Lakes” 
(European Council 1995a). Six months later, the European Council meeting 
in Madrid (Spain) “emphasize[d] the importance of national reconciliation and 
stability in the Great Lakes region” in order to “put an end to the violence, 
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particularly in Burundi, and to ease the return of Rwandan refugees.” The 
European Council restated its support to the convening, the earliest possible, 
of a conference on peace, security and stability in the region, “as well as well 
as the rapid appointment of a new special representative of the United 
Nations Secretary-General to Burundi.” (European Council 1995b). At the 
third summit held in June 1996, three months to the First Congo War, the 
European Council again expressed the concern of the European Union about 
“the violence which continue[d] to mark the Great Lakes Region and in 
particular Burundi”. The summit also confirmed the appointment by the EU of 
“a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region” in order to support “the peace 
efforts of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity as well as 
regional leaders and other concerned personalities”. (European Council 
1996a). The European Council also restated the EU’s support to the 
convening of an international conference on peace, security, and stability 
“under the joint auspices of the UN and the Organization for African Unity in 
order to address within a global approach the root causes of the crises and to 
ensure respect for commitments.” In the specific case of Zaire, the European 
Council expressed the EU’s support to the then “ongoing process of 
transition to democracy [...] aimed at holding free and democratic elections 
according to the framework and the timetable indicated by the institutions 
responsible for the transition.” It expressed the readiness of the EU “to assist 
Zaire in the preparation and organisation of the elections.”(European Council 
1996a). 
Concerning Declarations for the period under review (July 1994 - September 
1996), the relevant services of the Council of the European Union informed 
me that lists of CFSP Declarations for the year 1993 and 1994 had not been 
drawn up and therefore were not available (Sieberichs 2011). For the 
remainder of the forewarning and prevention period, I retrieved two CFSP 
Declarations issued on the situation in Zaire and the Great Lakes region. In 
the first Declaration (Press: 210 Nr: 8685/95), which was issued on 7 July 
1995, the EU expressed its continued and “deep concern” about the frequent 
violation of “the spirit and the letter of the [1994-] Constitutional Act” that “laid 
down the powers of Zairean State Institutions so that transition to the Third 
Republic could be managed in a spirit of cooperation”. The EU stressed “the 
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enormous importance which it attaches to respect for the principles of a state 
of law without which democracy cannot be established” and strongly urged 
each of the transitional institutions to ensure the removal of “any 
ambivalence” and the application of “the act of transition” in its entirety. In its 
second Declaration (Press: 183 Nr: 8399/96) that was made public on 20 
June 1996, that is, a year later and only three months before the outbreak of 
the First Congo War, the Union announced for the first time its “objectives 
and priorities with regard to the Great Lakes region” as being “to secure 
peace, to consolidate the process of national reconciliation in the countries 
concerned, to facilitate a return to normal democratic life, in particular by 
restoring the rule of law, and to encourage economic and social recovery.” 
The EU stated that it was “aware of the close links between the various 
political, economic and humanitarian problems in the region and of the 
serious risk of destabilization”, and “emphasize[d] the need for a 
comprehensive approach and a regional dimension in the search for lasting 
solutions to the crisis.” The EU also stated that “the presence of over a 
million and a half refugees in the region constitute[d] a major factor of 
destabilization and that their return to their countries of origin in safety and 
with dignity [was] essential if peace [was] to be restored.” To that end, the EU 
appealed to the signatories of the Cairo and Tunis Declarations to comply 
with the undertakings they gave, so as in particular to stop trafficking in arms 
and the training of the various militia and armed groups which serve only to 
increase insecurity in the region.” In that regard, the EU made reference to 
the “United Nations Resolution 1053 […] and also the measures in the plan 
of action adopted by the Bujumbura Conference (12 to 17 February 1995) for 
the prevention of subversive activities in countries of asylum.” The EU also 
underlined “the importance of deploying United Nations observers in airports 
and at frontiers.” In terms of Demarches, lists of the so-called “Other CFSP 
Activities” (declarations, demarches, reports of Heads of Mission and political 
dialogue meetings) were not drawn for the 1994-1997 and therefore were not 
available (Sieberichs 2011). As a result, I have not been able to establish 
whether the EU did carry out any Demarches regarding the specific situation 
of Zaire or its region during the period under consideration. 
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Legally Binding Decisions and Actions 
During the early warning and prevention period (July 1994 – September 
1996) of the First Congo War, the EU did not enact any Common Position 
(CP) in response to the deterioration of the political, security, and social 
situation in Zaire. On the other hand, the EU adopted one Join Action (JA 
96/250/CFSP, 25 March 1996) by which it appointed its “Special Envoy for 
the African Great Lakes Region” and legally outlined its objectives with 
respect to the region and its countries as being the following: (1) to assist 
those countries in resolving the crisis affecting their region and (2) to support 
the efforts of the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as well as 
those of regional leaders and other parties, aimed at finding a lasting and 
comprehensive peaceful solution to the political, economic and humanitarian 
problems facing the region (JA 96/250/CFSP, art. 1). In line with these 
objectives, the mandate of the Special Envoy was to “support the efforts 
aimed at creating the conditions for solving the crisis, including the 
preparation for the holding of a Conference on Peace, Security and Stability 
in the Great Lakes Region, which [was] an important step in the process of 
finding a lasting and peaceful solution.” (JA 96/250/CFSP, art. 2). The 
Special Envoy was assigned the following five specific tasks: 
 To work in support of the efforts of the UN and of the OAU and of those 
African personalities who were assisting the two organizations; 
 To establish and maintain close contact with the Governments of the 
countries of the region, with other interested Governments and 
international organizations in order to identify measures that needed to 
be taken towards solving the problems of the region; 
 To coordinate closely with the representatives of the UN and of the OAU 
in the region, which were responsible for the convening of the 
Conference; 
 To cooperate with regional leaders and other parties working towards the 
same objective; and  
 To establish, where appropriate, contact with other parties who might 
have a role to play in achieving progress. 
The Special Envoy had to report every two months, or whenever necessary, 
to the Council or its designated instances, and could be called to report orally 
on developments, whenever the need would arise. He/she could also “make 
recommendations to the Council on measures which the Union might 
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undertake to fulfil its objectives in the region.” (JA 96/250/CFSP, art. 3). 
Besides, the Special Envoy had to define with the parties the “guarantees 
necessary for the completion and smooth functioning” of this mission and 
Member States and the Commission were required to “grant all necessary 
support to such effect.” (JA 96/250/CFSP, art. 4). This Joint Action entered 
into force on the day of its adoption, i.e. 25 March 1996, and was to apply 
until 25 November 1996 (JA 96/250/CFSP, art. 5). In terms of CFSP 
Decisions, the Union adopted only one (96/441/CFSP, 15 July 1996) on the 
situation in Zaire and the Great Lakes Region in general. It concerned the 
extension of the application of the aforementioned Joint Action 96/250/CFSP 
until 31 July 1997. 
Conflict Management (Oct. 1996 – May 1997) 
Needs and Challenges 
By mid-October 1996, it became clear that the violent clashes involving 
Congolese Tutsi of Rwandan descent; ousted Rwandan armed forces and 
militia; armed groups from Rwandan and Burundian refugee camps; and 
Zaire’s security and armed forces in Zaire’s eastern province of South Kivu, 
veiled a large-scale war engineered and spearheaded by the post-genocide 
regime in Rwanda. The primary objective was to dismantle the Rwandan and 
Burundian refugee camps that the governments of the two countries of origin 
considered a serious threat to their respective security and survival (Amnesty 
International 1996a; Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Fédération 
Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’homme (FIDH) 1997). A less stated 
yet evident objective was regime change by force in Zaire. This latter 
objective underpinned the creation of Alliance des Forces Démocratiques 
pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) as the political umbrella of the 
armed rebellion. The presentation of the war as an uprising of a threatened 
(ethnic Tutsi) minority group, the so-called Banyamulenge, made it appear a 
‘just self-defence struggle’; whereas the ‘Alliance’ umbrella turned it into a 
‘War of National Liberation’. Refugee camps came quickly under direct and 
systematic military attacks from 17 October 1996 onwards. At the same time, 
related large-scale massacres, abductions, and forced dispersal of fleeing 
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refugees and civilians started to be confirmed and publicly denounced by 
media, non-governmental organisations, and UN agencies all of whom called 
for assistance and protection of defenceless civilians (Reyntjens 2009: 87-
101; Prunier 2009: 116-125). By 2 November 1996, all humanitarian 
organisations had been “forced to leave”, by the Rwanda-led rebel forces, all  
camp areas in North and South Kivu, abandoning refugees and displaced 
persons to their dreadful fate (Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 1996).  
In a press release dated 22 October 1996, the first date of forced departure 
of humanitarian organisations from the South Kivu region of Uvira, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Ms. Sadako Ogata, raised the alarm: "I am 
deeply worried by the widening scale of violence in eastern Zaire in recent 
weeks that has once again sent tens of thousands of refugees – women, 
children, sick and elderly – fleeing for their lives [...] Unless all parties to this 
conflict step back, we are, I am afraid, heading toward a humanitarian 
catastrophe." (UNHCR 1996c: 1). Three days later, 25 October 1996, the 
chief of the UN Refugee Agency addressed the UN Security Council on the 
matter and requested urgent political action to avert the course of events 
(UNHCR 1996d). On same date, the EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, 
Ms. Emma Bonino, urged the international community to “clearly say that [a] 
new genocide, which seem[ed] to be under preparation, [was not going to] be 
tolerated.” (Quoted in Reyntjens 2009: 88). Four days later, she reiterated: 
“Five hundred thousand people today, probably one million in the coming 
days are in mortal danger (...). If the Security Council does not act now, I 
wonder when it will ever act.” (Quoted in Reyntjens 2009: 80). On 3 
November 1996, nearly three months into the fighting, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees desperately reiterated her appeal:  
This may be a final appeal to all those involved in this terrible conflict, or it will be too 
late. Combatants should stop attacking refugees. The refugees from the largest 
camps in the region are on the move toward some of the most inhospitable and 
inaccessible areas in Zaire. The further the refugees move west, the more difficult it 
will be for us to reach them. It may make repatriation and reconciliation impossible. 
(UNHCR 1996b: 1). 
After lengthy tergiversations, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
1078 (1996) on 9 November 1996 requesting the Organisation’s “Secretary-
General, in consultation with his Special Envoy and the coordinator of 
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humanitarian affairs, with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, with the OAU, with the Special Envoy of the European Union and 
with the States concerned to draw up “a concept of operations and 
framework for a humanitarian task force, with military assistance if 
necessary”. The objectives of such a force would be the following: 
 Delivering short-term humanitarian assistance and shelter to refugees 
and displaced persons in eastern Zaire; 
 Assisting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees with the 
protection and voluntary repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; 
and 
 Establishing humanitarian corridors for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance and to assist the voluntary repatriation of refugees after 
carefully ascertaining their effective will to repatriate. 
Six days later (15 November 1996), the UN Security Council adopted, under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 1080 (1996) 
authorising the conduct of the aforementioned multinational force (MNF) to 
fulfil its objectives, “by using all necessary means”. However, the actual 
deployment of the force was delayed because of the opposition of the 
government of Rwanda and its allies. Their argument was that the bulk of 
refugees had returned home after the dismantlement, on the same date the 
resolution was adopted, of the largest camp (Mugunga) which housed about 
800,000 inmates by early November 1996. In the end, the military 
intervention was aborted on 13 December 1996, one month after the 
adoption of the resolution authorising it, because the pro-rebellion side won 
the diplomatic battle of figures against the pro-intervention side. The latter 
estimated that only some 400 hundred thousand refugees had been forced to 
return home and that about half a million of them were still missing (Prunier 
2009: 118-19; Reyntjens 2009: 85-86). 
In the following weeks and months until the fall of Mobutu regime in May 
1997, more and more consistent evidence and eye-witness testimonies of 
systematic massacres of Rwandan Hutu refugees surfaced; and urgent calls 
for intervention were again made (Prunier 2009: 125). In a press release 
made public on 26 November 1996, Amnesty International (1996b: 1) 




Members of a Tutsi-led armed group in eastern Zaire massacred about 500 
unarmed Rwandese refugees and displaced Zairians at Chimanga refugee camp, 
60 kilometres south of Bukavu [...]. These arbitrary and deliberate mass killings of 
defenceless civilians are a callous abuse of human rights and should be 
condemned by the international community [...]. It is unacceptable for the 
international community to ignore these and other killings and entrusts the return of 
Rwandese and Burundi refugees to the AFDL, which has committed these 
atrocities.  
In a statement issued about five months later, Human Rights Watch (1997) 
too denounced further massacres of refugees by the ADFL troops and their 
allies, and urged the international community to act without further delays: 
"These outrages are only the most recent in a series of ADFL actions to 
impede the delivery of aid and to evacuate a truly desperate population. [...] 
There is no question now about the aim of the ADFL to kill refugees. The only 
question remaining is how many must die before the international community 
rises to its moral and legal responsibility to intervene.” This and other similar 
emergency calls once again fell on deaf ears of the most influential members 
of the international community. In May 1997, the afore cited European 
Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs declared that the abortion of the 
multinational force decided under “Washington’s instigation” was “an 
incredible error” that allowed “massive human rights violations in eastern 
Zaire” and “the transformation of this region into a real slaughterhouse during 
the last six months” (Bonino; quoted in Lemaître 1997). Did the response of 
the ‘political EU’, as opposed to the well-known ‘humanitarian EU’, in the 
framework of its praised CFSP make a difference? The following section tries 
to provide an answer. 
CFSP-based Response 
For the management of the First Congo War, the European Union had at its 
disposal the same policymaking and implementation instruments as for the 
prevention stage. To re-cap, non-legally binding instruments comprised 
Principles and General Guidelines, Declarations, and Demarches; whereas 




Non-Legally Binding Decisions and Actions 
Concerning CFSP principles and general guidelines during the large-scale 
armed confrontation period of the First Congo War (October 1996 - May 
1997), the European Council, the highest political organ of the EU, held one 
summit that addressed the matter. The meeting took place on 13-14 
December 1996, two months after the outbreak of violence. At that summit, 
the European Council expressed “grave concern about the continuing 
violence in the Great Lakes Region, not only in Eastern Zaire but also in 
Burundi” and called for “fast and decisive action by the international 
community” in response to “the continuing humanitarian emergency, 
particularly in Eastern Zaire” (European Council 1996b). The European 
Council welcomed “the return of large numbers of refugees”, but underlined 
“the need to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of the remaining refugees”. It 
also stressed “the need for a flexible approach” with a view to swiftly 
addressing the implications of “the rapidly changing circumstances on the 
ground...] for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 
concerning the establishment, for humanitarian purposes, of a temporary 
multinational force” (European Council 1996b). In that respect, the European 
Council restated “the willingness of the European Union to contribute fully 
and urgently to these efforts”, in line with the Joint Action of 22 November 
1996 (JA 96/669/CFSP), the associated Council Decision of the same date 
(Council Decision 96/670/CFSP), and the Western European Union (WEU)’s 
Ministerial Declaration of 19 November 1996 (WEU Council of Ministers 
1996). The Joint Action and the corresponding Decision in question 
concerned the EU’s pledge of contribution to the democratic transition 
process in Zaire, mainly in the preparation for elections; whereas the 
declaration of the WEU Member States expressed their readiness to 
contribute to the aforementioned multinational force for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and the protections of humanitarian workers and civilians at 
risk (in particular refugees and displaces persons) in eastern Zaire in line with 





EU CFSP Main Aspects and Basic Choices on ZAIRE / DRC (1994-2009) 
 
First Congo War: Conflict Management (Oct. 1996 - May 1997) 
 
EU response: Principles and General Guidelines 
 
  1996 1997 
 
Total EU Summits 1 0 1 
EU Summits with reference to DR Congo/ Great Lakes Region (GLR) 1 0 1 
Main issue-areas addressed:       
EU grave concern about the continuing violence in the Great Lakes 
Region, not only in Eastern Zaire but also in Burundi. 
1* 0 1 
EU call for fast and decisive action by the international community in 
response to the continuing humanitarian emergency, particularly in 
Eastern Zaire. 
1 0 1 
EU welcome of the return of large numbers of refugees. 1 0 1 
Need to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of the remaining refugees. 1 0 1 
EU willingness to contribute fully and urgently to UNSC-decided 
establishment, for humanitarian purposes, of a temporary multinational 
force. 
1 0 1 
EU call for respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Zaire. 1 0 1 
EU call for peaceful and political solution to the problems in the region. 1 0 1 
Importance of the electoral process in Zaire in terms of the stability of the 
region. 
1 0 1 
EU pledge of support to the successful completion of the electoral 
process in Zaire. 
1 0 1 
EU support to the support for the early convening of an international 
conference on peace and security in the region. 
1 0 1 
 
10 0 
  The figure corresponding to each area-issue refers to the number of EU 
Summits that addressed that particular area-issue in the DR Congo and or 
Great Lakes Region. 
Besides, the European Council meeting in Dublin at the end of 1996 
welcomed “the initiative of the regional leaders in seeking to resolve the 
problems in Eastern Zaire through dialogue” and called for the respect of the 
principles already reached by those leaders, mainly “the crucial importance of 
respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Zaire, in pursuit of a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict.” (European Council 1996b). The European 
Council recalled “its view that the problems of the region as a whole can only 
be resolved by political means” and promised the EU’s support, in particular 
through its Special Envoy, to the peace efforts of the regional leaders and to 
dialogue between the different parties to conflict in the region. With regard to 
the specifically internal situation inside Zaire, the European Council 
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recognised “the importance of the electoral process in terms of the stability of 
the region” and reiterated “the commitment of the Union to play its part in 
support of the successful completion of that process in Zaire by means of the 
Joint Action adopted on 11 November 1996”, and called for “the latter's early 
and urgent implementation.” Finally, the European Council once again 
reaffirmed “its support for the early convening of an international conference 
under the joint auspices of the UN and the Organization of African Unity in 
order to address within a global approach the root causes of the crisis and 
thus bring about a peaceful, durable and comprehensive resolution of the 
conflicts in the region.” (European Council 1996b). 
On the other hand, the EU issued, during the same period, five CFSP 
Declarations with regard to Zaire/DR Congo during the period under review 
(mid October 1996 - mid May 1997). They focused on the outbreak of the 
South Kivu crisis (Press: 276 Nr: 10631/96, 21 October 1996; Press: 296 Nr: 
11054/96, 25 October 1996); the military build-up (Press: 44 Nr: 6017/97, 17 
February 1997); a five-point peace plan for eastern Zaire (Press: 69 Nr: 
6492/97, 7 March 1997); and the situation of refugees (Press: 83 Nr: 
6703/97, 15 March 1997). The peace plan in question had been presented by 
the joint Special Representative of the United Nations and Organization of 
African Unity for the Great Lakes and had been the object of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1097 (1997) adopted on 18 February 1997. Its five points 
were the following: 
 Immediate cessation of hostilities; 
 Withdrawal of all external forces, including mercenaries; 
 Reaffirmation of respect for the national sovereignty and the territorial 
integrity of Zaire and other States of the Great Lakes region; 
 Protection and security for all refugees and displaced persons and 
facilitation of access to humanitarian assistance; and 
 Rapid and peaceful settlement of the crisis through dialogue, the 
electoral process and the convening of an international conference on 






     First Congo War: Conflict Management (mid Oct. 1996 - mid May 1997) 
 CFSP-based response: CFSP Declarations 
   1996 1997   
 Main Points       
 
EU's (i) grave concern about the situation in South Kivu and (ii) call 
on all parties to exercise restraint and to ensure the prevention of 
open conflict across the border between Zaire and Rwanda 
(Press:276 Nr: 10631/96, Press:276 Nr: 10631/96). 
2 0 2 
 
EU's (i) great concern about the deterioration of the situation of 
refugees, displaced persons, and local populations and (ii) call for 
their safety and humanitarian corridors (Press:83 Nr: 6703/97). 
0 1 1 
 EU’s (i) great concern at the military build-up in the east of Zaire; (ii) 
strong condemnation of all interference in the conflict, and (iii) call for 
the withdrawal of all outside and mercenary forces (Press:44 Nr: 
6017/97). 
0 1 1 
 EU's (i) support for the efforts of the UN-five point peace plan and (ii) 
call on all belligerents and parties to endorse and give effect to the 
UN-OAU five point peace plan (Press:69 Nr: 6492/97). 
0 1 1 
 
 
2 3 5 
 
     
In terms of Demarches, I was not able to establish if the EU undertook any 
concerning Zaire and the Great Lakes region during the period under review. 
As indicated earlier, staff at the EU Council informed me that the data for the 
1994-1997 period were not available (Sieberichs 2011). 
Legally Binding Decisions and Actions 
The European Union did not adopt any Common Position between October 
1996 and May 1997. However, it enacted two Joint Actions in November 
1996, two months after the outbreak of hostilities. By the first Joint Action (JA 
96/656/CFSP, 11 November 1996), the European Union stated that it was 
going to “contribute to the democratic transition process in Zaire” as part of 
an international effort coordinated by the United Nations, mainly in the 
preparation for elections. The EU specified that its assistance would “involve 
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the establishing of a European electoral unit and a contribution to the Special 
Fund of the United Nations.” The Union indicated that it would “consider and 
assess appropriate further measures in support of the democratic transition 
process in Zaire, including measures for technical assistance and the 
possible deployment of observers.” (JA 96/656/CFSP, art. 1). By way of the 
second Joint Action (JA 96/669/CFSP, 22 November 1996), the European 
Union committed itself, the Community, and Member States to support “the 
urgent implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, with a view to enabling the delivery of humanitarian aid to 
eastern Zaire and facilitating the return by free consent of refugees to their 
country of origin and the return of displaced persons.” (JA 96/669/CFSP, art. 
1). The EU reaffirmed the priority which had to be given to the return of the 
refugees to their country of origin and the need to overcome all obstacles to 
that end, and confirmed its willingness to assist Rwanda to create the 
essential conditions for the return of the Rwandan refugees (JA 
96/669/CFSP, art. 1).  
 
The Joint Action also provided for the Member States of the EU to “consult 
and cooperate within the Council on their voluntary contributions in support of 
African participation in the multinational force, in accordance with the relevant 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” (JA 96/669/CFSP, art. 3). 
Finally, this Joint Action bound the European Union to “intensify its efforts to 
restore stability in the Great Lakes Region, in particular by encouraging the 
setting up of democratic institutions and respect for human rights.” (JA 
96/669/CFSP, art. 5). The Union also reaffirmed that “the holding of an 
international conference on peace, security and development in the Great 
Lakes Region, under the auspices of the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity, ha[d] a decisive role to play in finding a lasting 
settlement of the crisis in the region”, and invited “all the parties to redouble 







    First Congo War (1994-1997): Conflict Management (mid Oct. 1996 – mid May 
1997) 
CFSP-born response  
 JOINT ACTIONS (JAs) 
  1996 1997   
Total JAs on Zaire / DR Congo 2 0 2 
Main themes / issues re DRC/ GLR:       
EU support of the democratic transition process in Zaire. 1 0 1 
EU support to the urgent implementation of the relevant 
UNSC Resolutions (1078 and 1080) concerning the protection 
and repatriation of refugees in eastern Zaire. 
1 0 1 
 
2 0 2 
    As for CFSP Decisions, the EU adopted two in reference to the 
management of the First Congo War. The first Decision (Council Decision 
96/250/CFSP, 1 October 1996) was enacted in October 1996 and specified 
the additional fund to cover the costs that would arise from the extension, 
until 31 July 1997, of the mandate of the EU’s Special Envoy for the Great 
Lakes Region. By means of the second Decision (Council Decision 
96/670/CFSP) adopted on 22 November 1996, the European Union 
requested the Western European Union (WEU) to examine as a matter of 
urgency how it could, for its part, contribute to the optimum use of the 
operational resources available for the implementation of the aforementioned 
Joint Action (96/669/CFSP) adopted on the same date regarding the Union’s 
contribution to the UN-voted multinational force (MNF) for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid the protection of refugees in eastern Zaire (JA 
96/670/CFSP, art. 1). In effect, the implementation of Joint Action 
96/669/CFSP had defence implications and could in particular require the 
use of military means. In that case, use would have to be made of the 
Western European Union (WEU) in accordance with the Treaty provisions 





Needs and Challenges 
The First Congo War officially ended with the fall of the country’s capital 
Kinshasa into the hands of the Rwanda-manned rebel movement AFDL on 
17 May 1997. The AFDL leader, Laurent Désiré Kabila (hereinafter referred 
to as “Kabila Sr.” as opposed to his son “Kabila Jr.” who replaced him in 2001 
after his assassination) gave himself all powers by the constitutional law-
decree of 27 May. Two days later, on 29 May 1997, he was sworn-in as new 
president of Zaire which he renamed ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’. 
Expectedly, the First Congo War and its consequences worsened the pre-
war humanitarian, political, security, and social problems and challenges. In 
essence, the new government had to “be careful to avoid mirroring the 
government it deposed” (HRW 1997) and establish the foundations for a free, 
democratic, and prosperous nation for each and all Congolese without any 
discrimination. In a statement made public five days only after Kabila Sr. had 
become the new president, HRW (1997) stressed three priorities upon which 
the new regime had to focus on as a matter of urgency if it wanted to prove 
its commitment to eradicating past abuses and to preventing their recurrence 
in the future:  
 Establish the army and the national gendarmerie as non-partisan and 
nationally-representative forces under civilian control;  
 Establish basic political freedoms, including freedom of speech, 
particularly making public radio and television available to all points of 
view; and  
 Reform the regional and local administrations into non-partisan and 
nationally-representative institutions.  
Detailed requests and recommendations of the human rights organisation to 
all political forces of the country included the following: 
 Respect and represent the interests of a pluralistic society, and allow its 
citizens to freely elect their representatives;  
 Support as an urgent priority the development of an independent and 
effective judiciary;  
 Repudiate arbitrary measures to strip Kinyarwanda-speaking nationals, 
the Banyarwanda or other minorities of their Zairian nationality;  
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 Investigate and facilitate independent investigations of violations of 
human rights or humanitarian law by forces of the deposed government 
as well as members of the ADFL forces with a view to public disclosure 
of the findings and accountability before the law of those responsible for 
gross abuses; 
 Encourage the independent work of local and national civic 
organizations, including nongovernmental organizations dedicated to the 
promotion and protection of human rights, and remove legal or 
administrative obstacles to this work; and 
 Abide by the binding norms of international humanitarian law applicable 
to situations of armed conflict. 
To the members of the international community, “including the United 
Nations, the European Union and its member states, the United States, and 
the Organization of African Unity”, Human Rights Watch made the following 
recommendations: 
 Call upon the new government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to 
permit full, unhampered international investigations of the allegations of 
widespread civilian massacres during the armed conflict that led to its 
establishment;  
 Pressure the government to investigate reports of such attacks, to make 
the findings public, and to bring to justice those responsible;  
 Make any commitment of aid to the new government, including election 
assistance, dependent on concrete steps toward respecting human rights 
and creating the conditions for free and fair elections; and  
 Support programmes by organisations of civil society in Zaire to promote 
respect for human rights, propagate a democratic culture, and train 
independent election monitors. 
Other human rights and humanitarian organisations and agencies made 
similar calls and recommendations to the new authorities of the DR Congo 
and to members of the international community. Arguably, none of the 
problems and challenges warranted urgent political action more than the 
mass atrocities that the same organisations and agencies had been 
relentlessly denouncing and urging the Congolese authorities and the 
international community to prevent and stop throughout the armed conflict. 
Hence, in less than two months after the establishment of the new 
government (on 14 July 1997), Human Rights Watch wrote to the United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan asking him “to request the Security 
Council to authorize immediately the creation of a Commission of Experts 
with the explicit mandate not only to investigate the alleged atrocities but also 
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to determine whether the creation of an international tribunal [was] warranted 
[...]”. The organisation recommended him to act on his “own authority to 
establish a commission of investigation of similar stature and mandate” in the 
event the Security Council declined to act. HRW’s urgent recommendation 
was made following the release, three days before (11 July 1997), of the 
report of the Joint Mission that the UN Commission on Human Rights had 
mandated to investigate alleged massacres and other human rights violations 
that had occurred in eastern Zaire/DR Congo since September 1996. 
Paragraph 80 of the report (A/51/942) stated the following: “There is no 
denying that ethnic massacres were committed and that the victims were 
mostly Hutus from Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. The joint mission's 
preliminary opinion is that some of these alleged massacres could constitute 
acts of genocide.” (UN General Assembly 1997). Under paragraph 95, the 
Joint Mission stated that “there [were] reliable indications that persons 
belonging to one or other of the parties to the conflict in eastern Zaire, now 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, probably committed serious violations of 
international humanitarian law [...] between early September 1996 and 17 
May 1997.” The Mission indicated that “[S]uch crimes seem[ed] to be 
sufficiently massive and systematic to be characterized as crimes against 
humanity” and that “their authors could be brought to trial before international 
tribunals, as was decided in the case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.” 
Besides, more atrocities were still being committed, particularly in the eastern 
part of the country. On 16 June 1997, one month after the new president, Mr. 
Kabila Sr., had been sworn-in, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) (1997) 
presented a field visit report on human rights violations in eastern Congo and 
western Rwanda to a hearing sponsored by the United States House 
International Relations Committee. One of the key findings of the report was 
the following:   
Although civil war has officially ended in former Zaire/Congo, the region remains 
destabilized. Widespread insecurity and fear pervade Eastern Congo as well as 
Western Rwanda, where there is currently an unreported civil war taking place. [...] 
Atrocities and human rights abuses of many kinds are ongoing throughout the 
region (PHR 1997: 2-3).  
Concerning Eastern Congo, PHR (1997: 3) alarmingly reported: “Rwandan 
military have committed, and continue to commit, widespread atrocities 
 168 
 
against civilian populations in Eastern Congo.” The organisation indicated 
that it had received “reports and eye-witness accounts of killings of unarmed 
Rwandan Hutu refugees and local Congolese non-combatants throughout 
Eastern Congo by soldiers identified as Rwandan military.” It specified that 
the killings “appear[ed] to be systematic attacks to eliminate the Interahamwe 
threat, to annihilate remaining refugees, and to punish villagers in Eastern 
Congo alleged to have harbored or sheltered Rwandan Hutu refugees.” The 
international non-governmental organisation indicated that, “According to 
several testimonies, villagers in these instances were attacked merely 
because of their Hutu ethnicity.” (PHR 1997: 3). It made seventeen 
recommendations to the United States, the international community including 
the EU, and the governments of the two countries concerned. Key points in 
those recommendations were:  
 Full and independent investigation and punishment of alleged atrocities; 
prevention of further human rights abuses;  
 Protection of refugees and displaced persons; 
 Strict compliance with international human rights and humanitarian laws 
by the Rwandan and Congolese governments;  
 Acknowledgment of the civil war and related atrocities as direct 
consequence of the failure of the international community to preventively 
handle the refugee camps crisis in the first place; and  
 Conditioning of any assistance to the respective governments of the two 
countries to their compliance with international human rights and 
international laws and their practical commitment to the rule of law. 
In the following sections I undertake to establish, first, the policies and 
actions of the new authorities for addressing these needs, problems, and 
challenges; and, second, the EU response under its CFSP. 
New Government’s Response 
Social and Communal Policies and Actions 
Under the rule of President Kabila Sr., long-standing discrimination, 
pauperisation, divisions and tensions persisted and increased due to the lack 
of political will and practical commitment to their adequate handling. In early 
1998, a UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Garretón, detailed persistent “legal, 
cultural and educational discrimination against women” (UNECOSOC 1998: 
52, para. 239) and “violence, including sexual violence and torture” against 
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them (UNECOSOC 1998: 47, para. 206). He also reported lack of 
“improvement in living conditions, particularly those of wage-earners” 
(UNECOSOC 1998: 45, para. 193), “military presence in the universities” 
(UNECOSOC 1998: 46, para. 195), and “repression in schools and 
universities” (UNECOSOC 1998: 46, para. 196). Besides, Garretón noted 
“serious epidemics” and related death tolls as a result of the inability of 
people to afford adequate medicines and their resort to unsafe “traditional 
medicine” (UNECOSOC 1998: 46, paras. 197-99). He also underlined the 
predominance of “one ethnic group [that of the President] over hundreds of 
others” (UNECOSOC 1998: 48-49, paras. 212-13), and alerted the 
international community, including the EU, of the failure by the new 
authorities to progress peace and reconciliation in these terms:  
AFDL has failed to advance the peace process, if it ever really intended to do so. 
The country is more sharply divided than before, inter alia in its armed forces: 
between AFDL and former FAZ members, between Rwandans and Katangese, 
etc. [...] The ethnic conflicts have not been settled, nor will they be settled until the 
State commits itself to a policy of reconciliation. In the renewed conflict in Nord 
Kivu, the State, instead of acting as mediator or peacemaker, has aggressively 
taken the side of one of the ethnic groups. [...] Unfortunately, the security which the 
victorious forces had imposed on the conquered cities has been considerably 
eroded by those same forces. This is confirmed by the attacks on property and 
security described in this report. (UNECOSOC 1998: 50, paras. 225-27). 
The Special Rapporteur affirmed that the “Government ha[d] all the tools it 
needed to settle the ethnic conflicts in Kivu in conditions of justice and 
equality, without fomenting animosity or taking sides.” (UNECOSOC 1998: 
52, para. 240). On this particular aspect and others, Garretón asked the 
international community, including the EU, to do all in its power for the 
building in the DR Congo of “a genuinely democratic society that respects 
each of its members” (UNECOSOC 1998: 53, para. 243). 
Civil and Political Rights Policies and Actions  
Upon his arrival in power, President Kabila Sr. proved to be authoritarian by 
denying civil liberties and political rights to everyone except to himself and his 
followers. On 26 May 1997, only one week after his seizure of power, he 
prohibited any activities by political parties and public demonstrations. The 
following day, he signed the Constitutional law-decree 003 of 27 May 1997 
giving himself all executive and legislative powers. Four months later, he 
banned all political parties. The following year, on 25 May 1998, he signed 
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another constitutional law-decree giving himself unlimited powers (Reyntjens 
2009: 158-9). In sum, president Kabila concentrated all powers in his own 
hands; closed down the political space except for his own AFDL; and 
crushed any dissidence. From late autumn 1997 onwards, UN bodies and 
human rights organisations constantly denounced the authoritarian drift of the 
new regime and called for urgent action by members of the international 
community. In his aforementioned report of January 1998, the UN Special 
Rapporteur concluded that none of the basic conditions qualifying a 
democratic regime was being met in the case under consideration 
(UNECOSOC 1998: 48, para. 212), and that the Congolese people did not 
enjoy, and would “not enjoy in the foreseeable future, the human right to 
democracy.” (UNECOSOC 1998: 49, para. 217). Garretón indicated that the 
new regime had “eliminated the civil rights to life, liberty, physical integrity, 
etc.” and suspended “the rights of political participation”. He also reported the 
subordination of the courts to the executive branch, the use of “the new 
armed forces and police” by and for the sole “political and ethnic power group 
in the Government” and the commission by these armed forces and police of 
“abuses against opponents and ‘enemies’ (UNECOSOC 1998: 48-9, paras. 
212-13).  
The UN Special Rapporteur uncovered the emergence of a “new State 
structure, based on an omnipresent State-party [...], which [was] 
overwhelmingly dominated by two ethnic groups – the Tutsi and the 
Katangese Luba – the first of which [was] not considered by the population 
as being Congolese”; and “the absence of a short, medium or long-term 
democratic project” (UNECOSOC 1998: 49, para. 217). Garretón also 
denounced the lack of “freedom of information on radio and television, the 
most popular public media.” (UNECOSOC 1998: 49, para. 213). His overall 
observation was that, “A mentality of victors and vanquished ha[d] taken 
hold, aggravated by the perception that the former include foreigners, a 
situation which cause[d] a strong sense of humiliation.” (UNECOSOC 1998: 
49, 214) As the new regime was celebrating its first anniversary in power 




One year later, the country’s vibrant and diverse civil society is heavily under attack. 
Dozens of opposition politicians, journalists, human rights activists, academics, 
church leaders and trade unionists are currently unlawfully detained. Many more 
have been arbitrarily arrested and tortured during the past twelve months, and 
sometimes charged with endangering the security of the state. Others have been 
violently assaulted. [...] The constitution is still suspended and political party 
activities outside the ruling Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du 
Congo-Zaire (AFDL) are banned. In early April 1998, the government outlawed the 
country’s leading human rights organization, Association zaïroise pour la défense 
des droits de l’homme (AZADHO), Zairian Association for the Defence of Human 
Rights. A few days later, most other human rights organizations were declared illegal 
after the authorities refused to register them. 
 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Policies and Actions 
Despite official declarations and promises, the practical behaviour of the new 
regime authorities did not differ much from that of the one it had ousted 
concerning the respect, protection, and promotion of human rights and 
humanitarian law. Its rule quickly became characterised by “violations of the 
right to life, in the form of political murders, police brutality and 
disappearances; the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; attacks on the dignity of women; and restrictions on 
the freedoms of association (especially political parties and NGOs), opinion, 
expression, assembly, etc.” (UNECOSOC 1998: 49, para. 219). Moreover, 
“There [was] no effort to ensure justice by trying those responsible for 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.” (UNECOSOC 
1998: 49, para. 215). Besides an official war, and the resulting massive 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law, continued in the eastern 
part of the country after the military victory of the Rwanda-manned AFDL 
rebels. In February and May 1998, Amnesty International sounded the alarm 
as follows:  
Largely unknown to the international community, the armed conflict in Eastern 
Congo is continuing. The AFDL as well as the so-called Mai Mai and other armed 
opposition groups have committed serious human rights abuses against the civilian 
population. In late February 1998, the army reportedly killed more than 300 civilians 
in the area of Butembo, North Kivu Province.” (Amnesty International 1998).  
In his report cited above, the UN Special Rapporteur reported continued 
recruitment of children for armed combat, “absolute disregard” of their lives 
“in the attacks on the refugee camps, and the blocking of humanitarian 
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assistance” (UNECOSOC 1998: 46, paras. 200-201). Concerning alleged 
mass atrocity crimes committed during the First Congo War, the new regime 
repeatedly hindered all independent inquiries, including UN-authorised 
investigations. This was highlighted in the letter by which the UN Secretary 
General transmitted the report of the UN Investigative Team to the UN 
Security Council on 29 June 1998:  
It is a source of deep regret that, between its first deployment in August 1997 and its 
withdrawal in April 1998, the Team was not allowed to carry out its mission fully and 
without hindrance. Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties outlined in the report, the 
Team was able to reach a number of conclusions that are supported by strong 
evidence. Two of these conclusions stand out. The first is that all the parties to the 
violence that racked Zaire, and especially its eastern provinces, during the period 
under consideration have committed serious violations of human rights or 
international humanitarian law. The second is that the killings by AFDL and its allies, 
including elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Army, constitute crimes against 
humanity, as does the denial of humanitarian assistance to Rwandan Hutu refugees. 
The members of the Team believe that some of the killings may constitute genocide, 
depending on their intent, and call for further investigation of those crimes and of 
their motivation. (UN Security Council 1998a: 2). 
The UN Secretary-General indicated that “[v]iolations of human rights on 
such a scale as to constitute crimes against humanity must be regarded as 
posing a threat to international peace and security” (UN Security Council 
1998: 2), and called upon the members of the Security Council to respond to 
the report accordingly. 
Security and Stability Policies and Actions 
The new regime failed to create non-partisan, nationally representative army 
and security forces under civilian control. In the aftermath of the First Congo 
War, the DR Congo in fact lacked armed and security forces of its own worth 
the name. Actually, the country “had never had an effective army” since its 
independence from Belgium in 1960. Throughout the three decades (1965-
1997) of President Mobutu’s dictatorship and kleptocracy, “the security 
forces’ primary mission was to protect presidential powers, not to provide 
security to the civilian population” or “to defend the country from internal or 
external threats.” (Dobbins et al. 2008: 105). With the First Congo War, 
Mobutu’s troops disintegrated rapidly without engaging in combat. Some of 
them joined the victorious rebels; others allied themselves to the various 
armed groups and regional insurgents, while others simply went underground 
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to form their own factions and militias of fortune. As a result, the new 
government vulnerably relied on regional allies for the actual end of 
hostilities, the provision of security both inside the country and on its borders, 
and the formation of a new army and security apparatus. This daunting task 
rested by default with Rwandan troops who had brought the rebellion to 
power. The appointment on 1 December 1997 of Rwandan Lt. Col. James 
Kabarebe as acting Chief of Staff until his replacement on 13 July 1998 
(Reyntjens 2009: 162) was reflective of the strong foreign control over the 
new armed and security forces. Officially, Rwandan and Ugandan troops also 
stayed in the DR Congo to jointly combat RD Congo-based insurgents 
against their respective countries (Reyntjens 2009: 144-146); hence their 
direct and heavy involvement in the aforementioned unofficial war in eastern 
DR Congo.   
However, these neighbours’ heavy presence and absolute control of the new 
government’s security system was more of a problem than a solution. They 
were directly involved in gross violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law themselves, as well as the pillaging of natural resources in the eastern 
provinces of the country. Besides, their real agenda and priority, in particular 
of Rwanda’s military contingents, was “to keep President Kabila on the 
leash”. That “was detested by Kabila and his followers which resulted in 
friction and conflict in the Congolese Army” (Rudasingwa 2012: 1-2). 
Consequently, “the [new] army remained a hazy affair. [...] Rather than being 
one single army, the FAC [Forces Armées Congolaises] continued to be 
made up of factions (Rwandan and Congolese ‘Tutsi’, Katangans, former 
FAZ, kadogo and other recruited during the advance of the rebellion.” 
(Reyntjens 2009: 162). Very often, tensions and confrontations occurred 
between Congolese soldiers and their Rwandan colleagues and or allies 
(Reyntjens 2009). As a result, insecurity continued to reign in much of the 
country’s vast territory and war continued in the mineral-rich eastern 
provinces, pitting against each other regular armed forces, insurgents, and 
militias of all kinds. 
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Humanitarian Assistance Policies and Actions 
According to the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(USCRI) (1998), there were about 255,000 refugees and 100,000 IDPs at the 
end of 1997. Throughout the second semester of 1997 and the first one of 
1998, various humanitarian agencies and organisations consistently 
denounced: deliberate “attacks on the refugee camps and the blocking of 
humanitarian assistance” (UNECOSOC 1998: 46, para. 201); influxes of new 
refugees from neighbouring countries; forced mass displacements of civilians 
as a result of tensions and armed combats in certain regions, in particular in 
the eastern provinces; forced repatriation; forced suspension of humanitarian 
activities; manipulation, harassment, and expulsion of humanitarian 
organisations “presented [by the Government] as protecting those guilty of 
genocide” (UNECOSOC 1998: 50, para. 223); and closure of camps. All this 
resulted in unbearable living conditions and avoidable injuries and deaths of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees (Amnesty International 
1997, 1998; PHR 1997; USCRI 1998). 
CFSP-based Response 
Non-Legally Binding Decisions and Actions 
These comprise CFSP Principles and Guidelines, Declarations, and 
Demarches adopted during the period of post-war peacebuilding under 
review (June 1997- August 1998). Concerning Principles and Guidelines, 
the European Council held four meetings the only one of which that 
addressed the aftermath of the First Congo War took place on 16 and 17 
June 1997. On that occasion, the European Council indicated that the EU 
was looking “forward to establishing a constructive relationship with the new 
government of the Democratic Republic of Congo”, and that “respect for 
human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as a genuine 
commitment to democracy” constituted “[a]n essential cornerstone for 
rebuilding the country and securing the acceptance and assistance of the 
international community, including the European Union” (European Council 
1997). The Heads of State and Government of the EU welcomed “the 
agreement between President Kabila and the UN Secretary General 
regarding the investigation into alleged human rights violations in Congo” and 
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stated that they were expecting “President Kabila to give effect to that 
agreement and to implement the concrete steps which he ha[d] announced 
regarding the democratization process, which [they deemed to] result in free 
and fair elections within two years.” (European Council 1997). They 
announced that the European Union was prepared to play a full part in that 
process and, once again recalled “the need for an international conference 
under the auspices of the UN and the OAU on peace and stability in the 
Great Lakes Region.” 
EU CFSP Main Aspects and Basic Choices on ZAIRE/ DRC (1994-2009) 
 
First Congo War: Post-war Peacebuilding (June 1997 - Aug. 1998) 
 
EU response: Principles and General Guidelines 
 
  1997 1998 
 
Total EU Summits 3 1 4 
EU Summits with reference to DR Congo/ Great Lakes 
Region (GLR) 
1 0 1 
Main issue-areas re DRC/ GLR:       
Conditioning of EU assistance to the new authorities to respect 
for human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as 
a genuine commitment to democracy. 
 
1* 0 1 
Welcome of the agreement between President Kabila and the 
UN Secretary General regarding the investigation into alleged 
human rights violations in Congo. 
 
1 0 1 
EU call on new President to give effect to that agreement. 1 0 1 
EU pledge of support to the democratisation process. 1 0 1 
EU reminder of the need for an international conference under 
the auspices of the UN and the OAU on peace and stability in 
the Great Lakes Region. 
1 0 1 
 
5 0 
 * The figure corresponding to each issue-area refers to the number of EU Summits that 
addressed that particular area-issue in the DR Congo and or Great Lakes Region. 
On the other hand, according to the records available at the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU, three CFSP Declarations were issued 
in relation to the DR Congo during the reference period under consideration. 
They covered political developments and human rights violations in that 
country. In the first Declaration (Press: 164 Nr: 8316/97, 27 May 1997), which 
was made public ten days after the fall of the country’s capital, the European 
Union expressed its encouragement by “the change in Government in 
 176 
 
Kinshasa [...] without widespread fighting”; though it at the same time 
regretted “the loss of life which occurred throughout the conflict.” The Union 
expressed the hope that the transitional Government was going to be “as 
broadly based as possible in order to encompass the political aspirations of 
all of the people of the country” and restated “its willingness to support the 
democratization process leading to free and fair elections”, which it deemed 
was to “bring lasting peace, stability and prosperity for all the people of the 
country.”  By that same Declaration, the EU underlined the responsibility of 
the transitional Government “for promoting reconciliation between all the 
people” and the high importance of “respect for human rights and 
commitment to democracy” in that respect. The EU also recalled the primary 
responsibility of the new authorities “for security throughout the country, 
including the protection and dignified treatment of refugees, large numbers of 
whom remain[ed] in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” To this end, the 
Union requested the new authorities to grant “full and unrestricted access to 
them” and to ensure “full respect for international humanitarian law” and “the 
safety of humanitarian aid workers.” Besides, the European Union regretted 
that the UN investigative mission had been prevented from visiting the 
country and urged “the new authorities to allow the United Nations to carry 
out its work in relation to human rights as a matter of urgency and to 
guarantee it unhindered access to all the regions it wishe[d] to visit.” The 
Union indicated that it was on that basis and taking into account “the huge 
problems of rehabilitation, as well as of economic and social reconstruction of 
the country” that it hoped “to develop its relations with the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to help its people pursue their legitimate aspirations.” The 
EU also announced that a Presidency-led mission, including the Commission 
and the EU Special Envoy, was going to “convey the Union's views to the 
new authorities and, in the light of their visit, recommend appropriate next 
steps, including at the political level, to promote the EU's objectives in the 
region.” 
By the second Declaration (Press: 99 Nr: 7284/97) issued four months later 
(4 October 1997), the European Union expressed its “great concern” about 
the violence in the capital Kinshasa. It urged all parties concerned “to show 
the necessary restraint and respect the basic terms of the democratic 
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transition process” and “to engage fully in the search for a speedy political 
solution and to refrain immediately from further violence. The Union 
underlined the need to find a political solution to the conflict and reiterated “its 
support for the peace plan of UN/OAU Special Representative Sahnoun”, as 
well as for “the process of democratic transition, leading towards elections, 
as the only road towards a peaceful and stable situation.” The European 
Union noted that fighting was going on “in different parts of the country” and 
appealed to “all parties to respect the rights of the civilian population, ensure 
the safety of foreign citizens and, if necessary, to facilitate their evacuation.” 
The Union underlined “the most urgent need for humanitarian assistance to 
reach refugees and displaced persons.” By means of the third Declaration 
(Press: 255 Nr: 10396/98), which was made public on 17 July 1998 just less 
than a month before the outbreak of the Second Congo War, the EU stated 
that it was “gravely preoccupied with the findings contained in the Report of 
the UN Secretary General's Investigative Team charged with the inquiry into 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Zaire / the Democratic 
Republic of Congo”. The Union “strongly condemns all massacres and other 
atrocities committed before, during and after the military campaign which led 
to the overthrow of the former Zairian regime.” It also expressed its concern 
“about the difficulties the Investigative Team encountered in carrying out its 
task” and its support for the recommendation for further investigation of 
alleged atrocities to be carried out. In that regard, the Union urged the 
Governments of the DR Congo and Rwanda “to make a clear commitment to 
allow an independent and thorough inquiry without further delay.” The EU 
indicated that it was looking forward to such a commitment and would follow 
closely its implementation. The Union also urged the Governments of the two 
countries “to investigate within the framework of their own judicial systems 
the allegations contained in the report of the UN Secretary General's 
Investigative Team, and to bring to justice those responsible for crimes 
against humanity and other violations of human rights and humanitarian law.” 
The EU stressed the importance of putting an end to impunity if reconciliation 
and lasting peace [were] to be achieved in the Great Lakes Region” and 




     First Congo War: Post-war Peacebuilding (June 1997 - Aug. 1998) 
 CFSP-based Response: CFSP Declarations 
   1997 1998   
 Key Points       
 
EU regret of loss of life during the conflict and request to the new 
government to be broadly representative and effectively work for peace, 
unity, democracy, human rights, and prosperity for all Congolese citizens 
(Press: 164 Nr: 8316/97). 
1* 0 1 
 
EU's “great concern” about the violence in the capital Kinshasa and 
fighting in different parts of the country, and call for a political solution and 
respect of humanitarian law (Press: 99 Nr: 7284/97). 
1 0 1 
 
EU's strong condemnation of “all massacres and other atrocities 
committed before, during and after the military campaign which led to the 
overthrow of the former Zairian regime”; and call for their full investigation 
and prosecution (Press: 255 Nr: 10396/98). 
0 1 1 
 
 
2 1 3 
  The figure corresponding to each area-issue refers to the number of CFSP Declarations that 
addressed that particular area-issue in the DR Congo and or Great Lakes Region.  
Regarding Demarches, two Demarches were undertaken with the 
authorities of the DR Congo during the period under review. The first 
Demarche was carried out on 14 December 1997 by a Troïka of EU Heads of 
Missions in Kinshasa with the DR Congo Minister of Foreign Affairs 
concerning the harassment of citizens of EU Member States. The second 
Demarche was undertaken on 26 January 1998. It focused on the internal 
situation and the detention of four EU citizens in the country. 
Legally Binding Decisions and Actions 
Legally binding decisions and actions include Common Positions, Joint 
Actions, and Decisions. For the post-war phase of the First Congo War, the 
EU did not adopt any Common Position on the DR Congo or the Great 
Lakes Region. However, the EU adopted two Common Positions on Africa 
in general. In the first CP, the Union outlined the principles and guidelines of 
its stance on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa (CP 97/356/CFSP of 
2 June 1997). In the second CP, the Union defined its foreign policy 
principles, guidelines, and objectives concerning “human rights, democratic 
principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa” (CP 98/350/CFSP 
of 25 May 1998). Indirectly, the two CPs applied, by extension to individual 
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countries, such as the one hereby under consideration. By way of the first 
CP, adopted less than a month after the AFDL rebels had taken power, the 
EU stated that prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa were among its 
priorities; but that “the primary responsibility” rested “with the Africans 
themselves” (CP 97/356/CFSP, Preamble). The EU confined its role to 
actively supporting conflict prevention and resolution efforts “within the 
appropriate political and legal framework (United Nations, OAU, sub-regional 
organizations), where necessary, and in close cooperation with the relevant 
bodies.” (CP 97/356/CFSP, art. 1) In particular, the Union announced its 
readiness “to assist in building the capacities for conflict prevention and 
resolution in Africa on the basis of concrete project proposals of which the 
assessment was to be carried out by its own fact-finding mission (CP 
97/356/CFSP, art. 7). The EU indicated that it was going to develop a 
proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach, which was also to serve 
as a common framework for actions of its individual Member States, and that 
its policy would focus on preventing the outbreak or recurrence of violent 
conflicts, including at an early stage, and on post-conflict peacebuilding. For 
an improved contribution to conflict prevention in Africa, the EU announced 
that it would seek (i) to improve linkage between its efforts (policies and 
actions) and those of the Africans, and (ii) to use the various instruments 
available coherently to promote effective conflict prevention and resolution. 
The Union committed itself to take steps “to ensure coordination of the efforts 
of the European Community and those of the Member States in this field, 
including with regard to development cooperation and the support for human 
rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance.” (CP 97/356/CFSP, 
art. 3).  
Common Position 97/356/CFSP also bound Member States to recognise the 
availability of arms in quantities exceeding needs for self-defence as possible 
factor contributing to situations of instability and to consequently strengthen 
their efforts to prevent and to combat illicit trafficking of arms, in accordance 
with the eight criteria for arms exports established by the European Council 
in June 1991 and June 1992, and to encourage African States to submit 
annual returns to the UN Register of Conventional Arms as a means of 
promoting transparency and building confidence (CP 97/356/CFSP, art. 4). In 
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case the Union’s initiative to support conflict prevention and resolution efforts 
had defence implications, the EU would request the Western European 
Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement such initiative with regard to those 
defence implications, in particular the use of military means, in accordance 
with the provisions of the TEU (CP 97/356/CFSP, art. 5). By the second 
Common Position, which was adopted one year later (25 May 1998) after the 
adoption of the first one (2 June 1997), the European Union recalled that 
“human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and intrinsically 
linked” (CP 98/350/CFSP, Preamble). The Union announced that, in that 
respect, its objective was “to work in partnership with African countries to 
promote respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and 
good governance”; and that the new approach was to “serve as a framework 
for the actions of the Member States.” (CP 98/350/CFSP, art. 1.). The EU 
recognised the “the right of sovereign states to establish their own 
constitutional arrangements and to institute their own administrative 
structures according to their history, culture, tradition and social and ethnic 
composition”, and expressed its commitment “to encourage and support the 
on-going democratisation process in Africa on the basis of respect for” the 
following four principles (CP 98/350/CFSP, art. 2):  
(a) Protection of human rights (civil and political, and social, economic and 
cultural); 
(b) Respect of basic democratic principles, including: 
 The right to choose and change leaders in free and fair elections; 
 Separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers; and    
 Guarantees of freedom of expression, information, association and 
political organisation; 
(c) The rule of law, which permits citizens to defend their rights and which 
implies a legislative and judicial power giving full effect to human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and a fair, accessible and independent 
judicial system; and 
(d) Good governance, including the transparent and accountable 
management of all a country’s resources for the purposes of equitable 
and sustainable development. 
The Union indicated that, when deciding policy towards individual countries, it 
would “take into account their points of departure and the direction and pace 
of change within them, as well as the policy commitments of the respective 
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governments.” (CP 98/350/CFSP, art. 3). The Union legally bound itself to 
“give high priority to a positive and constructive approach that encourages 
human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance”, 
and to “consider increasing its support for African countries in which positive 
changes have taken place and where the governments concerned are 
engaged in promoting positive change.” (CP 98/350/CFSP, art. 3). In this 
regard, the EU envisaged working with both governments and civil society 
based on partnership and cooperation. In instances of negative changes, the 
Union legally committed itself to “consider the appropriate responses that 
could help reverse those developments” (CP 98/350/CFSP, art. 3). Besides, 
the EU took note of the intention of the European Commission “to direct its 
action towards achieving the objectives and the priorities of this common 
position, where appropriate, by pertinent Community measures.” (CP 
98/350/CFSP, art. 4). 
     EU CFSP Main Aspects and Basic Choices on ZAIRE/ DRC (1994-2009) 
 First Congo War: Post-war Peacebuilding (June 1997 - Aug. 1998) 
 CFSP-based Response: Common Positions (CPs) 
   1997 1998   
 Contents       
 Outline of EU foreign policy objectives, priorities, and approach 
concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa (CP 
97/356/CFSP). 
1 0 1 
 Outline of EU foreign policy objectives, priorities, and approach 
concerning human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law 
and good governance in Africa (CP 98/350/CFSP).  
0 1 1 
 
 
1 1 2 
 
      The figure corresponding to each area-issue refers to the number of CPs that 
concerned that particular area-issue in the DR Congo and or Great Lakes 
Region. 
In terms of Joint Actions, the EU adopted only one specifically on the DR 
Congo (JA 97/875/CFSP of 19 December 1997). The legal act in question 
extended and adapted “in substance” Joint Action 96/656/CFSP adopted a 
year earlier (on 11 November 1996) “in support of the democratic transition 
process in Zaire”. In the preamble of the new Joint Action, the European 
Union pointed out, among other things, that the new government had 
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renamed the country “Democratic Republic of Congo” and revoked the 
previous programme of democratic Transition while announcing its own 
intention to hold democratic elections and had appointed a Constitutional 
Commission. Taking into account these changes, the Union set out to 
contribute to the democratic transition process in the DR Congo as “part of 
an international effort”. Under the new Joint Action (97/875/CFSP), like under 
the one it extended (JA 96/656/CFSP), the Union’s contribution was to come 
essentially in the form of assistance in preparations for elections which would 
involve the establishing of a European Electoral Unit. The Union would also 
consider and assess appropriate further measures in support of the 
democratic transition process in the DR Congo, including measures for 
technical assistance and possible deployment of observers (JA 
97/875/CFSP, art. 1). The new JA also established that the operational 
balance of the amount of ECU 4 million charged to the general budget of the 
European Communities by virtue of Joint Action 96/656/CFSP was to be 
made available in order to finance expenditure arising out of this Joint Action 
(JA 97/875/CFSP, art. 4). Under Article 5, the Council noted the intention of 
the European Commission to propose measures to help achieve the 
objectives of this Joint Action, inter alia, within the meaning of the European 
Development Fund (EDF).  
On the other hand, the EU enacted CFSP Decisions, for the post-war 
peacebuilding phase of the First Congo War. Two of the three legal acts 
extended, for the third and fourth time respectively, the application of Joint 
Action 96/250/CFSP of 25 March 1996 by which the Union nominated its 
Special Envoy of the Union for the Great Lakes Region. The first Decision 
(97/448/CFSP) was adopted on 16 July 1997. It extended the application of 
Joint Action 96/250/CFSP from 31 July 1997 until 31 July 1998 (Decision 
97/448/CFSP, art. 1). It also established that an additional sum of ECU 
1415000 was to be charged to the general budget of the European 
Communities for 1997 in order to cover the costs related to the mission of the 
Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region (Decision 97/448/CFSP, 
art. 2). The second Decision (98/452/CFSP) was adopted on 13 July 1998 
and extended the application of same Joint Action 96/250/CFSP of 25 March 
1996 for another one year period (13 July 1998 - 31 July 1999) (Decision 
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98/452/CFSP, art. 1). It also established that a sum of ECU 813925 was to 
be charged to the general budget of the European Communities for 1998 in 
order to cover related costs (Decision 98/452/CFSP, art. 2). 
By means of the third Decision (98/410/CFSP) adopted on 29 June 1998, the 
European Union extended for a further year the application of the 
aforementioned Joint Action 97/875/CFSP (of 19 December 1997) 
concerning the Union’s support to the democratic transition process in the 
DR Congo and which was due to expire on 30 June 1998. In the preamble, 
the Union recalled that its support to the democratic transition process in that 
country as outlined in Joint Action 97/875/CFSP remained “contingent upon 
the commitment of the Democratic Republic of Congo Government and 
institutions to a transition towards democracy”. The EU restated its concern 
about the situation of tension, violence, and grave violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law that was prevailing in the country. Still, the 
Union noted “some positive developments such as the appointment of a 
Constitutional Assembly”, and therefore reaffirmed its readiness to support 
developments towards democracy in that country. 
First Congo War: Post-war Peacebuilding (June 1997 - Aug. 1998) 
  
CFSP-born Response: CFSP DECISIONS 
Main Points 1997 1998 
One-year extension of the mandate of the EU Special 
Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region (Decision 
97/448/CFSP). 1 0 1 
One-year extension of the mandate of the EU Special 
Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region (Decision 
98/452/CFSP). 0 1 1 
One-year extension of the application of Joint Action 
97/875/CFSP (of 19 Dec. 1997) concerning the Union’s 
support to the democratic transition process in the DR 
Congo (Decision 98/410/CFSP). 0 1 1 
  1 2 3 
 The figure corresponding to each area-issue refers to the number of CFSP Decisions 




Summary of Findings 
Early Warning and Prevention (EWP) 
During the period of EWP, July 1994 - September 1996, calls for action to 
prevent violent escalation of the situation in the then Zaire focused on 
peaceful transition to democracy and rule of law and on the removal of the 
security threat posed by the presence on the Zaire-Rwanda border of over 
one million of refugees among whom were ousted Rwandan military and 
militia forces some of whom had just been involved in the genocide and mass 
killings in their home country. For the first problem, the international 
community, the main aid donors in particular, was called upon to use all its 
influence, most likely through a well-coordinated and sustained  use of the 
carrot and stick, to revamp and progress the derailed political transition to 
democracy in Zaire. For the security threat problem, the Zairian authorities, 
the UN Agency for refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Secretary- General 
proposed the establishment of an international force to ensure security in and 
around the camps, facilitate voluntary and safe repatriation, relocation of 
camps far away from the border areas, and the separation of political and 
military leaders from bona fide refugees and their resettlement in other 
countries. However, the UN Secretary General received little or no positive 
response and resorted to the least bad solution of using poorly paid and 
disciplined local soldiers to patrol inside and outside the camps. Expectedly, 
the local contingent did not live up to the task for long. As a result, insecurity 
and cross-border provocation persisted and increased, leading to the 
outbreak of the First Congo War. 
 As far as the EU is concerned, its CFSP-born response to calls for 
preventive action came in various forms. The Union addressed the situation 
of Zaire and the Great Lakes Region at three of its six summits held during 
the EWP period; issued two CFSP Declarations; and adopted one Joint 
Action and one CFSP Decision. The first legally binding response was Joint 
Action 96/250/CFSP that the EU adopted on 25 March 1996 and by which it 
nominated its first Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region. The 
main substance of these CFSP-born policy outputs were the following: 
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 EU concern about and condemnation of all acts of violence and 
destabilisation; 
 Presentation of the Union’s objectives and priorities regarding the Great 
Lakes region: to secure peace, to consolidate the process of national 
reconciliation in the countries concerned, to facilitate a return to normal 
democratic life, in particular by restoring the rule of law, and to 
encourage economic and social recovery; 
 Appointment of an EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region; 
 Confirmation of EU support to the democratic transition in Zaire and its 
readiness to assist the country in the preparation and organisation of 
the resulting elections;  
 Call for the application of the Act of Transition in its entirety and without 
further delays in Zaire; and 
 Call for the organisation, the earliest possible, of a conference on 
peace, security and stability in the region. 
 
First Congo War: Early Warning and Prevention (July 1994 - Sept. 1996) 
EU CFSP Main Aspects and Basic Choices on ZAIRE/ DR Congo 




Principles  & General Guidelines* 0 2 1 3 
CFSP Declarations 0 1 1 2 
Demarches 0 0 0 0 
  0 3 2 5 
Legally Binding 
Responses 
Common Positions 0 0 0 0 
Joint Actions 0 0 1 1 
CFSP Decisions 0 0 1 1 
  0 0 2 2 
  0 3 4 7 
* The corresponding figure refers to the number of EU Summits that addressed matters 
related to the situation in the DR Congo and or Great Lakes Region. 
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Conflict Management (CM) 
The First Congo War officially broke out by late September-early October 
1996, following violent clashes around refugee camps as from early 
September 1996 onwards. As it soon turned out, the primary objectives of the 
main actors on the ground, that is, Rwandan and Burundian troops, were the 
dismantlement of camps hosting Rwandan refugees and the removal from 
power of Zaire’s long-time President Mobutu. Hence, the most desperate, 
repeated, and final appeals for action was for the establishment of a 
multinational force (MNF) for the protection of unarmed civilians, in particular 
Rwandan refugees, who came under direct attacks from day one of the 
military campaign. By mid-November 1996, two months into the war, the UN 
at last voted the force in question and authorised it to protect endangered 
population “by using all necessary means”. Yet, its deployment was delayed 
and finally cancelled in mid December 1996 because the pro-Rwandan 
government side convinced key decision-makers among the international 
community that the bulk of refugees had returned home amid the military 
attacks on and dismantlement of their camps (Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 
2009). 
 
The EU response under its CFSP was formulated and presented in various 
forms. To start with, the European Council discussed the war situation at the 
sole summit that it held during the war period; whereas the Council adopted 
two Joint Actions and two Decisions. The first legally binding response of the 
EU under the CFSP to the needs and challenges of Zaire during the Conflict 
Management stage was Joint Action 96/656/CFSP of 11 November 1996 and 
which outlined the principles, objectives, priorities, and approach of the EU 
support to the democratic transition process in Zaire. The Union also issued 
at least five CFSP Declarations. The essence of these policy outputs was the 
following: 
 Condemnation of acts of violence and violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law; 
 EU willingness and readiness to contribute fully to the establishment and 




 EU call for respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Zaire; and 
for peaceful and political solution to the problems in the region; 
 Confirmation of EU assistance to the successful completion of the 
electoral process in Zaire, through among other things, the establishment 
of a European electoral unit and a contribution to the Special Fund of the 
United Nations; 
 Extension of the mandate of the EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes 
Region; and 
 Need for an early convening of an international conference on peace and 
security in the region. 
     First Congo War: Conflict Management (Oct. 1996 - May 1997) 
EU CFSP Main Aspects and Basic Choices on ZAIRE/ DR Congo 
    1996 1997   
Non-Legally Binding 
Responses 
Principles  & General Guidelines*  1 0 1 
CFSP Declarations 2 3 5 
Demarches 0 0 0 
  3 3 6 
Legally Binding 
Responses 
Common Positions 0 0 0 
Joint Actions 2 0 2 
CFSP Decisions 2 0 2 
  4 0 4 
  7 3 10 
* The corresponding figure refers to the number of EU Summits that addressed matters 
related to the situation in the DR Congo and or Great Lakes Region. 
     
Post-war Peacebuilding (PWPB) 
The First Congo War officially ended with the fall of the country’s capital 
Kinshasa in the hands of the Rwanda-manned AFDL rebels on 17 May 1997. 
Expectedly, the new authorities were confronted with a myriad of daunting 
needs and challenges for rebuilding the country literally from the scratch. In 
this regard, the recommendations and advice of most, if not all, human rights 
activists, analysts, observers, aid donors, and friends of the country and the 
region to the new authorities could be captured in just one: perform differently 
and better than the ousted regime of President Mobutu. This meant that the 
AFDL-led government had to establish the foundations for a free, democratic, 
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and prosperous nation for each and all Congolese without any discrimination. 
However, the new authorities did not delay in choosing a different path. 
Instead of working for peace and reconciliation among long antagonised 
communities, they were much more involved in fomenting animosity, hatred, 
and violence; and in ensuring the predominance of the President’s ethnic 
group over hundreds of others in each and all sectors of the society. 
Discrimination and exploitation of women and children also continued 
unabated while the living conditions of the majority of the population 
worsened because of the high cost of basic commodities.  
On the political front, President Kabila Sr. soon proved to be authoritarian. 
Shortly after his accession to power, he promulgated laws and decrees 
concentrating both legislative and executive powers into his own hands and 
depriving all civil liberties and political rights to everyone except to himself 
and his followers. He prohibited political activities and public demonstrations, 
and persecuted dissenting voices by means of arbitrary arrests, 
imprisonment, tortures, disappearances, assassinations, and summary 
executions. With regard to truth and justice, the new regime hindered 
independent investigations into mass atrocities committed during the war and 
perpetuated the culture of impunity and human rights violations, including 
violations of the right to life. Besides, an unofficial war went on in the eastern 
part of the country after the arrival of the AFDL rebels onto power, causing 
further massive and serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law 
against the civilian population. Those violations included unlawful killings and 
cruel treatment, recruitment of children for armed combat, attacks on refugee 
camps, the blocking of humanitarian assistance, and the harassment and 
expulsion of human rights and humanitarian organisations. These and other 
grave denials and abuses of human rights were constantly and publicly 
reported and denounced by some of the most credible sources. In response, 
the European Union resorted to each and all the instruments that were 
available under its CFSP. It addressed the situation of the DR Congo and the 
Great Lakes Region at one of its four Summits held during the period under 
consideration; issued at least three Declarations; and undertook at least two 
Demarches with the country’s new authorities. On the legal side, the Union 
adopted two Common Positions on Africa that by extension applied to the DR 
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Congo as well, one Joint Action, and three CFSP Decisions. The first legally 
binding instrument was Council Decision 97/448/CFSP, enacted on 16 July 
1997. It extended the application of Joint Action 96/250/CFSP on the 
nomination of a Special Envoy of the EU for the African Great Lakes Region. 
The main area-issues and substance of these CFSP outputs were the 
following:  
 Conditioning of EU assistance to the respect for human rights and 
international humanitarian law by the new authorities, as well as to their 
genuine commitment to democracy; 
 Condemnation of all massacres and other atrocities committed before, 
during and after the military campaign that led to the overthrow of the 
Mobutu regime; 
 EU request and support for an full and independent investigation and 
prosecution of those atrocities and massacres; 
 Security and freedom of the citizens of EU Member States in the DR 
Congo; 
 Announcement and outline of EU foreign policy objectives, priorities, and 
approach concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa: indirect 
and subsidiary contribution to preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding 
initiatives; 
 Announcement and outline of EU foreign policy objectives, priorities, and 
approach concerning human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law 
and good governance in Africa: indirect and subsidiary contribution for 
the respect of human rights; protection of basic democratic principles; 
establishment of the rule of law; and practice of good governance.  
 Renewal of EU pledge of financial and technical support to the 
democratic transition process in the country; 
 Extension of the mandate of the EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes 
Region; and 
 Need for an international conference on peace, security, and stability in 










     First Congo War: Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (June 1997 - Aug. 1998) 
EU CFSP Main Aspects and Basic Choices on DR Congo 
    1997 1998   
Non-Legally Binding 
Responses 
Principles  & General 
Guidelines * 1 0 1 
CFSP Declarations 2 1 3 
Demarches 1 1 2 
  4 2 6 
Legally Binding 
Responses 
Common Positions ** 0 0 0 
Joint Actions 1 0 1 
CFSP Decisions 1 2 3 
  2 2 4 
  6 4 10 
* The corresponding figure refers to the number of EU Summits that addressed 
matters related to the situation in the DR Congo and or Great Lakes Region. 
** Two CPs adopted on Africa were by extension applicable to the DR Congo: 
1) CP 97/356/CFSP on EU principles and guidelines for its contribution to conflict 
prevention and resolution in Africa. 
2) CP 98/350/CFSP on EU principles and guidelines concerning human rights, 
democratic principles, rule of law and good governance in Africa. 
     
Commentary 
In this chapter, I set out to answer the following questions: Was the 
information on the first war in the DR Congo timely and sufficient for the EU 
to respond adequately for its prevention, mitigation and recurrence? Did the 
EU make the best use of the CFSP assets that were available for its 
response? Towards this end, I have used the three-stage analytical approach 
of Conflict Resolution: Early Warning and Prevention (EWP), Conflict 
Management (CM), and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB). The ultimate 
aim was to discern any general need-response pattern that might help 
establish as systematically and empirically as possible whether, how, and 
why the CFSP did (not) enable the EU to live up to its pledges and 
expectations for preventing or the occurrence, bloody escalation, and or 
recurrence of tragedies similar to 1994-Rwanda. This section offers a 
summary of the result of the exercise. 
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The First Congo War was a long foretold catastrophe about which the EU, 
like any other member of the international community, was timely and 
sufficiently informed. For a recall, its main immediate cause was the 
deterioration of security along the border between the DR Congo and 
Rwanda, following the settlement of about two million Rwandan refugees in 
the eastern provinces of the DR Congo in summer 1994, in the aftermath of 
the genocide in their home country. Among those refugees were defeated 
military and militias, some of whom had taken part in the genocide and mass 
killings. The repeatedly out-cried and over-demonstrated inability of the host 
government to effectively ensure security in and around refugee camps, the 
publicly stated intention of those ousted military and militias to re-conquer 
power by arms if necessary, and the declared determination of their 
defeaters to pursue them across the border could altogether but presage the 
worst. Many reliable sources timely, consistently, and repeatedly warned the 
international community; recommending various solutions in order to prevent 
the outbreak of the war at best or to mitigate and avoid its recurrence at 
worst (United States Department of State (US Department of State) 1994; 
UN General Assembly 1995; Amnesty International 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; 
ECOSOC 1996a, 1996b; UNHCR 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d; UN Security 
Council 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; HRW 1997; Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) and Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 
l’homme (FIDH) 1997; Lemaître 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) 1997; Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) 1997; 
UNECOSOC 1998; United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(USCRI) 1998). 
 
The main underlying origin, the start-up conditions in the terminology of CR 
theorist Sandole (1993, 1998), was the predatory, corrupt, neopatrimonial, 
personalist, and repressive rule of President Mobutu who, during the three 
decades of his rule (1965-1997), made his fellow citizens shockingly poorer 
than they were at independence in 1962, despite hosting much of the world’s 
most wanted natural riches (French 1995, 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; 
Bayart 2009). The international community, including the EC that was 
upgraded to EU in 1993, was along aware of the situation. In fact, the EC 
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“unilaterally suspended EDF aid to Zaire in 1992, in line with Article 366 of 
the Lomé IV Convention” (Bourque and Sampson 2001: 17), following a 
series of human rights violations such as the massacre of protesting students 
of the University of Lubumbashi (Human Rights Watch 1992). With the end of 
the Cold War, the country lost the strategic value for the West, with the latter 
withdrawing its economic aid, political support, and military protection. As a 
result, by the late nineteen eighties, the central state had virtually ceased to 
exist and operate, except in the country’s capital Kinshasa (Reyntjens 2009). 
The gradual and multi-level retreat of the State turned the country into “the 
quintessential case” of the fragmentation policy, that is, the nationwide 
systemic weakening and partition of institutions (Williams 2011). The 
unwillingness of the international community to address timely and 
adequately the problem of the 1994-Rwandan refugees was the last straw 
that broke the camel’s back.  
The consequences of the First Congo War were unimaginably horrific 
because it caused the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent persons 
and left behind deep wounds that will remain open for various generations to 
come. For its CFSP-born response before, during, and after the war, the EU 
varyingly resorted to all the decision-making and implementation instruments 
that were available except Common Position. The non-use of this instrument 
specifically on the DR Congo and or the Great Lakes Region was an 
important shortcoming and is much revealing. In the absence of the 
instrument of Common Strategy, introduced later by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
that entered into force on 1 May 1999, Common Position was the only legally 
binding instrument available under the CFSP that the EU could use to outline 
its position towards the DR Congo and its region in general and towards the 
First Congo War, in particular. Likewise, the EU did use Joint Action (JA) only 
for the appointment of its Special Envoy (JA 96/250/CFSP); the outlining of 
the principles, objectives, priorities, and approach of its support to the 
democratic transition process in Zaire, two months after the outbreak of 
military campaign (JA 96/656/CFSP, JA 97/875/CFSP); and for expressing its 
support to any relevant UN Security Council Resolutions for the protection of 
the refugees and their repatriation in safety and dignity (JA 96/669/CFSP). 
Arguably, it could have used that instrument in support of the repeated pleas 
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for the establishment and deployment of a capable preventive peacekeeping 
force in and around the refugee camps, the relocation of refugees away from 
the border between the two countries, and or the actual deployment of the 
UN-authorised multinational intervention (MNF). Instead, the EU resorted 
more to non-legally binding, generic instruments of its CFSP, namely general 
principles, guidelines, declarations; including when the most reliable sources 
were constantly reporting mass killings of refugees and unarmed local 
civilians, and calling for urgent decisive action.  
Overall, the general need-response pattern was that of inaction, 
insufficient action, and often too late response to killings and other 
gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The EU did not 
make the best use of the CFSP resources mainly because of the following 
factors: lack of experience and benchmarks in ‘high politics’ foreign policy; 
late inception of the CFSP; its non-exclusive competence status; its 
subsidiary role; the primacy of interests of the EU and or its allies; and the 
“Somalia Syndrome”. Concerning the lack of experience and benchmarks, for 
decades and until the entry into force of the CFSP in November 1993, the 
European Communities (EC), the predecessor of the EU, had carried out its 
external relations with the DR Congo and Sub-Saharan Africa in general 
through the Lomé Conventions, the focus of which were trade and 
development cooperation. Any ‘hard’ (as opposed to ‘soft’) foreign policy 
matter would be addressed through the EPC (European Political 
Cooperation), that is, the foreign policy consultation and coordination 
framework that preceded the CFSP. The policy outputs of the EPC were 
mostly declarations and demarches; and, exceptionally, joint actions in the 
form of positive and or restrictive measures as in the case of the fight against 
the apartheid regime in South Africa and terrorist incidents sponsored by 
Libya and Syria (European Communities 1988: 14). The testimony of the 
EU’s first Special Envoy and Representative to the Great Lakes region of 
Africa, the EU’s first diplomat to be assigned such a mission, Mr. Ajello, is 
quite illustrative of the level and importance of the lack of experience in 
foreign and security policy, in general, and in humanitarian intervention for 
human protection purposes, in particular: 
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It is clear that we are all inventing from scratch. We have no point of reference, no 
precedent, nothing. It's rather personal initiatives that take into account the views of 
different member states [of the EU], but a real common position there is not as 
such. What exists is a common denominator. By using the space rendered 
possible within this lowest common denominator, I try to draw up a comprehensive 
strategy for Europe in the region [of the Great Lakes] and eventually in Africa. 
(Ajello and Richard 2000: 118). 
The early infancy situation of the CFSP at the time of the First Congo War 
too was responsible for the lack of experience and thereby failure to make 
the best of the available resources. As substantiated in detail in the 
preceding chapter, the CFSP hardly entered into force in November 1993, 
when prevention for the First Congo War was nearly overdue. The non-
exclusive competence of the CFSP and its unanimity-voting rule underlay the 
lack of consensus and disagreement among Member States on various 
suggested solutions. For instance, a peacekeeping plan code-named 
“Tindemans Plan” after the name of Belgium’s Former Prime Minister and 
Former Foreign Affairs Minister who proposed it for addressing the security in 
and around Rwandan refugee camps and their eventual relocation was 
dropped out because of the lack of support at the Belgian and European 
levels (Reyntjens 2009: 21). The testimony of the first Special Representative 
of the EU for the region, Mr. Ajello, suggests that his  mission was indeed 
further complicated by divergent views of Member States some of whom (like 
France and Belgium) had long standing and often conflicting foreign policy 
objectives towards the region and its individual countries:  
At first, I had big problems due to the fact that as EU Special Envoy I should have 
been representing a common position. But there wasn’t one. The positions were 
varied and often completely contradictory especially on Rwanda, but also on 
Burundi. There were serious problems because it is not easy selling a product 
that does not exist. So I had to invent a common policy myself, taking into 
account the sensitivities of each of the parties. And this invention gradually 
became the effective common policy in the region. (Ajello, as quoted in Misser 
2007: 4).  
This quote suggests that the single and perhaps most decisive factor that 
prevented the EU to make the best use of the resources that were available 
under the CFSP in its response to the First Congo War was the primacy of 
national self-interests that underpinned the reported diverging views and 
positions among Member States. The EU Special Envoy for the region has 
revealed that his constant warning messages and suggestions for a 
peacekeeping force “were ignored” because the international community, 
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including some Member States of the EU, considered such intervention “a 
difficult and risky operation.” (Ajello and Richard 2000: 40). Some analysts 
rightly argue that the implementation of such a plan might have saved the 
Great Lakes Region from two successive wars and related mass atrocities 
(Reyntjens 2009). At least, it would have deprived the post-genocide regime 
of Rwanda and its allies of the sole official justification for their military 
invasion and occupation of the DR Congo: the security threat posed by 
armed elements among the Rwandan refugees along the border of the two 
countries. Likewise, had the UN-authorised multinational intervention (MNF) 
“for humanitarian purposes in eastern Zaire” in November 1996 actually 
taken place, the proportions of death and desolation that befell the refugees 
and local population might certainly have been much less. The mission was 
aborted not because the bulk of the refugees suddenly returned home as 
plans to intervene were being discussed; but rather because key actors at 
the UN and EU levels had never seriously considered it (Reyntjens 2009: 
87). The debate on whether the mandate of the Force had to include or not 
disarming and separating armed elements from ordinary refugees in the 
camps as one of its core objectives (Reyntjens 2009: 83) seems to have 
been a strategy to buy time (Prunier 2009: 119). Contestably, the NATO-led 
military intervention in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force, 23 March - 10 June 
1999), launched eight months after the outbreak of the Second Congo War, 
was not less risky or difficult. Certainly, it was worth carrying because crucial 
common interests of key decision-makers were at stake. As I highlight in the 
chapter discussing the overall findings of this thesis, Kosovo formed (and still 
forms) part of the EU backyard – the Balkans - and therefore was (and 
remains) the main strategic priority of the Union.  
The Treaty-based subsidiary role of the CFSP also played a role in the EU 
failure to make the best use of available resources, namely Common 
Positions and Joint Actions. Each and all the decisions and actions that the 
EU undertook under the CFSP in response to the war were aligned to and in 
support of decisions and actions by the United Nations and key international 
actors. Finally, the inception of the CFSP coincided with the most terrible 
humanitarian tragedies of the 1990s, in particular the genocide and mass 
killings in Rwanda and in the Balkans. While these tragedies triggered the 
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“Never Again” pledge worldwide, they at the same time commanded caution 
and disengagement from (forcible) military intervention, often referred to as 
the “Somalia Syndrome” (Weiss 1995), because they did expose the 
inadequacy of the modus operandi of humanitarian intervention of the time 
and its often deadly risks for the intervening forces. The humiliating killing of 
18 US Marines in Somalia, first, in 1993, and 10 UN peacekeepers in 
Rwanda, second, at the start of the 1994-genocide, still stands as the most 
remembered illustration of such dangers. In the following chapter, I determine 
whether there was any improvement in the use of CFSP resources in 
response to the Second Congo War. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CFSP-BASED RESPONSE TO THE SECOND CONGO 
WAR (1997-2009) 
Introduction 
My objective in this chapter is to establish whether the EU response to the 
Second Congo War under the CFSP experienced significant improvement in 
comparison to its CFSP-born response to the First Congo War. As in the 
case of the preceding chapter, I account for the empirical knowledge and 
information about the needs and challenges on the ground, the CFSP 
resources that were available, and their actual use by the EU. The underlying 
assumption remains the same: unless such empirical knowledge is first 
established, it is hardly possible to fairly establish whether the EU did have 
timely and sufficient information to act; whether and why it did (not) make the 
best use of the resources that were available under the CFSP; and whether 
any such use did enable the EU to make a difference as claimed by EU 
authorities and some academics (see first chapter). Interestingly, most if not 
all studies on the subject do not provide such information and knowledge as 
systematically as their assertions would require. One major contribution of 
this research consists in filling up this gap. As for the chapter on the First 
Congo War, I shall draw on secondary data and use the three-stage 
analytical approach of Conflict Resolution: early warning and prevention, 
management, and post-war rebuilding. Again, for the sake of clarity, I shall 
treat each stage separately. 
The Second Congo War (SCW) started on 2 August 1998 and formally ended 
on 17 December 2002 when the belligerents and parties signed a 
comprehensive peace accord known as the Global and Inclusive Agreement 
on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Global and Inclusive 
Agreement (GIA)). That war has been varyingly coined as the “Africa’s World 
War” (Punier 2009), “The Great African War” (Reyntjens 2009), and “‘Africa's 
‘first world war’” according to former US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright (The Economist 2009) because of its scale and toll of destruction. At 
least ten African countries sent in troops either in support of or against the 
then President of the DR Congo, Laurent Désiré Kabila. Countries that 
intervened to help the embattled president included Angola, Zimbabwe, 
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Namibia, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Libya; while 
those who attempted to topple him down were mainly Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Burundi. As a result, the DR Congo’s territory quickly became divided into 
two main geographical parts: the resources-rich East and North remained 
under the total control of Rwanda and Uganda and their respective local 
politico-military proxies; whereas the rest of the country stayed in the hands 
of the government of the DR Congo and its allies. 
 
Estimate of territory held by factions in June 2003 (Wikipedia 2011). 
Three intertwined factors underlay the break out of the second war. The first 
one was the inability and or unwillingness of the new authorities to unite the 
country and establish the foundation of a free, secure, democratic, and 
prosperous nation-state. The second one was the inaction or little action by 
the international community without whose sustained and substantial 
assistance long lasting peace, democratic politics, and socio-economic 
prosperity was doomed to remain elusive at best. The third and probably 
most determining factor was the real agenda of the key masters and 
protectors of the new regime, that is, Rwanda and Uganda, who were more 
interested in controlling the vast valuable resources of the eastern provinces 
of the country than in actually helping restore security for all, establish good 
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governance (a commodity they themselves were cruelly short of at home), 
and eliminate bases of insurgencies against them (HRW 2006a; Erlinder 
2008; Reyntjens 2009). Unsurprisingly, combats were initiated by the same 
Rwandan troops that President Kabila Sr. officially had ordered, only five 
days before (27 July 1998), to leave his country and return to theirs, allegedly 
anticipating an imminent coup to remove him from power. The consequences 
were horrific, particularly in terms of human casualties. According to the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC), nearly two million  out of the two and 
a half million persons who perished in the DR Congo between August 1998 
and May 2000 did so as a result of the war (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 241). 
Throughout the three stages of the conflict, human rights and humanitarian 
organisations, UN rapporteurs, and independent observers and analysts 
constantly denounced blatant and systematic violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law, and called on the most able actors of the international 
community to take appropriate action. For its part, the EU responded with 
various decisions and actions under its CFSP. Some of those endeavours, 
namely five field operations, have been presented as the most if not only 
supporting evidence for the alleged difference the CFSP and ESDP have 
enabled the EU to make in the DR Congo. 
Early Warnings and Prevention (June 1997 - August 1998) 
The one-year period of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding for the First Congo War 
(June 1997 - August 1998) was an inter-war period and therefore served for 
early warning and prevention for the Second Congo War. Accordingly, any 
CFSP-born decisions and actions aimed at rebuilding the country during that 
period were also valid for early warning and prevention for the second war. 
Certainly, the failure of both the new Congolese government and the 
international community to address adequately the multiple needs, problems, 
and challenges that faced the DR Congo in the aftermath of the First Congo 
War led to the outbreak of the second war. The preceding chapter (in 
particular the section on PCPB) deals at length with that inter-war period. For 
a reminder, I shall here offer only a summary. In terms of problems and 
challenges, the new authorities quickly proved more unwilling than unable to: 
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 Promote reconciliation, with the consequent sharpening of ethnically 
motivated divisions, tensions, and violence, particularly in the country’s 
eastern provinces; 
 Grant, for all citizens and on equal footing, civil rights to life, liberty, 
physical integrity, freedom of expression, etc.; 
 Respect and ensure respect of human rights and humanitarian law, 
particularly in the eastern provinces of the country where an unofficial low 
intensity war went on; 
 Create a non-partisan and nationally inclusive armed and security forces 
capable of ensuring law and order and of defending the country’s 
territorial integrity; and to 
 Facilitate independent investigations, including by the UN, of gross 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed during the 
First Congo War. 
Concerning the role of the international community, various watchdog 
organisations, agencies, UN-Commissions and Rapporteurs, and individuals 
relentlessly denounced the above-described situation and constantly called 
for timely, appropriate, and sufficient response. In particular, they recurrently 
asked the international community to: 
 Do all in their power to protect refugees and displaced persons in the DR 
Congo; 
 Pressure the DR Congo’s government to permit full, unhampered, 
independent, international investigation and prosecution of alleged mass 
crime atrocities;  
 Support programmes by civil society organisations in the DR Congo to 
promote respect for human rights, propagate a democratic culture, and 
train independent election monitors; and 
 Subject any assistance other than humanitarian aid to the commitment of 
new government and its regional godfathers to concrete steps toward 
respecting human rights and humanitarian law and creating the 
conditions for democracy and the rule of law. 
As far as the response of the EU under its CFSP is concerned, it came out in 
the form of both legally and non-legally binding decisions and actions. In 
terms of the legal acts, the Union adopted two Common Positions (CPs 
97/356/CFSP and 98/350/CFSP), one Joint Action (97/875/CFSP), and three 
CFSP Decisions (97/448/CFSP, 98/452/CFSP, and 98/410/CFSP). By 
means of the two CPs, the Union outlined respectively the principles and 
guidelines of its policy on (i) conflict prevention and resolution (CP 
97/356/CFSP) and on (ii) on the one hand; and, on the other, on human 
rights, rule of law, and good governance in Africa (CP 98/350/CFSP). On the 
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other hand, the Union adopted Joint Action 97/875/CFSP in order to extend 
and substantially adapt Joint Action 96/656/CFSP on its support to the 
democratic transition process in the DR Congo. The three CFSP Decisions 
adopted during that period bore on the nomination of the EU’s Special Envoy 
to the Great Lakes Region and its support to the democratic transition 
process in the DR Congo. In terms of non-legally binding initiatives, the 
situation in the DR Congo and the Great Lakes Region were object of one 
European Council meeting, three CFSP Declarations, and at least two 
Demarches with the authorities of that country. 
     Second Congo War: Early Warning and Prevention (June 1997 - Aug. 1998) 
EU CFSP Main Aspects and Basic Choices on DR Congo 




Principles  & General Guidelines* 1 0 1 
CFSP Declarations 2 1 3 
Demarches 1 1 2 
  4 2 6 
Legally Binding 
Responses 
Common Positions** 0 0 0 
Joint Actions 1 0 1 
CFSP Decisions 1 2 3 
  2 2 4 
  6 4 10 
* The corresponding figure refers to the number of EU Summits that addressed 
matters related to the situation in the DR Congo and Great Lakes Region. 
** By extension, the two CPs on Africa were also applicable to the DR Congo: 
1) CP 97/356/CFSP on EU principles and guidelines for its contribution to conflict 
prevention and resolution in Africa. 
2) CP 98/350/CFSP on EU principles and guidelines concerning human rights, 
democratic principles, rule of law and good governance in Africa. 
     
Conflict Management (August 1998 - December 2002) 
The ‘Conflict Management’ stage under review spanned from 2 August 1998, 
date on which the Second Congo War broke out, until 17 December 2002 
when Congolese belligerents and parties signed the ‘Global and Inclusive 
Agreement’. As underscored earlier, the Second Congo War broke out 
because of the failure of the new regime and the international community to 
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address adequately the immediate and latent problems that led to or resulted 
from the First Congo War. Like the First Congo War (1996-1997), the second 
one was launched from the country’s eastern region bordering with Burundi, 
Rwanda, and Uganda. Once again, it was disguised into a rebellion by the 
Banyamulenge, Congolese ethnic Tutsi of Rwandan origin, and based on two 
charges: authoritarianism and security concerns. On the first charge, Rwanda 
and its puppet rebels accused President Kabila Sr. of “misrule, nepotism and 
corruption”, as well as of the marginalisation of the Banyamulenge 
community and the killing of Congolese Tutsi. On 12 August 1998, the name 
of the new politico-military rebellion was announced as being 
‘Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie’ (RCD) in French (Reyntjens 
2009: 194-196), which translates in English as ‘Congolese Rally for 
Democracy’. On the second charge, the government of Rwanda and Uganda 
accused President Kabila Sr. of allying with insurgencies, including defeated 
Rwandan military and militia who had been involved in the 1994-genocide, 
based in eastern Congo against their two respective countries. Burundi, the 
other eastern neighbour of the DR Congo, too justified “its limited military 
involvement as arising out of the need to stop incursions of Hutu extremists 
based in the Congo.” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 238). Arguably, the 
unconvincing character of these arguments, their authors’ preference for the 
military coup solution approach, and the high economic and geopolitical 
stakes of the war triggered the direct and immediate military intervention of 
up to ten other African countries. 
Needs and challenges 
The Second Congo War, like the first one, was characterised by gross 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law. One of the first acts of the 
kind was “the blockade of the port of Matadi and the interruption of electricity 
and water supply to Kinshasa [the capital] by repeated switching off the Inga 
power dam”, which “resulted in shortages of basic necessities, an outbreak of 
waterborne diseases and numerous deaths.” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 241). 
Nzongola-Ntalaja has underscored that the Second Congo War was “peculiar 
in that it remained mainly a war against unarmed civilians, with repeated 
massacres of innocent men, women and children, particularly by Rwandan 
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troops and their Congolese auxiliaries, and with HIV-positive soldiers passing 
on the deadly virus to the thousands of women they raped or, occasionally to 
those whose services they purchased.” (Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002: 242). He 
recalls the alarming figures provided in 2000 by the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), according to which 1,7 million out of the 2,3 million persons 
who died in the DR Congo between August 1998 and May 2000 died as a 
result of the war. Actually, the IRC was just one of the many voices who, from 
the very start of the hostilities throughout to their formal end, relentlessly 
pleaded the international community to protect civilians and alleviate their 
suffering. Human Rights Watch (1998) did so only three days into the war. 
The organisation also “called on the international community to insist on full 
accountability for” the then and previous “human rights abuses in the Congo, 
Rwanda, and other countries in the Great Lakes region if a sustainable 
resolution to chronic instability in the region [was] ever to be found.” For its 
part, Amnesty International sent out its first public alert on 7 August 1998, 
only five days after the combats had started. It too made an “urgent appeal to 
safeguard human rights [...] in response to waves of arrests in the capital 
Kinshasa and reports of widespread killings, especially in the eastern Kivu 
region.” (Amnesty International 1998b: 1). The organisation called on “all 
parties involved in the conflict and to foreign governments who [could] have 
an influence on the situation to ensure that further human rights abuses 
[were] prevented.” It also urged “governments of neighbouring countries to 
allow unarmed civilians fleeing the conflict and human rights abuses in DRC 
to seek refuge in their country.” 
From then onwards, HRW, AI, and other human rights advocates, including 
UN agencies, constantly made many similar and more pressing calls and 
recommendations in the form of press releases, public statements, interviews 
and testimonies in word media, letters, and reports. One month into the war, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DR Congo, 
Mr. Garretón, submitted a report in which he detailed serious violations of 
international humanitarian law by the two sides to the war (Government and 
rebels). Reported violations included violence to life and summary 
executions, arbitrary detentions and or deportations, torture, sexual violence, 
and forced recruitment of civilians, including children (UN General Assembly 
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1998: 8-10, paras. 23–39). Two months later, Amnesty International (1998c: 
2) went further and denounced a “War against unarmed civilians” thousands 
of whom were “victims of atrocities” that included “large scale massacres [...], 
‘disappearances’ and torture, including rape, as well as arbitrary arrests and 
detentions”. AI deplored that, “While the conflict ha[d] received some 
international attention, almost nothing ha[d] been said or done about the 
atrocities inflicted on the unarmed civilian population.” Once again, the 
organisation called for urgent action to effectively ensure full protection of 
civilians, suspension of arms transfers and supplies to the parties implicated 
or likely to be involved in those atrocities, and full investigation and 
prosecution of those crimes.  
In July 1999, one year into the war, the belligerents signed a ceasefire 
agreement (the so called Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement) committing 
themselves, among other things, to respect and protect human rights and 
humanitarian laws, and a UN peacekeeping force was subsequently 
deployed to monitor their commitments. However, one year later, Human 
Rights Watch (2000: 1) had but to report, for the nth time, an unchanged 
pattern of brutal violence directed against defenceless civilians in these 
terms: “The Rwandan army and its Congolese allies have massacred and 
raped civilians in eastern Congo. Their opponents, Hutu and Mai Mai armed 
groups, are also committing atrocities against the civilian population.” Among 
other recommendations, the organisation asked the UN to ensure that the 
field office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Eastern Congo 
had adequate resources to function effectively and that the UN peacekeeping 
operation had a strong human rights component. Just two months before the 
signing of the so-named Global and Inclusive Agreement for peace, 
constitutional inclusive democracy, reconciliation, and socio-economic 
development in the DR Congo, another UN Special Rapporteur on human 
rights in the country, Iulia Motoc, too alerted the international community as 
follows: “Serious human-rights violations have taken place in rebel-controlled 
territory, particularly in the east of the country. Sexual violence against 
women and children has been used as a weapon of war by most of the 
armed groups involved in the conflict.” She described those violations as 
“massive” and asserted that “[t]he reprisals against the civilian population 
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constitute serious infringements of humanitarian law.” (UN General Assembly 
2002: 17, para. 79). By any standards, the international community, including 
the EU, continuously received timely and sufficient information in order to act 
accordingly.  
CFSP-based Response 
During the period under review, the following political and legal policy 
resources were readily available for use by the EU under its CFSP. Non-
legally binding political instruments were the following: Principles and 
Guidelines, CFSP Declarations, and Demarches. On the legal side, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, introduced a 
new politico-legal instrument: Common Strategy. The new instrument added 
up to the already existing three ones: Common Position, Joint Action, and 
CFSP Decision. In the following sections, I shall determine if, when, and how 
the EU used any of these instruments for the management of the Second 
Congo War.  
Non-Legally Binding Responses 
During Conflict Management stage of the Second Congo War (1998-2002), 
the European Council held sixteen summits only three of which issued some 
Principles and General Guidelines on the situation of the DR Congo. The 
first of the three meetings was held in December 1998, four months into the 
Second Congo War (European Council 1998). The second EU summit took 
place at the end of 2001 (European Council 2001a), more than two years 
after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July 1999. The 
third and last one took place in March 2002 (European Council 2002a), nine 
months ahead of the conclusion of the transitional peace and power-sharing 
agreement: the Global and Inclusive Agreement. At one or the other of the 
three summits, the EU expressed or reaffirmed its concern about the 
aggravation and internationalisation of the armed conflict in the DR Congo 
and related violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The Union also 
called for the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the 
respect of human right and humanitarian law, and a negotiated political 
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solution. To that end, the EU pledged or renewed its support to the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement-born process of inter-Congolese dialogue.  
       Second Congo War: Conflict Management (Aug. 1998 – Dec. 2002) 
 
CFSP-based Response: Principles and General Guidelines 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
Total EU Summits 1 4 3 4 4 16 
EU Summits with reference to DR 
Congo/ Great Lakes Region* 
1 0 0 1 1 3 
Main issues addressed with 
reference to DRC/GLR: 
            
EU concern about aggravation and 
internationalisation of the armed 
conflict in the DR Congo. 
1 0 0 0 1 2 
EU support to the principles of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
the DR Congo and its neighbouring 
countries.  
1 0 0 0 0 1 
EU call for negotiated political 
solution. 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
EU call for respect of human rights 
and humanitarian law. 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
EU support for the Lusaka and 
Arusha Agreements. 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
Commission's signing of National 
Indicative Programme for the DR 
Congo in January 2002. 
0 0 0 0 1 1 
EU support to inter-Congolese 
dialogue underway. 
0 0 0 1 1 2 
 
4 0 0 2 3 
  The corresponding figure refers to the number of EU Summits that addressed that 
particular issue. 
Besides, the EU issued thirty-three (33) CFSP Declarations on the political, 
military, and humanitarian developments in that country and its region. Those 
declarations were distributed per year as follows: three in 1998, nine in 1999, 
five in 2000 and 2001 each, and eleven in 2002. The three statements issued 
in 1998 reflected the EU’s concern at the deterioration of the internal 
situation, the violation of human rights, and its call for a peaceful solution. 
Declarations made public in the course of 1999 focussed on the armed 
conflict, arms trade to and within the Great Lakes Region, cease-fire 
negotiations and the resulting agreement, in particular the above-mentioned 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The EU retook on board the same issues in 
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the five declarations published in 2000, except one that focused on the 
infringement of liberty of Archbishop Emmanuel Kataliko and called for his 
return to his archdiocese in Bukavu (southeastern DR Congo). In its 2001-
five Declarations, the Union expressed its condemnation of the attack and 
assassination on the president of the DR Congo, Mr. Laurent Désiré Kabila 
(Kabila Sr.) on 16 January 2001, its concern over the conflict between 
Hema-Lendu communities in the north-eastern part of the country, and at the 
redeployments of troops in that country by Rwanda and Uganda. The eleven 
declarations issued in 2002 covered three main issues: the continued 
outbreak of violence and fighting particularly in the eastern part of the 
country; the dire human rights and humanitarian situation for ordinary 
Congolese, displaced persons, and refugees; and the peace negotiations 
that led to the Global and Inclusive Agreement and the ensuing agreements 
for the withdrawal of foreign troops (of Angola, Uganda, and Rwanda). 
Finally, the EU undertook at least forty-five Demarches on the conflict in the 
RD Congo during the period of Conflict Management (Aug. 1998 - Dec. 
2002). The bulk of those demarches were undertaken with the authorities of 
the DR Congo. Other actors that the EU approached included Rwanda, 
Namibia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Chad, Republic of Congo, Zambia, Gabon, the 
then Organisation for African Unity, and the United Nations. The predominant 
area-issues of those demarches were: the armed conflict and related 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the political situation, 
and the peace process in the DR Congo; and regional security and 
development challenges and solutions. Other area-issues included the 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the detention of EU diplomats in RD Congo, and the World 
Conference against Racism.  
Legally Binding Responses 
During the reference period under scrutiny, the EU did not adopt any CFSP 
Common Strategy (CS) in relation to the DR Congo, the Great Lakes 
Region, or Sub-Saharan Africa in general. Instead, the Union adopted four 
Common Positions, four Joint Actions and two CFSP Decisions as part 
of its contribution to the management of the Second Congo War. The first 
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Common Position (CP) was adopted and entered into force on 15 November 
1999, a few months after the singing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement; 
whereas the adoption of the fourth CP took place in October 2002, nearly two 
months ahead of the conclusion of the Global and Inclusive Agreement. The 
first three CPs (CP 1999/728/CFSP of 15 November 1999, CP 
2001/83/CFSP of 29 January 2001, and CP 2002/203/CFSP of 11 March 
2002) expressed and focused on the “support through action by the 
European Union and its Member States” to “the implementation of the 
Lusaka ceasefire agreement and the process towards peace in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)” (CP 1999/728/CFSP, art. 1). By 
means of the fourth and last Common Position (CP 2002/829/CFSP of 21 
October 2002), the Union outlined the conditions under which it amended the 
arms embargo that its Member States had previously decided (in April 1993) 
against the then Zaire (former name of the DR Congo) and allowed the 
supply of certain equipment to the country.  
EU position on and support to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
With regard to the support to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the peace 
process, the Union reaffirmed its conviction that lasting peace could only be 
achieved through the following: (i) peaceful, inclusive, and fair negotiations 
between all parties concerned; (ii) respect for the territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty of the DR Congo and for democratic principles and 
human rights in all States of the region; and (iii) consideration of the security 
interest of the DR Congo and its neighbouring countries (CP 
1999/728/CFSP, art. 1). Hence, the Union indicated that its support and 
action would only be geared towards enhancing and materialising these 
principles; as well as it was to be conditioned to the endorsement and 
implementation of these principles by all the parties to the conflict (CP 
2001/83/CFSP). In this regard, the Union stated that its cooperation with the 
countries in the region involved in the Congolese crisis would take account of 
the efforts made by those same countries to implement the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement and related agreements and the relevant Security Council 
Resolutions (CP 2002/203/CFSP, art. 7). The EU announced that in its 
cooperation with those countries it would “promote support for activities 
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which contribute to political stability and the alleviation of economic and 
social problems which contribute to instability in the Great Lakes region.” (CP 
1999/722/CFSP, art. 6) To that end, the Union restated its readiness to 
support the holding of an international conference on peace, security, 
democracy and development in the Great Lakes region once progress in the 
Lusaka and Arusha peace processes so allowed and the interested countries 
so decided (CP 2002/203/CFSP, art. 7).  
Besides, the Union committed itself to “pursue its action for a full withdrawal 
without delay of all foreign troops from the DRC in accordance with the 
Security Council Resolutions” (CP 2002/203/CFSP, art. 3) and pledged to 
“strive for the rapid implementation of the process of disarmament, 
demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement [DDRRR] of 
combatants of armed groups.” (CP 2002/203/CFSP, art. 4) Regarding the 
DDRR, the Union indicated that the process was to be carried out voluntarily, 
and that, to that end, it would maintain its support the work of the UN Mission 
in the DR Congo (MONUC) and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) (ibid.) 
EU position on and support to Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
With regard to the inter-Congolese negotiations, the EU expressed its desire 
and active support for an agreement that would enable the unity and integrity 
of the DR Congo to be maintained and the rule of law to be re-established 
through a peaceful transition capable of restoring good governance, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of paving the way for a 
return to democracy. The Union underscored that the “Agreement on 
transition and its institutions should in particular address the key issues of 
Congolese nationality and the new organisation of the army and of the State 
with a view to the full restoration of representative democracy as an essential 
guarantee for the country's lasting and equitable development.” (CP 
2002/203/CFSP, art. 5). The Union also pledged to maintain an appropriate 
level of humanitarian aid to the country and to lend its support to the 
reconstruction and development of the target country. The EU legally bound 
itself to ensure that such support would benefit all the Congolese people and 
all the regions of the country and that it would contribute dynamically and 
proactively to the peace process by promoting the restoration of the 
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Congolese State, good governance, an improvement in the economic 
situation and respect for human rights (CP 2002/203/CFSP, art. 5).  
Amendment of the 1993-arms embargo 
Concerning the amendment of the arms embargo, the Union allowed the 
following: (a) supplies temporarily exported to the DR Congo for the personal 
use only of United Nations personnel; (b) supplies of non-lethal military 
equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use; and (c) 
equipment to be used for the clearance and destruction of anti-personnel 
landmines (CP 2002/829/CFSP, art. 1(2)). Member States were legally 
bound to immediately inform each other and the European Commission of 
the measures taken under this CP and to supply each other with any other 
relevant information at their disposal in connection with it (CP 
2002/829/CFSP, art. 2). With a view to maximising the impact of these 
measures, the Union, on the one hand, undertook to deploy efforts to 
encourage other countries to adopt measures similar to those contained in 
this Common Position (CP 2002/829/CFSP, art. 3). 
Second Congo War: Conflict Management (Aug. 1998 - Dec. 2002) 
CFSP-based Response: Common Positions (CPs) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
Total CPs on Zaire / DR Congo 0 2* 0 1 2 5 
Main themes/ issues re DRC/ GLR:             
EU support for the implementation of the 
Lusaka ceasefire agreement and the peace 
process in the DR Congo. 
0** 2 0 1 1 4 
Exceptions to the arms embargo decided in 
April 1993 against DR Congo. 
0 0 0 0 1 1 
 
0 1 0 1 2 
 ** The CPs and Decisions of 8 November 1999 and 15 November 1999 as well as 
their corresponding implementing Decisions are similar to the best of knowledge. 
My request for clarification from the Council was unsuccessful. Consequently, my 
analysis takes into account only 4 CPs. 
** Number of Common Positions that addressed that particular issue.  
On the other hand, the EU adopted four Joint Actions for the management 
of the Second Congo War (Aug. 1998 – Dec.2002). All the four legally 
binding undertakings concerned the definition and updating of the status and 
mandate of the EU Special Envoy and Special Representative for the Great 
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Lakes Region (JA 2000/347/CFSP of 22 May 2000, JA 2000/792/CFSP of 14 
December 2000, 2001/876/CFSP of 10 December 2001, and JA 
2002/962/CFSP of 10 December 2002). The first JA (2000/347/CFSP) re-
extended the mandate of the Union’s Special Envoy (EUSE) for the Africa’s 
Great Lakes Region, decided for the first time on 25 March 1996 (JA 
96/250/CFSP), from 31 July 2000 until 31 December 2000. The second JA 
(2000/792/CFSP) upgraded the status of the ‘Special Envoy’ to that of 
‘Special Representative’ (SR) and accordingly refined her/his mandate, with 
a view to increasing transparency and clarity. Under the new status, EU 
Special Representative (EUSR) would conclude a contract as ‘Special 
Adviser’ with the Council and was responsible for implementing his/her 
mandate, including the constitution of her/his team, in consultation with the 
Presidency, assisted by the Council’s Secretary-General/ CFSP’s High 
Representative, and in full association with the Commission (JA 
2000/792/CFSP, art.3). The mandate of EUSR for the Great Lakes Region 
was to “support the efforts aimed at creating the necessary conditions for a 
lasting and peaceful solution to the crises affecting the African Great Lakes 
Region, including preparations, at the appropriate time, for an international 
conference on peace, stability, democracy and development in the African 
Great Lakes Region.” (JA 2000/792/CFSP, art. 2 (1)). The new JA specified 
that the mandate of the EUSR was to “be based on the policy objectives of 
the European Union regarding the conflicts in the African Great Lakes 
Region”. Those objectives were (re)defined as being mainly the following (JA 
2000/792/CFSP, art. 1): 
 Active and efficient contribution of the EU to a final settlement of the 
conflict in the DR Congo and the conflict in Burundi; 
 Particular attention to the regional dimension of the two conflicts;  
 Assurance of the continued presence of the EU on the ground and in 
relevant international fora, staying in touch with key players and 
contribution to crisis management; and  
 Contribution to a consistent, sustainable and responsible policy of the EU 
in the African Great Lakes Region.        
The Special Representative would report directly to the Secretary-
General/High Representative of the Union’s Council and was accountable to 
him/her regarding the administrative costs incurred in connection with his/her 
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activities. He / she had to submit regular reports on his/her own initiative or 
when requested, to the Council through its Secretary-General/High 
Representative (JA 2000/792/CFSP, art. 4); and such reports had to be 
forwarded to the European Commission (JA 2000/792/CFSP, art. 5). With a 
view to ensuring consistency of external action of the European Union, the 
Special Representative had to coordinate his activities with those of the 
CFSP’s High Representative, the Presidency and the Commission. In the 
field, he had to maintain close liaison with the Presidency, the Commission 
and the Heads of Mission all of whom had, on their turn, to make their best 
efforts to assist the Special Representative in the implementation of the 
mandate. The Special Representative was also to liaise with other 
international actors in the field (JA 2000/792/CFSP, art. 8). The new status 
and mandate of the SR were successively extended and amended twice, on 
10 December 2001 by the third Joint Action (JA 2001/876/CFSP) and on 10 
December 2002 by the fourth and last Joint Action (JA 2002/962/CFSP). 
Second Congo War (1998-2009): Conflict Management (Aug. 1998 - Dec. 2002) 
CFSP-based Response: Joint Actions (JAs) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
Total JAs on Zaire / DR Congo 0 0 2 1 1 4 
Main themes/ issues re DRC/ GLR:             
Nomination of an EU Special Envoy for the 
African Great Lakes Region. 
0* 0 1 0 0 1 
Appointment of EU Special Representative of the 
European Union for the African Great Lakes 
Region. 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Amendment and extension of the mandate of the 
Special Representative of the European Union 
for the African Great Lakes Region. 
0 0 0 1 1 2 
 
0 0 2 1 1 4 
* Number of Joint Actions that particularly concerned that issue. 
Finally, the EU adopted two CFSP Decisions in response to Conflict 
Management needs and challenges in the DR Congo. The two CFSP outputs 
concerned respectively (i) the mandate and activities of the Union’s Special 
Representative for the Great Lakes Region and (ii) the support of the EU to 
the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (Decision 
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1999/423/CFSP of 28 June 1999 and Decision 1999/729/CFSP of 15 
November 1999). By the first Decision, the Union extended for a year (31 
July 1999 - 31 July 2000) the validity of JA 96/250/CFSP by which the Union 
had appointed three years earlier its Special Envoy to the Great Lakes 
Region, and established the financial reference amount intended to cover the 
costs related to that mission at EUR1137000,00 (Decision 1999/423/CFSP, 
arts. 1-2). By the second Decision, the EU legally bound itself to contribute 
with a financial reference amount of EUR12.000.000,00 towards operational, 
non-military expenditure to enable the Joint Military Commission (JMC) to 
deploy its observers in the DR Congo during a six month period and fulfil its 
tasks as specified in its Rules of Procedure (Decision 1999/729/CFSP, arts.1 
and 2).  
Summary of Findings 
The Second Congo War: Causes and Casualties 
The Second Congo War started on 2 August 1998. It officially ended on 17 
December 2002 when the belligerents and parties to the conflict signed the 
‘Global and All-Inclusive Agreement’ (GIA) that was deemed (i) to put a 
definite end to the hostilities and the related gross violations of human rights 
and humanitarian law and (ii) to initiate democratic constitutional politics, 
national reconciliation, and reconstruction. One year earlier, on 10 July 1999, 
the same belligerents and parties had concluded a ceasefire, the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement, for (i) “effective cessation of hostilities” and “all acts of 
violence against the civilian population by respecting and protecting human 
rights”; (ii) the release of war prisoners and hostages; (iii) the facilitation of 
human assistance; and (iv) the holding of an inclusive inter-Congolese 
dialogue that actually resulted in the above-mentioned GIA. Three intertwined 
factors led to the Second Congo War. The first is the inability or unwillingness 
of the new authorities of the DR Congo to adequately resolve the causes of 
the First Congo War (long-run repressive dictatorship, mismanagement, 
patronage, generalised impunity, abject socio-economic poverty for the 
majority of the population, gross human rights violations, and the presence of 
over one million Rwandan refugees) and its immediate consequences (heavy 
presence and power of foreign armed forces, massive grave violations of 
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human rights and humanitarian law, and the weakening of the social fabric). 
The second factor is the inaction or little care of the international community 
whose sustained and substantial assistance was desperately indispensable 
to address that situation; whereas the third element was the paternalist and 
aggressive determination of Rwanda and Uganda, the two countries who 
engineered and led the First Congo War, to control all power and resources 
in the DR Congo. Indeed, the Second Congo War were started by the same 
Rwandan troops whom on 27 July 1998 DR Congo’s President Kabila Sr. 
ordered to leave his country and return to theirs, allegedly to abort a military 
coup by those same troops to overthrow him. Arguably, the veiled hegemonic 
plans of Rwanda and Uganda prompted the military intervention of at least 
other eight African countries in support of either of the two sides. The 
involvement of such a large number of African countries from the four corners 
of the continent transformed the DR Congo into a battlefield for ‘Africa’s First 
World War’ with an unprecedented toll of human and material casualties: 
some five million dead and the systematic plunder of the unparalleled natural 
resources of the country. 
Gross human rights violations and calls for action 
Throughout the period under review (August 1998 - December 2002), 
watchdog organisations, agencies, commissions, missions, UN’s Special 
Rapporteurs, and mass media timely, sufficiently, and continuously alerted 
the international community of the war-caused inhumane suffering of 
unarmed civilians inside the DR Congo and in the Great Lakes Region and 
called for appropriate action. For instance, less than five days after the 
outbreak of the Second Congo War (on 2 August 1998), Human Rights 
Watch (1998) and Amnesty International (1998) blew the whistle and urged 
the belligerents and the international community to do all in their power (i) to 
protect unarmed civilians against blind repression, torture, summary 
executions, and “widespread killings, especially in the eastern Kivu region”; 
and (ii) to hold accountable all the perpetrators of those atrocities as well as 
of the crimes that had been committed before. One month later, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DR Congo 
reported serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
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law which included violence to life and summary executions, arbitrary 
detentions and or deportations, torture, sexual violence, and forced 
recruitment of civilians, including children (UN General Assembly 1998: 8-10, 
paras. 23–39). Just two months before the signing of the Global and Inclusive 
Agreement for peace and democracy in the country, another UN Special 
Rapporteur reported “serious” and “massive” violations of international 
humanitarian law, “particularly in the east of the country” and which included 
the use of sexual violence against women and child soldiers and slaves “as a 
weapon of war by most of the armed groups involved in the conflict.” (UN 
General Assembly 2002: 17, para. 79). 
CFSP-based Response 
The reaction of the EU to reported mass atrocity crimes consisted of both 
non-legally binding and legal initiatives. Concerning the first category, the 
Union addressed the situation (i) at three of its sixteen Summits held during 
the military campaign period; (ii) in its thirty three (33) CFSP Declarations 
issued during that same period; and (ii) in its forty-five (45) Demarches 
undertaken throughout the same timeframe. By means of one or the other of 
these non-legally binding political responses, the Union alternately expressed 
its concern about and its condemnation of gross violations of human rights 
and humanitarian law, and its commitment and support to efforts to end 
the violence and reach a negotiated solution, as well as to the provision of 
humanitarian aid and the investigation and prosecution of reported human 
rights violations. As for the politico-legal responses, the EU passed four 
Common Positions, four Joint Actions, and two CFSP Decisions, 
outlining its stance and legally binding itself to “support through action” the 
implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the process towards 
lasting peace, representative democracy, genuine reconciliation, and socio-
economic development in the DR Congo. Its “support through action” 
consisted essentially of the following: 
 Political, diplomatic, technical, and financial support to the UN Mission in 
the DR Congo (MONUC) and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in 
charge of supervising the effective cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal 
of all foreign troops from the territory of the DR Congo, and the process 
of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and 
resettlement [DDRRR] of combatants of armed groups; 
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 Political, diplomatic, technical, and financial assistance for the holding of 
an international conference on peace, security, democracy, and 
development in the Great Lakes Region; 
 Pledge to condition its political, diplomatic, financial, and technical 
support to and cooperation with countries in the region to their political 
and practical commitment to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and to the 
process of peace, reconciliation, and democratisation in the DR Congo;  
 Extension and amendment of the arms embargo decided in 1993 by the 
Union’s Member States against the then Zaire in order to make it 
applicable to UN-identified spoilers of the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement 
and the process of peace, reconciliation, and democratisation; and 
 Upgrading and extending the status and mandate of the Union’s Special 
Envoy / Representative in the region. 
The earliest CFSP-born response came on 11 August 1998, nine days into 
the war hostilities, in the form of a Declaration (Press 255, Nr 10396/98) 
expressing the EU concern about the deterioration of the situation in the DR 
Congo. On the other hand, the first legally binding response was Common 
Position 1999/728/CFSP adopted on 15 November 1999, three months into 
the Second Congo War, on the EU support to the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement and peace process in the DR Congo. The first Joint Action (JA 
2000/347/CFSP) was enacted on 22 May 2000, nearly two years into the 
Second Congo War. 
Second Congo War: Conflict Management (Aug. 1998 - Dec. 2002) 
CFSP-based Response: Overview 
 





Principles  & General 
Guidelines* 1 0 0 1 1 3 
 CFSP Declarations 3 9 5 5 11 33 






(CSs) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Common Positions 
(CPs)** 0 2 0 1 2 5 
 Joint Actions (JAs) 0 0 2 1 1 4 
 CFSP Decisions ** 0 3 0 0 0 3 
   16 18 13 22 24 93 
 * The corresponding figure refers to the number of EU summits that addressed matters 
related to the situation in the DR Congo. 
 ** The CPs and Decisions of 8 November 1999 and 15 November 1999 as well as their corresponding 
implementing Decisions are similar to the best of knowledge. My request for clarification from the Council was 
unsuccessful. Consequently, my analysis takes into account only 4 CPs and 2 Decisions. 
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Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (Jan. 2003- Dec. 2009) 
In line with insights from Conflict Resolution, the stage here considered as of 
Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (PCSPB) in the DR Congo started in 
January 2003 and ended in December 2009. The start date marked the 
immediate aftermath of the signing, on 17 December 2002, of the afore-cited 
Global and Inclusive Agreement (GIA). That formally put an end to the war 
and lay the terms and conditions for a transition to multi-party democracy. 
The end-date refers to the first 10th anniversary of the ESDP and the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty which among other things suppressed the 
pillar structure of the EU, substantially reduced the policy making instruments 
of the CFSP, and renamed and upgraded the ESDP to the status of 
‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ (CSDP). I offer arguments for the 
timeframe of this research in the first chapter. Major developments in the 
formal post-conflict settlement period in the country included the following: 
 Formal endorsement of the Global and Inclusive Agreement by the parties 
to the conflict and the signing of a transitional constitution (April 2003);  
 Establishment of transitional institutions (June - August 2003);  
 Launching and conduct of the five civilian and military operations of the 
EU in the country since 2003 onwards;  
 Holding, in July 2006, of the first free and democratic general elections in 
the country since the early 1960s and the resulting end of the transition in 
December 2006;  
 Perpetuation of unofficial deadly war in the country’s eastern provinces;  
 Indictment, arrests, and trials of some individuals on charges of mass 
atrocity crimes committed in eastern DR Congo; and  
 Visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Goma (capital of North 
Kivu) in August 2009. 
Needs and Challenges 
The major needs and challenges for the DR Congo during this period were 
not different from those the country had been confronted with since the 
beginning of the First Congo War. They still were about the will and capacity 
of the leaders of the country to effectively prevent and end military 
campaigns, constant gross violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, and the massive plundering of the country’s wealth by 
foreign country troops and their local proxies. The authorities had also to 
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provide security for all, in particular defenceless and threatened civilians, and 
ensure humanitarian, social and psychological assistance reach internally 
displaced peoples, refugees, and other impoverished groups. Finally, the 
new leaders had to deliver justice and put an end to impunity; promote unity 
and reconciliation; introduce and nurture a democratic culture; and sow the 
seeds of a prosperous nation economically, socially, and culturally. Overall, 
meeting successfully these needs and challenges required bringing about 
good governance for which the EU established, in 2001, the following five 
principles: Openness, Participation, Accountability, Effectiveness, and 
Coherence (European Commission 2001: 10). These features are not 
significantly different from the eight key features that the UN attributes to the 
concept: Participation; Rule of law; Transparency; Responsiveness; 
Consensus; Equity and inclusiveness; Effectiveness and efficiency; and 
Accountability (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (UNESCAP) 2012). 
 
UNESCAP (2012: 3). 
Conceivably, the most urgent tasks and challenges were three. The first one 
was the provision of (physical) security and integrity for all, in particular the 
defenceless and vulnerable groups, including refugees and internationally 
displaced persons. The second pressing task was to ensure the provision of 
basic humanitarian aid (medicine, potable water, food, shelter, cloth, and 
sanitation facilities) and psychosocial assistance to those in desperate need 
of such help. The third compelling priority was the end to the unofficial war 
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and related gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law in the 
most afflicted part of the country: its eastern provinces. Indeed, only three 
months into the phase of Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding, Amnesty 
International for example publicly denounced economic exploitation and 
gross human rights abuses in eastern DR Congo in these words:  
For the last four and half years Rwanda, Uganda and their Congolese allies have 
systematically plundered eastern DRC’s natural wealth on a vast scale causing, 
directly or indirectly, the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Congolese civilians. In 
spite of numerous peace agreements, the killing continues, while the international 
community looks on (Amnesty International 2003a: 1).  
In particular, the organisation alerted of “one of the world’s gravest 
humanitarian and human rights crises” taking place in the Ituri region of 
north-eastern DR Congo where about 50,000 people had died “as a result of 
armed conflict in the region and more than 500,000 people displaced since 
mid-1999.” (Amnesty International 2003a: 1). In 2003, the number of people 
internally displaced by war in the DR Congo was estimated 3.4 million 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2006: 8). Amnesty 
International (2003) also denounced the systematic rape of women and use 
of child soldiers some of whom were under the age of seven. At that same 
time, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Ms. 
Motoc, too denounced a tragic situation of human rights in the DR Congo due 
to the continuation of the armed conflicts, unfair trials and summary 
executions, harsh repression against human rights defenders, denial of the 
freedom of expression and association, plundering of natural resources of the 
country, and endemic impunity. She sounded the alarm concerning the 
population in the most affected eastern provinces in these terms:  
Given their magnitude, the violations of human rights and humanitarian law, 
notably as regards the protection of civilians, the phenomenon of child soldiers and 
the sexual violence against women and children, may be characterized as crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. The atrocities committed in the east of the 
country have reached unprecedented levels. The humanitarian situation is 
catastrophic. (UNECOSOC 2003: 3).  
The Special Rapporteur urged the Congolese authorities to put an end to that 
situation and called on the international community to decisively contribute to 
that end. In particular, the rapporteur asked members of the international 
community to exert sufficient pressure for the enforcement of all international 
instruments, especially concerning the protection of unarmed civilians in 
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immediate danger. Ms. Motoc also demanded them to offer sufficient 
assistance with local capacity-building in the fields of administration of justice 
and the protection of women and children, and especially the victims of 
sexual violence; and to finance effective and meaningful actions to end 
impunity (UNECOSOC 2003: 17). 
Despite these and other similar calls for swift and need-tailored action by 
both the Congolese government and members of the international 
community, including the EU, perpetration of mass atrocities continued 
unabated throughout the seven-year period of Post-Conflict Settlement 
Peacebuilding (PCSPB) under consideration. In early 2006, three years into 
the PCSPB process and one year after UN member states had unanimously 
and solemnly committed themselves to never again fail their individual and 
collective ‘Responsibility to Protect (RtoP/R2P)’ populations against mass 
atrocity crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
genocide) (UN General Assembly 2005: 30, para. 139), a group of over ten 
international and Congolese human rights, environmental and aid 
organisations, for the nth time, called for an end to the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources and related gross violations of human rights (HRW 2006b). 
Citing various investigation reports, including the final report of the UN Panel 
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Congo 
(S/2002/1146), the group underlined that belligerents involved in the 
plundering of the mineral and economic wealth of the DR Congo “used some 
of their profits to finance further military operations that often involved 
widespread human rights abuses against civilians and violations of 
international humanitarian law.” The group also recalled that by then (2006), 
war had “caused the deaths of four million people in Congo, the highest 
death toll in terms of civilian lives since World War II.” (HRW 2006b: 2). The 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2006: 8) too blew the whistle, 
stressing that since October 2005 when there were about 1.5 million of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in DR Congo, some 40 thousand people 
had been fleeing their home every month as a result of fighting in eastern DR 
Congo. Later that same year, HRW (2006a: 1) once again denounced that 
the death of “more than 1,200 civilians” per day in the DR Congo as a result 
of violence, lack of medical care, and hunger was going mostly unnoticed by 
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the international community. That same year (2006), the report of the UN-
appointed human rights expert Mr. Titinga Frédéric Pacéré could not be more 
alarming: 
The human rights situation remains worrying, particularly in the eastern part of the 
country and in northern Katanga, where national and foreign militias, as well as the 
Mai-Mai and the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are 
committing atrocities and other massive human rights violations with impunity. 
Massacres of civilians, looting, mass rapes of women and girls and summary 
executions, among other things, are posing a serious challenge to the Transitional 
Government’s efforts to improve the situation. (UN General Assembly 2006: 2). 
He too urged the international community to provide the Congolese 
government with all the necessary attention and support for enabling the 
Congolese government and actors on the ground such as the UN force and 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to redress the 
situation. However, three years later (2009) and seven years into post-
conflict settlement peacebuilding, the pattern of mass violence and gross 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law remained 
unchanged. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported 
continuing armed conflict in eastern DR Congo and the resulting massive 
human rights violations in North Kivu and unprecedented attacks against 
civilians in Oriental Province. Outside the specific armed conflict in the 
eastern part of the country, the Commissioner reported generalised impunity, 
sexual violence, increasing political repression, as well as arbitrary arrests, 
torture, and appalling detention conditions (UN General Assembly 2009). 
CFSP-based Response 
Throughout the phase of Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (PCSPB), 
the EU had the same CFSP instruments as during the preceding stage of 
Conflict Management (CM). Non-legal binding or exclusively political 
instruments for foreign policymaking were Principles and General Guidelines, 
CFSP Declarations, and Demarches. The legally binding, politico-legal ones 
were Common Strategy, Common Position, Joint Action, and Decision. I shall 
now determine if, when, and how any of these instruments was used to 
progress transition from war to lasting positive peace in the DR Congo during 
the chosen timeframe (January 2003 – December 2009). 
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Non-Legally Binding Decisions and Actions 
During the 7-years of PCSPB in the DR Congo under review, the European 
Council held twenty-eight summits. Nine of those meetings adopted 
Principles and General Guidelines on the situation in that country and or in 
its region. The first three of the nine summits were held in 2003, one year 
after the signing (in December 2002) of the General and Inclusive Peace 
Agreement, two in 2004 and 2006 each, and one meeting in 2005 and 2007 
(European Council 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). 
  
Second Congo War: Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (Jan. 2003 - 
Dec. 2009)  
CFSP-Based Response: Principles and General Guidelines 
 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Total EU Summits 5 4 3 3 3 5 5 28 
EU Summits with 
reference to DR 
Congo/ Great Lakes 
Region (GLR) 
3 2 1 2 1 0 0 9 
The main substance of the Principles and General Guidelines adopted on the 
DR Congo at the nine summits can be summarised in the following points: 
 Expression of EU concern about and condemnation of gross human and 
humanitarian law violations, including mass atrocity crimes; 
 EU call for rapid disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-
combatants, and for the establishment of a unified, integrated army and 
police in the DR Congo; 
 EU call upon all neighbouring countries, in particular Rwanda, to support 
the peace process in the DR Congo; 
 Deployment of EU’s civil and military operations to support the transition 
and post-transition peace process in the DR Congo; 
 Requirement for EU future assistance to the DR: new authorities' strong 
commitment to good governance and to the strengthening of the rule of 
law; and 
 Multilateralism: close cooperation between the EU, the UN, and other key 
actors on conflict prevention, crisis management, and peacebuilding in 
the DR Congo, its region, and the whole Africa. 
Besides, the EU issued twenty-seven CFSP Declarations by which it 
varyingly expressed its commitment, its satisfaction, its deception, and its 
concern about the developments in the DR Congo and or in the region. For 
instance, in a declaration issued on 9 April 2003 (Press: 113 Nr: 8300/03), 
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the Union “welcome[d] the conclusion of the inter-Congolese dialogue in Sun 
City, South Africa on 2 April 2003 as a further significant step towards lasting 
peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the whole Great Lakes 
Region." Five days later, the EU issued another declaration (Press: 115 Nr: 
8433/03), strongly condemning “the acts of military aggression in and around 
Drodro, in the Ituri Region, in the North-Eastern part of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which culminated in the massacre of hundreds of 
civilians”; and expressed “serious concern about the grave humanitarian  
consequences  for  the  Congolese  population.” Some five months later, the 
EU restated, in a CFSP statement (Press: 301 Nr: 13526/03), its firm 
condemnation of the renewed massacres in Ituri on Monday 6 October 2003, 
in the village of Katchele. Likewise, on 4 June 2004, the EU issued a public 
statement (Press: 191 Nr: 10151/04), strongly condemning the violence in 
Bukavu and the ensuing deaths of innocent civilians. In another instance (18 
March 2004), the EU indicated that it remained “firmly committed to peace 
and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the entire Great 
Lakes region in general." (Press: 78 Nr: 7376/04). Roughly, about two thirds 
of the twenty-seven declarations concerned the instability, violence, killing 
and displacement of civilians in the eastern part of the country, violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law, and delays in the implementation of the 
peace accords. 
Second Congo War: Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (Jan. 2003 - Dec. 
2009) 
 
CFSP-based Response: Declarations   
Issue-areas addressed 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
Violence and killing of 
civilians, particularly in 
eastern DR Congo. 
3* 3 0 0 2 3 3 14 
Violations of human 
rights and humanitarian 
law; justice; and rule of 
law in DR Congo. 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Peace and political 
transition process in DR 
Congo. 
2 1 2 1 0 0 0 6 
Peace and stability in the 
Great Lakes Region. 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 6 5 3 2 4 4 3 27 
* Refers to the number of CFSP Declarations that addressed the corresponding area-issue. 
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On the other hand, the EU undertook at least twenty-eight CFSP 
Demarches in response to Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding needs 
and challenges in the DR Congo. The majority of them were undertaken in 
2003 and 2004, twelve and eight respectively.  
Second Congo War: Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (Jan. 2003- Dec. 
2009) 
 
CFSP-based Response: Demarches  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
CFSP Demarches with 
reference to DR 
Congo/ Great Lakes 
Region 
12 8 3 0 1 2 2 28 
         
The twelve Demarches undertaken in the course of 2003 (Council 2004) 
covered various area-issues such as the fighting and humanitarian 
emergency in Ituri (three times), capital punishment (two times), and support 
for EU’s initiatives at the 59th session of the UN Commission for Human 
Rights (CHR). They also addressed the entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the universality of the CWC 
(Chemical Weapons Convention), bilateral non-surrender agreements of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the safety and security of radioactive 
sources. Only two Demarches out of the twelve were conducted with the 
authorities of other countries (Rwanda and Uganda) than those of the DR 
Congo. Demarches undertaken with Rwanda and Uganda concerned the 
then catastrophic situation in Ituri. The eight Demarches carried out the 
following year (2004) (Council 2005b) also covered various issues such as 
the situation in eastern DR Congo and in the Great Lakes Region, the status 
of implementing the legislation accompanying the ratification of the Rome 
Statute (on ICC), and the human rights in various countries, notably DR 
Congo, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. They were undertaken with authorities of DR 
Congo, Burundi, Uganda, and Congo. The remaining eight Demarches were 
undertaken solely with DR Congo and addressed issues such as; children in 
an armed conflict, political assassinations in the country, EU guidelines on 
torture, and International Criminal Court (ICC). 
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Legally Binding Decisions and Actions 
Like under any previous phase of the two wars, the EU did not adopt any 
CFSP Common Strategy in response to the needs and challenges of post-
conflict settlement peacebuilding following the Second Congo War. Instead, it 
took a significant number of Common Positions (CPs), Joint Actions (JAs), 
and CFSP Decisions. The Union adopted nine Common Positions in 
relation to the DR Congo and or Great Lakes Region: two CPs in 2003, 2005, 
and 2008 per each year and 1 per year in 2006, 2007, and 2009. All the nine 
CPs either amended or repealed previous CPs on three themes: (i) EU 
support for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the 
peace process in the DR Congo (2 CPs); (ii) EU’s restrictive measures 
against that country (6 CPs); and (iii) the supply of certain equipment into that 
country (1 CP). 
Second Congo War: Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (Jan. 2003 - Dec. 2009) 
CFSP-based Response: Common Positions (CPs) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   
Total CPs on Zaire / DR Congo 2 0 2 1 1 2 1 9 
Main themes/ issues re DRC/ 
GLR: 
                
EU support for the 
implementation of the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement and the 
peace process in the DR Congo 
(DRC). 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
EU exceptions to the arms 
embargo decided in April 1993 
against DR Congo. 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
EU restrictive measures against 
the DR Congo.  
0 0 1 1 1 2 1 6 
 
2 0 2 1 1 2 1 9 
 
 
EU support to Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and Peace Process 
By means of the two CPs on the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the peace 
process, the EU committed itself to support action taken by the United 
Nations and the African Union, and to cooperate closely with these 
organisations and other relevant actors of the international community in the 
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implementation of that ceasefire and the various related peace agreements 
and relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) (CP 
2003/319/CFSP, art. 2). The Union pledged that, in its cooperation with the 
countries in the region involved in the Congolese crisis, it would “take 
account of the efforts made by the latter to implement the ceasefire and 
peace agreements and [the relevant] UNSCRs (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 10). 
The EU “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the atrocities […] committed in 
the east of the country, particularly in the Ituri region”, and called for those 
responsible to be brought to justice (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 7). The Union 
“recall[ed] that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is 
applicable to all acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed on DRC territory after the statute's entry into force (1 July 2002)” 
(CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 7). The EU undertook to “urge the complete 
withdrawal of foreign troops from the Ituri region, as well as increased 
DDRRR, the full implementation of MONUC's mandate, and peace-building 
efforts, which are vital in order to reach a degree of stability in Ituri and the 
Kivus.” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 7). The Union committed itself to “call upon 
the Governments of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda to use all their influence 
to bring an end to the tension and to work towards ensuring that conditions 
exist in the Ituri region which will allow the Luanda Agreement (September 
2002) to be successfully implemented.” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 7). On the 
other hand, the EU “condemn[ed] the illegal exploitation of natural resources, 
which represents one of the causes and consequences of four years of war, 
as well as a factor that fuels prolonged conflict, according to the recent UN 
report of the panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
and other forms of wealth of the DRC.” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 8). The 
Union “call[ed] on all States to draw the appropriate consequences from the 
findings of the panel and [...] on all states concerned to take the necessary 
measures.” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 8). The Union pledged its support to 
“the action agreed in UNSCR 1457 (2003), which should help bring to an end 
such exploitation” and its readiness “to cooperate with the panel to fulfil its 
new mandate.” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 8). 
Besides, the Union reaffirmed “its willingness to support the transition, as 
soon as its institutions [were] in place, with projects that [were] designed in 
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particular to promote aid to the population, the strengthening of state 
structures, the economic reconstruction of the country and DDRRR projects.” 
(CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 6). In this respect, the EU underlined “the 
importance of adhering to the agreements between the DRC and the 
international financial institutions, especially the agreement concerning the 
poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) between the government of the 
DRC and the International Monetary Fund.” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 6). The 
Union also pledged to “ensure [...] an appropriate level of development and 
humanitarian aid to the DRC” and to “lend its support to the transitional 
Government for the reconstruction and development of the country, ensuring 
that such support benefits all the Congolese people and all the regions of the 
DRC, and that it contribute[d] dynamically and proactively to the peace 
process by promoting the restoration of the Congolese State, good 
governance, an improvement in the economic situation and respect for 
human rights.” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 9). Furthermore, the EU committed 
itself to continue its support to “the Burundi peace process based on the 
Arusha Agreement” the success of which, it believed, was “linked to the 
solution of the Congolese crisis and which in itself could promote peace and 
stability in the Great Lakes Region.” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, art. 11). In this 
regard, the Union pledged to support “the holding of an international 
conference on peace, security, democracy and development in the Great 
Lakes Region once progress in the Lusaka and Arusha peace processes so 
allow[ed] and the countries concerned so decide[d].” (CP 2003/319/CFSP, 
art. 11). 
EU arms embargo against the DR Congo 
During the period under review, the EU adopted one CP (2003/680/CFSP) 
amending Common Position 2002/829/CFSP on the arms embargo against 
the DR Congo in order to bring it in line with UN Security Council Resolution 
1493 (2003) of 28 July 2003. The latter, adopted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, imposed an arms embargo and embargo on 
any assistance, advice or training related to military activities, to all foreign 
and Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the territory of North 
and South Kivu and of Ituri, and to groups not party to the Global and All-
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inclusive Agreement, in the DR Congo (UNSCR 1493 (2003), para. 20). 
Exemptions were allowed for supplies to the UN mission (MONUC) in that 
country, the Interim Emergency Multinational Force deployed in Bunia and 
the integrated Congolese national army and police forces; as well as to 
supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or 
protective use, and related technical assistance and training as notified in 
advance to the Secretary-General through its Special Representative 
(UNSCR 1493(2003), para. 21). Accordingly, the new Common Position, 
adopted two months after the adoption of UNSCR 1493(2003), committed the 
Union and its Member States to prohibit “direct or indirect supply, sale or 
transfer of arms and any related material of all types, including weapons and 
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and 
spare parts for the aforementioned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States, or 
using their flag vessels or aircraft, [...] whether originating or not in their 
territories.” (CP 2003/680/CFSP, art. 1(1)). This prohibition also applied to 
“direct or indirect provision to any person, entity or body in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo of any assistance (including financing and financial 
assistance), advice or training related to military activities, including in 
particular technical training and assistance related to the provision, 
manufacture, maintenance or use of the items mentioned in subparagraph 
(a), by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States” 
(2003/680/CFSP, art. 1(2)). As under the UNSCR 1493 (2003), this Common 
Position allowed exemptions for (a) the supply, sale or transfer of any of the 
aforementioned items to the United Nations Organisation Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the integrated Congolese national army 
and police forces and for (b) “the supply, sale or transfer of non-lethal military 
equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, or the provision 
of assistance and training related to such non-lethal equipment, provided that 
such supply or provision is notified in advance to the UN Secretary-General 
through its Special Representative.” (CP 2003/680/CFSP, art. 1 (2)). 
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EU restrictive measures against the DR Congo 
The EU adopted six CPs concerning restrictive measures against the DR 
Congo during the post-conflict settlement peacebuilding period under review. 
The first CP (2005/440/CFSP) was adopted on 13 June 2005. It repealed the 
aforementioned CP 2002/829/CFSP on the arms embargo against the DR 
Congo in order to integrate, in one single legal document, its provisions and 
those of UN Security Council Resolution 1596 (2005). Hence, in addition to 
the aforementioned prohibitions, the new CP banned the grant, sell, supply or 
transfer technical assistance, brokering services and other services related to 
military activities and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of 
arms and related materiel of all types directly or indirectly to any person, 
entity or body in, or for use in the DR Congo (CP 2005/440/CFSP, art. 1(2)). 
The revised prohibition also applied to the provision of “financing or financial 
assistance related to military activities, including in particular grants, loans 
and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of arms 
and related materiel, or for any grant, sale, supply, or transfer of related 
technical assistance, brokering services and other services, directly or 
indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in the DRC.” (CP 
2005/440/CFSP, art. 1(2)). Exemptions were allowed for units of the army 
and police of the DR Congo, provided that the said units (i) had completed 
the process of their integration; or (ii) operated under the command, 
respectively, of the ‘état-major intégré’ of the Armed Forces or of the National 
Police of the DR Congo; or (iii) were in the process of their integration, in the 
territory of the DRC outside the provinces of North and South Kivu and the 
Ituri district. Exemptions were also allowed for the supplies for humanitarian 
or protective use and for the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC 
(‘MONUC’), if such supplies were notified in advance to the Sanctions 
Committee (CP 2005/440/CFSP, art. 2(c)). 
On the other hand, the new CP imposed, in line with the provisions of 
UNSCR 1596 (2005), restrictive measures against those persons whom the 
UN Sanctions Committee would designate as acting in violation of the arms 
embargo (CP 2005/440/CFSP, art. 3). The Union and its Member States 
bound themselves to freeze all funds, other financial assets and economic 
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resources owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons or held 
by entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons or by 
any persons acting on their behalf or at their direction (CP 2005/440/CFSP, 
art. 5). Common Position 2005/440/CFSP was subsequently amended three 
times (by CPs 2006/624/CFSP, 2007/654/CFSP, 2008/179/CFSP) before 
being repealed on 14 May 2008 by CP 2008/369/CFSP which was on its turn 
amended by CP 2009/66/CFSP of 26 January 2009. The amendments and 
repeal aimed to bring its provisions in harmony with the relevant Security 
Council Resolutions (UNSCR 1649 (2005), UNSCR 1698 (2006), UNSCR 
1768 (2007), UNSCR 1771 (2007), UNSCR 1771 (2007), UNSCR1799 
(2008), UNSCR 1807 (2008), UNSCR 1857 (2008)) on arms embargo and 
restrictive measures against UN-identified spoilers of the peace process in 
the DR Congo and the GLR.  
Joint Actions (JAs) 
The European Union adopted thirty-one (31) Joint Actions in response to 
the aforementioned needs and challenges of post-conflict settlement 
peacebuilding in the DR Congo. Two of those JAs concerned respectively the 
launching and conduct of EU’s first military operation (code-named 
ARTEMIS) in the DR Congo (JA 2003/423/CFSP) and EU support to the 
creation of the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in DR Congo (JA 
2004/494/CFSP). Nine Joint Actions addressed the question of the EU 
Special Representative to the Great Lakes Region; whereas the EU support 
to the security sector reform (SSR) in DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) was 
object of eight JAs. The EU police mission in the country’s capital Kinshasa 
(EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’) and the Union’s police mission in the whole country 
(EUPOL RD Congo) were object of five JAs, each. Finally, two Joint Actions 
concerned the EU’s second military operation (EUFOR RD Congo) that was 






 Second Congo War: Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (Jan. 2003 - 
Dec. 2009) 
  CFSP-based response: Joint Actions 31 
   2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   
EU military operation in DR 
Congo (ARTEMIS). 
1* 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
EU Special Representative for 
the African Great Lakes 
Region. 
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 9 
EU support to Integrated 
Police Unit (IPU) in DR 
Congo.  
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa 
(EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’). 
0 1 1 3 0 0 0 5 
EU Police Mission in DR 
Congo (EUPOL RD Congo). 
0 0 0 0 2 1 2 5 
EU support to SSR in DR 
Congo (EUSEC RD Congo). 
0 0 2 1 2 1 2 8 
EU military operation (EUFOR 
RD Congo). 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
 
3 3 5 6 6 3 5 31 
 Number of JAs that particularly addressed the corresponding area-issue. 
EU military operation in DR Congo (Operation ARTEMIS) 
Operation ARTEMIS was the first military operation of the EU outside 
Europe, in Africa, and in the DR Congo. It was decided by way of Joint Action 
2003/423/CFSP that the Council adopted on 5 June 2003, following a 
request of UN Secretary General to the EU for assistance in order to enforce 
the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003) (UNSCR 
1484 (2003)) of 30 May 2003. For a background, during the Second Congo 
War, Uganda’s troops intervened on the side of some Congolese armed 
movements (MLC, UDC, DCR-ML) operating from north-eastern DR Congo 
against the central government. In early 2003, Ugandan troops started to 
leave that province (ITURI) in compliance with an agreement between the 
governments of the two countries in the framework of the General and 
Inclusive Agreement signed on 17 December 2002. As Ugandan troops were 
leaving Ituri, fighting for controlling power and resources and for settling 
scores rapidly erupted and intensified between local armed groups along 
ethnic and tribal lines (Lendu vs. Hema) as from February 2003 onwards 
(Helly 2009: 182). Despite the deployment of some 700 UN peacekeeping 
troops in the framework of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC: Mission de l’Organisation des 
Nations Unies au Congo, in French), the violence intensified, causing the 
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death of tens of thousands civilians and the displacement of at least half a 
million persons (Amnesty International 2003d). Until more UN troops could 
be deployed on the ground, the UN Security Council decided to dispatch to 
the region an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) that France 
accepted to lead upon request of the UN Secretary General. To that end and 
on the initiative of France, the EU decided, through the adoption of JA 
2003/423/CFSP, to launch operation ARTEMIS in the framework of the 
ESDP. 
Operation ARTEMIS 
Aim To contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the 
improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia. 
Headquarters Paris (OHQ) and Entebbe (FHQ) 
Starting date 12 June 2003 
Ending date 1 September 2003 
Strength  Ca 2000 troops 
Budget EUR7 million 
Contributors 14 EU Member States + Brazil, Canada, and South Africa. 
Source: Helly (2009: 181). 
Operation ARTEMIS had three objectives as per UN Security Council 
Resolution 1484 (2003). The first one was to help stabilise the security 
conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in BUNIA, the provincial 
capital of Ituri. Secondly, ARTEMIS had to ensure the protection of the airport 
and of internally displaced persons in the camps of Bunia. The third task was 
to contribute, if the situation so required, to the safety of the civilian 
population, United Nations personnel, and the humanitarian presence in the 
town. The mission lasted three months (12 June - 1 September 2003) during 
which period it succeeded in halting the massacres and in restoring stability 
in the town of Bunia and its surrounding (Ajello 2010: 155-157; Helly 2009: 
183-184). 
EU Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region 
The EU adopted nine Joint Actions concerning the EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) to the Great Lakes Region during the post-war 
rebuilding period under scrutiny. It approved two per year in 2003 and 2005 
and 1 per year in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. All of them concerned 
the extension and or amendment of the mandate of the EUSR to the region 
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in accordance with changes on the ground. The core of the mandate 
remained to contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives of the 
Union in the region. Those objectives were essentially three. The first one 
was to ensure an active and efficient contribution of the EU to a final 
settlement of the transition in the DR Congo, in Burundi, and to security, 
political, and economic developments in the whole region. The second 
objective was the development and implementation of a consistent, 
sustainable and responsible policy of the EU in the African Great Lakes. The 
third one was to ensure continued presence of the European Union on the 
ground and in relevant international fora, staying in touch with key players, 
and contribution to crisis management. Mr. Aldo AJello (Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the UN Operation 
in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 1992-94) occupied the EUSR post for the 
African Great Lakes Region since its creation in March 1996 (JA 
96/250/CFSP) until his resignation and his replacement by Mr Roeland VAN 
DE GEER (Dutch) as from 1 March 2007 onwards (JA 2007/112/CFSP). 
EU support to Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in DR Congo 
The creation of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in the DR Congo was 
provided for in the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the transition in the 
country, signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, and the Memorandum on 
Security and the Army of 29 June 2003. The essential task of the Unit was to 
ensure the protection of the State institutions and to reinforce the internal 
security apparatus. The creation of the unit involved the training of 1008 
Congolese police personnel with a view to scaling up the neutral force made 
available by the UN mission (MONUC) there to guarantee the security of the 
government and transitional institutions. The EU decision to support the 
actual implementation of this provision was taken by means of Joint Action 
2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004. In addition to the activities funded by the 
European Development Fund, the Union and its Member States committed 
themselves to “contribute with funds and/or contributions in kind to provide 
the government of the DRC with the law enforcement equipment, arms and 
ammunition […], including transport costs to Kinshasa where relevant, 
identified as necessary for the establishment of the IPU.” (JA 
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2004/494/CFSP, art. 1 (2)). The rationale behind the EU’s joint action in 
favour of the IPU  was that the then “security situation in the DRC could 
deteriorate with potentially serious repercussions on the process of 
strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and international and regional 
security”; and that a “commitment of EU political effort and resources [would] 
help to embed stability in the region.” (JA 2004/494/CFSP, Preamble (7)). 
More importantly, this Joint Action was adopted in response to a request for 
assistance from the UN Secretary General (UNSCR 1493 (2003)) and from 
the RD Congo’s Government of National Unity and Transition put in place on 
30 June 2003 following the promulgation, on 4 April 2003, of the Country’s 
Transitional Constitution. 
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’) 
The European Union Police Mission (EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’) was established by 
means of Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP adopted on 9 December 2004. It was 
the EU's first police mission in Africa. It lasted two years (12 April 2005 - 
June 2007) and was replaced by EUPOL DR Congo in July 2007. Its 
mandate was two-fold. Firstly, it had to help with the establishment and 
running of the Congolese National Police's Integrated Police Unit in the 
capital Kinshasa, responsible for the protection of state leaders and 
institutions. Secondly, EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ had to mentor and advise on the 
reform and reorganisation of the Congolese National Police (JA 
2004/847/CFSP, art. 1).  
EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ (JA 2004/847/CFSP) 
Aim   Support the creation and management of the Congolese 
National Police's Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in the capital 
Kinshasa, responsible for the protection of state institutions.  
 Advise on the reform and reorganisation of the Congolese 
National Police, in line with international police best practices. 
Headquarters Kinshasa: capital of DR Congo 
Starting date 12 April 2005 
End of mandate 30 June 2007 
Staff 30 international staff 
  Mission budget EUR4.3 million. 
Contributing States 6 EU Member States + Canada and Turkey. 
Source: Council (2005a, 2006a, 2012d). 
 235 
 
In particular, EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ was “to monitor, mentor, and advise the 
setting up and the initial running of the IPU in order to ensure that the IPU 
acts following the training received in the Academy Centre and according to 
international best practices in this field.” (JA 2004/847/CFSP, art. 3) In light of 
developments on the ground, the Joint Action (2004/847/CFSP) establishing 
EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ was subsequently amended and extended four times (JAs 
2005/822/CFSP; 2006/300/CFSP, 2006/868/CFSP; 2006/913/CFSP) until the 
end of the mission on 30 June 2007. Hence, the last amendment provided for 
the increase of the advisory role of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ with the Congolese 
police in order to facilitate, in liaison with the mission ‘EUSEC RD Congo’, the 
process of security sector reform in the DRC (JA 2007/405/CFSP, Preamble 
(7)). The strength of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ was, at its peak, 30 personnel. 
According to various accounts, EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ made a difference 
because it helped the National Police of the DR Congo keep order during the 
country’s transition to democracy, particularly during the preparation and 
running of the country’s first democratic general elections in 2006. In 
particular, the Mission “assisted the police (the IPU) in improving its capacity 
to deal with mass demonstrations and street protests”; which “proved to be 
very useful during several political rallies and demonstrations during the 
electoral campaign.” (Vircoulon 2009: 225). The Mission “was also involved 
in the preparatory work for the reform of the Congolese police together with 
Member States (the UK and France), Angola and South Africa and the 
European Commission” and the UN police mission there (UNPOL). The 
result of that work was “the guidelines of the reform and the draft organic law 
in 2006” (Vircoulon 2009: 225).  
Martin (2010: 66) points out that thanks to the training programme organised 
by the EUPOL Kinshasa, the IPU “underwent human rights awareness 
provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross.” She too values 
positively the participation of EUPOL Kinshasa’, after the 2006 elections, in 
“a multilateral think-tank/ working group to reform the CNP” with a view to 
implementing “a more wide-ranging programme of reorganisation and 
development of the police able to reinforce reforms in the security sector as a 
whole.” (Martin 2010: 66-67). She underlined that, “In terms of human 
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security, EUPOL Kinshasa’s work on the CNP [Congolese National Police] 
represented a more significant impact on sustainable peace in the DRC than 
assistance to the IPU [Integrated Police Unit].” Martin recalls that, “Prior to 
2004 there was no police force for public order, and crowd control was an 
instrument of violence undertaken by armed forces.” (Martin 2010: 67). For 
the EU Special Envoy/Representative for the region at the time, EUPOL 
Kinshasa, despite its limited financial and limited resources, “has been a 
success. The police were well trained and the part of the project executed by 
the Council represented a major innovation. After the formation and training, 
we did not leave the integrated police unit to cope alone as is usual. We 
continued to follow and assist them and be assured that the police officers 
correctly apply what they had learned during the training.” (Ajello 2010: 169). 
As developed below, the takeover was assumed by another police mission, 
‘EUPOL RD Congo’, which this time covered the whole territory of the 
country. 
EU Police Mission in DR Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) 
The EU Police Mission for the DR Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) was decided 
on 12 June 2007 by means of Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP) and launched on 
1 July 2007, in order to follow on EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’. The internal objective 
was to develop “an overall EU approach to security sector reform [SSR].” The 
external aim was to contribute “to Congolese efforts to reform and restructure 
the National Congolese Police (PNC) and its interaction with the judicial 
system”, by means of monitoring, mentoring, and advisory action (JA 
2007/405/CFSP, art. 1). That entailed the four specific objectives  the first 
one of which was to support the setting up of a viable, professional and multi-
ethnic/integrated police force, which takes account of the importance of 
proximity policing throughout the whole country with the direct involvement of 
the Congolese authorities in that process. Secondly, EUPOL RD Congo has 
specifically to contribute to improving interaction between the police and the 
criminal justice system in the broader sense. Its third specific task was to 
help ensure the consistency of all SSR efforts. Fourthly, the Mission had to 
operate in close interaction with another EU mission in the country, EUSEC 
RD Congo, and the projects of the Commission, and coordinate its action 
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with the other international efforts in the field of reform of the police and the 
criminal justice system (JA 2007/405/CFSP, art. 2). 
Besides, EUPOL RD Congo had also to advise the EU Member States and 
third States, and to coordinate and facilitate, under their responsibility, the 
implementation of their projects in fields of interest to the mission and in 
furtherance of its objectives. The financial reference amount to cover 
expenditure relating to the mission was established at EUR5.500.000 (JA 
2007/405/CFSP, art. 9). The Council and the Commission were responsible 
for the coordination and consistency of the activities undertaken through 
EUPOL RD Congo with the Community's external activities. The Head of 
EUPOL DR Congo was mandated to cooperate with the other international 
players present, in particular MONUC and the third States involved in the DR 
Congo (JA 2007/405/CFSP, art. 11). Initially, this Joint Action was to apply 
from 1 July 2007 until 30 June 2008. Yet in light of the changes on the 
ground, it was amended and extended four times: once in 2007 
(JA2008/38/CFSP) and 2008 (2008/485/CFSP), and twice in 2009 
(2009/466/CFSP and 2009/769/CFSP). At the writing of this dissertation 
(2012), its mandate was due to end on 30 September 2012 (Decision 
2011/537/CFSP). As of early 2012, EUPOL RD Congo was strong of 50 
international staff, with eight contributing Member States of the EU and a 
headquarters still Kinshasa, the capital of the DR Congo. 
EUPOL RD Congo 
Aim To support, by means of monitoring, mentoring, 
and advisory action, Congolese efforts to reform 
and restructure the National Congolese Police 






Starting date  
 
1 July 2007  
 
End of mandate (as per COUNCIL 
Decision 2011/537/CFSP)  
 




50 international staff 
 
Contributing States    8 EU Member States 
Source: Council (2012d). 
 
According to various assessments, EUPOL DR Congo contributed to the 
reform and restructuring of the Congolese security forces through its support 
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to three institutions: the Police Reform Monitoring Committee (CSRP), the 
General Inspection of the Congolese police (IG-PNC) and the General 
Commissariat of the Congolese police (CG-PNC). Vircoulon (2009: 226) 
positively values the mission in that it sought “to cover all aspects of police 
reform (legal framework, structures, administration and management, etc.)” 
and tried “to develop more operational and visible activities such as the 
establishment of a research and intervention police unit in Kinshasa (through 
German funding of €500,000), and support to the border police and the police 
inspectorate.” Vircoulon also alleges that EUPOL RD Congo “tried to support 
the peace process in the Eastern Congo that was launched at the beginning 
of 2008, collapsed at the end of 2008, and allegedly re-started after the RDF 
/ FARDC collaboration against the FDLR.” Martin (2010: 67) sustains that it 
“was not until the end of EUPOL Kinshasa and the transfer to EUPOL DR 
Congo that policing issues were seen in terms of fundamental problems of 
security sector reform, rather than a bolt-on to support the election process.” 
In her view, EUPOL was “able to push for an increased role regarding 
security sector reforms with discernible long-term benefits for human 
security.”  
EU support to SSR in DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) 
The EU mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform 
(SSR) in the DR Congo, codenamed EUSEC DR Congo, was established in 
May 2005 by means of Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005. Its 
mandate was to contribute with advice and assistance to the reform, 
integration, and professionalisation of the Congolese armed and security 
forces, with four specific objectives the first one of which was to contribute to 
the integration of the Congolese army. The second specific task was to run 
the "Chain of payments" project; whilst the third was to support the 
Congolese authorities in their efforts to establish a modern, efficient 
administrative structure within the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC). 
Fourthly, EUSEC DR Congo has to assists the Congolese army in the field of 
officer training, logistics, human rights, and civil-military cooperation. The 
Mission had to provide advice and assistance “while taking care to promote 
policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, 
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democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency 
and respect for the rule of law.” (JA 2005/355/CFSP, art. 1(1)). The initial 
duration of the mission was of one year (2 May 2005-2 May 2006) and the 
corresponding financial reference amount to cover expenditure relating to the 
mission was established at EUR 1,600.000 (JA 2005/355/CFSP, art. 9). The 
political control and strategic direction of the mission rested with the Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) under the authority of the Council of the EU 
(JA 2005/355/CFSP, art. 8). Throughout the post-conflict settlement stage 
under review, the legal instrument (JA 2005/355/CFSP) establishing EUSEC 
DR Congo was amended and extended once in 2005 (2005/868/CFSP), 
2006 (JA 2006/303/CFSP), and 2008 (JA 2008/491/CFSP); and twice in 
2007 (JA 2007/192/CFSP, JA 2007/406/CFSP) and in 2009 (JA 
2009/509/CFSP, JA 2009/709/CFSP).  
EUSEC RD Congo 
Headquarters Kinshasa (capital of DR Congo) 
Start date June 2005 
End date (as per 
Council Decision 
2010/565/CFSP) 
21 September 2012 
Mandate Contribute with advice and practical assistance to the 
reform, integration, and professionalisation of the Congolese 
armed forces, with special focus on human rights, 
humanitarian law, good governance, and civil-military 
cooperation. 
Mission strength 51 staff 
Mission budget EUR 13,6 million (2011-2012) 
Contributing states 13 EU Member States + USA 
Source: Council (2012e). 
 
In terms of achievements, the overall results of EUSEC RD Congo appear to 
have been at best mixed including by the standards of EU diplomats. Martin 
(2010: 67) attributes the same merit to it as to EUPOL and EUFOR DR 
Congo, and affirms that “[a]ll the three missions demonstrated aspects of a 
human security approach with their attention to human rights, a display of 
effective multilateralism, and a bottom-up perspective, although in all cases 
this was weak and incidental to their principal mandate.” For the first and 
long-time serving EU Special Envoy / Representative for the region (March 
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1996 - February 2007), Mr. Aldo Ajello, three main factors have prevented 
EUSEC RD Congo from living up to its mandate and to the expectations of all 
concerned: (i) the lack of sufficient human and financial resources; (ii) 
coordination problems; and (iii) political correctness and dogmatic rigidity of 
donors in particular the World Bank. Ayello suggests that the hindrances 
have been particularly felt regarding the formation of the new national army 
and the programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 
(DDR) (Ajello 2010: 170-74). Concerning the first handicap, Ajello affirms that 
from the very start of the mission, EU “Member States have not been able to, 
or rather have not been willing to provide a sufficient number of officers to 
cover all the integrated brigades and the United Nations have been very 
reluctant to provide logistical assistance and security measures to the 
European officers.” (Ajello 2010: 170). In relation to the second disabling 
factor, Ajello indicates that “coordination”, which was in the end entrusted to 
EUSEC RD Congo at least in the capital Kinshasa, “proved more difficult 
than expected” because each of the actors involved, mainly South Africa, 
Angola, Belgium, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, and 
United Sates “wanted to keep its identity and continued to pursue its bilateral 
agenda.” (Ajello 2010: 171). Writing in 2010, only one year after the EU 
authorities had proudly celebrated the ‘successes’ of the ESDP in its first 
decade, including its five operations in the DR Congo, Ajello could not be 
more critical and pessimistic about the unnecessary delays and resulting 
negative consequences:  
It is only in February 2008, when my mandate had expired for nearly a year, that 
the Government managed to approve the model of the new integrated army. But 
the reform of the army remains still to be done. If it took three years to identify a 
model, which has since been modified, one can easily imagine the time required to 
put it in place. Meanwhile the army continues to wreak havoc, especially during 
military operations in the east, for which it is still not properly prepared or 
supported. (Ajello 2010: 171).  
Concerning the third disabling factor, Ajello focuses on the DDR and 
suggests that it has been a “foretold failure” because all donors, including the 
EU and its Member States, entrusted the lead role to the World Bank (WB), 
knowing in advance that its principles and rules of procedure were inherently 
incompatible with the programme. He in particular cites the “sacred principle 
of ‘government ownership’” and the legal impossibility for the WB to deal with 
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armed military, receive them in “orientation centres”, or disarm them. The WB 
could not even “finance the portion of the program which concerned the 
operations of disarmament, even if it was run by someone else.” (Ajello 2010: 
172). Ajello regrets that the European Union that was the main contributor to 
the programme and therefore had the right to offer an alternative to the WB 
did not do so because it “did not want to question the ‘intimidating’ authority 
of the Bank and the dogmatic nature of the principle of ‘government 
ownership’”. He concludes that, “The result has been a waste of money and 
time and a lot of additional suffering to the Congolese people.” (Ajello 2010: 
173).  
EU military operation ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ 
The EU undertook its military operation code-named ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ in 
2006 in support of the UN Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) during the first 
multiparty presidential and legislative elections that had been scheduled to 
take place in summer 2006 in that country. The operation was authorised by 
UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) of 25 April 2006 (UNSCR 1671 
(2006)). The latter was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with the 
rationale that “the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
continue[d] to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region” and because “neither the forces of MONUC [UN force in Congo] nor 
the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would have the 
capacity to contain [it]”. This implies that the two other EU missions, EUPOL 
‘Kinshasa’ and EUSEC RD Congo, that had been operating in the country 
since a year before too would not be capable of properly handling such 
violence. Hence, the Security Council authorised the deployment of EUFOR 
RD Congo “for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of 
the presidential and parliamentary elections”. The resolution authorised the 
EU force “to take all necessary measures, within its means and capabilities, 
to carry out the following tasks” the first one of which was to support MONUC 
to stabilise a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its 
mandate within its existing capabilities. The second main objective was to 
contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the 
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responsibility of the Government of the DR Congo. The third task was to 
contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa; whereas for the fourth one 
consisted of ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the personnel 
as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR RD Congo. Fifthly, 
EUFOR RD Congo had to execute operations of limited character in order to 
extract individuals in danger.  
EUFOR DR Congo, like other EU operations in the country herein discussed, 
was decided in response to the request of the UN and in agreement with the 
authorities of the recipient country. The EU established its own legal basis 
(JA 2006/319/CFSP) for the operation on 27 April 2006, only two days after 
the adoption of UNSCR 1671 (2006). EUFOR DR Congo carried out the UN-
established mandate during the four-month period, from 30 July until 30 
November 2006, excluding the two months for pre-deployment and 
withdrawal. The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUFOR 
DR Congo for a four-month period was established at EUR16700000; 
whereas the overall cost amounted to EUR100 million (Major 2009: 315). In 
terms of military force resources, EUFOR relied on three pools based in three 
different places: an advance deployment troops in Kinshasa (capital of DR 
Congo); an on-call force in the neighbouring country of Gabon; and a 
strategic reserve force in Europe. Together, the three bases made up 4000 
troops 2400 of whom made up the forces based in Kinshasa and Gabon 
(Major 2009: 314). Contributions came from 21 EU Member States and two 
third states (Turkey and Switzerland).  
EUFOR DR Congo 
Mandate 
Support UN mission in DR Congo (MONUC) in ensuring 
security, law, and order during 2006-general elections 
Start date 30 July 2006 
End Date 30 November 2006 
Headquarters 
Kinshasa (DR Congo) and Potsdam (Germany) 
Strength 4000 troops 
Cost EUR100 million 
Contributing countries 





In terms of performance, the overall verdict is that EUFOR DR Congo 
successfully fulfilled its mandate and tasks (Major 2009: 318-322; Rodt 2009: 
213-219; Ajello 2010: 177). Most analysts and observers underlined the way 
it handled the most serious incident of violence during the election that broke 
out in the capital Kinshasa on 20 August 2006 and which caused the death of 
some 23 civilians and soldiers and 43 wounded (Martin 2010: 60). 
Reportedly, not only did the force adequately contain the violence between 
militias loyal to two of the most potential winners of the presidential election, 
but it also contributed to the change of perception among the local population 
who started to see it “a neutral power and credible force” that was well 
prepared and fully determined to secure “a fair electoral process.” (Martin 
2010: 60-1). Martin advances that the force passes the test of human 
security (“defined most simply as individuals’ freedom from want and freedom 
from fear” (Martin 2010: 55)) not only for providing security to all in the capital 
during the election, but also because: 
A human rights agenda was built into the mission from the earliest stage of the 
planning in consultation with the Council’s human rights secretariat and with the 
appointment of a specific human rights advisor to the mission: a gender concept was 
developed, along with a reporting system to monitor human rights issues; training 
was carried out in human rights and gender issues; street patrols took with them a 
human rights monitor and often medical assistance for the local population. (Martin 
2009: 61). 
By most accounts, the most felt shortcoming of the mission was the limited 
scope of its mandate, operational theatre, and duration. Martin (2010: 61) 
rightly recalls that though EUFOR DR Congo “in practice implemented what 
could be called a human security approach”; its “mandate by itself was not 
conducive to protecting human rights, unless protection is viewed in its 
broadest sense as part of the process of supporting democratic elections.” 
Indeed, the mission “had no statutory right to intervene if it witnessed human 
rights abuses; but was reliant on a request for support from MONUC before it 
could intervene.” (Martin 2010: 61). Arguably, the toll of deaths and injured at 
the violent incident of August 2006 might have been avoided or reduced had 
the Mission been given a right of initiative of its own. On the other hand, all 
the activities of the EUFOR DR Congo were concentrated in the country’s 
relatively peaceful capital Kinshasa, very far away from its endemic war-torn 




Source: Council (2006b).   
 
Moreover, the mission was allowed to last four months only, which was a too 
short period in light of the human security needs on the ground. According to 
various sources, some EU Member States, in particular France and Belgium, 
and EU representatives on the ground, called for its extension “as a 
precaution against the danger of riots after [its] withdrawal”. However, 
Germany and parts of the military personnel reportedly opposed such an 
extension (Major 2009: 315). It has been sustained that the concerns of 
Germany, which provided the commander and the operational headquarters 
for the Force, “centred on the risks that German soldiers might incur in the 
DRC and the political exposure the mission represented for a country which 
was still nervous about ‘out of area’ engagements.” (Martin 2010: 58) Hence, 
for political reasons, Germany wanted “to have its troops home by [2006] 
Christmas.” (Martin 2010: 59) Resultantly, the legal basis of EUFOR DR 
Congo was repealed on 27 February 2007 (JA 2007/147/CFSP). 
CFSP Decisions 
During the period of Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding under review 
(January 2003- December 2009), the EU adopted nineteen CFSP 
Decisions that served as legal basis for the definition, implementation, or 
termination of the Common Positions and Joint Actions presented above.  
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EU CFSP Main Aspects and Basic Choices on ZAIRE/ DRC (1994-2009) 
 CFSP DECISIONS 
 SECOND PHASE (1998-2009): SECOND CONGO WAR 25 
 Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (Jan. 2003- Dec.2009) 19 
   2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 EU military operation in 
DR Congo (ARTEMIS). 5* 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
EU Police Mission in 
Kinshasa (EUPOL 
‘Kinshasa’). 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
EU support to SSR in 
DR Congo (EUSEC RD 
Congo). 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 
EU military operation 
(EUFOR RD Congo). 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 
EU restrictive measures 
against the DR Congo. 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
 
5 1 3 6 0 2 2 19 
 The figure refers to the number of CFSP Decisions adopted on a specific issue. 
         
EU military operation in DR Congo (ARTEMIS) 
The EU adopted five CFSP Decisions as legal acts for the carrying out of 
ARTEMIS (JA 2003/423/CFSP): the Union’s first military operation in the DR 
Congo and in Africa. The first Decision (2003/432/CFSP) was taken on 12 
June 2003 for the launching on the same date of the operation; whereas the 
second (Decision DRC/1/2003) was adopted the following month for the 
acceptance of contributions from third States, namely Brazil, Canada, 
Hungary, and South Africa. That Decision was amended at the end of the 
same month in order to accept contributions from Cyprus (Decision 
DRC/3/2003). The participation of Cyprus was further subject to a specific 
Decision (2003/693/CFSP) on the agreement between that country and the 
Union concluded on 22 September 2003. The Union adopted the fifth and 
last Decision (DRC/2/2003) on 11 July 2003 to establish a Committee of 
Contributors (CoC) for ARTEMIS the main function of which was “to play a 
key role in the day-to-day management of the operation.” The CoC 
constituted “the main forum where contributing States collectively [would] 
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address questions relating to the employment of their forces in the 
operation.” Members of the CoC were of two categories: Representatives of 
all EU Member States, on the one side, and Representatives of the third 
States participating in the operation and providing significant military 
contributions, on the other. 
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’) 
The Council adopted three Decisions (1 in 2004 and 2 in 2005) for the 
implementation of Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the 
launching of the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC): EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’. 
By the first Decision (EUPOL Kinshasa/1/2004), the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) of the Council appointed Mr Adílio CUSTÓDIO Head of 
Mission for EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’. The first of the two Decisions adopted the 
following year approved the Agreement between the EU and the DR Congo 
on the status and activities of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ (Decision 2005/680/CFSP); 
whereas the second decision extended the mandate of the head of mission 
until its end (Decision EUPOL KINSHASA/2/2005). 
EU support to SSR in DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) 
The EU adopted three CFSP Decisions for the launching and running of 
EUSEC RD Congo: the Union’s mission to provide advice and assistance for 
security sector reform in the D R Congo. They all concerned the appointment 
of the Head of Mission. The first Decision (EUSEC/1/2008) was taken on 12 
February 2008 for the appointment of Michel SIDO as the new Head of 
Mission in replacement of his predecessor, Pierre Michel JOANA, who 
resigned on 19 December 2007. On 23 June 2008 Michel SIDO too resigned, 
which led the Union to appoint his successor, Jean-Paul MICHEL, by means 
of the second Decision (EUSEC/2/2008). The EU adopted the third Decision 
(EUSEC/1/2009) was on 25 September 2009 to appoint again Jean-Paul 
MICHEL as the Head of Mission. 
EU military operation ‘EUFOR RD Congo’ 
Six CFSP Decisions in total were adopted, all in 2006 (two in May, two in 
June, and two in August), in relation to the launching and running of ‘EUFOR 
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RD Congo’: the EU military operation in support of the UN Mission in the DR 
Congo (MONUC) during the 2006 election process. The first two Decisions 
concerned respectively the acceptance of the participation of Turkey as a 
third State (Decision MONUC SPT/1/2006) and the establishment of a 
Committee of Contributors (Decision MONUC SPT/2/2006). The two 
Decisions taken in June addressed respectively the launching of the 
operation on 12 June 2006 (Decision 2006/412/CFSP) and the approval of 
the Agreement between the EU and the Gabonese Republic on the status of 
the European Union-led forces in the Gabonese Republic (Decision 
2006/475/CFSP). The same two matters were object of two more CFSP 
Decisions (2006/675/CFSP and 2006/676/CFSP) adopted in August 2006 
concerning the participation of Switzerland in EUFOR RD Congo. 
EU restrictive measures against the DR Congo 
The EU adopted two CFSP Decisions, respectively on 29 November 2005 
(Decision 2005/846/CFSP) and on 27 April 2009 (2009/349/CFSP), in 
relation to its restrictive measures against the DR Congo enacted for the first 
time on 13 June 2005 (CP2005/440/CFSP). The two Decisions served to 
update the EU’s list of persons and entities subject to the measures imposed 
by UN Security Council Resolution 1596 (2005) in accordance with the list 
approved on 1 November 2005 by the Sanctions Committee that the UN 
established for that purpose pursuant to its Security Council Resolution 1533 
(2004).  
Summary of Findings 
In the preceding section, I researched the phase of post-conflict settlement 
peacebuilding that spanned from the signing, in December 2002, of the 
Global and Inclusive Agreement (GIA) to the celebration of the 10th 
anniversary of the ESDP and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
December 2009 (January 2003 – December 2009). I have pursued two 
objectives. The first one consisted of identifying the most pressing needs, 
problems, and challenges that country was facing for its transition from all-out 
war to lasting positive peace, following the singing of the GIA. The latter had 
indeed been purposely engineered to put a definite end to war and to 
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irreversibly set the DR Congo on the path of democratic constitutional politics 
and socio-economic prosperity for all its population. The second objective 
was to account as systematically and accurately as possible for the legally 
binding and non-legally binding decisions and actions that the EU undertook 
under the CFSP umbrella in order to contribute to the success of the 
transition. I have established that there were indeed many needs, problems, 
and challenges in the aftermath of the formal end of all-out war and 
afterwards. The most urgent of such needs and challenges was to end an 
unofficial war and related deadly insecurity that continued unabatedly in the 
eastern part of the country. The country’s authorities had also to put an end 
to the inhumane treatment and mass killings of innocent civilians, mass 
rapes, and forced and active enlistment, conscription, and use of children 
(child soldiers) in military campaigns. Hindrance of humanitarian assistance 
to refugees and internally displaced persons, political persecution of real and 
supposed dissidents and critics, and generalised impunity were also 
persistent throughout the period under scrutiny. Moreover, the illegal 
exploitation of the country’s natural resources and other kinds of wealth 
equally required urgent and definite solution. Finally, the authorities of the DR 
Congo had to invest in the rekindling of the social fabric through appropriate 
decisions and actions for national unity and reconciliation. Unfortunately, the 
same authorities were involved more in the frustration and denial of most of 
these needs than in their fulfilment; thus creating and exacerbating problems 
and challenges instead of handling them. Many human rights and 
humanitarian organisations, agencies, various UN bodies, and mass media 
relentlessly warned both the Congolese authorities and the international 
community, pressing for timely and appropriate action in order to avoid the 
perpetuation of the war situation and related suffering for the majority of the 
population.  
For its response, the EU varyingly resorted to all its policymaking and 
operational resources that were available under the CFSP, except Common 
Strategy. The European Council, the highest political organ of the EU, held 
twenty-eight summits nine of which issued Principles and General 
Guidelines concerning the situation in the DR Congo and the Africa’s Great 
Lakes Region in general. On the same matter, the Union issued at least 
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twenty-seven CFSP Declarations and undertook some twenty-eight 
Demarches. In terms of legally binding decisions and actions, the Union  
adopted nine Common Positions (CPs), thirty-one Joint Actions (JAs), 
and nineteen CFSP Decisions. More notably, some of these decisions and 
actions led to the launching, implementation, and extension of two military 
operations (Operation ARTEMIS, 2003 and EUFOR DR Congo, 2006) and 
three civilian missions (EUPOL Kinshasa, 2005; EUSEC DR Congo, 2005; 
and EUPOL DR Congo, 2007). These operational initiatives aimed at helping 
with the control of ethno-political tensions and violence, some of which 
resulted from recurrent fighting in the eastern part of the country, and the 
building of professional national security and armed forces.  
SECOND CONGO WAR 
CFSP-based contribution to Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding (2003-2009) 
  




Principles  & 
General 
Guidelines* 3 2 1 2 1 0 0 9 
CFSP 
Declarations 6 5 3 2 4 4 3 27 





Strategies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Common 
Positions 2 0 2 1 1 2 1 9 
Joint Actions 3 3 5 6 6 3 5 31 
Decisions 5 1 3 6 0 2 2 19 
  31 19 17 17 13 13 13 123 
* The corresponding per year figure refers to the number of EU summits that addressed 
matters related to the situation in the DR Congo. 
In general, the decisions and actions taken under the CFSP throughout the 
period under review focused on human rights and humanitarian law issues, 
as well as peace and security affairs. In each and all them the EU strongly 
expressed its concern about and condemnation of gross human and 
humanitarian law violations, including mass atrocity crimes, and illegal 
exploitation of DR Congo’s natural resources and other forms of wealth. The 
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EU also used the decisions and actions accounted for above to communicate 
and reaffirm its adherence to and defence of multilateralism in conflict 
prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict peacebuilding in the Africa’s 
Great Lakes region and in Africa; as well as its commitment to and call for the 
improvement of the international peace and security system based on the 
Rule of Law. The earliest CFSP-born response was a Demarche undertaken 
on 7 January 2003 with the authorities of the DR Congo on death penalty. EU 
diplomats continued to resort to Demarches on this same theme and on the 
war and humanitarian situation in Ituri until the issuing of the first Declaration 
(Press: 113 Nr: 8300/03) on 09 April 2003. Through the latter, the Union 
welcomed "the conclusion of the inter-Congolese dialogue in Sun City, South 
Africa on 2 April 2003 as a further significant step towards lasting peace in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and the whole Great Lakes Region." On 
the other hand, the first legally binding response was Common Position 
2003/319/CFSP adopted on 8 May 2003 on EU's support for the 
implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the peace process in 
the DR Congo. The first operational decision was Joint Action 
2003/423/CFSP that the Council adopted on 5 June 2003 and which laid the 
legal ground for the launching of Operation ARTEMIS a week later. 
Commentary 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate whether there was any 
improvement in the CFSP-based response to the Second Congo War, in 
comparison to its dealing with the First Congo War. Again, I have drawn on 
secondary data and used the three-stage approach of Conflict Resolution 
(early warning and prevention, management, and rebuilding). Concerning the 
characteristics of the war itself, I have established that it displayed both 
similarities and differences with regard to the first war. In terms of similarities, 
it broke out because the winners of the First Congo War perpetuated and 
aggravated the neopatrimonial, predatory, and repressive policies and 
practices that constituted the underlying causes of that war (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002). Such policies made the country much poorer throughout the 
1990s than it was at its independence in 1960 (Bayart 2009; French 1995, 
1997); despite being home to some of the most diverse and abundant natural 
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wealth on earth (Daley 2006) and being the recipient of huge amounts of 
development aid (Lancaster 1999). The second war, like the first one, also 
broke out because the international community proved hesitant at best, and 
unwilling at worst, to take timely action and implement appropriate decisions 
despite constant early warnings and calls for action, particularly by civil 
society and human rights and humanitarian organisations. Likewise, the 
second war was initiated and manned by Rwandan troops, with the support 
of Burundi and Uganda, professedly in order to introduce democracy and to 
eradicate insecurity that was being caused by insurgents along the border of 
the DR Congo with these three countries. A more notably saddening 
similarity is the targeting of the civilian population, which caused millions of 
deaths and wounded, displaced, and traumatised persons (Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2002; Lemarchand 2001, 2012; Gegout 2005; Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009; 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2010). 
However, the second war was different from the first one in that it pitted 
former allies (RD Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda) against each other; involved 
more African country regular armies; lasted longer; and had much more to do 
with the strategic control of the country and the systematic plundering of its 
natural resources and wealth. Another important difference is that the 
Second Congo War formally ended through a ceasefire and a comprehensive 
political agreement between the different parties to the conflict; whereas the 
first war terminated by military victory of the rebels. 
Concerning the CFSP response, the EU deployed more policy instruments 
and material means than it did for the First Congo War. More importantly, the 
Union resorted to some of its so called restrictive/negative measures, that is, 
compliance enforcement measures, against UN-listed spoilers of the peace 
process and carried out five field operations (two  military and three civilian) 
for post-conflict settlement peacebuilding. Notwithstanding, by the standards 
of Conflict Resolution, that response was insufficient and most often 
came too late to help prevent or halt the large-scale bloodshed caused 
by that war. It was insufficient in five main ways. Firstly, the EU did not use 
Common Strategy, the most important legal policy making instrument that, 
unlike for the first war, was available following the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999. Arguably, one would have expected 
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the EU to use that instrument for outlining its overall strategic interests, 
position, objectives, and priorities towards the DR Congo and the whole 
Great Lakes Region of Africa, and the resources to be made available by the 
Union and its Member States for the implementation of such a strategy. The 
adoption of Common Strategy would have attenuated the ad hoc and trial-
and-error approach of most of the decisions and actions undertaken under 
the CFSP in response to the bloody conflict; no less because the minimal 
period of a Common Strategy was four years (TEU, Title V, art. 13(2)). 
Moreover, the adoption of a Common Strategy would have symbolised the 
strongest political commitment of the EU towards the country and the region, 
and would thus have served as a key reference for other EU policies for the 
region and for EU peacebuilding partners working on and in the region. 
Secondly, the EU resorted to more declaratory and procedural foreign policy 
and confidential diplomacy (through Demarches) than to legal and 
operational decisions and actions. Indeed, the first CFSP-based reaction to 
the war and related mass atrocities was a Declaration (Press 255, Nr 
10396/98). From the outbreak of the war in August 1998 until the signing of 
the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in December 2002, the EU issued 33 
CFSP Declarations and undertook 45 Demarches. In sharp contrast, it 
enacted only four Common Positions (CPs), four Joint Actions (JAs), 
and two CFSP Decisions. Thirdly, all CFSP decisions and actions, in 
particular the legal ones, focused on central statebuilding to the detriment of 
community building and societal recovery.  
Fourthly, the space, time, and or the strength of any of the five field 
operations (Operation Artemis; EUFOR RD Congo; EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’; 
EUPOL RD Congo; and EUSEC RD Congo) were too limited to meet 
effectively the needs of all the civilians who were at risk. Certainly, ARTEMIS 
adequately protected civilians under deadly threat and restored temporary 
and relative security and safety in and around Bunia, the provincial capital of 
Ituri in the East, in accordance with its mandate and objectives (Helly 2009; 
Rodt 2009; Ayello 2010; Martin 2010). However, looting, killings and forced 
displacement continued in large numbers in other parts of the Ituri province 
(Reyntjens 2009: 220). Besides, the operation ended too early despite 
constant warnings of the continuation and resumption of ethno-political 
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violence and related atrocities in that province (Gegout 2005; Reyntjens 
2009) and calls for its extension (Helly 2009; Major 2009). As a result, its 
dissuasive effect on local warlords did not last long. Only one month after the 
UN force (MONUC) had taken over from ARTEMIS and expanded its 
protection mandate to larger Bunia, “fighting between militias resumed in 
October 2003 and continued throughout 2004.” (Reyntjens 2009: 221). 
Likewise, EUFOR DR Congo was a success both internally and externally 
(Rodt 2009) reportedly because it satisfactorily delivered on its mandate and 
objectives. However, its work was limited to the capital of the country, some 
2693 km (1673.36 miles) away from the war-bedeviled eastern provinces. It 
only lasted the initially planned four months (30 July 2006 - 30 November 
2006), despite calls for a more than needed longer stay (Major 2009; Martin 
2010). Besides, its human rights protection mandate was confined to 
supporting the democratic elections and any intervention to protect human 
rights required prior demand and or authorisation from the UN mission 
(MONUC) in the country. More importantly, “the main target of EUFOR 
assistance were members of the international community”, mainly and in 
order priority “‘MONUC personnel, members of EU organisations other than 
EUFOR, European Union nationals, unarmed civilians’.” (Martin 2010: 61). 
For their part, the three non-military missions (EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’; EUPOL 
RD Congo; and EUSEC RD Congo) too contributed to the professionalisation 
and democratisation of the armed and security forces (Vircoulon 2009; Ajello 
2010; Martin 2010). Yet they too were incommensurate in view of the 
pressing needs they were deemed to address on the ground. In particular, 
they were limited in strength and space in that they were made of a small 
staff - 30 international staff for EUPOL Kinshasa; 50 international staff for 
EUPOL DR Congo; and 51 staff for EUSEC DR Congo - and were 
concentrated in the country’s capital Kinshasa. As Martin (2010: 67) notes, 
the attention of these missions to human rights abuses “was weak and 
incidental to their principal mandate.” According to the first Special 
Envoy/Representative of the EU for the region, the lack of sufficient human 
and financial resources, disorganisation, and the politics of ‘correctness’ and 
‘dogma’ of donors altogether prevented EUSEC DR Congo from living up to 
its objectives and external expectations (Ajello 2010). As I explain later in this 
 254 
 
section, more motives underpinned the insufficiency of not only EUSEC DR 
Congo but also the rest of CFSP response to the two Congo Wars. 
Fifthly, none of the CFSP legal decisions and actions enacted in response to 
the Second Congo War specifically targeted any of the countries, in particular 
Rwanda and Uganda, largely responsible for the outbreak and perpetuation 
of the bloody conflict and for the ensuing massive plundering of the natural 
riches and other forms of wealth of the DR Congo (Human Rights Watch 
2000; UN Security Council 2002). Froitzheim, Söderbaum, and Taylor (2011) 
correctly underscore that the EU failed to adequately deal with the strong 
trans-border dimension of the conflict due to the national approach of its 
post-war peacebuilding endeavours. The three authors attribute that 
approach to the “bureaucratic and organisational complexity” of the EU as 
well as to “its ineffective policies”. By bureaucratic and organisational 
complexity, they essentially refer to the institutional incoherence and 
interdepartmental and interpersonal rivalries and turf wars. Surprisingly to a 
lesser extent, they attribute that complexity to the double locus (EU + 
Member States) of the foreign and security policy of the EU. Regarding 
ineffective policies, they contend that the “EU is organized and designed to 
deal with nation-states (however dysfunctional these may be) and not with 
regions”. In the case of the Africa’s Great Lakes Region, they state, the EU 
“has found it very difficult to successfully engage in the context of a regional 
conflict where a credible regional counterpart is absent” (Froitzheim, 
Söderbaum, and Taylor 2011: 59). This explanation is hardly convincing 
because of two reasons, at least. First, its authors do not demonstrate, from 
a theoretical, legal, and policy perspective, how and why “the EU is 
organized and designed to deal with nation-states […] and not with regions”; 
how the opposite set-up would look like; and, more importantly, how it could 
at all help better address regional dimensions of violent conflicts like the one 
under scrutiny. Second, their assertion is clearly challenged, rather than 
supported, by one of their interviewees - diplomats from EU Member State - 
who told them that “the EU focuses on regional economic integration and 
puts weight on regional organisations.” (Froitzheim, Söderbaum, and Taylor 
2011: 59). The existence of partnership frameworks between the EU and 
Africa (through the African Union), EU and West Africa (through ECOWAS: 
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Economic Community of West African States), or between EU and Asia (for 
example through the ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations) are 
some of the examples. Sounder reasons (than the alleged in-built set up 
flaw) account for the conscription of post-war peacebuilding by the EU and 
other external interveners to the national level in the DR Congo. One reason 
is that key players of the international community, in particular Western 
powers, considered the tragedy of the DR Congo essentially, if not 
exclusively, as an internal problem caused by the failure of the Congolese 
state under the three-decade long reign of the West’s proxy President 
Mobutu throughout the Cold War. Another important reason is the genocide-
derived moral guilt complex of Western powers for failing Rwandans at the 
greatest hour of their need in 1994. This guilt served as an excuse for silent 
complicity and or unconditional support of the most influential Western 
powers to the Rwanda’s post-genocide regime that played the leading role in 
setting in motion and sustaining the two wars; each time effectively 
highlighting security concerns and grave violations of human rights against 
Congolese ethnic Tutsis of Rwandan descent (Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 
2009). A third motive is that the strongman of post-genocide Rwanda and the 
President of Uganda were members of the quartet whom in March 1998, only 
five months to the breakout of the Second War, the then US President Bill 
Clinton admirably branded as a “new breed” of African leaders. These 
included Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia), Isaias 
Afewerki (Eritrea), and Paul Kagame (Rwanda). Western powers and donors 
deemed these leaders to bring and or cement peace, multiparty democracy, 
freedom, and free-market economies in their respective countries and 
regions (Maliti 2012).  
On the other hand, the CFSP response to the Second Congo War under 
usually came too late for the protection of the millions of victims. This 
was particularly the case for the most important decisions and actions such 
as operational undertakings and negative measures against some peace 
spoilers. It took nine days after the outbreak of the war for the EU to make its 
earliest reaction, in the form of a Declaration, under the CFSP. However, the 
Union enacted its first legal response under the CFSP (Common Position 
1999/728/CFSP) on 15 November 1999, one year and three months into the 
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Second Congo War and four months after the signing of the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement. Its first Joint Action (JA 2000/347/CFSP) came out on 
22 May 2000, nearly two years after the beginning of the war. While it did 
save many human lives from butchery, Operation ARTEMIS was launched 
months after many human rights and humanitarian law organisations had 
relentlessly called for such a force to prevent at best or control the mass 
killing of innocent civilians. One of such calls came from Amnesty 
International as early as in October 2002 (Amnesty International 2003d). 
From the foregoing is it evident that, overall, the EU did not make the best 
use of the CFSP resources in response to the Second Congo War. The 
causes – and not one single determinant as is often sustained – are largely 
the same that I have exposed earlier in relation to the CFSP response to the 
First Congo War. They comprise the lack of experience and benchmarks in 
‘high politics’ (hard) foreign policy; the early age of the CFSP; its non-
exclusive competence status towards Member States; its subsidiary role; the 
primacy of values and interests of the EU and or its allies; the Somalia 
Syndrome; and the guilt complex from the Rwandan genocide. When the 
Second Congo War broke out in August 1998, the CFSP was hardly five year 
old. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which substantially amended and fine-tuned 
the provisions for the CFSP by introducing among other things the most 
important legal policy making instrument (Common Strategy), had not 
entered yet into force. The ESDP was yet to be established nearly one year 
later (June 1999) and the EU Programme for Conflict Prevention was yet to 
be adopted in 2001. The ESDP supporting institutional structures were in 
place by the end of 2001 while its trained combat forces and civilian experts 
reached their envisaged operational strength in 2007; one year after the first-
ever democratic elections had taken place in the DR Congo. More notably, 
the first European Security Strategy (ESS), the key reference document that 
the EU presented as embodying the values, vision, and scope of its foreign 
and security policy, was adopted ten years after the inception of the CFSP 
and one year after the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement that 
formally ended the Second Congo War. Arguably, during much of the 
outbreak and escalation of the Second Congo War, the CFSP, in particular 
its much-awaited operational backbone ESDP that was established in 1999 
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and was declared operational at the end of 2001, was still in its early 
development. This partly explains the trial-and-error approach of much of the 
CFSP response to the war and the frequent resort to statements, general 
principles and guidelines, declarations, and confidential diplomacy.  
Concerning the disabling role of the subsidiary status of the CFSP, it is 
important to recall that any operational undertakings under the ESDP was 
legally subject to the request and or approval of the UN Security Council and 
or the authorities of the target country or regional organisation. This 
requirement underpinned the launching of the five operations (Operation 
ARTEMIS; EUPOL Kinshasa; EUSEC DR Congo; EUFOR DR Congo; and 
EUPOL DR Congo) that allegedly enabled the EU to make the difference in 
the DR Congo. In the following chapter, I shall elaborate on this determinant 
in relation to the development and implementation of the ‘responsibility to 
protect (R2P)’ norm that emerged in 2001 with a view to addressing the 
failure of humanitarian interventions of the early 1990s. With reference to the 
condition of non-exclusive competence vis-à-vis Member States, any legal 
binding decisions and or action under the CFSP had not to prejudice the 
individual foreign and security policies of Member States, individually or in 
coalition; and therefore required unanimity except for the implementation of a 
Common Strategy. Established to protect national interests of each Member 
States within the CFSP, this requirement often led to inaction, late 
response, and or insufficient action (Ajello and Richard 2000; Misser 2007; 
Ajello 2010). One of the most reported examples took place at the end of 
2008. Influential European NGOs, the UN Secretary-General, and individual 
EU Member States and officials called for a military intervention by the EU in 
order to halt bloodshed in the north-eastern DR Congo and thus allow the UN 
force (MONUSCO) to reinforce its presence on the ground. However, the EU 
finally did not intervene because of the lack of unanimity. Member States in 
favour included Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. Against the 
idea were Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). The latter argued that its 
military deployment to the country fell outside its national interests (Vines 
2010:1101-02). It is worth noting that throughout the period covered by this 
research (1994-2009), the EU adopted only three Common Strategies, 
respectively on Russia on 4 June 1999 (1999/414/CFSP), Ukraine on 11 
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December 1999 (1999/877/CFSP), and on the Mediterranean region on 19 
June 2000 (2000/458/CFSP). After that, Member States decided not to adopt 
Common Strategies anymore because, legally, their implementation (mainly 
through the adoption of Common Positions and Joint Actions) automatically 
implied the possible use of qualified majority voting within the Council to the 
detriment of the preferred cardinal principle of unanimity. Their decision was 
meant to prevent the use of that clause by any coalition of the willing within 
the Council on behalf of all Member States (Director at Council Legal 
Service, 2007, interview, 10 October). In the case under study, individual 
self-interests of Member States did not only cause inaction but also played 
an important role in some of the decisions and actions of the CFSP on the 
Second Congo War, especially the aforementioned five civil and military 
operations. Hence, France took the lead on Operation ARTEMIS apparently 
because “it badly wanted a mission to show the EU was capable of acting 
alone, where NATO would not be involved”; whereas the United Kingdom 
endorsed the operation and sent in engineers because it “had to prove that it 
was still part of the project to create a European defence policy.” (Gegout 
2005: 437-38). 
On the other hand, without the existence of core values and or common 
interests, the EU would not have taken those decisions and actions. For 
some analysts, the five operations were “more about the EU experimenting 
with its own capabilities than about Africa” because “the EU can reach 
decisions more easily on Africa than on many other parts of the world” (Vines 
2010: 1091). However, one should nuance this often-offered interpretation. 
Certainly, the construction of a self-assigned identity of a global Good 
Samaritan or a global Normative/Civilian Power EU – which is different from 
just testing EU’s own capabilities as an autonomous international actor – and 
the relative facility for decision-making on Africa played an important role in 
the choice of that continent for the first experiments of ESDP outside Europe. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that by the time of the launching of those 
operations no other part of the world outside Europe was in urgent need of 
international assistance as helplessly as was the African theatre of the five 
operations. Our findings show constant and compelling calls from the most 
credible voices for such assistance and that the five operations responded to 
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genuine needs. It might be fairer and more accurate to assume that these 
operations were “more about EU experimenting with its own capabilities” to 
live up to its own humanitarian pledges and external expectations and that 
the tragedy of the DR Congo and EU’s close historical ties with Sub-Saharan 
Africa made the decision much easier to take. Certainly too, security 
concerns underlay the launching of these operations, in particular EUSEC 
RD Congo, because the target country fitted into the category of failed states 
and the regional impact of its wars “had negative spill over effects in the 
wider region.” (Hoebeke, Carette, and Vlassenroot 2007: 15). To some 
extent, this interpretation is tenable because the 2003 European Security 
Strategy (ESS) identified failed / failing states as one of the main sources of 
challenges and threats to international security and bad governance as the 
main cause of state failure. The same document listed the DR Congo, 
alongside the Balkans and Afghanistan as a case in point (Council of the 
European Union 2003b: 6). However, in the case of the DR Congo, these 
security concerns were of much less importance than often assumed 
because the same ESS document did not explicitly identify that country, or 
the Great Lakes Region, or Sub-Saharan Africa in general as part of the 
geostrategic objectives of the foreign and security policy of the EU. These 
security concerns become more easily appreciable only when placed in the 
wider context of the dominant worldview championed by the EU. That view is 
of an international society of states bound by the rule of law, well governed 
(that is, democratic), upholding shared values, each pursuing its interests 
within common interests, and characterised by free market economy and 
social prosperity (Council of the European Union 2003b). For the EU, “The 
quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that 
are its foundation." (Council of the European Union 2003b: 10). I come back 
to this issue of the role of values and the corresponding worldview in the 
following chapter when I address the constraints of global culture on 
contemporary international peacebuilding.  
Finally, the Somalia syndrome, which suppressed the appetite of military 
intervention in Rwanda (Brunk 2008; Cooper, Turner, and Pugh 2011), and 
the moral guilty complex for the failure of the international community in 
Rwanda too played an important role in the inaction, late action, or little 
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undertaking of the EU under its CFSP regarding the Second Congo War. In 
the absence of a direct and serious threat to core common interests of its 
Member States, the EU found politically too costly sending boots on the 
ground to prevent or halt a war labelled as Africa’s First World War and the 
subsequent constant bloody fighting between regular armies, ruthless militia, 
armed groups, and rebel movements along constantly shifting alliances. In 
the following chapters, I offer an overall assessment of the motives and 
capacities of the CFSP as well as its response to the two Congo Wars. From 
the foregoing, three elements are clear though. First, the motives, capacities, 
and achievements of the CFSP have often been misrepresented or 
misinterpreted. Second, various factors, rather than a single determinant, 
altogether account for the inbuilt flaws of the CFSP as well as of its omission, 
late action, or insufficient response regarding the two Congo Wars. Third, the 
Conflict Resolution approach is more appropriate for critically discerning and 
assessing those motives, capacities, and achievements.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
 
This chapter offers a general and final evaluation of the motives, strengths, 
and accomplishments of the CFSP including its response to the two Congo 
Wars, prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (on 1 December 
2009). It does so through the lens of Conflict Resolution and 
recommendations from the failure of the international community to protect 
populations from mass atrocity crimes of the 1990’s. Briefly, these insights 
and recommendations relatedly include: 
 Adoption of clear and strong norms, laws, and mechanisms for global 
humanitarianism; 
 Strong and sustained political commitment to global human protection; 
 Acquisition of appropriate knowledge, skills, and foresight;  
 Provision of need-tailored, sufficient, and timely responses; and  
 Use of a comprehensive and complementary approach.  
Some of the relevant works on these prescriptions and lessons include the 
following: Burton (1972, 2001); Sandole (1993, 1998, 2001); Vassal-Adams 
(1994); Eriksson (1996); Galtung (1996,1998, 2000); Millwood (1996); 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996, 2000); UNDPKO (1996); Barnett 
(1997); Adedeji (1999); Carlsson, Sung-Joo, and Kupolati (1999); Miall, 
Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999); Cavanaugh (2000); IPEP (2000); 
Hansen et al. (2001); and Rubenstein (2001). In the following sections, I 
assess the CFSP and its actual response to the two Congo Wars against 
each strand of these five prescriptions. 
Clear and strong norms, laws, and mechanisms 
Early research studies and policy reports on genocide and mass killings in 
the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990’s identified the lack of clear and strong 
norms, laws, and mechanisms for intervention for human protection purposes 
as one of the main reasons of the failure to prevent and halt those tragedies. 
One of their main recommendations was the revision, fine-tuning, and 
adoption of norms, laws, and mechanisms that would make possible timely 
and decisive preventive and curative action in the face of mass atrocities 
(Vassal-Adams 1994; Millwood 1996; Annan 1999; Carlsson et al. 1999; UN 
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Security Council 1999; IPEP 2000). On a worldwide level, the utmost result of 
the discussion of this recommendation is “The Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P); a norm-setting document produced by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 and which introduced 
and elaborated the responsibility to prevent (R2prevent), the responsibility to 
react (R2react), and the responsibility to rebuild (R2rebuild). It was a 
response to a challenging question that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 
1999-2000 put to opponents, critics, and sceptics of humanitarian 
intervention in these terms: "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, 
to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend 
every precept of our common humanity?" (UN General Assembly 2000: para. 
217). The report established a set of clear principles, procedures, 
mechanisms, and actions, including, as last resort, military action that could 
be authorised by the General Assembly, failing a UN Security Council 
decision, in order to protect people from mass atrocity crimes (genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). As Gierycz 
(2010: 112) suggests, the ICSS report “constitutes the most comprehensive 
and well-developed characterization of R2P to date”, because it established a 
set of “principles that would equally enable effective prevention of future 
atrocities against civilians and ensure respect for international principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.” 
Gierycz (2010: 113) rightly laments that the publication of the report (on 30 
September 2001) only two weeks after the tragic terrorist attacks on US soil 
(on September 11) and the ensuing war on terror ill-fated the chances for the 
document to be “converted into an agenda for action or taken up by member 
states”, and condemned it to remain “merely a technical paper available to 
the Secretary-General and the public at large.” Gierycz (2010: 113) argues 
that as of 2010, the ICISS report had “served merely as a basis for 
elaborating the so-called ‘protection clause’ included in the Millennium 
Declaration in 2005.” The latter was adopted by all the 150 UN member 
states who participated in the World Summit that took place that year. One 
the one hand, the ‘protection clause’ commits each member state to fulfil its 
primary R2P its population from potential and actual mass atrocity crimes. On 
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the other, the clause provisions commit the international community to assist 
any member state in fulfilling its individual R2P; and to collectively use “in a 
timely and decisive manner” all appropriate means, including, as a last resort, 
enforcement action, in order to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes 
if national authorities are “manifestly” unable or unwilling to do so in the first 
place (UN General Assembly 2005: para. 139).  
 
Unfortunately, the UN-adopted ‘protection clause’ provisions were a largely 
watered down version of the original report. They are not legally binding and, 
mainly, criteria and conditions for their actual use were deliberately left 
unspecified, arguably in order to make them acceptable to all signatories. As 
Gierycz (2010: 113) points out, the ‘protection clause’, unlike the original 
report, avoided to elaborate “on possible military enforcement of protection 
means, and any restraint in using the veto in the Security Council in R2P 
cases.” Nonetheless, the EU is credited for playing an important role for the 
adoption of this clause. According to the international nongovernmental 
organisation (INGO) Oxfam International, “In 2005, EU members were world 
leaders in developing the ‘rule-based international order’ in helping to win the 
international argument for the Responsibility to Protect.” (Oxfam International 
2008: 2). In particular, the EU reportedly played a decisive role by convincing 
its African partners to loosen their fierce hold on the principle of ‘non-
interference into internal matters’ (Oxfam International 2008: 1). Surprisingly, 
EU’s own norm-setting documents, which include the TEU provisions and 
other principles and general guidelines adopted since the creation of the EU 
itself in 1993 until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 for the 
organic and operational growth of the CFSP, are even softer and unclear. 
For instance, the EU did not refer to the R2P in the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) that it adopted in 2003, two years after the publication of the 
aforementioned report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty. The EU simply indicated that it needed “to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust 
intervention" (Council of the European Union 2003b: 12); and warned 
countries who "ha[d] placed themselves outside the bound of international 
society" that “there [was] a price to be paid, including in their relationship with 
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the European Union.” (Council of the European Union 2003b: 11). In March 
2008, one year before the official celebration of the ‘success’ stories of the 
ESDP and eight months to the revision of the ESS, Oxfam International 
made the following recommendation to the EU for a clear and strong 
normative stance: 
In revisiting the ESS in 2008, make clear that it has a vital role in upholding 
the Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity – and commit to this as a central 
objective of the CFSP and ESDP. This should help set the agenda for the 
next period in building the EU’s foreign policy identity, when the new High 
Representative and External Service bring greater unity to the different 
policy instruments today still divided between the European Commission and 
Council of Ministers. (Oxfam International 2008: 3-4). 
 
In the updated version of the ESS, the EU took on board this 
recommendation as laconically as a follows: “With respect to core human 
rights, the EU should continue to advance the agreement reached at the UN 
World Summit in 2005, that we hold a shared responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity." (Council of the European Union 2008e: 12). Undoubtedly, this 
reference fell short of the recommendation of Oxfam International because it 
did not provide any single indication of how the EU intended to advance that 
agreement. This should not come as a surprise since the wording is as 
laconic and cautious as the ‘protection clause’ included in the declaration of 
that Summit. Arguably, the EU might not even have referred to the R2P in the 
revised version of the ESS if that Summit had not included in its declaration 
the clause. In the 2003, the EU made it clear that “the fundamental 
framework for international relations” was the UN Charter; that the UN 
Security Council had “the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security”, and that enabling the UN to “fulfil its 
responsibilities and to act effectively” was “a European priority.” (Council of 
the European Union 2003b: 10). Indeed, all EU norm-setting documents 
herein reviewed confine it to a subsidiary role when it comes to decisively 
and timely responding to mass atrocity crimes wherever and whenever they 
threaten to occur or actually occur. Actually, there exist three unwritten 
criteria for any forcible action by the EU for human protection purposes that 
are extremely difficult if not simply impossible to meet at all or on time. These 
are in a hierarchical order of importance the following: (1) Mandate by the UN 
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Security Council; (2) Decision by the European Council; and (3) Authorisation 
by National Parliaments of EU’s Member States. One of my respondents – a 
senior diplomat at the Sweden’s permanent representation to the EU – 
outlined them when I underlined the lack of information as to when and how 
the EU would undertake a forcible action in response to mass atrocity crimes. 
He underlined that even the application of this procedure is not automatic but 
rather a case-by-case decision; and that the mandate must be strictly 
humanitarian and in any case exempt of any regime change by force. He 
indicated that the primary condition of UN Security Council authorisation was 
very important for his country “because it adds legitimacy to what the EU 
does.” He highlighted that such “legitimacy in itself is very important” because 
it adds “respect to International Law” and that, for that reason, “allowing for 
certain States to intervene militarily in other parts of the world without a UN 
mandate is a very serious matter where we would be very cautious.” 
Unquestionably, the cases of Rwanda (1994), DR Congo (1996-2000), and 
Darfur (2003-2005) precisely show that both the recognition of mass 
atrocities as a genocide and the authorisation by the UN Security Council of 
a forcible response are always in short supply when they are most needed, 
unless high stakes of most if not all its permanent members are involved. 
When I pointed out this, my respondent referred me back to the R2P and 
cautiously specified as follows: “I think in extreme cases we might be able to 
accept that the General Assembly or a coalition of States act if it is a clear 
case to prevent genocide ... Maybe that has to be on an ad hoc basis.” He 
gave the example of his country’s support to NATO-led military action against 
the Serbs to prevent them from committing further ethnic cleansing against 
the Albanian population in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, precisely when 
similar mass atrocities were taking place in the DR Congo! In the case of the 
mass atrocities of Darfur which unfolded when the CFSP was entering its 
tenth year and its ESDP backbone was about to be declared operational, the 
Swedish diplomat precisely blamed the inaction or little action of the EU on 
the lack of a UN formal recognition of the crimes as a genocide:  
First of all, I’m not aware that we have said clearly that ‘This is genocide’. 
Sweden has not. I think the US Congress has perhaps made some statement in 
this regard, but Sweden has not clearly...I think there has been some legal 
attempts to try to find whether this is genocide or not, or if what's happening there 
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is genocide, but we have not come to a conclusion. (Anonymous 2008, interview, 
19 May). 
Certainly, the materialisation of either option (UN Security Council mandate 
or a UN General Assembly/Coalition of States mandate) for meeting the first 
condition for a forcible action for human protection purposes requires the EU 
to have a unique and strong voice at the UN. Lamentably, the EU is in this 
respect much weaker than its CFSP reference documents might suggest by 
requiring Member States to “coordinate their action in international 
organisations and at international conferences” and to “uphold the common 
positions in such forums.” (TEU, art. 11(1)). In particular,  
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will 
concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are 
permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, 
ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice 
to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. (TEU, art. 
11(2)). 
This coordination imperative is important because prior authorisation by the 
UN Security Council is the most important of the aforementioned three 
unwritten conditions for any EU enforcement of human protection in favour of 
third party victims. During interview, all my respondents attributed the lack of 
timely and decisive response by the EU to gross violations of human rights in 
third places to the absence of a UN mandate. The recurrent example was 
Darfur (Sudan). To one Head of Unit (at the Council) who too evoked the 
absence of agreement at the UN Security Council, I simply asked: “Why then 
does the EU not campaign at UN Security Council for strong measures 
including military interventions to be timely taken?” His reply was 
straightforward:  
It is difficult because, first, the two countries on the UN Security Council [France 
and UK] do not coordinate their policies there and actually the EU as such does not 
have a common voice at the UN but rather as many voices as Member States. 
Second, those countries that are the target of possible intervention are also 
members of the UN and some have effective lobbying capabilities. Sudan is one 
example: because of its economic relations with China, it has succeeded in 
blocking any UN Security Council’s decisive action against it. (Anonymous 2008, 
interview, 20 May). 
One representative of Sweden to the EU too regretted the absence of 
coordination between the two Member States of the EU with a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council in the following terms: 
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 [...] if we have faith in the CFSP of the EU, in the long run it's a bit of anomaly that 
two countries are permanent members of the Security Council without coordinating 
their policies with the rest of us. They don't. UK and France do not coordinate. 
That's an exception, you know, there is an exception to the CFSP when it comes to 
the Security Council. Because there the EU does not have a coordinated view, 
which is quite strange. That's why we have said in the past that it would make 
sense for the EU to have a seat on the UN Security Council rather than individual 
EU members. (Anonymous 2008, interview, 19 May). 
To one senior diplomat at the CFSP, I put a similar question: “Does not the 
requirement of a prior mandate by the UN imply that, for the EU, the first 
thing to battle for is to have a permanent seat at the UN Security Council who 
would make the voice of the EU duly heard and taken into consideration?” 
His answer could not be more diplomatic: “Yes, that's nice; but ask the 
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council!” As I insisted on having his 
own view as an EU diplomat, he elaborated:  
They don't want to give their seats! [Long silence] We have moved along in CFSP 
matters but do not forget also that there are still national diplomacies, especially for 
the bigger countries, which are of course very dear to them. We’re trying 
increasingly hard so that European Members of the UN Security Council see their 
position in the European context and we try to move towards some joint approach 
in the Security Council but in the end it remains the national decision. (Anonymous 
2007, interview, 3 October). 
When I asked him if he could think of the day when the EU would have one 
voice at the UN Security Council, he diplomatically responded: “Yes, but let’s 
talk in a fifty year time.” The fore-cited Swedish representative too was quite 
pessimistic about that possibility, assuming that the two countries concerned 
would veto any EU decision in that direction. These testimonies clearly 
suggest that fulfilling the other two conditions (Decision by the European 
Council and Decision by National Parliaments) is equally difficult if not 
impossible, unless core self-interests are involved. Sweden’s representatives 
to the EU informed me that until May 2008, the Darfur case had not been 
really on the agenda of the CFSP-ESDP and had never been really an issue 
where the EU was going to do it alone. They told me that the vehicle for 
Darfur had always been the UN and the AU. A senior diplomat at the Council 
of the EU pointed out that “sending troops into Darfur would be extremely 
politically risky” for any EU Member State government (Head of Unit at 
Council 2007, interview, 3 October). One senior EU official simply retorted to 
me: “Why should the EU intervene in Sudan?” Very surprised, I reacted: 
“Because of the same fundamental values at the core of the European 
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project!” He was on his turn very surprised by my innocence and clarified the 
matter once for all as follows: 
In theory, it is easy to say and campaign. In practice, no one considers sending 
troops to Sudan against the will of Sudanese government. The Responsibility to 
Protect is like a religious statement: in real life, no Member State can put its troops 
at high risk in a country where it does not have interests. Any government doing 
that would face its own voting constituencies back home and hardly survive 
politically speaking. (Head of Unit at European Commission 2008, interview, 20 
May). 
The official indicated that “forcible military interventions are an option that in 
practice the EU will use on very limited occasions and in which common 
interests are clearly identified and will be used.” He explained that this is the 
case partly because the EU does not have its own army but rather relies on 
troops of Member States who cannot commit them without prior authorisation 
of their national parliaments. The official summarised the position and modus 
operandi (approach) of the EU concerning forcible intervention for human 
protection purposes as follows: 
In principle, we agree to intervene on humanitarian grounds. In practice, we do it 
with local actors. We do it in accordance with international law. This was the case 
of EU operation in Congo [Operation Artemis in the DR Congo] and now in Chad. 
This is also why we do it in agreement with and support to the UN and African 
Union. The EU cannot intervene in Zimbabwe against the will of Zimbabwe, its 
influential neighbours, or the African Union. (Head of Unit at European Commission 
2008, interview, 20 May). 
In terms of clarity, the norm-setting documents that were applicable during 
the period under review were so vague and open-ended that it was 
impossible even for insiders to spell out the scope of the CFSP. To every EU 
official I interviewed, I put the following two-fold question: “According to the 
Treaty provisions, the CFSP covers ‘all areas of foreign and security policy’, 
and ‘all questions related to the security of the Union’: (a) what are those 
areas and questions? (b) Why are those areas and questions unspecified? 
To the first part of the question, they all told me that at any time any matter 
could be of the CFSP realm if Member States decided so. An EU official 
working in the Council’s Policy Unit simply advised me to check up in 
documents and concrete decisions of the CFSP: “You should look at the 
instruments used and see which areas and issues are addressed,” she said. 
“In particular, you have to look at the EU Security Strategy as it gives details 
on the scope of the CFSP.” (Anonymous 2007, interview, 3 October). Her 
reference to the European Security Strategy is quite revealing, because the 
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Union adopted its first Security Strategy ten years after the entry into force of 
the CFSP. Moreover, the ESS did not spell out the aforementioned 
conditions for an EU forcible action for human protection purposes. In the 
2008-updated version, the EU simply undertook to advance the agreement 
reached at the 2005 UN World Summit that all members of the international 
community “hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." 
(Council of the European Union 2008e: 12). Only interviews with EU decision 
makers and analyses of individual cases help discern some of the criteria for 
a possible EU action in response to “gross and systematic violation of human 
rights that offend every precept of our common humanity”. All EU officials 
and representatives of its Member States I interviewed acknowledged this 
lack of clarity. Most of them did not consider it a source of concern and 
actually defended it. To all my interviewees I put the following question: “Are 
you personally or your country [in the case of diplomats at permanent 
representations of Member States to the EU] comfortable with that lack of 
precision?” Diplomats from Member States unequivocally approved and 
defended the ambivalent wording as the price for every Member State to 
adhere to and support the CFSP project. One British diplomat simply ruled 
out the possibility of a crystal-clear conscription of the scope of the CFSP 
due to the differences of foreign policies among Member States (Anonymous 
2007, interviewed on 9 November). Senior staff at the Political Affairs Unit at 
the permanent representation of Germany to the EU explained to me that 
leaving the CFSP flexible was the only realistic way to make it acceptable to 
all Member States because in some of them there exist(ed) constitutional 
barriers to handing over sovereignty on some specific matters. In their view, 
the in-built ambiguity over the scope of the CFSP made every Member State 
feel comfortable and allowed any of them to propose any matter they would 
consider to be of the CFSP (Anonymous 2007, interview, 5 November). For 
this reason, they explained, it would have been unrealistic and 
counterproductive to place the CFSP under the roof of the Commission 
because of the latter’s strict rules, exclusive right of initiative, and its large 
independence from Member States. For Sweden’s representative to the EU, 
the ambivalence over the scope and criteria and conditions of the CFSP was 
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not a matter of concern as long as it did not cross his country’s red line on 
defence matters:  
Our limits have been on the defence side. That is where our limits are. We 
do not see the EU developing a common defence for us for instance. That is 
where our red lights are as a non-alliance country. This is the limit for us. 
We're not a NATO member; we are also sceptical about the EU working on 
Common Defence. (Anonymous 2008, interview, 19 May). 
Another argument of Member States’ representatives in defence of the 
ambiguity and open-endedness is what they referred to as the 
unpredictability of Foreign Policy. The fore-cited British diplomat argued that 
themes of foreign policy change so often that writing down them once for all 
would not be realistic and probably many Member States would oppose it; for 
each would like to have its view fully reflected in the Treaty. He suggested 
that no one even tried to write down the scope because it would be futile. He 
gave the example of ‘climate change’, recalling that, a few years before, it 
had been absent from foreign policy, but by then had come to the centre of 
any foreign policy discussions within and outside the EU. In a similar vein, an 
EU official working in the Policy Unit of the Council explained and somehow 
justified the lack of clarity in the Treaty provisions for the CFSP in terms of 
the geopolitical context that was prevailing at the inception of the CFSP. 
According to her, the Berlin Wall had just fallen, Germany had been united, 
and the Cold War had just ended; so there was a new security context and 
new security challenges that at that time no one really knew what foreign and 
security policy  meant for the EU. She told me that Member States did not 
know for sure the common foreign and security issues and matters that had 
to be covered. Therefore, she said, Member States preferred, out of caution, 
to leave the scope of the CFSP flexible enough for any subsequent 
amendments in the future to be easy to make (Anonymous 2007, interview, 3 
October).  
Admittedly, there is a valid point in the argument of my two respondents as 
far as open-endedness or flexibility, but definitely not ambiguity, is 
concerned. Usually, intentional vagueness and open-endedness – more 
referred to as “constructive ambiguity” – is just one strategy for securing 
agreement and advantages on hardly negotiable points (Bell and Cavanaugh 
1998; Klieman 1999); or for “experimentation and learning” (Inkpen and 
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Choudhury 1995). However, in the case of the negotiations for the creation of 
the CFSP, resorting to imprecision was largely inherent to the hybrid, sui 
generis nature of the EU: neither an intergovernmental organisation nor a 
federation of States. It was not the best strategic option, but rather the only 
option for Member States to reach some sort of an agreement, be it, as was 
actually the case, for only offering guidelines. Open-endedness of the CFSP 
was problematic because of the excessively ambiguous wording of its scope 
that made any agreement extremely difficult not just for new inputs but also 
for the interpretation of the original Treaty provisions. The main if not sole 
underlying motive was not the accommodation in advance of future 
adjustments in response to possible humanitarian imperatives. The aim was 
rather to secure the acceptance of the CFSP to each and all Member States 
and its absolute political control and strategic direction, at both the national 
and EU levels, by Member States. This underlay the requirement of 
unanimity of all Member States for the vote of all legally binding decisions, 
except implementing decisions, of the CFSP. In fact, the crystal-clearness 
and delineation of the scope of other common policies exclusively under the 
rule of the EU Commission, such as Trade and Agriculture policies, never 
impeded any updating of those policies. Therefore, the price for establishing 
a common foreign and security policy was to make it as less common as 
required by the unique nature of the EU and not by the unpredictability of 
foreign policy itself; and the use of an ambiguous language perfectly served 
that purpose. One main consequence of this somehow existential politics of 
ambiguity is that the extreme difficulty to accurately discern and fairly assess 
in theory and practice the essence and modus operandi of EU foreign and 
security policy. Following the inception of the CFSP in 1993 and of its 
operational backbone ESDP six years later, various scholars underlined this 
problem and offered different solutions (Peterson and Sjursen 1998; Larsen 
2000; Hill 2003; Bono 2004; Carlsnaes 2004). As indicated in the first 
chapter, this thesis has opted for using the three-level analytical framework of 
the policy network model developed by Peterson (1995), and for reinforcing it 
with the CR approach. 
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Strong and sustained political commitment  
The acquisition and actual use of adequate resources for human protection 
largely depend on the political will and commitment of the highest decision 
makers nationally, regionally and internationally. In this respect, the dispatch 
and deployment in Rwanda of poorly trained and equipped UN troops, with 
the exception of the Belgian battalion, and the UN decision to reduce them to 
a minimal presence, rather than reinforcing them, at the height of the 1994-
genocide are very illustrative. For a solution, the fore-cited research studies 
and policy evaluations recommended unreserved and sustained political 
commitment to the protection of populations from genocide and other gross 
and systematic violations wherever and whenever circumstances on the 
ground would so require (Vassal-Adams 1994; Carlsson et al. 1999; Eriksson 
1996; Millwood 1996; UNDPKO 1996; IPEP 2000). However, attempts to 
materialise this recommendation have fallen short of the expectations. On the 
international level, the reduction of the original R2P report to a mere and 
unprecise protection clause that was included in the 2005 Millennium 
Declaration remains so far the most emblematic example of the failure. On 
the EU level, we have shown in the preceding section that because of the 
primacy of national self-interests mainly, EU Member States were only able 
to afford a soft and ambiguous CFSP. For the same reason, the EU did not 
mention the R2P in the first European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 and 
only did so laconically in the revised version adopted five year later. This 
implies that the CFSP per se inherently reflects limited and conditional 
political commitment of Member States towards each other, first, and the rest 
of the world, second. The more common high stakes a real or potential 
human tragedy involves, the more and sustained collective political 
commitment the CFSP is likely to galvanise for its prevention or mitigation. In 
practice, this can only translate into selective collective political commitment 
to the R2P in third places. In the ESS, the EU clearly earmarked four 
geographical areas for its primary concern. These are in a hierarchical order 
the following: Balkans, Southern Caucasus, Middle East, and the 
Mediterranean Area and Arab Word in general (Council of the European 
Union 2003b: 8). Regarding the Balkans, the 2003-ESS stated: “The 
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credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our 
achievements there.” On the other hand, the signatories of the document 
called for “a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the 
Southern Caucasus, which [would] in due course also be a neighbouring 
region.” Member States identified the resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict as 
“a strategic priority for Europe” and an indispensable condition for “dealing 
with other problems in the Middle East.” They decided that the EU “must 
remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is 
solved.” (Council of the European Union 2003b: 8). Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which in EU's own words was “poorer” in 2003 than it had been 10 years 
before (Council of the European Union 2003b: 2), was left out of the 
geographical strategic priorities of EU foreign and security policy. The DR 
Congo was not an exception despite being included in that same document 
and along the Balkans and Afghanistan as one of the places where the 
“European Union and Member States ha[d] intervened to help deal with 
regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet” (Council of the 
European Union 2003b: 6). Whereas the first legally binding response of the 
CFSP on the DR Congo was adopted three years after the entry into force of 
the Treaty provisions on the CFSP (Joint Action 96/250/CFSP), a similar 
initiative on former Yugoslavia was enacted only one week (8 November 
1993) following the entry into force of the CFSP. It concerned the EU support 
for the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Council 
Decision 93/603/CFSP). By contrast, calls for a preventive international 
peacekeeping force to ensure security in and around the Rwandan refugees 
camps in eastern Zaire and to relocate armed constituencies in the camps 
farther inside Zaire, far away from the zone bordering the country of origin, 
were ignored, despite repeated clear warnings of a looming regional 
conflagration – the First Congo War - with unimaginably grave consequences 
(Ajello and Richard 2000; Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009). 
Moreover, by means of Common Position 97/356/CFSP adopted on 2 June 
1997 a month after the First Congo War had officially ended, the Union 
outlined the principles and guidelines of its stance on conflict prevention and 
resolution in Africa, which by extension applied also to the DR Congo. By that 
legal act, the Union certainly stated that prevention and resolution of conflicts 
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in Africa were among its priorities. However, the Union confined its role to 
supporting conflict prevention and resolution efforts by other actors; mainly 
by Africans, African regional and continental organisations and the United 
Nations. In that document, the EU expressly earmarked prevention and 
post-conflict rebuilding as constituting its main if not sole concerns. By so 
doing, the Union deliberately excluded from target situations of its possible 
forcible intervention the most destructive stage of violent conflict, that is, the 
stage of escalation and intensification of physical violence including mass 
atrocity crimes, when precisely maximal and unequivocal commitment is 
most needed for saving lives. Accordingly, the majority of CFSP-born 
responses to the two wars, in general, and to their respective peaks of large-
scale violence, in particular, were non-legally binding political acts, in 
particular Declarations. I have documented this in detail in the two preceding 
chapters. One would have expected more legally binding decisions and 
actions, not least because, contrary to most non-legally binding outputs 
presented and analysed herein, they all had a Treaty base in the provisions 
for the CFSP and therefore committed far more the Union and its Member 
States. Besides, all legally binding responses, with the exception of the 
nomination of the EU Special Envoy and Representative to the Great Lakes 
Region, to any stage of either of the two wars were subsidiary contributions 
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2009 9 27 28 64 0 9 31 19 59 123 
    12 60 73 145 0 13 35 21 69 214 
 
    17 70 75 162 0 15 39 27 81 243 
 
* Number of EU Summits that addressed issues directly related to the conflict in the DR 
Congo. 
 
** The one-year period of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding for the First Congo War (June 1997 - 
August 1998) was an inter-war period and therefore served for early warning and prevention 
for the Second Congo War. The corresponding CFSP decisions and actions are included in 
the overall total sum only once. 
 
EWP: Early Warning and Prevention 
 
CM: Conflict Management 
 
PCSPB: Post-Conflict Settlement Peacebuilding  
 
N.B.: For the PCSPB phase of the first war, the EU did not adopt any Common Position on 
the DR Congo and or Great Lakes. The two CPs recorded in this table concerned Africa in 
general and only by extension can be applied to our case study. 
 
Overall, these findings clearly show that during the period under 
consideration, the CFSP largely reflected limited and selective collective 
political commitment to the R2P in general and with regard to Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the DR Congo in particular. As such, it did not live up to one of the 
key recommendations of research studies and policy reports on the failed 
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humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990’s: 
unreserved and sustained political commitment to the protection of 
populations from mass atrocity crimes across the globe. One of the main 
reasons was the primacy of self-interests at the national and EU levels.  
Appropriate knowledge, skills, and foresight 
Much of the Conflict Resolution and ‘lessons learnt’ literature mentioned in 
the preceding sections underlined the lack of appropriate knowledge, skills 
and foresight as one of the key factors that led to the failure of third party 
humanitarian intervention in the Balkans and Rwanda. The claim is that third 
parties failed to properly grasp and analyse the dynamics of the violent 
conflicts in those places and to foresee otherwise foretold and preventable 
tragedies. For a solution, the literature suggested human and material 
capacity building for appropriate information gathering and analysis. Two 
specific solutions were strongly recommended: (i) Professional training and 
recruitment of qualified and competent staff and (ii) establishment of early 
warning and prevention systems and mechanisms. My findings suggest that, 
during the period under consideration, the EU largely took on board the 
recommendation for human and material capacity building for appropriate 
early knowledge, warning, and prevention of deadly conflicts. With the 
adoption, on 2 October 1997, of the Treaty of Amsterdam and its entry into 
force on 1 May in 1999, a permanent post of the High Representative for the 
CFSP, who at the same time was the Secretary-General of the Council, was 
created and a policy unit, Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, came into 
being. Housed in the Council Secretariat and under the responsibility of its 
Secretary-General and High Representative for the CFSP, the mandate of 
the unit was to gather and analyse information on potential and actual violent 
conflicts and to recommend courses of action by the Union. Besides, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the Council to appoint, whenever it would 
deem it necessary, a special envoy/representative of the Union on CFSP 
matters. The mandate of the special envoy or representative and her/his 
team include information gathering and analysis on the ground and 
suggestions for policy formulation at the CFSP Headquarters. As indicated 
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earlier, the EU appointed its first Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region in 
March 1996, seven months to the outbreak of the First Congo War (JA 
96/250/CFSP, 25 March 1996). Unquestionably, the inception of the ESDP in 
June 1999, only one month after the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty; the adoption, four months later, of the Helsinki Commitments to 
implement it; and its swift institutional and operational strengthening from 
2001 onwards constituted the most relevant and important delivery on 
capacity and capability building for EU response to violent crises and 
conflicts over the period under scrutiny. The ESDP Committee for Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom), incepted in 2000 and composed of 
only representatives of EU Member States, provided room for inputs from 
non-state actors, in particular the Civil Society, for policy shaping and 
implementation. Such participation covered the training and recruitment of 
civilian experts (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office staff, interview, 5 
November 2007). By the year 2007, the EU had put together some 15-battle 
groups for autonomous rapid response to crises and violent conflicts at any 
stage and over 1.6 million civilian personnel specialised in four priority areas 
of civilian action: police; strengthening the rule of law; strengthening civilian 
administration and civil protection. 
In relation to the case study of this research, the findings herein presented 
clearly show that CFSP-based decisions and actions in response to violent 
conflicts and mass atrocities in the DR Congo during the period under review 
(1994-2009) included and prioritised strengthening knowledge, capacity, and 
skills of state institutions and staff in these four areas. In particular, three of 
the often praised five missions of the EU in the DR Congo (EUPOL 
‘Kinshasa’, EUPOL RD Congo, EUSEC RD Congo) focused on reforming 
and training the armed and security forces so that they could be the 
guarantor of security and safety instead of being source of all the wrongs as 
had been the case for decades. They also focused on the interaction of the 
police with the population and the judiciary, and their democratic governance 
and accountability with a view to enhancing their knowledge and handling of 




However, our findings also reveal that the design and development of these 
human, institutional, and material resources of the CFSP and their actual use 
in response to the two Congo Wars had two important and related 
shortcomings. On the one hand, they reflected much more the interveners’ 
worldviews, values, and security concerns than those of the intervention 
target societies. On the other, they are state-centred both in the outset and in 
the outlook. The CFSP and in particular its operational spine ESDP were an 
exclusive realm of EU Member States. The participation of the Civil Society 
could only occur when and where Member States would find it ‘appropriate’ 
and ‘relevant’ to the strategic objectives of Union (EPLO Staff 2007, 
interview, 5 November; EU Council Staff (Unit for Horizontal Issues) 2007, 
interview, 2 October). More importantly, their actual intervention focused on 
the (re)building of the central state to the detriment of the (re)building 
communities and the recovery of the society being intervened. As pointed out 
earlier, various academics rightly consider this approach emblematic of the 
dominant neoliberal approach to intervention in violent conflicts and partly or 
entirely responsible for the failure of international peacebuilding in many 
places (Cooper, Turner, and Pugh 2011; Francis 2012), including the DR 
Congo (Daley 2006). The original contribution of this thesis is a thorough 
scrutiny, through the lenses of Conflict Resolution, of the key reference 
documents and concrete decisions and actions on one of the most cited 
cases in this regard: the DR Congo. 
Need-tailored, sufficient, and timely response 
Research studies and policy reports on the horrors in the Balkans and 
Rwanda in the nineteen nineties convincingly established that the failure of 
third party intervention for human protection purposes there was also, if not 
mainly, due to irrelevant, insufficient, and late responses. Their main 
recommendation was need-tailored, proportionate, and timely responses 
before, during, and after violence escalation (Millwood 1996; Annan 1999; 
Carlsson et al. 1999; IPEP 2000). According to the findings herein presented, 
the CFSP-based decisions and actions to the tragedy in the DR Congo 
varyingly meet these three criteria. By the standards of the Human Need 
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Theory reviewed earlier in the chapter on the theoretical framework, they 
overall were need-tailored because they were directed to genuine and 
pressing needs. In particular, they were intended to help address three of the 
“four essential human freedoms” that President Franklin Roosevelt once 
articulated in his famous annual address to the US Congress on 6 January 
1941: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom of speech and 
expression everywhere in the world (U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration 1941). In most, if not all, the decisions and actions under the 
CFSP on the two Congo Wars, the EU strongly called for and defended the 
physical and moral integrity, safety, dignity, and freedom of movement and 
expression of the millions of innocent victims of the human rights abuses and 
mass atrocity crimes. In each and all the 243 legal and non-legal acts herein 
reviewed, the EU condemned, through its CFSP, all forms of violence and 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law, particularly mass atrocity 
crimes committed in the DR Congo during the time span of this research. 
Through the operational backbone of the CFSP, the EU provided direct 
protection to civilians from physical violence. This was specially the case 
through the conduct of two military operations (ARTEMIS and EUFOR DR 
Congo) and assistance to the UN peacekeeping force in the DR Congo. 
Some CFSP decisions also established arms embargo and restrictive 
measures against specific spoilers of the peace process (CP 
2002/829/CFSP; CP 2003/680/CFSP; CP 2005/440/CFSP). Other measures 
conditioned the assistance of the EU to the country to proven commitment of 
its leaders to basic democratic principles, good governance, and to the rule 
of law (CP 2003/319/CFSP). Various CFSP legal and non-legal acts 
supported the reform, professionalisation, and democratisation of the 
country’s armed and security forces and their interaction with the judiciary 
system. This was markedly the case through the dispatch of three civilian 
operations - EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL DR Congo, and EUSEC DR Congo - 
all of which I have accounted for in detail in the two preceding chapters. 
Besides, various CFSP initiatives defended the provision and protection of 
humanitarian assistance to the neediest persons and constantly called on the 
authorities of the country to promote and protect the freedoms and rights to 
all the nationals of the country regardless of their regional, tribal, ethnic, or 
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migratory origin. Other basic needs such as those related to identity and 
recognition were also object of various CFSP deliberations such as those 
that addressed the protracted problem of nationality, ethnicity, and 
tribalism. Indeed, constant politicization and manipulation of this problem 
had led to recurrent social and communal tensions and violent 
confrontations, particularly in the eastern provinces of the country 
(UNECOSOC 1994, 1996, 1997; Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009; Lemarchand 
2012). Hence, in one Common Position adopted in support of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue for the establishment of democracy, good governance, 
and rule of law, the EU underlined the following:  
Agreement on transition and its institutions should in particular address the 
key issues of Congolese nationality and the new organisation of the army 
and of the State with a view to the full restoration of representative 
democracy as an essential guarantee for the country's lasting and equitable 
development. (CP 2002/203/CFSP, art. 5).  
Finally, the highest decision making level of the CFSP, that it is the European 
Council, constantly called for and pledged support to the organisation of an 
international conference on peace, stability and development in the Great 
Lakes Region from as early as 1996 (European Council 1996a; European 
Council 1996b; European Council 1997). Its calls had strong echo at the UN 
level, particularly through two Security Council resolutions (S/RES/1291 
(2000); S/RES/1304 (2000)). The latter underlined “the importance of 
holding, at the appropriate time, an international conference on peace, 
security, democracy and development in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region 
under the auspices of the United Nations and of the OAU, with the 
participation of all the Governments of the region and all others concerned” 
(S/RES/1304 (2000), para. 18). The calls yielded fruit in 2004 when the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was 
established as an intergovernmental organisation. According to its founding 
declaration, its main goal was to combine and integrate regional visions and 
endeavours towards lasting peace, good governance, and socio-economic 
development for the region (Al Bashir et al. 2004). Some analysts have 
advanced that the ICGLR originally much emulated the Conference on 




One the other hand, our findings clearly show that by the standards of 
Conflict Resolution and recommendations of research studies on and policy 
evaluations of failed humanitarian interventions of the nineteen nineties, the 
CFSP response to the two Congo Wars was insufficient, particularly in 
qualitative terms. Concerning the First Congo War, its prevention required 
sufficient and sustained support to weakened state and non-state institutions 
and organisations and to the democratisation process long before the 
massive arrival and settlement of Rwandan refugees on the Congo-Rwandan 
border. Following the arrival of those refugees, the prevention of the First 
Congo War required the creation of the conditions that were indispensable 
for their voluntary repatriation, settlement, relocation, and resettlement in 
dignity and safety. Various authoritative voices timely made many and 
constant appeals and viable options for decisive action in this regard (US 
Department of State 1994; UN General Assembly 1995; UN Security Council 
1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Amnesty International 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; ECOSOC 
1996; UNHCR 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 2000; UN Security Council 
1996a, 1996b, 1996c; USCRI 1998; Odom 2006). However, the CFSP 
followed the suit of the key decision-makers of the UN Security Council and, 
in most instances, opted for procedural and declaratory foreign policy 
and the provision of humanitarian aid. The most important initiative of the 
CFSP during the prevention phase of the First Congo War was the 
appointment, on 25 March 1996, of Mr. Aldo Ajello as the first EU Special 
Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region (Joint Action 96/250/CFSP). As 
Samyn (1997: 9) sustains, that appointment “provided an instrument for joint 
analysis and for more concerted action in the region.” In his first report filed 
on 30 May 1996, Ajello warned EU authorities of the worsening situation on 
the ground and of the likeliness of a pre-emptive military action by Rwanda 
against refugee camps if the international community continued to prove 
unwilling or unable to prevent further rearming of defeated Rwandan armed 
forces and militia (Samyn 1997: 9). For a solution, Ajello essentially retook 
the proposal of the UN Secretary General that consisted of two 
complementary actions. On the one hand, he proposed the deployment of 
UN military observers in and around refugee camps areas, at airports, and 
Zaire-Rwanda borders. On the other, he suggested the isolation of political 
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and military leaders from refugee camps with a view to neutralising their 
control over ordinary refugees and to identifying refugees’ political 
representatives with whom the post-genocide Rwandan government could 
negotiate a political settlement. He even promised EU aid to the Zairian 
government to tackle the problem of intimidation in refugee camps (Samyn 
1997: 9). However, his proposal, like that of the UN Secretary General, and 
his pledge of EU contribution, remained just a proposal. The EU, like other 
key international actors, rather supported the least bad alternative of local 
contingent policing force whose initially promising performance soon faded 
away due essentially to its lack of discipline and its political 
instrumentalisation (UNHCR 2000). The remainder of CFSP-based response 
to early warnings and appeals for preventive action were Principles and 
General Guidelines and Declarations (European Council 1995a; European 
Council 1995b; European Council 1996a). As Samyn (1997: 8-9) puts it,  
For more than a year [1994-1996], the only political response to the 
increased danger of regional destabilisation was the support of the EU to the 
organisation of the regional conference for peace and security in the region 
[...], as well as to the work of the International Tribunal [for Rwanda]. 
 
The findings presented in the fifth chapter show that upon the outbreak of the 
First Congo War, it immediately became clear that the Rwandan troops and 
their allies were specifically targeting the refugee camps and that incessant 
calls were made for decisive action for the protection of the refugees. After 
wearisome deliberations, the UN Security Council voted a multinational force 
(MNF) on 15 November 1996 (UNSCR 1080 (1996)) the mandate of which 
was to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and to protect the refugees 
and war-displaced persons in eastern Zaire “by using all necessary means”. 
Notwithstanding, the force was aborted one month later under the pretext 
that the bulk of the refugees had returned to their home country amid the 
fighting and consistent reports and accounts of systematic and large-scale 
massacres of unarmed refugees and local populations suspected of 
sympathising with them (Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009). The most significant 
CFSP response was the adoption of Joint Action 96/669/CFSP and Decision 
96/670/CFSP by which the EU committed itself to contribute to that force 
under the umbrella of the Western European Union. Against all expectations, 
the EU did not take any Common Position (CP) regarding the armed conflict, 
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the country, or the region. Nor did it take any restrictive measures against 
any of the belligerents. This was mainly due to two related factors that much 
of the literature reviewed in the first chapter of this research ignored or 
undervalued in favour of the much-noted neoliberal motives. These are the 
lack of experience and benchmarks in hard power in international politics, on 
the one hand, and the diverging views and interests of key Member States, 
on the other. The testimonies of the first EU Special Representative to the 
region leave no single doubt. On the first ground, he and his team had to 
start completely from the scratch in their attempts “to draw up a 
comprehensive strategy for Europe in the region [of the Great Lakes] and 
eventually in Africa.” (Ajello and Richard 2000: 118). This justification is 
tenable because until after the end of the Cold War, the EU did not exist and 
its predecessor, the European Community (EC), had been carrying out ‘soft’ 
foreign policy. In the case of (Sub-Saharan) Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific 
(ACP) countries, that ‘soft’ sovereign policy consisted of trade, commercial, 
and development aid relations through the Yaoundé Conventions (1964-
1975) and the Lomé Conventions (1975-1999) the scope of which excluded 
political situations in aid recipient countries (de Wilde d'Estimael 2000: 68). 
Likewise, the predecessor of the CFSP, European Political Cooperation 
(EPC), which was supposed to address such aspects, was a foreign policy 
consultative and coordination framework that Member Sates used to 
exchange information and views and to make some political declarations and 
demarches (European Communities 1988; Permanent Representation of 
France to the EU 2008; Solana 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d). The context of 
the Cold War rivalries, the existence of close ties between most decolonised 
countries and their former colonial masters, and the power struggle between 
the latter within the EPC altogether rendered impossible any significant 
common foreign policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, except for South Africa 
whose Apartheid regime was the target of sustained coercive political action 
by the EPC (de Wilde d'Estimael 2000: 68-69). Concerning the second 
factor, some EU Member States did have, individually, long-standing ‘hard’ 
foreign policies and/or clear strategic plans towards the region and its 
individual countries. These Member States included Belgium - the former 
colonial power of Rwanda, Burundi, and the DR Congo - and France - the 
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main European protector of President Mobutu’s neopatrimonial and predatory 
regime. When Mobutu became strategically useless for the West as a result 
of the end of the Cold War (Braeckman 1995; Lemarchand 2001; Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002; Tshiyembe 2003; Daley 2006; Prunier 2009), his Western 
protectors could not swiftly agree on the way forward. Belgium and the 
United States wanted a swift regime change without Mobutu (Willame 2000: 
181-2); whereas France wanted him to lead the democratic change not only 
in his country but also in the whole region, particularly in the aftermath of 
genocide in Rwanda (Lanotte 2003: 213-15; Tshiyembe 2003: 94). Precisely, 
the surprising magnitude of the Rwandan genocide, its aftermath, and its 
continent-wide geostrategic implications for key Western powers simply 
made it more unlikely for EU Member States to have any common position 
for the prevention and or management of the First Congo War. In the words 
of the first EU Special Envoy to the region, “The positions were varied and 
often completely contradictory especially on Rwanda, but also on Burundi.” 
(Ajello, as quoted in Misser 2007: 4). Hence, following the armed attacks on 
Rwandan refugees and reports of repatriation of some of them, France was 
almost left alone by most of other EU Member States in its sustained defence 
of the UN multinational force (MNF) to protect refugees in eastern Zaire. The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom for instance were against the force and 
any eventual contribution of the EU to it; thus echoing the United States’ 
argument that the force was no more necessary (Lanotte 2003: 233).  
 
The CFSP-based contribution to post-conflict building following the end of 
the First Congo War too was insufficient. After the AFDL rebel forces ousted 
President Mobutu and took power in mid May 1997, their dictatorial and 
repressive ruling style was immediately unveiled and constantly denounced 
by the most credible sources. The new Congolese government rapidly 
excelled in repression of political opponents and critical civil society. It 
blocked UN-commissioned investigations into the atrocities committed 
before, during, and immediately after the First Congo War (UN Security 
Council 1998a). It also suspended and expelled humanitarian workers. At the 
same time, further systematic and massive atrocities were being committed 
particularly in the eastern provinces where an unofficial war continued until 
the outbreak of the second war on 2 August 1998 (Amnesty International 
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1997, 1998; PHR 1997; UNECOSOC 1998; USCRI 1998). However, the 
reaction of the EU under its CFSP was mostly declaratory diplomacy. The 
most valuable policy initiatives were the two Common Positions by which the 
Union legally established, at last, the principles, guidelines, priorities, and 
the approach of its contribution to conflict prevention and resolution in Africa 
(CP 97/356/CFSP) and to human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law 
and good governance in Africa (CP 98/350/CFSP). Both legal acts fell short 
of expectations by both Conflict Resolution criteria and lessons from the 
failure of the international community to protect populations in the Balkans 
and Rwanda in the 1990s. With reference to the conflict intervention 
continuum (prevention – management – rebuilding), the EU explicitly 
excluded management from its focus despite the fact that in the majority of 
violent conflicts, most mass atrocities are precisely committed during that 
phase. Besides, the Union confined its role to supporting efforts by other 
actors, in particular the UN and African and regional organisations. 
Concerning the important issue of human rights, democratic principles, rule 
of law, and good governance in Africa, the Union failed to establish a 
threshold, be it general, beyond which it would not tolerate gross violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law. Establishing such threshold would have 
sent an unequivocal warning to rogue governments and individuals involved 
in such violations as was being the case in the DR Congo.  
 
In the same way, the CFSP response to the Second Congo War was 
incommensurate. For early warning and prevention (June 1997 - August 
1998), which was the post-war period of the First Congo War, I have just 
recalled in the preceding section how that response was deficient. For 
conflict management (August 1998 - Dec. 2002), the most important 
initiatives that the EU enacted under its CFSP were four Common 
Positions, four Joint Actions, and two Decisions. All of them expressed 
the EU stance and its political, diplomatic, and technical support to the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the resulting 
Global and Inclusive Agreement and its implementation. That contribution 
was insufficient because blatant abuses of human rights went on unabated 
throughout the four-year-period (Amnesty International 1998; Human Rights 
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Watch 1998, 2000; UN General Assembly 1998, 2002), causing directly or 
indirectly the death of some 2,3 million persons in the country between 
August 1998 and May 2000 alone (International Rescue Committee, as cited 
in Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 242). Concerning post-conflict settlement 
peacebuilding (Jan. 2003- Dec. 2009), the most salient undertakings under 
the CFSP consisted of the two military operations (Operation ARTEMIS and 
EUFOR DR Congo) and three civilian missions (EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL 
DR Congo, and EUSEC DR Congo). As highlighted earlier (particularly in the 
first chapter), some reports and studies consider these missions as 
emblematic of the alleged difference that the the ESDP − the operational 
spine of the CFSP − enabled the EU to make in that country (Head of Unit at 
the Council of the EU 2007, interview, 3 October; Dobbins et al. 2008; 
Belliard 2009). The CFSP response to the needs of post-conflict settlement 
peacebuilding also included the extension of the embargo and restrictive 
measures against UN-identified spoilers of the peace process in the DR 
Congo and in the region (Common Position 2002/829/CFSP; Common 
Position 2003/680/CFSP). Nonetheless, that contribution too fell very short of 
expectations in view of the many gross violations of  human rights and 
humanitarian law, including mass atrocity crimes, that were constantly 
reported and denounced throughout the period from the signing of the Global 
and Inclusive Agreement (December 2002) to the 2009 celebration of the 
‘success’ stories. An unofficial war involving regular armies and tens of 
armed groups and militias continued in the eastern provinces of the country. 
It caused the killing and maiming of hundreds of thousands persons and the 
displacement of millions of others; as well as the systematic plundering of the 
natural resources and other wealth of the country (Amnesty International 
2003a; UNECOSOC 2003; UN General Assembly 2005; Human Rights 
Watch 2006b; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2006; UN General 
Assembly 2006, 2009). Furthermore, the two military operations and the 
three civilian missions were too limited in scope, space, strength, and or in 
time to meet adequately the needs of all the war-affected civilians throughout 
the country. All recommendations and requests for their otherwise justified 
extension fell on deaf ears (Helly 2009; Major 2009; Martin 2010). 
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Doubtlessly, the lack of sharply identified important common stakes of the EU 
in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
absence in the region of serious and direct threat to the core values and 
interests of the EU underpinned the minimalist approach of the five 
operations. As mentioned earlier (particularly in the third chapter), with the 
end of the Cold War, the DR Congo lose any strategic relevance for the 
same Western powers that had placed and protected the country’s long-
serving dictator President Mobutu for three decades. It was not until March 
1996 that the EU was able to appoint its first Special Envoy to the region with 
a mandate to gather elements that would help formulate any common foreign 
policy of the EU for the region and Sub-Saharan Africa. The first result of that 
mission was the adoption, three years later and three months into the 
Second Congo War, of Common Position 1999/728/CFSP in support of the 
implementation of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and the peace process in 
the DR Congo. It was not until May 2001 that the EU finally adopted its first 
common position on Africa (CP 2001/374/CFSP) and in which it specified 
that its contribution to conflict prevention, management, and resolution on 
that continent would be limited to supporting efforts by the UN, African Union, 
and African sub-regional organisations. As indicated earlier (in the 
‘Commentary’ section of chapter 6), the EU did not adopt any Common 
Strategy - the most important legal instrument under the CFSP - on the DR 
Congo or Africa. Nor did the 2003 European Security Strategy - which 
identified the security threats and challenges the EU and its key allies had to 
decisively deal with - include the DR Congo, its region, or Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the geostrategic objectives of the CFSP.  
By contrast, the existence of clearly identified and long-standing strategic 
importance of Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean region underlay the 
adoption of  a Common Strategy on each of these geographical areas, 
shortly after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (on 1 May 1999) 
that introduced that legal instrument: Common Strategy on Russia 
(1999/414/CFSP), Common Strategy on Ukraine (1999/877/CFSP), and 
Common Strategy on the Mediterranean zone (2000/458/CFSP). Moreover, 
the 2003 European Security Strategy included the three geographical areas 
in the strategic priorities of the foreign and security policy of the EU (Council 
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of the European Union 2003b). For a comparison of resources allocation, the 
initial strength of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) was 478 international staff and 296 national staff. The 
Mission had a law enforcement component at international standards and, 
throughout its ten-year duration (2003-2012), it “maintained its presence in 
the entire country through regional and field offices, ensuring monitoring, 
mentoring and advising at all levels, from local to entity and state level.” 
(Council 2012a: 1). For a broader picture, the DR Congo (with 2.344.858 sq 
km and 73.599.190 population as of July 2012 (United States Central 
Intelligence Agency 2013a) is nearly 46 times bigger and was by then 18 
times more populated than BiH (51.197 sq km and 3.752.200 population as 
of July 2012 (United States Central Intelligence Agency 2013b). In terms of 
UN-set human development indicators (health, education, and income), in 
2003 BiH belonged to the category of ‘Medium human development’ 
countries and ranked 68 on world scale, with a life expectancy at birth of 74.2 
years (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2013: 238). By 
contrast, the DR Congo pertained to the category of ‘Low human 
development’ countries and ranked 168 on a world scale, with a life 
expectancy at birth of 43.1 years (UNDP 2005: 226). Moreover, at the time, 
the DR Congo was still convalescing from the terrible desolation caused by 
‘Africa’s First World War’ and had hardly initiated its post-war healing 
process. On the other hand, the international community had continuously 
assisted the BiH from 1995 onwards. The first time, the assistance was 
provided by NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of 60.000 
troops. The second time, it was by another NATO-led substitute force 
(Stabilisation Force (SFOR)); whereas the third time it was a European Union 
peacekeeping force (EUFOR). The latter replaced SFOR in December 2004 
and was strong of 7000 troops at its initial stage and of 1400 troops as of 
March 2012 (Council 2012a). Undeniably, the bloody disintegration of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s inspired more fear and 
shame because it took place in the backyard of the EU. It triggered a swift 
response of the CFSP because, unlike the Africa’s Great Lakes Region or 
Sub-Saharan Africa in general, the Balkan region was the primary strategic 
objective of the CFSP from the very inception of the EU (Hallergård 2009). In 
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defence of the EU little action to rescue the people of Darfur, one senior 
diplomat at the Policy Unit of the EU Council simply told me that, “[EU] Crisis 
Management tools, ESDP, [...] were not designed originally to take them or 
use them in Africa”. As I promptly asked him where the EDSP was originally 
and primarily supposed to be used, he replied with a bit of astonishment and 
irritation at my apparent ignorance: “Well, it's more in the Neighbourhood (my 
interruption), Balkans and Caucasus and so on.” (Head of Unit at Council 
2007, interview, 3 October). In his view and that of various EU Member 
States’ diplomats dispatched to the EU capital and to whom I talked to, the 
EU had been doing more for Africa than for its neighbours in central Asia. A 
Swedish ambassador went as far as to inform me that several Member 
States, especially new Member States, felt that the EU was doing “too much 
on Africa” under the ESDP. He reported that they could not understand why 
the EU was sending “two thousand troops to Chad” while it had problems in 
its backyard “with strong tensions between Russia and Georgia [...] and 
frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh” in the Southern Caucasus (Anonymous 
2008, interview, 19 May).  
In terms of timing, the most notable CFSP response to the two Congo Wars 
during the period under review came too late to prevent or to halt some of 
the gross and systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 
With the exception of non-legally binding initiatives, in particular 
Declarations, our findings clearly show that the CFSP response came long 
after large-scale and high intensity fighting and related mass atrocity crimes 
had ended. In other words, the majority of CFSP decisions and actions 
corresponded to the phase of post-war peacebuilding. The first legally 
binding and most important contribution to the prevention of the First Congo 
War was Joint Action 96/250/CFSP that the EU adopted on 25 March 1996 
and by which it nominated its first Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region. 
His mandate was to gather field information, views, and ideas, and to 
formulate concrete proposals for the Union to design its own foreign policy for 
appropriate conflict prevention first, and subsequently conflict 
management and transformation. Arguably, that appointment was due 
upon the earliest warning, that is, at the outbreak of the Rwandan refugee 
crisis in summer 1994; and not just six months into the outbreak of the First 
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Congo War. In contrast, the EU issued its first pre-war recorded CFSP 
Declaration in July 1995, nearly a year before the adoption of the first legally 
binding and significant initiative (JA 96/250/CFSP). Regarding the 
management phase of the First Congo War, the EU published its first CFSP 
Declaration on 21 October 1996. This was four days before the EU 
Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid publicly stated that a new genocide 
seemed to be under way, and urged the international community to “clearly 
say that it was not going to be tolerated” (Ms. Bonino, as quoted in Reyntjens 
2009: 88). On the other hand, the EU enacted the first legally binding CFSP 
response to the war, Joint Action 96/656/CFSP, on 11 November 1996, two 
months into large-scale fighting and massacres of civilians. This legal act 
announced and outlined the contribution of the EU “to the democratic 
transition process in Zaire”, mainly in the preparation for elections. By any 
standards, this announcement was due long before the outbreak of the First 
Congo War, shortly after the entry into force of the CFSP provisions in 
November 1993. Indeed, political transition in that country started in 1991. 
Following the arrival of Rwandan refugees in the summer of 1994, Zairian 
authorities, in particular its Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo, tiredly decried 
their country’s inability to bring that transition to the desired end because of 
lack of means. Likewise, the first response to the Second Congo War under 
the CFSP was a Declaration (Press 255, Nr 10396/98) that was issued on 
11 August 1998, nine days into hostilities. The first legally binding response 
was Common Position 1999/722/CFSP that the EU adopted on 8 
November 1999, 13 months into the war. It concerned the support of the EU 
to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and peace process in the DR Congo. 
Even when the most cited ‘success’ story (Operation ARTEMIS) took place 
(June - September 2003), the violence (in Ituri) it was intended to halt had 
already taken the life of about five thousands persons between July 2002 and 
the beginning of 2003; and had left over 50,000 dead and hundreds of 
thousands of displaced persons since 1999. By then (2003), the International 
Rescue Committee estimated at 3.5 million the number of human casualties 
of the conflict since 1998 (Amnesty International 2003e: 1). Here again, 
various factors, instead of one single motive, concurrently restrained the 
CFSP from responding timely to the two Congo Wars. I have detailed these 
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motives earlier in the two preceding sections and ‘Commentary’ sections of 
chapters 5 and 6. They included the lack of experience and benchmarks; the 
insignificant strategic value of the Africa’s Great Lakes Region for the EU; 
diverging views and interests among EU Member States; and the self-
assigned subsidiary status of the CFSP concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Comprehensive and complementary approach 
In line with the Conflict Resolution approach, the evaluations and research 
studies mentioned at the start of this chapter regarding the failure of the 
international community to protect civilians from genocide and other forms of 
mass killings in the Balkans and in Rwanda in the early 1990s included the 
lack of comprehensiveness and complementarity of responses as one of 
the main underlying factors. For a solution, Conflict Resolution suggests that 
undertakings aimed at preventing, managing, and constructively transforming 
violent conflicts be intrinsically multi-level, multi-functional, and 
complementary; all of which requires appropriate coordination. The ‘multi-
level’ requirement means that responses to a violent conflict should target all 
the levels of its manifestation: individual and interpersonal level; community 
level; sub-national level; national level; regional level; and systemic level. Our 
findings attest that the CFSP response to the two Congo Wars did not live up 
to the task because most of its key decisions and actions focused on the 
national level and on the central state apparatus, particularly in the capital 
and large urban areas. This was particularly the case for the five operations 
that allegedly enabled the EU to make a difference in its response. That 
narrow focus was detrimental to the countryside where two-thirds of the 
nearly 70 million Congolese population lived in self-organised communities, 
villages, and chiefdoms; and where most of the mass atrocities reviewed in 
this study occurred, particularly in the war-afflicted eastern provinces. Even in 
peacetime and since the onset of the Mobutu regime onwards, these 
communities, villages, and chiefdoms would from time to time engage in 
violent competition against each other for the control of power and resources, 
resulting in many human casualties and huge material losses. As indicated in 
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the chapter on the background of this thesis, they would do so either under 
the instigation of the central state authorities or on their own initiative. The 
situation unprecedentedly worsened in the context of the two Congo Wars. 
Indeed,   
Throughout the eastern Congo, bottom-up rivalries played a decisive role in 
sustaining local, national, and regional violence after the conflict officially ended. 
These agendas pitted villagers, traditional chiefs, community chiefs, or ethnic 
leaders against one another over the distribution of land, the exploitation of local 
mining sites, the appointment of local administrative and traditional positions of 
authority, the collection of local taxes, and the relative social status of specific 
groups and individuals. The resulting violence was not coordinated on a large scale 
but was rather the product of fragmented, micro-level militias, each of which tried to 
advance its own agenda at the level of the village or districts. (Autesserre 2010: 8).       
The inability or unwillingness to address the Congo tragedy on the various 
levels of its manifestation was a serious shortcoming because it had both 
top-down causes – inexistence of central state institutions worth the name – 
and bottom-up sources – local transposition and adaptation of the 
malfunctioning of the central state. Autesserre rightly advances that 
resources for international peacebuilding in the DR Congo could have been 
used “in a manner more conducive to peace than disproportionately focusing 
on elections, security sector reform, or the repatriation of foreign militias.” In 
her view, “International peacebuilders should have devoted part of their time, 
efforts and resources to local conflict resolution, because local tensions were 
crucial.” (Autesserre 2010: 243). Martin (2010: 71) too sustains that “a more 
explicit focus on engaging with local organisations and civil society could 
have improved both visibility on the ground and the effectiveness of the 
initiatives [EUFOR, EUPOL, and EUSEC DR Congo].” As indicated from 
outset of this thesis, the shortcoming in these and other studies on 
international peacebuilding in the DR Congo concerns three aspects. These 
are the unspecified use of the term ‘conflict resolution’; the attribution of the 
failure or mixed results to one single cause, which is the “politics of frames” in 
the case of Autesserre; and the generalisation of one such factor for all 
international peacebuilding initiatives in that country at all levels and stages 
of the bloody conflict. Moreover, as these quotes suggest, there is a 
persistent tendency to intermingle problems of level of involvement (national, 
subnational, local, individual, international) with those of issue-area 
(elections, security sector reform, repatriation of foreign militias); whereas 
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failure or mixed results on the former does not necessarily entail failure or 
mixed results  on the latter and vice versa. As highlighted earlier (in the 
section on Methodology and the chapter on the theoretical framework), the 
two concepts of analysis (issue-area and level) are complementary but 
different. They are not interchangeable and for the sake of analytical clarity 
and accuracy, one should always make that difference clear. 
On the regional level, the CFSP response to the two wars was deficient 
because the  EU used its powerful development aid leverage more as a 
carrot than a stick in its dealing with African countries (namely Angola, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) who partly caused or 
exacerbated either of the two wars, mainly through direct military intervention 
(André and Luzolele 2001b). I concur with André and Luzolele (2001b: 31) 
that this policy contravened the principles and values at the heart of EU 
development aid and had negative effects for the prevention and resolution of 
the deadly conflict. Indeed, un-interrupted and unconditional aid flow meant 
political support to the recipient countries and reinforced their capacity to 
wage and sustain bloody wars in the DR Congo. On the systemic level, the 
EU always aligned and conditioned its CFSP response to that of other 
powerful international actors, regardless of the relevance and quality of their 
contribution. A combination of various factors underlay the shortcoming on 
the regional and international levels. They included the definition of the two 
wars as a direct consequence of state failure and the view of some key 
regional leaders, namely Rwandan and Ugandan presidents, as representing 
hope for a politically and economically liberalised Africa. They also comprised 
the ‘guilt’ complex from the Rwandan genocide; the non-exclusive 
competence status and unanimity voting principle of the CFSP; the self-
assigned subsidiary role of the CFSP regarding the maintenance of 
international peace and security; and the primacy of values, worldview, and 
interests of the EU.  
On the other hand, the multi-functionality requirement concerns the issue-
areas of intervention. It entails that decisions and actions address all the 
different aspects of the conflict, in particular political, economic, social, 
educational / cultural, psychological, judicial, and security dimensions. I have 
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extensively reviewed these points earlier in the chapter on the theoretical 
framework. The findings herein presented show that the CFSP response was 
below expectations because the most important decisions and actions 
focused on the rebuilding, by state actors, of four central pillars of the state: 
the government, the army, the police, and the judiciary. The most emblematic 
examples are the two military operations (ARTEMIS, EUFOR DR Congo) and 
the three non-military missions (EUSEC DR Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa, and 
EUPOL DR Congo). Other equally important issue-areas such as truth, 
reconciliation, collective memory, compensation for victims, community 
capacity building in constructive conflict handling, and international 
accountability and responsibility were either left out or insufficiently taken on 
board in important decisions and actions, in particular the legally binding 
ones. When it updated its ESS, the EU acknowledged and justified its choice 
as follows: "Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration are a key part of postconflict stabilisation and reconstruction, 
and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo." 
(Council of the European Union (Council) (2008e): 8). Four causes, instead 
of a single one as is often advanced, concurrently underlay that choice. The 
first one is the original design of the CFSP as a pillar exclusively for 
addressing ‘hard’ foreign and security policy. The second factor is the easy 
and rewarding mediatisation and marketisation of (non-)intervention in those 
issue-areas, as evidenced by the excessive if not exclusive focus of most 
literature on the five operations, in total disregard of non-operational 
initiatives under the CFSP. The third one is the total decay in which the 
central state apparatus of the DR Congo was at the time of the two wars. The 
fourth and last determinant is the view of the state as the primary if not sole 
provider of peace, security, and well-being for the populations living within its 
boundaries. From this perspective, statebuilding as an issue-area was a 
much-needed component of international peacebuilding in that country. 
However, in view of the application of the same mode of operation 
irrespective of the particularities of each bloody protracted conflict, the fourth 
factor tends to outweigh any other single explanatory element. One scholar, 
Roland Paris, seems to refer to this prevailing underlying motive as the diktat 
of global culture. Paris (2003: 443) defines it as “the prevailing norms of 
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global culture, which legitimize certain kinds of peacekeeping policies and 
delegitimize others.” (Paris 2003: 443). He uses the term ‘peacekeeping’ “in 
its broadest sense to include the many variants of multinational peace 
operations, including ‘traditional peacekeeping’, ‘peace-enforcement’ and 
‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ missions.” (Paris 2003: 464, note 1). He draws 
on ‘world polity’ sociologists who “treat the entire world as a single society, 
and argue that there is a distinct global culture that comprises the formal and 
informal rules of international social life” and that “defines whom the principal 
actors in world politics should be, how these actors should organize 
themselves internally, and how they should behave.” (Paris 2003: 442). In his 
view, “the design and conduct of peacekeeping missions reflect not only the 
interests of key parties and the perceived lessons of previous operations, but 
also the prevailing norms of global culture.” (Paris 2003: 443; emphasis 
added). He holds that peace operations “are prisoners of global culture in the 
sense that peacekeeping agencies seem to lack the freedom to pursue 
peacekeeping strategies that violate, or risk violating, global cultural norms, 
even if these strategies are potentially more effective at fostering peace than 
the peacekeeping policies currently in use.” (Paris 2003: 463). Drawing on 
fourteen case studies of major peacebuilding operations carried out between 
1989 and 1999 worldwide, he found out that third parties failed in their 
intervention essentially because of their preference for and imposition of 
one specific form of (international) peacebuilding, that is, an all-at-once and 
quick political and economic liberalization and their disregard or 
undervaluation of its inherent “destabilising effects [...] in the fragile 
circumstances of countries just emerging from civil wars.” (Paris 2004: 6). In 
the same line of reasoning, Autesserre refers to this kind of diktat as the 
“politics of frame”. In clear reference to the case of the DR Congo, she 
affirms that the “dominant international peacebuilding culture often orients 
intervention strategies away from local conflict resolution and towards 
popular, but harmful, tactics such as the rapid organisation of elections.” 
(Autesserre 2010: 271). For Martin (2010: 70), the EU involvement in the DR 
Congo was “informed by the Commission’s Strategy for Africa, drawn up in 
2005, which draws on the failed state discourse and sees security and the 
restoration of governance as the pre-conditions for peace and sustainable 
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development.” Such driving force, whether one coins it diktat of global culture 
or politics of frames, reflects nothing more and nothing less than the 
aforementioned state-centric perception and projection of the world –
worldview – as a norms-bound, rule-based, and multilaterally managed 
international society of democratically governed states. Perhaps no other 
single international actor holds and advocates this worldview as firmly and 
decisively as the EU does, as it transpires from the most important reference 
document for its foreign and security policy: the European Security Strategy 
(Council 2003b, 2008e).  
Finally, complementarity between the different responses within the 
different departments of the EU and in its interaction with other interveners 
too was unsatisfactory. Certainly, all decisions and actions concerning the 
prevention and management of the two wars as well as the post-war 
rebuilding of the country contained clear mention of the importance of 
complementarity and clauses for its actual application. Regarding in-house 
coordination, clear and direct reference was always made to actions 
undertaken under the Community procedure, in particular humanitarian 
assistance, development aid, and external relations, on the one hand; and 
decisions and actions by individual Member States of the EU, on the other. In 
2003, this cardinal principle was enshrined in the European Security 
Strategy, the document that the EU presented as embodying the scope, 
values, norms, principles, and the mode of operation for the CFSP (Council 
2003b). All my interviewees from the EU Commission and Council attested to 
strict adherence to and compliance with the principle of internal coordination 
and provided concrete examples of efforts towards that end. However, they 
also acknowledged that they still had a long and hard way to go. One 
Swedish ambassador could not be more sincere:  
Well I don't think we are that coherent if I should be quite frank with you. That's an 
area (deep sigh!) where we have identified a problem and then we need to be 
better and improved. And that relates to creating a structure here in Brussels which 
is more coherent. You know, the proposal now is to have one External Action 
Service (EAS) [...] You know, we will have more like a Desk System where you 
have a Gabon Desk and people on the Gabon Desk would see how the EU plays 
its policy in terms of Trade [...], Aid, security policy, possibly ESDP, etc. So, I think 
that's going to be improved. On the national level, that's really up to each national 
country. The EU cannot, you know, call us and say, ‘Look, you can't do this and 
that, because it contravenes what we had; you know, our general policy vis-à-vis 
Zimbabwe.’ I mean if you go against a Common Position, I mean, or Joint Action 
 297 
 
on sanctions, it's one case. But coherence ‘National vis-à-vis Brussels’ has to be 
managed at home by each capital. I do not think that's a major problem. Because, 
especially when it comes to Africa, I think most countries, most European Union 
countries, have the EU as their main vehicle for their foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. 
(Anonymous 2008, interview, 19 May).   
To my inquisitive surprise concerning his implied specificity of Africa, he 
responded assertively as follows:  
I think so! I think that for the big ones it might not be the case. I mean France, UK, 
Belgium perhaps, former colonial powers, Portugal, you know, might have, I mean, 
intense relations that perhaps go beyond what the EU is doing; but most countries 
like ourselves I think we have a very close look at what the EU does. I mean if we 
get a response or a question from our Parliament in Sweden about what Sweden 
does about Guinea Bissau, well, then the answer would be ‘with the EU Minister, 
this and this and this and that.’ We usually say that ‘What the EU does is what we 
do.’ (Anonymous 2008, interview, 19 May). 
My respondent insisted that no Member State contravened the EU when it 
came to its legally binding decisions and actions like sanctions and other 
restrictive measures. When I asked him what in his view the CFSP was not 
doing but should be doing for the future, he again showed more optimism 
about internal coherence and comprehensiveness than for the ‘EU - Member 
States’ duality:   
(Long silence, sigh!) Well...I mean, I would hope that it comes more coordinated, 
coherent, in a sense that the EU is more consistent you know with ... If we want to 
... If you look at Afghanistan, you know, 'What can the EU do there?' Well, we are 
there with a very small mission, with police training, basically. We still see 
Afghanistan as a huge producer of opium drugs. What is the EU doing about that? 
Much of that drug is contributing to financing the insurgency and they destroy our 
populations who consume those drugs. But then 'Why don't we have a strong 
policy on drugs which is very effective there in Afghanistan?' We don't. As far as I 
understand, we don't. And that policy needs to be dealing with farmers' interest to 
have other crops that the EU buys. And that requires a trade policy which opens its 
boarders for products from Afghanistan for example. Of course, there would be 
farmers in Europe who would react negatively to that because they would fear the 
competition. But my point is that unless a strategic and a whole holistic view on the 
situation where also trade, farm products, and drugs are part of the question, then I 
don't think the EU will have that much impact. So, my hope is that the CFSP would 
really be a common policy which would be more coherent, which will include also 
other aspects of what the EU does. (Anonymous 2008, interview, 19 May). 
Regarding the case under scrutiny, various analysts have pointed to 
important problems of coherence and coordination in the EU. According to 
Martin (2010: 72),  
Where the three missions [EUFOR, EUPOL, and EUSEC DR Congo] failed most 
was in coherence, and their ability to either connect the different aspects of EU 
engagement in the DRC, or provide a continuum between short term ‘rapid 
reaction’ measures and long-term assistance, or the individual missions and their 
personnel as much as the context, particularly within the Brussels system, in which 
these missions are planned and implemented. There has been an element of 
‘accidental success’ about civilian-military coordination. A successful outcome was 
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often achieved despite mission mandates and thanks to the creative energies and 
careful planning of individuals in implementing them. 
Debatably, the negative impact of the lack of coherence between the CFSP 
and any other policy of the EU towards that country was less of a problem 
before 2003. Broad cooperation between the EU and the DR Congo resumed 
only in 2002 after nearly a decade of a suspension enacted in the early 
1990s to exert pressure on President Mobutu for democratic change. After 
2002 and throughout to the ‘success’ story celebration date (2009), traditional 
development cooperation with that country was mainly shaped by two 
successive Country Strategy Papers (Country Strategy Paper for the DRC 
2003-2007; Country Strategy Paper for the DRC 2008-2013). The EU 
elaborated these documents drawing on, first, the EU Strategy for Africa 
(2005) and, second, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2007). More serious 
coherence problems occurred between the CFSP response and initiatives of 
other interveners. According to the first Special Envoy and Representative of 
the EU to the region, with the exception of the payment chain for the soldiers, 
the “remaining of the programme for creating a new army [was] neither faster 
nor more efficient” mainly because of coordination problems:  
A first problem that we met to define the framework of a coherent army was the 
multiplicity of actors. Several countries and international organisations had shown 
interest to assist Congo in the reform of the army. A non-exhaustive list would 
include South Africa, Angola, the Belgium, the France, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, the Germany, the United States, the United Nations and the African 
Union. However, each of these players had its own ideas on the designated type of 
army to be created, on how to do so, and sometimes its own agenda. The risk was 
to end up with a ‘patchwork’ army, where units were more or less consistent with 
the model of the country which had formed them, but perfectly inconsistent 
between them. (Ajello 2010: 171). 
Even entrusting the task of coordination to the EU mission ‘EUSEC DR 
Congo’ in the capital Kinshasa reportedly did not solve the problem of 
competition and duplication. As a result, three years passed by after the start 
of the mission (in 2005) before a new model of the new integrated army was 
at last consensually agreed among the different players and approved by the 
Congolese government in 2008. For Ajello (2010: 171), “coordination proved 
more difficult than expected” because each of the actors who were involved 
“wanted to keep its own identity and continued to pursue its bilateral agenda.” 
Here again, various factors, rather than one single determinant, concurrently 
underpinned the failure or limited success of both internal and external 
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coherence and coordination of the CFSP response to the two wars. However, 
for the sake of analytical clarity and accuracy, it is important to discern (or 
attempt to do so) those determinants and their corresponding weight. 
Regarding in-house coherence and coordination, the first determinant is the 
conceptual and legal insulation, from the start, of the CFSP as a standalone 
pillar from the rest of EU external policies, namely development and 
humanitarian aid policy and trade policy. The second factor is its placement 
under the intergovernmental control. The third determinant is the ambiguity 
over its scope that guaranteed that any issue-area could at any time fall 
under the realm of the CFSP if Member States would so decide. The fourth 
determinant was the lack of (sufficient) in-house experience in ‘hard’ foreign 
and security matters when the CFSP was established in 1993. This factor 
also accounted for the problems of external coherence and coordination. 
Through a CFSP in its early development, the EU had to coordinate with 
various actors with more than a century of experience in high politics on the 
international scene and with clearly defined self-interests and means to 
pursue them in the DR Congo, the Great Lakes Region, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa in general. Other causes of the problems of external coherence and 
coordination included precisely the lack of (1) a common view of the bloody 
conflict and (2) clearly identified core common interests and plan of action 
until after the adoption, on 14 May 2001, of the first Common Position 
concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa (CP 
2001/374/CFSP). They also included the non-exclusive competence status of 
the CFSP, which allowed Member States to pursue their own foreign and 
security policy agenda individually or in coalition, and the self-assigned 
subsidiary role of the CFSP regarding the maintenance of international peace 






CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
What do we learn when we analyse through the lenses of Conflict Resolution 
the alleged potential of the CFSP and ESDP of the EU and their actual 
contribution to its response to the two Congo Wars? This was the main 
research question that this thesis set out to address. As exposed in the first 
chapter, it has been often claimed that the introduction of the CFSP in 1993 
and its organic and operational development from then onwards meant a 
major qualitative shift from declaratory foreign policy to concrete, appropriate 
decisions and actions for human protection purposes worldwide. People who 
hold this assertion underline the CFSP principle of common stance and joint 
action, on the one hand; and, on the other, the operational resources - in 
particular, the military capabilities - that the EU developed following the 
inception, in 1999, of the ESDP (Solana 2000; Tonra 2000; Stavridis 2001; 
Habermas and Derrida 2003; Petiteville 2003; Reynolds 2004; Wong 2005; 
Permanent Representation of France to the EU 2008; Solana 2009a). For 
empirical evidence, some EU officials and researchers point to the CFSP-
based response to the two Congo Wars, notably the five ESDP operations 
that the EU undertook in the DR Congo from 2003 onwards (Dobbins et al. 
2008; Belliard 2009). This thesis, like various other studies, holds that that 
this double-folded claim is overstated at best. However, unlike many other 
studies, it shows that no single factor but rather the interplay of various 
determinants, both intrinsic and extrinsic, varyingly undermined the potential 
of the CFSP and made its response to the two wars in the DR Congo 
insufficient and often too late. This has been possible through the use of the 
Conflict Resolution approach which prescribes comprehensive and 
systematic analysis of violent conflicts; third party involvement in their 
handling; and responses that are timely, tailored to the victims’ needs, 
sufficient, multi-levelled, and multi-functional not only after the formal end of 
armed confrontation, but also before the outbreak of violence and during its 
escalation. The findings herein presented clearly suggest various degrees 
and stages of failure and success throughout the period under evaluation. 
Regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the CFSP, its swift and 
sustained organic and operational growth from its inception in 1993 to the 
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celebration date of the ‘success story’ in 2009 sharply contrasts with the lack 
of clarity and significant progress in terms of normative stance and political 
commitment with reference to the R2P populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity worldwide. On the one 
hand, in a relatively short period, the EU rapidly transformed itself from its 
traditional status of a civilian actor into that of a civil-military actor in 
international politics. It rapidly established and developed legal, institutional, 
and policy-making frameworks and mechanisms that enabled it to respond 
autonomously or in conjunction with other actors to various violent crises and 
conflicts within and outside Europe. These successful developments 
comprise the rapid Treaty-based institutionalisation and operationalisation of 
in-house capacity building for the collection, analysis, and sharing of 
information; and for the formulation and implementation of foreign and 
security policy options. The institutionalisation of the system of special 
envoys and representatives, whom the EU dispatches and keeps in places 
that are prone to or are afflicted by violent crises and conflicts, or in important 
international and regional intergovernmental organisations, is worth noting. 
Undeniably, their presence of EU special envoys and representatives in the 
field and their work help keep and improve EU awareness of and concern for 
those crises and conflicts, and constitute valuable inputs for its foreign policy 
making while at the same time enhancing its international visibility and 
prestige. On the other hand, throughout the period under review (1994-2009), 
the CFSP remained normatively and politically weak and selective with 
regard to its own pledge of a “new international morality” for human 
protection purposes worldwide (Solana 2000: 6). This was due to the non-
exclusive competence of the CFSP vis-à-vis Member States, its unanimity 
voting rule, its self-assigned subsidiary status regarding the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and its Eurocentric view and approach to 
world peace and security. The non-exclusive right of initiative vis-à-vis 
Member States and the unanimity voting principle (for all legally binding 
decisions, except implementing decisions) ensured that only issue-areas, 
positions, decisions, and actions agreed on by each and all Member States 
could become part of the CFSP. The findings herein presented confirm that 
this Treaty-based inbuilt limitation was the price for the acceptance of the 
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CFSP by all Member States. Important negative consequences include the 
ambiguity over the scope and mode of operation of the CFSP and the failure 
to speak always with a single voice at the UN Security Council. As a result, 
on various occasions, the CFSP proved to be much less common than 
claimed and desired, and its initiatives on the Congo tragedy very often 
reflected the lowest common denominator. The self-assigned subsidiary role 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, in general, and for 
the R2P populations in danger, in particular, implies that any undertaking by 
the EU for human protection purposes requires prior authorisation of the UN 
Security Council. This position reflects the strong belief of the EU in a 
multilateralism bound by international law and in the UN as standing “at the 
apex of the international system.” (Council 2008e: 2). As this thesis has 
established, this is quite discouraging because the EU does not have a seat 
on the UN Security Council and those EU Member States who have a seat 
on it do not want to give it up in favour of the EU; and generally they speak 
more for themselves than for the EU. As Haine (2009: 457) has noted, 
“Multilateralism as a condition of action can rapidly become an alibi for 
inaction.” Finally, the Eurocentric view and approach to world peace and 
security of the EU underlies the deliberate focus of the CFSP response to 
violent crises and conflicts on issue-areas of political and economic 
liberalisation and statebuilding, rather on community building and nation 
building. The Eurocentric view and approach also entails the primacy of EU 
interests. The identification of four geostrategic objectives (Balkans, 
Caucasus, Middle East, and Mediterranean region) for the EU Security 
Strategy (Council 2003b; Council 2008e) and the exclusion of forcible conflict 
management from its first Common Position on conflict prevention, 
management and resolution in Africa (CP 2001/374/CFSP, 14 May 2001) are 
good illustrations.  
 
Concerning the CFSP-based response to the two Congo Wars, this thesis 
has also unveiled various degrees and stages of failure and success 
throughout the period under review; and that various determinants, instead of 
a single one, underpinned, in varying degrees, those achievements and 
failures. With reference to the First Congo War, this research has established 
that two factors concurrently accounted more than any other (of the different 
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determinants herein identified) for the failure of the EU to make the best use 
of available resources, namely Common Positions and Joint Actions. The first 
factor is the situation of early infancy that the EU was in at the time and the 
corresponding lack of experience and benchmarks in hard foreign policy. The 
second and perhaps definitive factor is the primacy, through the Treaty-
based non-exclusive competence and unanimity voting rule of the CFSP, of 
national self-interests of each Member State, particularly in the absence of 
clearly defined core common interests among all Member States as was the 
case. Regarding the Second Congo War, the findings of this research 
suggest that there was a significant improvement in the CFSP-based 
response. The EU took more decisions and actions than it did for the first 
war. More importantly, some of those decisions and actions led to the 
launching, implementation, and extension of two military operations 
(Operation ARTEMIS, 2003, and EUFOR DR Congo, 2006) and three civilian 
missions (EUPOL Kinshasa, 2005; EUSEC DR Congo, 2005; and EUPOL 
DR Congo, 2007). In particular, the EU resorted to the so-called restrictive / 
negative measures, that is, compliance enforcement measures, against UN-
listed spoilers of the peace process. However, those decisions and actions 
were insufficient and most often the EU took them too late to help prevent or 
halt the large-scale bloodshed caused by that war. As in the case for the first 
war, no achievement or shortcoming may be attributed to a single underlying 
factor out of the eight ones that I have identified for all the decisions and 
actions of the CFSP regarding the two wars: 
 Lack of experience and benchmarks in ‘high politics’ (hard) foreign 
policy;  
 Early age of the CFSP at the time of the two wars;  
 Subsidiary role of the CFSP;  
 Non-exclusive competence status and unanimity voting rule of the 
CFSP; 
 Primacy of core values, worldviews, and interests of the EU and its 
key allies; 
 The conceptual and legal insulation, from the start, of the CFSP as a 
standalone pillar from the rest of EU external policies; 
 Somalia Syndrome; and 
 Guilt complex from the Rwandan genocide. 
 304 
 
The self-assigned subsidiary role of the CFSP; its non-exclusive competence 
status and unanimity voting rule; and the primacy of the values, worldviews, 
and interests of the EU and its key allies altogether seem to account more for 
the insufficiency and delays of the CFSP response to the Second Congo 
War. The first determinant was for instance responsible for the dependency 
of the EU on the UN Security Council for the launching the five operations 
and the use of restrictive / negative measures against UN-identified spoilers 
of the peace process. Each time, the EU opted for aligning its decisions and 
actions with the decisions and actions of the UN Security Council. Besides, 
the non-exclusive competence status and unanimity voting rule of the CFSP, 
and the primacy of core values, worldviews, and interests of the EU and its 
main allies altogether were largely responsible for the non-use of the 
Common Strategy instrument and the use of more and better resources for 
post-conflict peacebuilding. They also decisively underpinned the limitation of 
time, resources, and levels of involvement as well as the focus on 
statebuilding and the special, positive treatment of regional leaders perceived 
as favourable to the neoliberal agenda. 
 
In the same line of reasoning, one should also not generalise failure or 
success. Overall, the findings of this research suggest that the CFSP 
response to the two Congo Wars is more valuable than it perhaps appears at 
face value, if one duly takes into account the weight of the endogenous flaws 
of the CFSP and the protracted nature of the violence in the DR Congo. 
Firstly, there was always a CFSP reaction, be it a statement solely, at any 
stage of either of the two wars. As a result, the CFSP initiatives regarding the 
two wars were quantitatively substantial and they constitute a valuable stock 
of peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. The appointment of a Special 
Envoy / Representative for the Great Lakes Region of Africa in March 1996 is 
of special relevance in this regard. Secondly, most, if not all, of CFSP 
initiatives were discussed at the highest level of the EU decision-making 
pyramid: the European Council and or the Council of the European Union. 
These two elements – the large number of CFSP initiatives and the political 
level at which they were discussed and decided – constitute a valuable 
testament to the constant and high degree of concern of the EU about the 
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human tragedy of the DR Congo since the mid-1990s throughout the period 
leading to the success celebration year (2009). Thirdly, some of those 
undertakings, in particular, the two military operations (ARTEMIS and 
EUFOR DR Congo) saved and protected endangered lives. Most importantly, 
they proved that at last, the EU could show some teeth, if it chose and was 
allowed to do so (by the UN and the authorities of the target country), for 
human protection in third places that half of its Member States hardly knew 
about. That in itself was a glimmer of relief and hope not only for the 
construction of the self-assigned identity of a force for a global common good 
but also for the real and potential victims of human rights violations that 
shock human conscience. When in 2007 I pointed out to one EU official that 
the EU response to mass atrocities in Darfur had been too late, he indeed 
responded: “Well, for the 200 or 300 thousands who have died it's certainly 
too late but it's not too late to do something.” (Head of Unit at Council, 
interview, 3 October 2007). The two operations and the restrictive measures 
against UN-identified peace spoilers were also particularly significant and 
more difficult to decide on because they were likely to provoke hostile 
reaction from the designated peace spoilers and their backers; and they 
therefore involved considerable security risks and geopolitical shortfalls for 
the intervening side. Obviously, one can easily discern and duly appreciate 
these and other important nuances only if one accounts as comprehensively 
and systematically as possible for all the needs and challenges on the 
ground and for all the initiatives of the CFSP, and not just for its field 
operations as most studies tend to do. 
Undoubtedly, the impact of the CFSP-based contribution to efforts towards 
long-term democratic peace and prosperity in the DR Congo cannot be 
established in absolute terms because of two main reasons, at least. The first 
one is that the CFSP initiatives were subsidiary to decisions and actions of 
other actors, in particular the UN and the African Union. The second reason 
is that the real and lasting transformative effect of some of those endeavours 
can be established only after decades, due to the complexity of the issues 
involved. In the end, statebuilding, if sustained, might gradually expand to the 
countryside and contribute, be it indirectly and unintendedly, to community 
building and nation building. This means that further and sustained research 
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is needed, more on viable options for effective complementarity of these 
three and other facets of peacebuilding (as discussed in the chapter on the 
theoretical framework) than on the possible incompatibility of some of their 
respective constitutive elements. This is particularly imperative in the context 
of the Lisbon Treaty which eliminated the three pillar structure of the EU; 
placed all the external relations under one umbrella; broadened and clarified 
the issue-areas of the CFSP; reduced its policymaking instruments from five 
to only two; and upgraded European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Arguably, interdisciplinary 
approaches are more suitable than disciplinary perspectives, for such a 
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